Evolving Concept of Security

D5.2 – Case study on West-Mediterranean EU Countries

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1. Description of the country and rationale for the regional selection of the countries

In the EvoCS context, the West Mediterranean EU Region includes Italy, Malta and Spain.

The research has been conducted in two stages according to Codebook methodology. In stage 1, the application of the coding process allowed to gather data regarding the concepts of security from different sources, that have been further analysed in stage 2 through qualitative analysis.

A total of 798 documents have been coded: 358 for the Italian case study, 130 for the Maltese one and 310 for the Spanish one.

In this first section, the rationale behind the choice of these three countries as representative sample for the West Mediterranean EU region is presented along with a brief description of the main distinguishing features of each country.

It follows, in the second section, the presentation of the three national case studies, which in the third section are compared and further analysed in a regional perspective.

To conclude, the main findings and conclusions of the regional research are presented in the last section, together with some policy recommendations.

These three countries have been selected because of various reasons. First, they are geographycally part of the Mediterrean basin, a geopolitical factor which contributes to shape not only their climate and territory but also their history and economy. Second, they are all European countries and members of the EU, with interesting differences in the timeline of their accession to the Union: Italy is a founding member already since the 1950s, Spain joined the European Economic Community in the 1980s, Malta became an EU member only in 2004. Third, they present significant differences in terms of size and population: Spain is the second largest country in the EU while Malta covers only $316 \ km^2$, Italy counts 61 million inhabitants, Spain 47 millions and Malta only 450.000.

Accordingly, the three countries have diverse institutional layers. In the Maltese case due to its small size there is little room for local government. In contrast, Spain is divided into 17 regions which all have their own directly elected authorities, and the level of autonomy afforded to each region is far from uniform: for example, Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia have special status with their own language and other rights. Italy also has a strong tradition of local government, particularly in the centre and the north of the country, and several institutional layer including 20 regions – whose 5 with special statute and enhanced authonomy.

The culture and history of the three countries are strictly interlinked: all of them share the same catholic religious background; Italy's southern regions have been for centuries under the rule of the Spanish crown; and Italian language is widely spoken in Malta, having been its second official language until 1943; the populations of the three countries fought together against the Ottoman Empire, when the Italian and Spanish ships came to support the Malta Knighs during the Great Siege which proved to be a turning point in European history, as well as against each other as Italy and Malta during World War Two.

As a whole, the group of countries makes up a diversified but coherent ensemble of case studies. Indeed, as this report will shows, there are important similitarities in the national security discourses

of the three countries, regarding core values and most prominent security challenges, as well as relevant differences.

In this light, a very brief description of each country is useful to set the stage for the analysis of their national security discourse.

Italy is located in Southern Europe, with borders marked by the Alpine watershed in the North and surrounded by the Mediterrean Sea. It has a surface of 300,000 km^2 and a density of 202 inhabitants/km^2. Almost 68.8% of the population lives in urban areas, with 8.8% concentrated in the capital city, Rome. Concerning its geologic nature, the Italian territory is characterized by high seismic activity, which regards the 80% of its territory: in fact, the country is positioned between the European and African plates. Due to this particular aspect, Italy is also a volcanic country withthe only active volcanoes of the European mainland: Etna and Stromboli (Sicily).

Malta, officially the Republic of Malta, comprises an archipelago of five islands - Malta (the largest), Gozo, Comino, Comminotto, and Filfla - in the Mediterranean Sea. It lies 80 km south of Sicily, 284 km east of Tunisia, and 333 km north of Libya. It is one of the world's smallest and most densely populated countries. According to the 2012 World Risks report, Malta is the second least likely country (only followed by Qatar) to be affected by a disaster caused by the impacts of natural hazards.[1]However, the impacts of future concerns such as climate change impacts, socio-economic and local/global security dynamics and potential new energy generation/distribution plans, could lead Malta to become much more prone to the impacts of various security challenges.

As mentioned before, **Spain** is the second largest country in the European Union, and by population is the fifth in the European Union. Located at the crossroads of the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, Europe and Africa, Spain's role in Europe, history and security background made it an essential part of the EvoCS study.

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[1] UNU-EHS, World Risk Report 2013. Available at: http://worldriskreport.entwicklung-hilft.de/uploads/media/WorldRiskReport_2013_online_01.pdf

2. Country profiles

2.1 Italy Country Profile

2.1.1 Characterization of the core values

In line with the analytical framework and the coding process, in order to elaboratethe Italian country profile, 358 documents from different sources have been coded as follows: 10 academic papers, 25 NGOs publications, 21 Government documents, 25 sources from the private sector, 77 parliamentary publications and 200 newspaper articles.

As a result of the coding, three out of the eight EvoCS core values[2] emerged as the most salient in Italy, namely:

- Physical safety and security (31%)
- Social stability and security (17%)
- Economic prosperity and security (13%)

**Figure 1 - Predominant core values for Italy[3]**

Figure 1 shows that none of the three most salient core values reaches an overwhelming majority. Apart for the physical safety core value - that accounts for one-third of the total - the coding analysis reflects an Italian security debate characterized by fragmentation, diversification and, above all, interrelation.The latter means that the same prominent issue, for example illegal immigration, can fall within different core values, such as physical safety and security orsocial

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[2] The eight core values are: physical safety and security; territorial integrity and security; environmental and ecological security; social stability and security; cultural identity and security; political stability and security; economic prosperity and security; information and cyber security. For a description of each core value see the EvoCS, Deliverable 3.1, *Assessing Evolving Concepts of Security: Coding Handbook,*October 2015.

[3] Cyber security data might be biased since one of the coded sources (Newspaper) has a section specifically dedicated to the cyber domain. In particular, this aspect affects data distribution, implying that the core value "cyber security" and its relative threats turn out to be mostly covered by the source "Newspapers articles".

stability and security, thus demonstrating that a theme can have multiple implications within the security debate (see Table 2).

A qualitative research and a closer look at Italy's recent history prove that such findings are, indeed, in line with certain events that the country has experienced in the recent years and that probably contributed to the prominence of such core values in the public debate. For instance, when it comes both to physical safety and security and social stability and security, a good example is the illegal immigration issue, which has acquired ever greater relevance in Italy especially since the "Arab Springs" occurred and the consequent flows of immigrants coming from North Africa increased. This element has also been linked, most recently, to the fear of terrorist attacks due to the possible arrival of religious extremists in Italy. According to the latest survey conducted by Demos (8th Report on social security and insecurity in Italy and Europe), immigrants are perceived as a threat to public order and to people security by 33% of Italians.[4]

Regarding the core value of economic prosperity and security, it is worth mentioning that Italy was one of the victims of the financial Euro-crisis of 2011, which dramatically increased the interest rates on the Italian public debt and was coupled with harsh austerity measures. This combination has led to economic stagnation and recession, with an increase of unemployment rate from the 8% of April 2011 to a range of 10-13% in the 2012-2015 period, which has deeply and negatively affected the perception of economic prosperity and security. Interestingly, when it comes to economic prosperity and security, and more closely to employment, 35% of Italians feels threatened by immigrants[5] who are less considered as a resource for the national economy. This can be linked, again, to the increasing fear for economic loss as a consequence of the financial crisis of 2011.

The above-mentioned elements confirm, to a large extent, the analysis developed in the following paragraph. In fact, the coding process allowed to narrow down Italy's profiling to the most prominent security challenges, common to more than one of the three core values, which resulted to be:
- Terrorist attacks;
- Economic crisis;
- Illegal immigration.

In addition, in light of the qualitative analysis carried out, this study will also consider natural disasters as a further security challenge, even if it is not emerged as a prominent theme from the coding process. According to the methodology, this falls within the core value of physical safety and security thus confirming its salience to Italy.The reasons of this additional selection come from events that have recently hit Italy, in particular the two major earthquakes in 2009 (L'Aquila province) and in 2012 (Emilia-Romagna region), as well as by further analysis that discusses the

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[4] Demos and Pi, Fondazione Unipolis, *VIII Rapporto sulla sicurezza e l'insicurezza sociale in Italia e in Europa*, February 2015, http://demos.it/2015/pdf/3346fondazione_unipolis_rapporto_sulla_sicurezza_febbraio_2015.pdf, p.17.
[5]*Ibid.*

importance of the security challenge of natural disasters in the country.[6] In particular, the regional workshop on West-Mediterranean Europe – held, not by chance, precisely in L'Aquila - contributed to give striking evidence of the significant impact of earthquakes (but also other natural hazards) on the definition of the concept of security in Italy. This aspect was confirmed also by presentations and discussions in which the experts participating to the workshop generally agreed on the salience of physical safety and security for Italy.[7] In addition, particular attention was devoted to the post-earthquake situation in terms of resilience, recovery and adaptation which is still "in the making", thus highlighting the constant sensitiveness of this issue for Italy.[8]

In addition, 75% of Italian people is also convinced of the link between natural disasters and the national economy, stating that the former could have a negative impact on the latter[9], thus linking physical safety and security with economic prosperity and security. Finally, according to the World Risk Report 2013, Italy's exposure to natural hazards (recorded as "medium") is just below the high exposure threshold.[10]

To sum up, according to the coding and to the qualitative analysis, the Table 1 identifies the selected most prominent security challenges in relation to the main core values, whilst Table 2 illustrates the interrelation between a same security challenge and different predominant core values.

Table 1 – Most prominent security challenges according to core values

Core values	Most prominent security challenges
Physical safety and security	Terrorist attacks
	Illegal immigration
	Natural disasters
Social stability and security	Terrorist attacks
	Illegal immigration
	Economic crisis
Economic prosperity and security	Economic crisis

Table 2 – Interrelation between selected prominent security challenges and core values

Most prominent security challenges	Core values
Terrorist attacks	Physical safety and security
	Social stability and security

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[6] See, among other, European Union Framework Programme 7th Project "Analysis of Civil Security Systems in Europe" (ANVIL) and the related publication: F. Di Camillo et al., *The Italian Civil Security System*, IAI research papers n. 11, Rome, February 2014. http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/italian-civil-security-system

[7] EvoCS, Deliverable5.1, *Report on the regional workshop West Mediterranean EU*, February 2015.

[8] *Ibid.*

[9] European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 433*, May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_433_en.pdf. p.11.

[10] UNU-EHS, *World Risk Report 2013*, http://worldriskreport.entwicklung-hilft.de/uploads/media/WorldRiskReport_2013_online_01.pdf

| Illegal immigration | Physical safety and security |
	Social stability and security
	Economic prosperity and security
Economic crisis	Economic prosperity and security
	Social stability and security
Natural disasters	Physical safety and security
	Economic prosperity and security

2.1.2 Description of sources, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights issues related to the predominant core values

2.1.2.1 Sources

What are the main sources that cover the most salient core values? To answer to this question, the degree of salience (according to the parameters "main topic", "mentioned" and "absent" in a certain source) has been elaborated in relation to each predominant core value. Data reveal that "Newspaper Articles" and "Parliamentary publications" are the main sources that cover the three predominant core values. Indeed, in relative terms, they cover these three core values more than sources from private sector, government, NGO and academia. At the same time, however, these two sources show that the "absent" parameter is very high, especially for the case of social stability and economic prosperity: there are many newspapers articles and parliamentary publications in which there is no reference to a particular core value. Figure 2 demonstrate how different sources cover each of the three predominant core values.

Figure 2 – Main sources covering predominant core values

Economic prosperity

2.1.2.2 Actors and roles

As demonstrated in Figure 3, the most prominent actors are the national government and the general public, in different ways. But, first of all, who is the main addressor?[11] A decisive result does not emerge. The national government reaches the highest level, roughly 20%, but other actors also serve as important addressors, such as the national parliament, the civil society and the private sector. Undoubtedly, the general public serves as the prominent object actor, that is "the actor who is impacted by the security problem in relation to a given core value".[12] At the same time, it represents the main addressee together with the national government, i.e. "the actor to whom the statement of the addressor is directed".[13] Moreover, it is worth underlying a further consideration: think tanks are perceived as an important object actor, particularly by "Parliamentary publications". This might be explained by the fact that think tanks are often quoted in some parliamentary debates and hearings.

Figure 3 - Most prominent actors

2.1.2.3 Levels

[11] The "addressor" is "the actor—whether the government, an NGO, a business, a citizen, or other identifiable entity—who expresses itself explicitly on a given security issue", from EvoCS, Deliverable 3.1, *Assessing Evolving Concepts of Security: Coding Handbook*, p. 13.

[12] EvoCS, Deliverable 3.1, *Assessing Evolving Concepts of Security: Coding Handbook*, p. 14.

[13]*Ibid.*

Data show that the main level for the security discourse is the national one: in other words, the national level represents the main dimension for actions whoever is the actor that calls for an action. At the second place there is the international level, followed by the local one. However, the importance of the local level should not be underestimated. The Italian security system is shaped by both the national political architecture and, in a very important way, by the local level: municipalities, provinces and regions. Indeed, the local level is in charge of the drafting and the implementation of several security policies. This in turn plays a pivotal role in creating a general framework of security perceptions, identifying some specific challenges, potential risks and threats as well as providing tailored responses. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that five Italian regions are granted with a special statute by the Constitution, which provides a broader amount of autonomy and enables them to enact legislation on some of their local matters. Moreover, the diversity of both natural environment and economic conditions across the country favours the differentiation of local perception on a number of security challenges affecting the predominant core values.

Figure 4 – Most prominent levels

2.1.2.4 Human rights and ethical issue in relation to the prominent security challenges

Referring to human rights and ethical issues, the coding highlights a general lack of attention to these aspects within the security domain. Nonetheless, a far more complex picture hides behind this outcome.

In particular, as for illegal immigration, since 2013 media has been giving a closer attention to the human dimension of the phenomenon and today it seems to be generally portrayed in correlation to its dimension of humanitarian emergency.[14] This kind of representation proved to have an impact on the public perception regarding illegal immigration, as it progressively increased people awareness on this theme. In fact, although figures related to public fears toward immigrants reveal a 2% increase in 2014 in comparison to the 31% of 2014, Italians are divided on the immigration

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[14] Osservatorio Europeo sulla Sicurezza, *Nella "terra di mezzo" fra terrore globale e paure quotidiane - Rapporto sulla sicurezza e l'insicurezza sociale in Italia e in Europa*, February 2015, http://www.osservatorio.it/download/Rapporto%20sicurezza_febbraio2015.pdf , p.24.

issue.[15] Whereas 45% support the logic of "refoulement" for migrants, 46% are in favor of their treatment.[16] However, it has to be underlined that despite this gradual evolution, the majority of the population still perceives immigration as a negative issue (56% of citizens)[17] and claims the need for a stronger European activism. Such a request does not aim at reaching integration, but it is instead considered as a defensive tool.[18] This inclination could be perceived as a discrimination discourse, increasingly exploited by Italian right-wing parties such as Northern League (Lega Nord) that gave rise to various street protests against illegal immigration in the last months.[19]

Even if not directly linked to human rights and ethical issues, fears of terrorist attacks and diseases transmission due to migration flows are invoked to justify stricter policy towards immigrations and to claim for restrictions of freedom of movement. For example, on some occasions people demonstrated in favor of the suspension of the Schengen Agreement after the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks.[20] In this regard, it is interesting to highlight the results of the Eurobarometer survey, according to which about 53% of the Italian people believes that fundamental rights and freedoms have been restricted in the EU for reasons related to the fight against terrorism.[21]
Similarly, economic crisis is perceived to have had a negative impact on fundamental rights. To a certain extent the implementation of austerity measures has touched sensitive topics, such as the right to employment and education. According to a European Parliament report austerity measures are perceived to have generated a different and disproportional enjoyment of rights by certain groups of people, thus jeopardizing the principle of equality.[22]

As for natural disasters, the fact that Italy does not have a legal regulation on economic coverage for damage from natural disasters - which implies the adoption by the Government of legislative decrees whenever a natural disaster occurs -[23] can compromise the ability of the government to ensure specific rights related to prompt and adequate resilience, relocation and reconstruction.

2.1.3 Historical Trajectory

In this section a brief overview of the evolution of the most prominent security challenges in the last ten years is presented. Key events have been chosen in order to draw an historical trajectory and to

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[15] *Ibid.*, p. 17.

[16] *Ibid.*, p.18.

[17] European Commission, *Eurobarometro standard 82*, Autumn 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_it_it_nat.pdf , p.5.

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 10.

[19] *Repubblica*, "Lega folla in piazza del Duomo. Salvini: "Sospendiamo Schengen"", Milano, 18 ottobre 2014, http://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2014/10/18/news/milano_la_lega_in_piazza_contro_l_immigrazione_la_contro-manifestazione_della_sinistra_razzisti-98427848/
Corriere della Sera, "Tor Sapienza: auto e cassonetti in fiamme, protesta anti-immigrati", Roma, 11 novembre 2014, http://roma.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/14_novembre_11/tor-sapienza-nuova-protesta-anti-immigrati-basta-crimini-f19f71bc-69dc-11e4-96be-d4ee9121ff4d.shtml

[20] *Repubblica*, "Lega folla in piazza del Duomo. Salvini: "Sospendiamo Schengen"", Milano, 18 ottobre 2014.

[21] It has to be pointed out that besides terrorism, also "organized crime" is considered.

[22] European Parliament-Directorate General for Internal Policies, *The impact of the crisis on fundamental rights across Member States of the EU*, p.12.

[23] International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, *Background Report Law and Regulation for the Reduction of Risk from Natural Disasters in Italy*, September 2012, p.23.

evaluate the salience of these issues: such overview generally matches with the results of the quantitative analysis, as terroristic attacks, illegal immigration and economic crisis turned out to be the most prominent security challenges in the Italian recent history. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, natural disasters also emerged as a relevant issue for security as well, although it did not result from the coding.

By looking at the core values, the historical trajectory confirms physical safety and security, social security and stability, economic prosperity and security to be the most salient. The following paragraphs present a brief evolutionary trajectory for each security challenge and outline how these themes affected the national security perceptions.

Terrorist attacks

The security challenge of terrorism has historically followed a two-fold trajectory: a national and a transnational one. In the last 10-15 years, the former has concerned mostly terrorist attacks conducted by left-wing extremists, as well as those organized by autonomous cells, which are gathered within the so called Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale, FAI). According to EUROPOL data, 93 people were arrested in the last ten years for left-wing terrorism.These attacks culminated with the murder of the jurist Marco Biagi in 2002 by the New Red Brigades.As for the transnational one, it is important to bear in mind that although Italy was never targeted by any terrorist attack of this kind, 21 people were arrested in the charge of terrorist activities inspired by religious extremism in the 2012-2013 timeframe. Additionally, external events - ranging from the attacks in Madrid in 2004 and in London in 2005 to the burst of the Arab Springs, and to the very recent attacks in the Île-de-France and at the Bardo Museum in Tunisi -[24] made the issue resurface within the national debate. Finally, the risk that many "foreign fighters"[25] could join the ranks of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and then planning new attacks within the European territory, has been addressed both at the national and at the international level.[26]

Economic crisis

The latest recession caused a progressive deterioration of both economic and social indicators. Italy's GDP dropped 11% since 2008, with a short revival from 2010 to 2011. Bad macroeconomic performances were coupled by a dramatic worsening of social standards. Italy still suffers a very

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[24] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, Sistema di informazione per la sicurezza della Repubblica, *Relazione sulla Politica d'informazione per la sicurezza,* 2014, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/relazione-2014.pdf, p.27.

[25] According to the estimates there are approximately 1,500-2,000 freedom fighters in Europe. http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2014/09/27/foreign-fighters-chi-sono_n_5892976.html

[26] Among other, see for example, United Nations Security Council, *Resolution 2178/2014,*http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2178%20(2014), The Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF), *"Foreign Terrorist Fighters" (FTF) Initiative The Hague – Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon* https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/140201/14Sept19_The+Hague-Marrakech+FTF+Memorandum.pdf, Council of the EU, Foreign Affairs Council, *EU counter terrorism / foreign fighters strategy*, www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/145218.pdf, Council of Europe, *Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism*, https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM/PV%282015%29125add1&Language=lanEnglish&Ver=app&Site=COE&BackColorInternet=C3C3C3&BackColorIntranet=EDB021&BackColorLogged=F5D383

high unemployment level (13% as for March 2015), notably among young people (43%),[27] with an employment rate (55.7%) that is still far from the EU's average (63.9%).[28] The recession also dramatically increased the number of people who are at risk of poverty, with this danger being more likely to occur among young people.[29] Nonetheless, the latest economic data seem confirming the national Government's claims that Italy will be out of the crisis in 2015.[30]As mentioned before, a prolonged economic recession, marked by high unemployment and risk of poverty, has turned the economic crisis into a perceived security challenge for the economic security and prosperity in a way somehow new with respect to the previous 10-15 years, when the low rate of GDP growth and/or periods of economic stagnation did not make the salience of this core value that high in the perception of the public opinion – although it was obviously subject of debate how to improve Italy's economic performance.

Illegal immigration

As for migration, betweenthe 1980s and the 1990s Italy experienced a shift from the status of country of origin to the one of country of destination for migration flows. More specifically, the Italian emigration decreased and disappeared as a remarkable phenomenon during the 1980s. The first immigration flows appeared at the beginning of the 1990s, with migrants coming mostly from the former Yugoslavia and then continued with arrivals from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. On the one hand, the number of foreign citizens living in Italy grew up 25 times, from 210,937 in 1981[31] to 4,922,085 in 2013 (more than 8%of the overall population).[32] On the other hand, the number of illegal migrants skyrocketed in the last years, especially as a consequence of the "Arab Springs" and the general instability of the MENA region. Figure 5 perfectly highlights the tremendous boost that occurred in the last five years, with a peak of 170,000 people arriving in Italy in 2014.[33]

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[27] Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), Employment and unemployment (provisional estimates), http://www.istat.it/en/archive/158601

[28] Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), *Rapporto annuale 2015 – La situazione del Paese*, http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/159350

[29] OECD, *Italia 2015: Come si posiziona l'Italia?*, OECD360 2015, http://www.oecd360.org/oecd360/pdf/domain21 media2003 310490-wg7yksqcgv.pdf

[30] Istituto Nazionale di Statistica (ISTAT), *Preliminary estimate of GDP,* www.istat.it/en/archive/159456

[31] Giulia Bettin, Eralba Cela, *L'evoluzione storica dei flussi migratori in Europa e in Italia*, 2014, http://www.unescochair-iuav.it/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/UR-AN_Bettin-Cela_def.pdf

[32] Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, sulla base del *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2014 Rapporto Unar*, "L'immigrazione in Italia all'inizio del 2014", www.dossierimmigrazione.it/docnews/file/2014_Sintesi%20IDOS.pdf

[33] Italian Ministry of Interior, *Presenze dei migranti nelle strutture di accoglienza in Italia,* March 2015,http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/dati_statistici_marzo_2015.pdf

Figure 5 - Migration flows in Italy from the MENA region

Source: Italian Ministry of Interior, 2015

According to official data, Italy is the third main final destination for asylum seekers in Europe after Germany and Sweden, but it also represents a temporary landing place for migrants who seek to reach other northern and central European countries.[34] This tremendous increase posed serious infrastructural challenges, since reception centres are more and more under strain, and the cost of the first temporary hosting of migrants has grown up to 42 euro per person per day – meaning hundreds of millions of euro per year for the state finance. The national government launched an ambitious (and costly) operation entitled "Mare Nostrum", which lasted from October 2013 till September 2014, rescueing more than 127,000 people at sea.[35] The Mare Nostrum operation has been replaced by the EU-led operation "Triton", which operates on a much smaller scale and with less naval assets than Mare Nostrum. Yet, in 2015 immigration flows across the Mediterranean experienced an even more dramatic growth. According to the UNHCR, in the first four months of 2015, 26,800people arrived in Italy[36] and more than 1,800 people perished in the attempt to reach the Italian coasts, a number that is more than 30 times higher than the same period of 2014.[37] For this reason, Italy worked hard at diplomatic level to convince the EU partners to share the humanitarian costs in order to manage these huge migration flows.

In recent years and months, the dramatic images of boat people risking their life in the Mediterranean Sea, the debate on the costs and effects of Mare Nostrum and Triton missions, as well as the polemics on the EU negotiations on the relocation of migrants, fuelled the perception of this issue in the national debate. At the same time, the episodes of violence and criminality associated with migrants highly covered by media, the issue of relocation of migrant among Italian

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[34]More than 64,000 people applied for asylum in 2014 (10 per cent of the total number of applications received in the EU), 143 times more in comparison with the previous year. See more at Eurostat, "Asylum in the EU - The number of asylum applicants in the EU jumped to more than 625 000 in 2014 20% were Syrians", Eurostat news release, 20 March 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/6751779/3-20032015-BP-EN.pdf/35e04263-2db5-4e75-b3d3-6b086b23ef2b

[35] Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS, sulla base del *Dossier Statistico Immigrazione 2014 Rapporto Unar*, "L'immigrazione in Italia all'inizio del 2014", op. cit.

[36] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), "Sea Arrivals to Southern Europe", www.unhcr.it/risorse/statistiche/infografiche

[37] *Ibid.*

regions and municipalities, and the daily experience in most Italian cities and town with the new and growing presence of foreigners, all increased the salience of this issue at local and national levels.

Natural disasters

Italy has long been subject to major natural disasters due to the nature of its territory and its position. It suffices to mention that, according to the ISIDe (the Italian seismological instrumental and parametric database), overall more than 6,000 earthquakes have hit the country since 2005.[38] On the one hand, natural disaster have, by definition, serious consequences in terms of material damages and loss. On the other hand, they also impact significantly on people's lifes and perception of security. For this reason, they often leave a mark in people's mind and, in the case of Italy, they also stimulated the development of a specific legal framework in the field of civil protection. More precisely, the two earthquakes in Friuli in 1976 and Irpinia in 1980 acted as an input to the adoption of the regulation implementing the law on civil protection that dated back to 1970.[39]

Moving forward to more recent times, Italy experienced a few major natural disasters in a relatively short timeframe: namely, the L'Aquila earthquake in April 2009 and in Emilia-Romagna in May 2012 (which respectively killed 309 and 28 people, and injured 1,500 and 250). Still in 2012, landslides occurred in Messina (Sicily) in October and heavy rains and floods in November both in Northern Italy (Piemonte e Liguria), after hitting Tuscany and Calabria in October and November 2011. More recently, floods occurred again in November 2014 in Liguria.

Such natural disasters obviously had an impact on the security perception at local level, together with many others smaller scales. They also influence the debate at national level in two ways. On the one hand, the media coverage of the single dramatic event was quite extensive. On the other hand, the debate – often marked by strong polemics – on the ability of national and local institutions to prevent, respond and recovery from such disasters has continued after the event in the political arena – both government and parliament - among think tanks and – to a certain extent – in the media.[40]

2.1.4 Overview of current trends and their likely salience in the next future

As shown in the previous section, in the last decade a certain historical trajectory has shaped the perception of security in Italy, contributing to define the country's strategic objectives within the security domain. Since Italy does not have a proper National Security Strategy, relevant security threats and the Italian approach to them are discussed in several institutional documents. The analysis of these documents contributes to understand whether certain issues and perceptions have a long term prominence, and thus are likely to remain salient in the next five to ten years in the popular discourse.

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[38] Io Non rischio - Buone pratiche di protezione civile, *Terremoti recenti, http://www.iononrischio.it/terremoto-io-non-rischio/mappa-interattiva-i-terremoti-recenti/*

[39] F. Di Camillo et al., *The Italian Civil Security System*, IAI research papers n. 11, Rome, February 2014, http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/italian-civil-security-system, p. 40.

[40] See, among others, F. Di Camillo et al., *The Italian Civil Security System*, IAI research papers n. 11, Rome, February 2014, http://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/italian-civil-security-system

As a consequence, this section will focus on the most relevant institutional documents in terms of definition of security challenges, national interests and strategic objectives:

- 2008: 2020 Report - Italian Foreign policy strategy;
- 2014: Report on security intelligence policy and the results achieved in 2014;
- 2014: National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security;
- 2015: White Paper for International Security and Defense.

The literature review highlights that the core values and security challenges resulting from the coding procedure are basically aligned with security challenges and strategic objectives defined at the national level, and underlines the presence of some *permanent* issues, that is illegal immigration and terrorist attacks. Moreover, the 2014 "Report on security intelligence policy and the results achieved in 2014" considers economic crisis as a security issue. The White Paper places high importance on economic crisis as a factor that constraints Italy's level of ambitions in the international arena and the resources available for the armed forces.

Starting with the first institutional document in a chronological order, the 2020 Report - Italian Foreign policy strategy was drafted in 2008 on the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[41] with the contribution of a group of experts. It focuses on Italian national interests and foreign policy priorities, presenting various potential external threats to national security. Within this framework, it confirms terrorist attacks on the national soil and illegal immigration to be prominent security challenges.[42] According to the report, these dynamics are defined as the result of the socio-political instability that characterized a very broad area ranging from the Western Mediterranean region to the Southeastern border of the EU.[43] Since this document was published in 2008, it does not contain any reference to the economic downturn, although it considers the core value of economic prosperity and security in relation to the issue of energy supply. Secondly, being a foreign policy paper, it focuses on external variables and threats that are likely to have internal repercussions, thus leaving aside considerations on specific internal threats, such as terrorist attacks by national subversive groups or social instability.

The socio-economic implications of the latest recession led to a progressive securitization of the economic downturn, as itis mirrored in national security-related policies and papers. The "Report on security intelligence policy and the results achieved in 2014" thus includes the economic crisis as a security challenge. In particular, by presenting social instability as a potential consequence of the negative economic conjuncture, the report highlights the complexity of "economic crisis" security challenge, which interlinks the core values of economic prosperity and security as well as of social stability and security.[44] Furthermore, the document confirms terrorist attacks and illegal immigration as prominent security challenges, hence giving further evidence of their importance at

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[41] The initiative was presented when Romano Prodi was the Prime minister, but after the premature collapse of its government the project was carried out under a government composed by an opposite political group (IV Berlusconi Government, Polo delle Libertà) since it was recognized that national interests and priorities should not be affected by power turnover.

[42] Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Rapporto 2020- Le scelte di politica estera*, 2008, p. 57.

[43] *Ibid*, p. 6.

[44] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *Relazione sulla politica dell'informazione per la sicurezza*, 2014, p. 65.

the national level. Additionally, it is worth noting that the report refers to the terrorist security challenge both as a national (subversive groups) and transnational (jihadist cells) phenomenon.

Among institutional documents relevant for security-related policy, the "National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security"[45]and the "National Plan for Cyberspace Protection and ICT Security"[46] have been introduced in 2014. Interestingly, the drafting of a national strategy for cyber security reveals a governmental special commitment to this theme, which is not aligned with the outcomes of the coding procedure. In fact, the results of the desk research indicate that cybersecurity is not perceived as a prominent security challenge by the broader public. This sort of "anomaly" could represent a response to external pressures from the European level, namely the introduction of a European strategy on cyber security and the consequent EU call to Member States to do likewise.

The 2015 White Paper considers illegal immigration and terrorist attacks among the main security threats to Italy.[47] However, the White Paper aims to the protection and promotion of national interests in the international arena through a pro-active approach, and it is not based on a "defensive" categorization of threats and related answers.[48] In this context, illegal migration, terrorist attacks, cyber security, energy security and other issues are addressed through a comprehensive approach. In particular, the White Paper considers most of these issues as deeply correlated with the stability of the "Euro-Mediterranean Region" stretching from the Sahel to the Horn of Africa in the South, up to the Middle East and Caucasus in the East. According to the document, security challenges need to be addressed at the international level through a multilateral initiative to which Italy would provide a significant contribution, and/or by assuming the role of the leading nation to deal with a particular threat in the Euro-Mediterranean region.[49] Such approach is also the result of 25 years of continued and large scale involvement in military operations abroad, from the Balkans to Middle East, Horn of Africa and Central Asia, which marked a shift of the Armed Forces from the traditional tasks of territorial defence to an expeditionary and professional model fit for crisis management operations.[50] Efforts for the restoration of stability and peace aim not only at containing the phenomenon of terrorism and illegal immigration but also at ensuring the freedom of commerce, thus recognizing the importance of economic prosperity and security value for Italy.[51]

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[45] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *National strategic framework for cyberspace security*, December 2013, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/italian-national-strategic-framework-for-cyberspace-security.pdf

[46] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *The national plan for cyberspace protection and ICT security*, December 2013, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/italian-national-cyber-security-plan.pdf

[47] Italian Ministry of Defence, *Libro Bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa,* 2015, http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Documents/2015/04_Aprile/LB_2015.pdf , p. 12.

[48] See, among others, A. Marrone (eds), *Il Libro bianco: una strategia per la politica di difesa dell'Italia*, Documenti IAI n.9, Rome, May 2015.

[49] Italian Ministry of Defence, *Libro Bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa*, 2015, p. 18.

[50] See, among others: Alessandro Marrone, Paola Tessari, Carolina De Simone, *Italian Interests and NATO: From Missions to Trenches?*, IAI Research Paper 14, Rome, December 2014, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iai1412e.pdf
Piero Ignazi, Giampiero Giacomello and Fabrizio Coticchia, *Italian Military Operations Abroad: Just Don't Call it War,* Palgrave Macmillan, February 2012.

[51] Italian Ministry of Defence, *Libro Bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa*, 2015, p.14.

As for natural disasters, this theme deserves a separate mention. The Department of Civil Protection, which operates under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, plays a leading role in dealing with natural disasters within the National Service of the Civil Protection. This National Service presents a multi-layered structure[52] as regions, provinces and municipalities are strongly involved in crisis-management activities in case of natural disasters. This might explain why, though being a crucial national security issue, natural disasters are mostly addressed at local level, according to different priorities depending on the territorial specific features.

Curiously, the above mentioned documents also consider energy security as a fundamental national interest, given the significant Italian energy dependence on external suppliers.[53] In this regard, it is interesting to note that the national significance of this theme is confirmed by the fact that Italy has a "National Energy Strategy: for a more competitive and sustainable energy".[54] However, the coding shows that this issue seems not to be perceived as a prominent one in the recent public debate.

To sum up, the qualitative analysis underlines that results from the coding are generally confirmed by the findings of the literature review. All the above mentioned documents cover the most salient core values, thus confirming that they are perceived to be salient at the national level. Moreover, by analyzing governmental and ministerial reports that provide guidelines for the national security-related policy for the next years, it emerges that the core value of physical safety and security receive greater attention. This result depends on two elements. On the one hand, the perception that a breach to this core value could be imminent or probable, and on the other hand, the institutional documents maintain a definition of security somehow more narrow than the ones adopted in the EvoCS analytical framework: cultural identity, economic prosperity, social stability are not "securitized" by directly linking them with security. As a result, the focus is on the core values more relevant to the traditional notions of security and safety, such as physical safety and security or cyber-security. Having said that, the core values of economic prosperity and security and social stability and security are likely to remain salient in the nearest future, as demonstrated by a closer look to the security challenges represented by illegal immigration, terrorist attacks and economic crisis.

Illegal immigration and terrorist attacks are perceived to be salient and long-term, since they derive from Italy's geographical exposure to political, social and economic instability currently affecting its neighborhood.[55] Similarly, their future relevance as possible security challenges to the Italian national security largely depends on the evolution of the complex situation that currently characterizes the Southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. As long as instability dominates the region, both these issues are likely to keep on challenging Italian security debate. In this regard, it is

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[52] As provided by the 225 Law of 1992, on the creation of the National Service for Civil Protection, http://www.protezionecivile.gov.it/resources/cms/documents/Legge_225_24febbraio1992.pdf

[53] Presidency of the Council of Ministers, *Relazione sulla politica dell'informazione per la sicurezza*, 2014, http://www.sicurezzanazionale.gov.it/sisr.nsf/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/relazione-2014.pdf , p. 55; Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Rapporto 2020- Le scelte di politica estera*, 2008, http://www.esteri.it/mae/doc/rapporto2020_sceltepoliticaestera_090408.pdf , p. 6.

[54] Italian Ministry of Economic Development, *Strategia Energetica Nazionale: per un'energia più competitiva e sostenibile,* March 2013, http://www.sviluppoeconomico.gov.it/images/stories/normativa/20130314_Strategia_Energetica_Nazionale.pdf

[55] Italian Ministry of Defence, *Libro Bianco per la sicurezza internazionale e la difesa*, 2015, p. 12.

interesting to quote a part of the White Paper, suggesting that the regional scenario is far from stabilization: "Due to the complexity of the context and the diversity of actors in play, it is hard to foresee, at the moment, a stable and efficient regional system in the nearest future".[56] As a consequence, it follows that both terrorist attacks and illegal immigration are perceived to be long-term security challenges that could potentially breach Italian physical safety and security, as well as negatively affect both economic prosperity and security and social stability and security.

Conversely, although "economic crisis" appears to be a salient security challenge at the moment, its salience is likely to diminish in the nearest future if the country's economic situation slowly improves as it seems in mid-2015. This consideration affects the sphere of perceptions, making the issue perceived as a short-term threat. Once again, the fact that until 2011 economic issues were considered highly important in general terms but not that salient in security terms hints towards the fact that the "securitization" of the economic crisis can be reduced - provided it is addressed by an adequate economic policy.This may reduce the prominence of the core value economic prosperity and security, but also social stability and security, as much as the situation improved and the perception of a security challenge as the economic crisis declines. It is also worth mentioning that the economic recovery could also potentially affect the phenomenon of national subversive groups, and thus domestic terrorism, as it removes a possible incentive to take rebellious actions.

As for natural disasters, being highly exposed to various natural hazards due to Italy's geographic location,[57] this issue is considered as a long-term and salient security challenge at the national level. In fact, the majority of natural disasters has long-term consequences on both private life as well as elements of the public sphere such as infrastructures and production facilities. Moreover, many areas that experienced major natural disasters still have to recover completely: for example, in L'Aquila province reconstruction works are still going, on and the view of damaged areas might influence the perception of the security challenge represented by natural events at local level – but also, to a lesser extent, at national one. Responsibility in terms of prevention, response and recover lies within the Government and some interesting findings come from the "Special Eurobarometer 433" on Civil Protection. In fact, it shows that 82% of Italians (the highest percentage if compared to all EU Member States) does not feel enough is being done to prevent or prepare national disasters at the national level, against the 10% that, instead, replied positively.[58] This aspect does not emerge from the coding results, probably because its salience usually rises when natural disasters – such as an earthquake, a flood or similar events – directly breach physical safety and security of citizens or are perceived as imminent, and no major natural disasters occurred in the period when media, NGO and private sector sources were coded (November 2013-October 2014). Yet, the country's experience tells that it could easily gain salience in the nearest future because of the nature and characteristics of such security challenges and the possible occurrence of natural disasters.

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[56] *Ibid.*

[57] According to the 2013 World Risk report, Italy is ranked 118th country for the level of exposure of its population to natural disasters (with the 13,85%). The country comes under the category of "medium level of exposure". UNU-EHS, *World Risk Report 2013*, http://worldriskreport.entwicklung-hilft.de/uploads/media/WorldRiskReport_2013_online_01.pdf

[58] European Commission, *Special Eurobarometer 433*, May 2015, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_433_en.pdf. p.7.

2.2 Malta Country Profile

2.2.1 Characterization of the core values

Overall, 130 documents have been coded.[1] As demonstrated in Figure 6, the most salient core values are:
- Physical safety and security (23%);
- Economic prosperity and security (20%);
- Information and cyber security (18%).

This demonstrates that most of the core values in Malta's context are almost equally salient; territorial integrity and security and political stability and security are the only core values that are mentioned very briefly (3% and 1 % of all the coded documents respectively).

Figure 6 - Core Values for Malta

The most prominent security challenges appearing under the most salient core values are outlined in Table 3.

Table 3 - The most prominent security challenges

Core value	The most prominent security challenges
Physical safety and security	Illegal immigration
	Terrorism
	Gas [safety of storage facilities]
Economic prosperity and security	Financial risks
	Fraud

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[1] No academic publications have been coded as none were identified that would fit the coding criteria. It must be noted that only documents written English have been analysed, which may lead to some bias in the results of the coding.

Information and cyber security	Information loss
	Communication interception
	Phone tapping
	Cyber attack

.However the focus of this report will be on the most salient security challenges appearing in more than one category; these are:

- Illegal immigration (the term 'irregular immigration' is used in the Malta's documents);
- Cybercrime (which includes information and data loss, cyberattacks and fraud);
- Weather related events (including floods, storms and extreme weather) and climate change.

As can be seen in Table 4, these security challenges appear across different core values; this demonstrates a sense of the complex interconnectivity of the debates that have shaped/are shaping the security discourse in Malta.

**Table 4 – Security challenges mentioned under different core values**

Core value/ Security challenges group	Physical safety and security	Economic prosperity and security	Information and cyber security
Illegal immigration	X	X	-
Information/ data loss	-	X	X
Weather/climate change	X	X	-

2.2.2 Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels, and human rights

2.2.2.1 Actors

The most prominent actors are the national government and general public, although they play very different roles in the security discourse (Figure 7): the national government is the most prominent as an addressor and an addressee, whereas general public is mainly perceived as an object. Think tanks, academia and regional state apparatus do not play any role in the security discourse, which may be explained by the limited timeframe within which the coding documents have been selected as well as by the fact that only documents published in English were considered for this analysis.

Figure 7 - Roles of different actors

Illegal immigration is the most salient security challenge addressed by the majority of the actors and is the sole focus of the EU and the general public as addressors. Illegal immigration is not discussed by the private sector, perhaps because it is not perceived to be a direct threat to their security. Whilst this issue is widely discussed in the newspapers, their focus is on reporting about illegal immigration rather than on suggesting how to tackle the problem.

None of the actors acts as an addressor of all three security challenges (Figure 8): private sector has the largest say about cybercrime, which is not surprising as it is a security challenge that can have the largest direct impact on the business performance. Interestingly, the government does not address this issue:[2] as will be discussed later in this report, the responsibility for dealing with it is left with the private sector.

Figure 8 - Comparison across the actors: Who has the largest say?


Figure 9 demonstrates that the messages related to the discussed security challenges are addressed to various actors at various levels, with the national government being the biggest addressee (Figure 10). National government is the only actor that is addressed on the issue of cybercrime (it is called on to implement the legal framework). Illegal immigration is addressed to all the acknowledged actors. The national government is the largest addressee: judging by analysis of the coded sources, the Maltese national government – and in particular the Prime Minister – is very open to discussion, which may be the reason for such an observation from the coding.

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[2] This finding however has to be taken with caution: as will be discussed later in this Section, the government of Malta has issued a number of policy documents aimed at dealing with cybersecurity issues, however these documents have been published outside the coding exercise timeframe. It is one of the methodological limitations, however in order to minimise the impact of this limitation the role of the Government in addressing this threat is discussed in the context of the existing policy and its historical trajectory .

Figure 9 - Discourse of security challenges addressed towards addressees


Figure 10 - Comparison of the addressees: who's been talked to the most?

The general public is the main object of all security challenges in approximately equal measure (Figure 11).

Figure 11 - Who is the main object of security challenges?

The figures in this section present some interesting findings: whilst the private sector is an active addressor, it is also an object of all the security challenges; however it does not address illegal immigration neither is it being addressed in relation to any of the security challenges. This potentially shows that although the private sector understands the security challenges it is exposed to, it deals with these by itself, and it is the private sector who calls on the government and other actors to address these security challenges. As demonstrated in many countries across Europe (and in particular in the Nort-West region), private sector often initiates addressing of various issues as these issues may have a direct impact on their performance and profit. This later leads to private businesses attracting the attention of the government to these issues and lobbying for the solutions being addressed in the policies.

The active participation of the general public in a discourse on illegal immigration may be triggered by the media; however it is unclear whether illegal immigration is a real or perceived security challenge when it comes to the views of the general population. The EU's roles in the discourse are not surprising as most of the Maltese policies are closely linked to, and based on, EU regulations; it is often the case that coded documents referred to EU directives and policies.[3]

2.2.2.2 Levels

The most prominent level, at which all three security challenges are discussed, is national (Figure 12); but security discourse does not take place at a sub-national level (which may be due to the small size of the country). Cybercrime is the most salient threat discussed at the national level. Whilst climate change and extreme weather events are discussed at various levels, these are the only threats discussed at the local level due to its local impacts. Illegal immigration is more prominent on higher levels: this may be explained by the intergovernmental nature of the threat, which requires the focus not only of the Maltese government but also of other EU member states (which may also be affected by this issue) as well as other non-EU countries (which may be the root of the problem). Illegal immigration is discussed widely at the international level as Malta participates in various exercises and talks with Italy, a country affected by similar concerns.

Figure 12 - Distribution of discussions about different security challenges at different levels

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[3] For instance, in the case of immigration, the legal status of a resident is given in accordance with the provisions of specific EU Directives such as the Legal Notice No. 278 of 2006 (Regulation on Long-Term Residents), which transposes the provisions of Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning long-term residents.

Figure caption chart showing Extreme weather/ climate change (n=10), Cybercrime (n=16), Illegal immigration (n=26)

2.2.2.3. Sources

As demonstrated in Figure 13, the most salient core values are discussed by all the sources (although to a different extent) except the NGOs. This is because the main focus of this source is on cultural identity and social stability.

Figure 13 - The share of the predominant core values in different sources

When it comes to specific security challenges (Figure 14), illegal immigration is covered in all sources, and it the sole focus of the NGOs. It is important however to bear in mind that NGOs see illegal immigration as a part of the Cultural Identity and Social Stability core values. Cybercrime is also salient: it is the most prominent security challenge discussed by private businesses. Although government publications focus on the cyber security, their discussed is generic in scope and does not go into much detail about specific cyber-security security challenges.

Figure 14 - The share of most salient security challenges in different sources

As demonstrated in Figure 12, all the sources focus on national and international levels. Surprisingly, the private sector only focuses on national and international levels, despite their operation on local level. The attention to the local level is given only by the newspapers; this source is the only one that covers all the levels.

Weather events and climate change receives the most multi-level discussion (from global to local) from various sources; illegal immigration is discussed on higher levels, and cybercrime is seen as a national and bilateral issue that is hardly addressed by the governmental bodies.

2.2.2.4. Human rights and ethical issues

As demonstrated in Figure 15, human rights and ethical issues are not discussed in the context of extreme weather events and climate change, and are only perceived as the main issue when it comes to illegal immigration.

Figure 15 - Human rights and ethical values as addressed in different security challenges

Surprisingly, government publications do not participate in a discourse on human rights and ethical values. The focus of the majority of the other sources is on a single security challenge: NGO publications focus on human rights and ethical values in the context of illegal immigration, and the private businesses in the context of cybercrime. Newspapers are the only source that addresses the human rights and ethical issues in the context of both security challenges (Figure 16).

Figure 16 - Human rights and ethical values covered by various sources with relation to different security challenges

Legend:
- Illegal immigration (n=26)
- Cybercrime (n=16)
- Extreme weather/ climate change (n=10)

2.2.3 Historical Trajectory

2.2.3.1 Description of the most salient core values in Malta
2.2.3.1.1. Physical safety and security

Since Malta does not have any national security strategy, there is no official definition of the physical safety and security. Security agenda is a responsibility of the Ministry of Home Affairs and Security, which is in charge of the Armed Forces, defense, police, immigration, airport security, correctional services, probation and parole, civil protection (i.e. emergency and rescue services), and citizenship and expatriate affairs (including ID management).[4]
The literature review shows that security in discussed in a context of defence, resources, geography and neutrality. From abroad, Maltais often being called a 'security free rider',[5] due to its small contributions towards the overall EU security, and its decreasing defence spending.[6,7]

When analysing the popular discourse based on the coding (and as demonstrated in Table 1), the notion of physical safely and security in Malta security is seen from the perspectives of both human beings and physical assets. Government reports (e.g. Economic Vision)[8] sees safety and security of infrastructure as key to the nation's development and growth. It is emphasised that in order to ensure Malta's security, there is a need for the retrofitting, upgrading and technology refreshing of existing physical infrastructures.

The media debate is greatly influenced by the international – and in particular European – affairs: for instance, a terrorist attack in Europe creates a discussion on whether Malta is prepared for such

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[4] The Ministry of Home Affairs and Security. *Portfolio*. http://homeaffairs.gov.mt/en/The-Ministry/The-Minister/Pages/Portfolio.aspx

[5] Fiott, D. *Being small, acting tall? Malta and European defence*. Long Post. 17 Feb. 2015.

[6] European Defence Agency. *Defence data of Malta in 2011*. http://www.eda.europa.eu/info-hub/defence-data-portal/Malta/year/2011#1

[7] European Defence Agency. National Defence Data 2012 of the EDA participating Member States. Brussels, Feb.2014.

[8] The Malta Chamber of Commerce, Enterprise and Industry. *Economic Vision for Malta 2014-2020*. 2014.

an attack.[9] Due to its geographic position, there is also a discussion about a potential missile threat from the IS.[10]

2.2.3.1.2. Economic prosperity

Economic prosperity and security is perceived as a second most salient core values in popular discourse. It is highly dependent on other security dimensions: for example, uncertainty created by an unstable political system may reduce private investment that could lead to a reduction of economic growth.

In the case of Malta, economic prosper and security goes hand in hand with the information and cyber security, as the risks of data loss, information interception and fraud have a large negative impact on the country's economy. Due to the small size of most of the Maltese enterprises, the prices of the appropriate cyber security measures can be quite high, and businesses are therefore not willing to pay for it.

Malta's Economic Vision lists the main drivers for the country's economic prosperity, the first of which is '*strengthening competitiveness in energy and climate policy*'.[11] Energy policy and security of energy supply is often mentioned with regards to the Maltese economic prosperity: being highly dependent on imported prime energy sources for the generation of electricity, Malta is vulnerable to a number of supply risks such as geopolitical conflicts and natural hazard which can cause temporary disruptions in supply or hikes in prices. Critical infrastructure - and its reliable performance - is another key factor. Climate change can also affect the economy of the country dramatically given its heightened economic dependence on the tourism industry and its particular susceptibility to the effects of climate change.

Similarly, illegal immigration plays a major role in economic prosperity as it tests the country's financial and human capacity: large amounts of money (relatively to the overall Malta's defence spending) are spent on Malta's border control, participation in rescue missions, and treatment of the illegal immigrants that arrive in Malta as the first port of entry:in relation to its population, Maltaa receives the highest number of asylum applications in the world[12] (although the EU contributes to this expenses as will be discussed later (e.g. operation Frontex)).

2.2.3.1.3. Information and cyber security

There are no specific definitions of cybersecurity and cybercrime in Malta's regulations. Malta has introduced some legal measures to improve the cyber security situation; however, as a member of the European Union and the Council of Europe, it must fully conform to its obligations resulting therefrom.

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[9] A good example of such newspaper article is Scicluna, M. Terrorism and neutrality.*Times of Malta*. 25 Feb. 2015.

[10] A good example of such newspaper article is Dalli, M. Prime Minister dispels rumours of 'imminent terrorist attack' on Malta. *Malta Today*. 3 Feb. 2015

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] Abrahams, J. Malta needs EU help to cope with its immigration crisis. *The Guardian*. 4 Aug. 2013.

Overall, it is regulated industries and e-government itself that lead the way in the field of cybersecurity: this was clearly demonstrated in Section 2.2, which highlighted that private businesses are the main actor interested in this core value. Businesses involved in online banking, payments, telecommunications, e-government services, web-service providers and co-location centres, and remote gaming are among those that respond to the challenges set by the cyber security threats, as they are the most vulnerable to the risks created if cyber security is breached. On the other hand, many companies have adopted 'a head-in-the-sand approach' when it comes to safeguarding their information systems, since they believe that nothing can go wrong.

Recently introduced national Information Communication Technology strategy aims at making Malta "*a digitally-enabled country empowering its people, communities and entrepreneurs through the intelligent and universal use of ICT*",[13] and therefore changed people's attitude and levels of ignorance of cyber security issues. The Strategy emphasised that improved cyber security is a particularly important part of the critical infrastructure's performance. The Strategy's four main goals are:
- Combat Cyber Crime;
- Strengthen National Cyber Defence;
- Secure Cyberspace; and
- Build Capacity.

2.2.3.2 Description of the most prominent security challenges within the salient core values
Three most salient security challenges that fall under the core values described in the previous section will be discussed here.

2.2.3.2.1. Illegal immigration
Malta has become an attractive destination for some immigrants, particularly from the mid-1970s, with the main three groups of immigrants being British settlers, Indian traders and Libyan teachers; however the overall number of immigrants coming into the country was negligible.[14] The situation has changed in the last decade: since joining the EU in 2004 Malta has experienced an increase in the arrivals illegal immigrants. Because of its proximity to North Africa, Malta has become a gateway for those seeking entry to Europe.[15] These people are coined the "boat people" traveling from Sub-Saharan and North Africa (including Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia).[16] From 2003 to 2007 the influx of immigrants tripled from 502 to 1,780;[17] by 2008, 84 boats came from North Africa bringing 2,775 people.[18] Overall in the last decade Malta has received 17,743

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[13]Malta Communications Authority.*Digital Malta: National Digital Strategy 2014-2020*. 2013.

[14]Bekium, J et al. *Asylum Seekers: A Humanitarian Approach. 2010*

[15] Abrahams, J. *Malta needs EU help to cope with its immigration crisis.*4 August 2013.

[16]King, R., & Thomson, M. T*he Southern European model of immigration: do the   cases of Malta, Cyprus and Slovenia fit?*Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans.10(3). 2008.

[17]Kroeger, A. *Malta struggles with migrant*s. Available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6283736.stm. 2007.

[18]Bekium, J et al. *Asylum Seekers: A Humanitarian Approach. 2010*

mainly African migrants.[19] The year 2012 was ranked as the second highest since 2001 in the number of international protection applications received by the Office of Refugee Commissioner.[20] A number of policy documents have been introduced and amended in the recent years in order to address the problem of illegal immigration (Table 5); these are mostly based on the EU regulations such as the Council Directive 2011/95/EU on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection.

Table 5 - List of government policies and legislative documents relevant to illegal immigration

Year	Document
2000 (with amendments in 2004, 2007, 2008 and 2015)	Refugees Act
2004 (amended in 2012)	Immigration regulations
2013 (first introduced in 1965)	Citizenship Act
2013 (first introduced in 1970)	Immigration Act
2015 (latest amendments)	Criminal Code

However establishing a comprehensive regulatory basis is not sufficient. Being a small country, Malta does not have the adequate resources, space, or supplies to contain such a large number of people entering the country illegally. [21] As a member of the EU and of the Schengen agreement,Malta is bound by the Dublin Regulation to process all claims for asylum by those asylum seekers that enter EU territory for the first time in Malta. When an immigrant comes into Malta, s/he is detained for up to 18 months while waiting for the status hearing. The hearing can decide if the person is a refugee, [22] is under subsidiary protection, [23] temporary humanitarian protection,[24] or the application is rejected.[25]

Illegal immigration has become one of Malta's top policy priorities, nationally as well as at the EU level: Malta has been calling for burden-sharing mechanisms and support from other EU countries in coping with the growth in illegal immigration. With only three off-shore patrol boats and a handful of smaller vessels, the Armed Forces of Malta are responsible for an area which measures around 250,000 km^2. Moreover, the challenge is not only to deter illegal migration, but also to prevent the loss of life at sea: it is estimated that up to 600 would-be immigrants have died every year in the Mediterranean in the recent years trying to reach the EU from the south.[26]

To counteract this problem the EU has allocated over 126 million EUR to spend from 2007 to 2013 in the field of asylum, immigration and borders. In 2006 the EU also launched Frontex operations in

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[19] Freeman, C. *EU immigration: 'Malta is the smallest state, and we are carrying a burden that is much bigger than any other country'*. The Guardian, 21 July 2013.

[20] European Migration Network.*Country factsheet: Malta 2012*. 2013.

[21] I Bekium, J et al. *Asylum Seekers: A Humanitarian Approach. 2010*

[22] A refugee is a person who can remain in Malta with freedom of movement and is eligible to resident documents.

[23] Subsidiary protection status provides people with temporary humanitarian protection and intended for people who cannot return safely to their native country.

[24] Temporary humanitarian protection status is given in extra ordinary cases when none of the above statuses are met but the person needs special protection.

[25] Cassar, C.M. *Researching Migration and Asylum in Malta: A Guide*. The People for Change Foundation. 2013.

[26] Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies.*Managing the challenge of illegal migration in Malta*.Unknown.

the Central Mediterranean providing some support with regards to border patrol and search and rescue efforts. However, these operations have repeatedly been delayed and interrupted, mainly due to uncertainties over Libya's role as well as budgetary constraints and limited assets. EU countries have generally been reluctant to provide the patrol boats, as this entails the 'risk' that the country providing the vessels will remain responsible for migrants rescued or intercepted at sea. As a result Malta has remained responsible for 90 percent of the surface coverage in Malta's search and rescue area, even in the framework of Frontex's operations.[27]

Analysis of the coding has demonstrated that the main issues within these security challenges that the popular discourse is also concerned with are rescue operations and treatment (e.g. detention) of illegal immigrants. Both of these issues are closely connected to the economic prosperity and security core value as they put pressure on the Maltese financial resources, and therefore its capacity to respond and save lives as well as to treat appropriately those who were rescued. One of the main challenges posed by this threat is the border control: Malta does not have a capacity to increase border control, but at the same time the government does not want to make their border regulations any stricter as it could affect tourism, which is one of the main industries in the country.

The treatment – and in particular the issue of 18 months detention - raises a lot of questions with regards to ethics and human rights and is closely watched by the EU and some of the NGOs. At the same time, the security challenge of illegal immigration increases xenophobia and discrimination amongst the Maltese population: the coding demonstrates that many of the newspaper headlines are relevant to this security challenge and often portray a negative picture of the impacts of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.

2.2.3.2.2. Cybercrime

Cybercrime is a relatively new threat that Malta is facing; escalating use of cyberspace and its global connectivity resulted in the fact that the traditional criminal laws could not cater for novel crimes.[28] The government however recognises this and as a response to the emerging crimes it has introduced a new chapter in the Criminal Code 'Of Computer Misuse', which largely incorporates the provisions of the Council of Europe Cybercrime Convention. Other EU regulations which form the framework for the Maltese cyber-security strategy are Data protection Act 2001 and The Electronic Communications Networks and Services Regulations. In addition Malta complies with ISO27001 to govern their information security management operations.[29] Other than these, there is no dedicated legislation that deals specifically with cybercrime (Table 6).

Table 6 - List of government policies and legislative documents relevant to cybercrime

Year	Document
1997 (latest amendment in 2014)	Electronic Communications Act

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[27]*Ibid.*

[28]Gatt, G.G. *The misuse of Computers in Maltese criminal legislation*. 2002. University of Malta.

[29]Finkel, O. and Zammit, R.. *Cybersecurity, Matla.* In: Powell,B.A et al (eds.) *Getting the Deal Through: Cybersecurity 2015.* 2015.

2001 (latest amendment in 2015)	Criminal Code (Chapter 9)
2002	Electronic Commerce Act
2002	Data Protection Act
2003	Processing Of Personal Data Regulations
2014	Digital Malta Strategy

The recently introduced Digital Malta Strategy 2014-2020 covers cyber security as a whole but does not focus on cybercrimes specifically. There is however a Cybercrime Unit launched in 2003 as a part of the Malta Police force; its main focus is on hacking and fraud, however they also deal with child abuse online.[30] In 2013 the Maltese Police Cybercrime Unit has investigated around 576 complaints, the majority of which related to computer misuse such as hacking and fraud; most of these attacks have been carried out from outside Malta.[31]

The coding results demonstrated that within the cybercrime security challenge, a lot of attention is paid to the loss of information and data protection, and communication interception. Since this security challenge's largest impact is on the private sector, businesses develop their own risk assessment models and introduce various security measures. However these efforts can only go so far as the main barrier for addressing cybercrime is a lack of legal framework that specifically focuses on this security challenge.

2.2.3.2.3. Weather/climate change

As has been discussed in Section 1, Malta is considered to be one of the safest countries in terms of its exposure to natural hazards. At the same time its ability to cope with such events is not guaranteed, which makes extreme weather caused by the impacts of climate change a subject of popular discourse. Natural hazards that are most prominent in the popular discourse are flooding, drought and storms.

A European Commission White Paper that addresses the challenges posed by climate change has placed Malta in the middle of the two European regions most vulnerable to a warming world's multi-faceted threats.[32] Climate change is seen as a big issue that can affect Malta's national development and growth; and although only a few strategies have been adopted so far, they are clearly demonstration of the Government's effort to find a way to adapt to and decrease the impacts of climate change (Table 7). Malta has also enforced a number of laws indirectly relevant to climate change (including in the areas of water policy, flood management, Environmental Impact Assessments, protection of flora, fauna and natural habitats as well as plant protection). [33]

Table 7 - List of government policies and legislative documents relevant to climate change

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[30] UNIDIR, *The Cyber Index International Security Trends and Realities*. 2013.

[31] CSB Advocates. *The Relevance of Cybersecurity Risk Management*. 20 August 2013.

[32] EC. *White Paper: Adapting to climate change: Towards a European framework for action*. 2009.

[33] European Climate Adaptation Platform. *Malta*. Unknown. Available at: http://climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/countries/malta

Year	Document
2009	National Strategy for Policy and Abatement Measures Relating to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions
2012	National climate change adaptation strategy
	The National Environmental Policy

In 2008 the Climate Change Committee was created as a part of the Ministry for Resources and Rural Affairs; it was commissioned to develop a realistic national strategy directed to reduce Green House Gas (GHG) emissions. The Strategy published in 2009 suggests a number of priority actions in the areas of energy, waste, agriculture, water, and transport.[34]

Another committee - the Climate Change Committee for Adaptation - was constituted by the Ministry for Resources and Rural Affairs; its main responsibility was to develop the National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy, the draft of which was presented for consultation in 2010 and was consequentially published in 2012.[35] The Strategy adopted an approach that interrelates between climate change impacts, vulnerabilities and adaptation needs. It outlines the climate change adaptation policy which should be adopted and indicates which Government entity or authority is responsible for its implementation as well as the time-frames within which such policy actions should be implemented. The Strategy focuses on various policy areas such as risks, financial impacts; water agriculture; human health; tourism; and communication and education. It also incorporates a Storm Water Master Plan, the main objective of which is to manage the various impacts associated with storm waters including flooding impacts on road infrastructure deterioration and traffic management, civil protection and valley management in general. In addition it makes reference to particular flood-prone areas and localities, and to utilise storm water to augment the water resources of the Maltese Islands through the harvesting storage, reuse recycle and distribution of storm water and proper disposal of excess.[36]

The coding results mainly focused on the impacts of natural hazards (e.g. damage caused by the storm, which happened during the coding period); the discussion on climate change however was much broader. With the main focus being on climate change mitigation, the debate around GHG emissions reduction and dependency on fossil fuels are common. What is interesting is that hardly any connection between climate change and natural hazards is acknowledged; this however may explain the apparent lack of discussion around climate change adaptation.

2.2.4 Overview of current trends

Malta does not have a National Security Strategy. Similarly, very little has been done in term of vulnerability and risk assessment at a national level. Nonetheless vulnerability and risk assessment are accepted as essential steps in the process of identifying the challenges that may have to be addressed by society. Article 4 (d) of Chapter 411 of the Laws of Malta, the "Civil Protection Act",

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[34]Ministry of Resources and Rural Affairs. National Strategy for Policy and Abatement Measures Relating to the Reduction of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. 2009.

[35]Ministry of Resources and Rural Affairs. *National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy: consultation report*. 2010.

[36]Ministry of Resources and Rural Affairs. *National Climate Change Adaptation Strategy*. 2012.

is the basis for carrying out vulnerability and risk assessment, which is a responsibility of the Civil Protection Department. In addition, all relevant stakeholders have a duty for conducting their own risk assessment and management practice as well as to ensure that risks are appropriately managed to ensure effective continuity of critical operations at all times.

Malta is currently developing a national risk assessment: it is expected that it will identify the vulnerabilities and risks at a national level, incorporating single-risk and multi-risk scenarios, human impacts, economic and environmental impacts and political/social impacts within identified Critical Infrastructures and other relevant sectors. In addition, the new risk assessment is expected to take into account national climate change adaptation strategies as well as potential cross-border issues involving a wide-range of actors and stakeholders ensuring appropriate prevention and treatment measures are introduced.[37]

These expectations go in line with the coding results emphasising that climate change and illegal immigration will remain salient in the near future. Illegal immigration is perceived to be a national challenge (thus the focus is on the national level), however it is also widely discussed in international and transnational contexts as the root of the problem lies not in Malta but elsewhere. It is therefore the political instability in North African countries in particular that influences the number of illegal immigrants. Cybercrime receives 'special treatment' as a Digital Strategy has been introduced (and discussed in Section 2.3.1.3). However the levels in which these security challenges are discussed differ slightly. Cybercrime is also seen as a national threat, however the actors responsible for addressing it (i.e. private sector) are typically at a local level. As for the climate change, it is mainly discussed on a national level but it is understood that a global effort is required.

2.2.3.4. Salience of the security challenges in the nearest future

As demonstrated in this report, the findings concluded from the literature review and from the coding exercise are aligned: all of the discussed security challenges - illegal immigration, cybercrime, and extreme weather and climate change – are salient and long-term, and will remain as such in the near future. In addition, it is clear that these security challenges – and the core values within which these threats are identified – are closely interlinked.

The salience of cybercrime as a security challenge is revealed in Figure 11: it is a threat all actors are vulnerable to. Recent introduction of the National Digital Strategy demonstrates a commitment to imminently release a national cybersecurity strategy. The Strategy was launched by the Government, thus charging it with the responsibility for addressing this security challenge, however it is acknowledged that the main actors who is realistically acting on addressing the challenges posed by cybercrime is the private sector. It is therefore expected that the private sector would continue their efforts in trying to reduce the risks of cybercrime, however the government needs to take further steps and implement the relevant legal framework. This would help all the businesses mitigate cybercrime associated threats. The coding results and the existing policy framework

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[37]Department of Contracts.*Tender For The Services Of Drafting Of A National Risk Assessment.* 2014.

suggest that the areas on which cybersecurity could have a potential impact include cloud computing and online business. The coding revealed that cyberattacks are closely linked to the majority of the core values, in particular economic prosperity and physical safety and security. Its impacts are discussed in the context of future change. The main challenges within the cyber-attack threat that have any impact on the Malta security are data leaks (with the particular reference to private data interceptions) and IT failures (which can also lead to data leaks) caused by cyber criminals. The popular discourse emphasises that cyberattacks may have an impact on every member of the Maltese society as well as all of the country's assets

Whilst illegal immigration is a relatively new trend that has started in early 2000s, it will remain salient until the political situations in the countries of origins of the immigrants have not improved. This security challenge however is moving towards becoming an EU challenge rather than purely Malta's challenge as demonstrated by high EU involvement in Malta's border security, and search and rescue operations described in section 2.3.2.1. In addition, this security challenge contributes to the additional challenges within cultural and social core values, as without the integration ethnic minorities are segregated and exploited, and racist sentiments among the Maltese populations is on the rise. The Government is perceived to be the key actor who can address this security challenge, with the support from the EU. However the coding results demonstrate that despite various EU commitments, popular discourse is not certain whether EU helps enough.

Climate change is also a security challenge that has only recently become central to the governmental discussions. A number of existing laws which are in force in Malta demonstrate the country's commitment to mitigation. The coding and the policy analysis demonstrates that securitisation of climate change takes place due to its impacts on other security security challenges such as food and energy supply, which in a long-term may affect Malta's economic prosperity and security. More focus is however needed on dealing with natural hazards as a result of the impacts of climate change: this may serve as a basis to indirectly address adaptation to climate change and to mainstream climate change related laws, policies and regulations, instead of mainly focusing on mitigation.

2.3 Spain Country Profile

2.3.1 Characterization of the core values

As Figure 16 shows, core values measured in Spain could be distributed in three different groupings. The first one includes top core values: Physical safety, environmental and ecological security and economic prosperity. Core values where governmental, private and parliamentarian actors are aware and key supporters of their social construction. The second one includes information and cyber and social stability, two core values that are gaining more and more attention from the different security stakeholders. Finally, political stability, cultural identity and territorial integrity, are the last three core values due to their low perception among the population as potential sources of insecurity. The third one includes information and cyber and social stability, two core values that are gaining more and more attention from the different security stakeholders.

Figure 16 - Core values according to coded sources

Key core values: 1.Physical Safety and security 2.Environmental and ecological security and 3.Economic prosperity and security

The top position of **physical safety and security** among core values explains the salience that addressors give to their strategic communication with regard to safety and security matters. In fact, according to the coding process it turns out to be "Main topic" in the 76,92% of Government publications; 65,00% of Newspaper articles; 60,32% of Parliament publications; 29,17% NGOs documents and 12,50% Private/Business reports and it is "Mentioned" in 15,38% Government publications, 12,50% Private/Business documents and reports, 9,52% of Newspaper articles, 4,00% of Newspapers articles. The main themes of threats related to physical safety and security are: Terrorism and armed conflicts, demonstrations, violence against women, vulnerability of critical infrastructures, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, bombings, racist violence, health risks due to illegal abortions, sexual abuse, associated mental and health problems, psychological and physical aggression against civil servants, road-safety, security threats related to car sharing platforms.

Mainly Government and Parliament produce materials to address issues dealing with individual security, migration, safety (civil protection in Spanish), fundamental rights and freedoms, criminality or terrorism inter alia. The Government leads the ranking as being responsible for its governance, followed closely by the Parliament due to the involvement of law-makers in regulatory matters. The third position belongs to Newspapers due to the attention paid to terrorist attacks,

crimes, prosecutions or safety incidents. The salience of this core value shows more than any other that security is becoming a social construction where more public and private stakeholders interact to define the priorities of the security agenda.

Consultations with national security experts[38] reveal low rates of concern among the population about physical integrity when compared with the rest of collective problems. There is not a great perception of insecurity and citizens express a low degree of concern, both collective and individual, about terrorism, migration and safety. If any, public opinion is increasingly concerned about domestic violence (gender violence in Spanish) and the international terrorism due to the impact of the *jihadist* terrorism in the Middle East and North African countries. Recent developments on foreign fighters or home-grown terrorist are causing more political and social unrest as the traditional concern about local terrorism is fading.

Data also demonstrates the importance of NGO's as addressors because of their involvement on issues dealing with human rights and freedoms, together with their interaction with Government along the agenda-setting process (securitization). Private/Business actors have a lower score as addressors but they are equally scored as addressees. That is explained by the increasing role of private security in physical safety and security affairs and, of course, in the agenda-setting of public security policies.

Environmental and ecological security is the second most salient core value, as it turned out to be the "Main topic" in 100% of Private/Business documents or reports, 46,15% of Governmental publications, 37;5% of NGOs reports; 9,52% of Parliamentary publications; 3,5% of Newspapers articles and "Mentioned" in 15,38% of Governmental publications, 8,33% of NGOs documents, 3,17% of Parliamentary publications and 1,5% of Newspapers articles.

The main themes of threats related to this core value are: insufficient resources available for prevention, early diagnostics and treatment of contagious diseases (Ebola and others), biodiversity conservation, environmental pollution of oil exploration, natural gas supply, food import restrictions, natural hazards, flooding, extreme episodes of ice and snow, illegal exploitation of marine resources and damages of marine environment, acts against underwater cultural heritage, mercury pollution, accidents involving chemical weapons and nuclear risks.

Natural disasters cause unrest given their potential risk and the way in which they perturb the life of the affected population. Given the geographical position of Spain, close to the Sahara desert, the process of *desertification* is advancing in the South of Spain together with the environmental impact of recurrent drought, fires and floods. Safety measures are improving the resilience at the different levels of response (local, subnational and national) but cannot prevent the reiteration of the incidents. On the other hand, environmental policies have promoted the use and production of renewable energies which has increased the environmental awareness of the population. Its second position is partially based on the flow of information coming from the Private/Business sector which reflects the relevance of the environmental and ecological industry in Spain. The governmental support for renewable energies in the past years has developed a significant industrial

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[38]Personalconsultation with experts of the Elcano Royal Institute, held on April 14th in the premises of the Institute.

and technological base and boosted the internationalization of Spanish companies in different "green" sectors.

Nevertheless, and according to the consulted security experts[38], environmental and ecological security is not perceived to be at risk at a national level with the only exception of the price of the energy. This counterintuitive fact could be explained by the global nature of the ecological and environmental risks, which make pollster very difficult to capture potential global risks that have no actual and local impact on the population. NGOs try to close this gap but the information they generate is normally about long-term, long-distance, too-complex and low-tangible problems that do not affect the daily life of the population. The low involvement of the Media or the Parliament as addressors or addressees also obeys to this perception of environmental and ecological problems among the population.

With regard to **economic prosperity and security**, the third core value (coded as "Main topic" in 38,46% of Government publications, 37,50% of Private/Business reports, 33,33% NGOs documents, 27,00% of Newspapers articles and 17,46% of Parliamentary publications and being "Mentioned" in 23,08% of Government publications; 16,67% NGOs of documents; 12,50% of Private/Business reports; 7,94% Parliamentary publications; 0,50% of Newspapers articles) Private/Business actors almost equal the Government as addressors due their regular public relations and communication of their initiatives and demands. The main themes of threats in this category are: economic and financial insecurity, energy vulnerability, new poverty maps, welfare society at risk, natural gas supply, long term unemployment, families and children affected by the economic crisis, exploitation of migrant labour and money laundering.

Private/Business actors handle a significant set of communication instruments in order to increase its interaction and influence with the Government, market and labor. Economy is a leading topic for the citizens, and mass media takes profit of that interest. That makes national and international media key addressors and opinion-makers. Experts[38] confirm that unemployment and economy performance are among the top Spanish concerns, especially along the sustained economic crisis that has transformed the previous perception of economic prosperity and security of the population.

Such perception is changing for the better as the economy is recovering but macrogains will require much more time to produce microgains among the affected population. NGOs participate in the discussion about financial uncertainty to express their assessments on the economic situation. Most of the NGOs dealing with this core value are independentthink-tanks or university centers involved in economic or financial research and divulgation. Their proposals generate a feedback that scores them a relevant second position after the Government as addressees. On the contrary, data show that the Parliament is neither a relevant actor as addressor nor addressee with regard to the economic prosperity and security. Its responsibility to intermediate between society and government is not translated into an effective performance and its score is even lower than the Media average.

2.3.2 Security challenges, political actors, levels, ethics and human rights

2.3.2.1 Actors

Government is the key interlocutor in the physical safety and security, economic and ecological core values of the Spanish security. Figures 17 and 18 confirm its prominent role for the whole set of national security components (31.6% and 32.3%, respectively). Private sector holds the second position, very close to the government but more as an addressee (29.2%) than as addressor (20,4%). Its relevance is unbalanced in the different core values with more presence in the economic, social and cyber dimensions of the security than in the defense ones. The presence of companies is strong in defense affairs, a fact closely associated with their narrow relationship with the Ministry of Defense. For the reasons that will be explained later, the industrial and technological base of the Spanish defense has reduced its visibility as much as possible to avoid social or political misperceptions about the influence of the industrial sector in defense affairs. Hence its low contribution to the perception of this core value.

Civil society and NGOs hold the second place as addressors (24.5%). They show an unbalanced presence in some areas where they contribute to the construction of the national security discourse: Economy, ecology, social stability, safety, cultural identity, together with other areas as cyber or political stability where they make marginal contributions. Their low profile regarding political stability according to the available data of the research is counterintuitive given the evolution of the social movements mobilized by the economic downturn towards political activism and political parties that are displacing traditional parties in voting trends. Data also show a lower score as addressee (7.6%) which means that civil society contributes more to the security discourse from the demand side than from the supply side. This is a logical finding given the complexity of the current security challenges.

Figure 17 - Addressors

Another relevant finding is the low contribution of the general public and the Academia to the social construction of the security. This fact is more justifiable with regard to the public opinion, given the tradition of activist movements related with pacifism, security and safety, just the contrary than in the human rights and freedoms or the foreign aid sectors where social commitment is more developed. Anyway, there is a clear distinction among public interest and risks perception with regard to physical safety and security matters because, as experts state[38], there is a low degree of

social concern about terrorism, migration, drug trafficking or domestic violence when compared with other priorities such as economy, health, unemployment, corruption, pensions, education and alike. That means that citizens are aware of the importance of these issues in general but they do not feel concerned about the impact of the physical and security risks in their daily life. The lack of insecurity perception reduces the interaction between citizens and administrations because the latter do not receive enough political and social pressure from the former to prioritize other security policies different from the public choice.

2.3.2.2 Levels

The low contribution of the local and subnational levels to national security is a significant finding. Despite the security decentralization that took place in the last decades, those levels are still not considered as prominent as the rest of levels. This could change with the new concept of national security to be explained later. However, local and subnational levels enjoy a fair degree of responsibility and action to achieve a better visibility than the analyzed data show. It is worth complementing the coding with a qualitative analysis in order to clarify this counterintuitive finding. For example, civil protection (safety) is a responsibility that corresponds primarily to the local and regional authorities, being the competence of the state level subsidiary. That is why the government had to create from scratch a Military Emergency Unit to contribute to civil protection but the government cannot employ this Unit without the previous requirement of the regional authorities. Last, the contribution of the National Parliament is very relevant both as addressor (21.6%) and as addressee (10%) holding the third place in both indicators.

Figure 18. Addressees

It is important to highlight the role of third countries, international institutions and the European Union in helping states to cope with security problems (5.9%, 6.2% and 6%, respectively). This view confirms the multilevel nature of security, in which the agendas and decisions are discussed at regional, national, European and international level. Precisely one of the reasons for the emergence of strategies of national security was the need to clarify the situations in which the governments can act unilaterally and those reserved for bilateral o multilateral frameworks. For example, in the field of physical security, the State holds the primary competence though it may delegate the

implementation of the measures belonging to its competence to local, subnational, European, international or global levels.

2.3.2.3 Human rights and ethical issues

Corruption and fraud are the most valuable issues with ethical implications in Spain, closely behind unemployment and economic problems in the official surveys. It is also a phenomenon on the rise due to the increasing social awareness (36.7% in December 2013 and 48.6% in April 2015 according to the Center for Sociological Research, CIS Barometer, April 2015). That affects, to a growing extent, the credibility of political parties that occupy the fourth place among social concerns. The absence of racist or anti-migration feelings is remarkable for a country standing in the border where inequality between the rich North and poor South is more profound. Consultations with security experts[38] do not show a particular concern about them despite the ongoing economic crisis and the risk of international terrorism.

2.3.3 Historical Trajectory

Every country is contingent upon its own history and experience to define its security construct. On the one hand, the adoption of a new concept of national security was due to the pressure of security experts, in order to modernize national security according to the best Western practices and against agencies' opposition to transformation. On the other hand, leaders and public opinion change their mindsets very slowly in absence of tragic events or decicive leadership. In Spain, the most transformative events on core values include the terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004, the participation of the Spanish armed forces in military operations abroad in Iraq, an environmental incident (Prestige disaster), and the economic crisis of recent years.

These events influenced the Spanish securitization by stressing the salience of physical safety and reducing the salience of territorial integrity. This process of inclusion, exclusion and change of priority (securitization) represents a new approach to security and public policy. The terrorist attacks in Madrid in March 2004 showed that the security challenge of international terrorism was superior and different from the previous domestic terrorism on which anti-terrorist salience was focused. The attacks did not pose an existential threat to the territorial integrity of the state, but they created the feeling that the current physical security of the citizens was no longer guaranteed under the new threat. Concerns about the new type of terrorism replaced the social concern about the national terrorism and its securitization will deserve a prominent place among future priorities of national security discourse.

Spain has participated in international security missions since the 1990s and, in 2003, the government decided to participate in the international coalition that invaded Iraq, thanks to the legal support of its parliamentary majority. However, the political and social opposition to the intervention was so intense that it contributed to the downfall of the government and the 2004's new government imposed by law the obligation to request permission to the Parliament before sending troops abroad. Since then on, the focus of national defense has shifted from the territorial

integrity to the role of the Spanish Armed Forces andthe implications of military interventions abroad (terrorist attacks of March 11, 2004 were initially understood as a reprisal for the intervention of Spanish troops in Iraq). This shift is in line with the social perception that does not include territorial integrity among the more salient core values, despite the occasional territorial claims of Morocco on the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla on African soil.

In 2002, the sinking of the Prestige caused an environmental disaster in the Northwestern coast of Spain. Beyond the damage caused to the environment, social mobilization forced the Government to strengthen its environmental sensitivity because of the political consequences that this type of disasters can provoke. Since then, the environmental risks are taken more seriously and environmental and ecological policies have escalated high into the political and social priorities. The need to promote prevention, response and resilience to natural disasters at every level has given a greater salience to safety as a public service.

Finally, the global economic crisis that erupted in 2008 and still tangible in Spain has put an end to the expectations of the ending economic prosperity, which was predominant among the population. Spain experienced a prolonged recession in the wake of the global financial crisis which marked one of its main domestic challenges. GDP contracted by 3.7% in 2009, ending a 16-year growth trend, and continued contracting through most of 2013. Economic growth resumed briefly in late 2013, albeit only modestly, as credit contraction in the private sector, fiscal austerity, and high unemployment continued to weigh on domestic consumption and investment.[39] The combination of austerity, debt, job losses, long-term unemployment and reduction of economic expectations has placed the economic and financial security within the top priorities of the security agenda. The crisis has highlighted the speed and virulence of the economic contagion and the difficulties of the different levels of responsibility to respond to global economic problems that affect national prosperity. Governments cannot address global economic risks alone, but neither can international organizations, due to their limited power to address those systemic risks. So, national strategies will securitize economic prosperity in the future instead of delegating its responsibility to the freedom of market or to the international governance as they did before. In this manner, it has become increasingly evident that security can be threatened both by financial instability and the lack of adequate global economic governance. In this context, many countries, including Spain, have begun to pay more attention to the economic security by creating or strengthening their competitive intelligence teams.

The introduction of national security strategies in 2011 and 2013 represented a milestone in the perception and management of security. Until that time, security was limited to governmental bodies and divided into stove pipes with no clear mechanism of coordination. The state held the primary competence in almost all facets of security, except for some competences partially delegated to the local and subnational level in the fields of environment, economy, safety or police among others related to the analyzed core values. Within the state level, competences were divided into the different ministries and agencies so than everyone could manage it in an autonomous way. Only in case of severe crisis the government resorted to the crisis management system in place. In the case of Spain, the Spanish Security Strategy (SSS) is an example of the importance of the issues

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[39] The World Factbook available online at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp.html, last consulted in June 2016.

of economic security in the wider security agenda, and it addresses Strategy addresses economic issues.

The SSS 2011 came to change that state of things. The SSS replicated the same logical structure of other Western security strategies: it described the global risks and its potential impact on national interests, and the most relevant threats and risks (armed conflicts, terrorism, organized crime, financial and economic insecurity, energy vulnerability, proliferation, cyber threats, illegal immigration, emergencies and disasters). The SSS identified the drivers that could enhance or mitigate the former risks and threats (globalization, demographic imbalance, poverty and inequality, climate change, technological hazards and radical and undemocratic ideologies) together with some basic principles: holistic approach, coordination between government and society, efficiency in resource use, anticipation and risk prevention, resilience and recovery effects, responsible interdependence with partners and allies. The SSS introduced a sequence of goals, strategies and lines of action together with a new management structure of national security closer to the Prime Minister, including a Security Council and supporting elements. Last but not least, the SSS asked for a greater interaction between public and private sectors to boost the social construction of the security.

Regarding other less important core values, governments and corporations continue to make progress in the securitization of cyber risks but small and medium enterprises and the population has not yet become aware of the risks of cyberspace. The deterioration of bipartisanship and the proliferation of new political parties could put governance into risk together with the current political and social stability. One of Spain's most serious security issues has been the tension in the northern Basque region. Also secessionist tensions in territories such as Catalonia could hinder social and political stability and lead to a spiral of destabilization. In contrast, it is not expected any change of concern on the territorial integrity if the political and social situation in the North African remain stable, but the potential destabilization of Algeria or Morocco would have an impact on national security similar or even greater than the impact that the Libyan destabilization has had on the countries in the central Mediterranean. Finally, Spain faces a broad spectrum of threats and hazards to its national security such as serious and organised crime, terrorism, natural disasters and pandemics.

2.3.4 Overview of current trends

In May 2013, the Government adopted a National Security Strategy (NSS). Like the previous one, it covers the main themes of threats described above. Risks identified are terrorism, armed conflicts, organized crime, economic and financial insecurity, cyber threats, uncontrolled migration, weapons of mass destruction, the vulnerability of energy supplies, public services and critical infrastructure together with the traditional emergencies and natural disasters or new risks as espionage and maritime insecurity. The risks of the NSS are not ordered by priority, so it is not possible to compare its salience for the Government. Neither risks nor lines of action appear be useful to understand in more detail the core values of territorial integrity, environmental security, cultural identity, social and political stability. Coming national strategies and those in charge of its

implementation will have to improve their risk analysis in order to obtain a better distribution of limited resources in a cost-effective ratio.

The elaboration of the NSS is still too inter-governmental and the contribution of security stakeholders outside the government is very limited. Since public policies require political and social support of citizens, national strategies would have to be more inclusive and governments would have to develop better communication strategies to bridge their perceptions of insecurity with those of the citizens.

The National Security Strategy will develop sub-strategies and action plans for core values such as cyber-security or threats such as maritime security among others but it will not develop complementary sub-strategies on themes that are not included in the NSS. This means that policies and measures related to environmental security, cultural identity and security, social stability and securitywill be developed outside the structures and procedures of national security strategies.

National Security Strategies cannot address social and political problems because they are focused on external threats. This approach prevents national security strategies and policies to blur the distinction between the internal and external dimensions of security. The strategic culture of nations (that is the way in which leaders and public opinions perceive threats and the employment of instruments of national power to cope with them) must change in order to understand the impact of global risks on their way of life. Without a transformation in the strategic culture of the nation, the governance of the national security will become much more complicated in the future because every stakeholder will try to remain isolated and keep its responsibilities as before. The major challenge of the national security system for the coming years is to carry out such transformative change, first, in the public sector, into a more comprehensive approach (whole-of-the-government-approach) and then in the private sector reinforcing its security awareness and its interaction with the public sector (whole-of-the-nation-approach). If security is to be a social construction, those in charge of national security will have to take more into account the perception of security stakeholders both inside and outside the government.

In conclusion, in the near future current core values will likely remain salient in Spain but their components may be modified. In the case of physical security, there is a growing concern about radicalization and violent extremism that interact with new phenomena such as jihadist terrorism and groups of radical ideology. The possible return of foreign fighters to Spanish territory and, above all, the possible radicalization of Muslim citizens of second generation, a phenomenon already seen in some Spanish cities as Ceuta, Melilla and Barcelona, is also worrying.
The trend of securitization of economic prosperity will continue in the near future given the convergence of the different security stakeholders in stressing its salience.The lasting current levels of unemployment, especially among young people, combined with the economic inequality that is affecting large segments of the population, could evolve into economic insecurity if social unrest progress into riots and violence. This would affect other core values such as social stability. Domestic violence against women is another component that does not decrease despite the increased social awareness and the securitization of police and judicial response. In the environmental field, the effects of global warming will continue aggravating the problems of

drought, desertification and water stress that affect to the most vulnerable territories, affecting economic interests such as tourism, industry and agriculture.

3. Regional Analysis

3.1 Characterization of the predominant core values

The regional picture of the core values in the security discourse presents interesting characters.

As outlined by the previous sections, in Italy according to the coding three core values emerged as the most salient, namely:

1. Physical safety and security (31%)
2. Social stability and security (17%)
3. Economic prosperity and security (13%)

It should also be noted that other core values are well represented in the Italian security discourse, with percentages not far from the three top ones: territorial integrity and security (10%), environmental and ecological security (9%), political stability (8%), information and cyber security (7%).

As for Malta, the three most salient core values are:

-       Physical safety and security (23%);
-       Economic prosperity and security (20%);
-       Information and cyber security (18%).

Again, in the Maltese case there other core values which receive significant attention in the security debate in comparison with the three most salient ones: environmental and ecological security (12.2%), cultural identity and security (11.4%), social stability and security (10.5%).

In the Spanish case, the three most salient core values are:

1) Physical safety and security
2) Environmental and ecological security
3) Economic prosperity and security

The other two core values that are gaining more and more attention from the different security actors are information and cyber security and social stability and security.

This demonstrates that thre relevant elements emerge:

-   the overall salience of physical safety and security;
-   the common concern about economic prosperity and security;
-   the differentiation among national security discourse.

First, the physical safety and security core value stands on top of the security discourse in all three countries. This element may be an interesting indication of a somehow narrow perception of security within the popular discourse, which cares first and foremost to the physical integrity of human beings, both individuals and groups, as well as the spaces where they live and the systems or

infrastructures they use in their everyday life.[40] In this light the main concern is about security challenges responsible for premature deaths, human suffering, or destruction or degradation of critical assets, such as terrorist attacks, natural or man-made disasters, epidemics, but also domestic violence, etc.

This perception of security can be considered as the "man of the street" security, which primarily focused on the individual, his/her family, house, working place, village or neighbourhood. Such a focus is not surprising in countries which have been at peace for around 70 years, that means most citizens do not have direct personal memory of war or foreign occupation and therefore do not care, for instance, about Territorial Integrity and Security – a situation different than for example in the Eastern EU Borders region.[41] The fact that Italy and Spain are NATO members but without direct borders with Russia, and that Malta is a neutral country with no possibility of direct military threat from any neighbour country, contribute to explain why the focus has been narrowed from the security of the state to the security (and safety) of the single citizen. In particularly, in the Spanish case study it is reported that 2004 terrorist attacks influenced national security discourse by stressing the salience of physical safety and reducing the salience of territorial integrity. Even when the Territorial integrity and security core value reaches a double-digit percentage as in the Italian case (10%) the participants in the EvoCS regional workshop pointed out that this core values is more linked to the flow of illegal migration that are "invading" national borders and territory rather than to an armed aggression by another state.

In other words, the most salient core value in the West Mediterrean EU region is the "personal" security and safety of citizens in the three analysed countries.

The second interesting element is the common concern about economic prosperity and security. Whilst this core value ranks differently in the three countries according to the coding exercise, and it is not perceived to be at the top of the security agenda, its salience is underlined by the qualitative analysis. Indeed, in Italy and Spain the economic crisis is explicitly perceived as one of the most prominent security challenges. The regional workshop further confirmed this interpretation. In particular, Spain unemployment and economy performance are among the top national concerns, especially after the prolonged economic crisis has transformed the previous perception of economic prosperity and security of the population. In Italy, a prolonged economic recession marked by high unemployment and risk of poverty, has turned the crisis into a perceived security challenge for the economic security and prosperity in a way somehow new with respect to the previous 10-15 years. The situation is less acute in Malta, where security challenges associated with this core value are financial risks and fraud; nonetheless the island economy is highly dependent on the situation in euro-zone, and the salience of economic prosperity and security core value has increased in recent years.

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[40] According to Codebook: "Physical safety and security are the part of security concerned with physical measuresdesigned to safeguard the physical integrity of systems, spaces, objects and human beings. It could therefore concern both individuals and groups of individuals, as well as theinfrastructure they depend on.
Physical security gains salience if a breach has occurred, is perceived to have occurred, oris perceived to be imminent or probable. Breaches of physical security may includeanything responsible for premature deaths, human suffering, or destruction or degradationof critical assets. Concrete examples include severe flooding, virulent epidemics, chimica accidents, terrorist attacks, but also local street attacks, domestic violence, forced labour,torture, and inhumane treatment.
[41] For more information on security dimensions across EU regions, see among others: Chmutia, K., Jovanovic, M., Bosher, L., Dainty A. and Burbiel, J (2015). The Complexity of Security Dimensions: a Comparison of the North-West and South-East European Regions. Future Security 2015. 15-17 September, Berlin, Germany.

The salience of this core value is relatively new with respect to other aspects of security, including both state security, security of critical infrastructures or citizens safety and security, because it has obviously increased after the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008. This may imply that a gradual recovery from the economic downturn would lead to a decline in the perception of salience of this core value – although it will remain subject of non-security related public debate. Still, for the time being and the short term, also considering the persistent instability in the euro-zone, the concern over economic prosperity and security is a part of the security discourse, which is very difficult to dismiss, and therefore this core value is significantly salient across the West Mediterranean EU region.

The third interesting element emerging from the coding is the differentiation among the national discourses in the three countries. Considering the differencies among Italy, Malta and Spain briefly outlined in the first section of this report, a certain degree of divergence among the case studies is not surprising. However, the way they diverge is interesting. In Italy, the second most salient core value is Social Stability and Security (17%); in Malta, Information and Cyber Security ranks third (18%); in Spain, Environmental and Ecologycal Security is within the three most salient core values. In the Italian case, the most prominent security challenges associated to Social Stabiltiy and Security are Terrorist attacks, Illegal immigration and Economic crisis. The diversity of threats is not surprising since this core value, according to the EvoCS Codebook, is not strictly defined, and therefore it is likely to be conceived in different ways across different countries. In Malta, cyber crime (including cyber attacks and fraud) but also communication interception and phone tapping are the security challenges related to the core value Information and Cyber Security. Finally, the geographical position of Spain, close to the Sahara desert, makes the process of desertification advancing in the Southern region of the country, together with the environmental impact of recurrent drought and fires. As a whole, the region present a wider range of security challenges than those easily identifiable as common concerns among the national security discourses, and this is per se a valuable findings insofar it warns against a too narrow and/or standardized approach to the security challenges in the region.

Such differentiation is enhanced by the fragmentation of security perceptions within each national discourse and across the region. In Italy, beside Physical Safety and Security Standing at 31%, there are six core values in the range of 7-17% score. In the Maltese case, no single core values reaches 25% of score, and six core values are above 10%. In Spain the core values could be distributed in three different groupings. The first one includes top core values: Physical safety, environmental and ecological security and economic prosperity. The second one includes information and cyber security as well as social stability and security, two core values that are gaining more and more attention from the different security stakeholders. Finally, political stability, cultural identity and territorial integrity, the are last three core values due to their low perception among the population as potential sources of insecurity.

3.2 Description of the security challenges, sources, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights

3.2.1 Security challenges

The securitity challenges are deeply interrelated across the region, as emerges in particular from the analysis of Italy and Malta. The same prominent issue, for example illegal immigration, can fall within different core values, such as physical safety and security and social stability and security, thus demonstrating that a theme can have multiple implications within the security debate and that the identified security challenges are complex and intertwined.

According to the coding results, in Italy the most prominent security challenges, common to more than one of the three core values, are terrorist attacks, economic crisis and illegal immigration. In addition, the qualitative analysis carried out underlines natural disasters as a further security challenge that falls within the core value of physical safety and security thus confirming its salience to Italy. The reasons of this additional selection come from events that have recently hit Italy, in particular the two major earthquakes in 2009 (L'Aquila province) and in 2012 (Emilia-Romagna region), as well as by further analysis that discuss the importance of the security challenge of natural disasters in the country. In particular, the regional workshop on West-Mediterranean Europe – held, not by chance, precisely in L'Aquila - contributed to give striking evidence of the significant impact of earthquakes (but also other natural hazards) on the definition of the concept of security in Italy.

Table 1 – Most prominent security challenges according to core values / Italy

Core values	Most prominent security challenges
Physical safety and security	Terrorist attacks
	Illegal immigration
	Natural disasters
Social stability and security	Terrorist attacks
	Illegal immigration
	Economic crisis
Economic prosperity and security	Economic crisis

In Malta, the most prominent security challenges appearing under the most salient core values are outlined in Table below. Among them, qualitative analysis identified as the most salient challenges appearing in more than one category:
- Illegal immigration;
- Cybercrime (which includes information and data loss, cyberattacks and fraud);
- Weather related events (including floods, storms, etc) and climate change.

The aforementioned complex interconnectivity of the debates that shapes the security discourse in Malta, as in Italy, is reflected in the correlation among most prominent security challenges and core values.

Table 3 - The most prominent security challenges / Malta

Core value	The most prominent security challenges
Physical safety and security	Illegal immigration
	Terrorism
	Gas [safety of storage facilities]
Economic prosperity and security	Financial risks
	Fraud
	Information loss
Information and cyber security	Communication interception
	Phone tapping
	Cyber attack

Many of the security challenges prominent in Spain (as identified by the coding exercise) are also in line with the ones identified in this region. A wide range of them is related to physical safety and security: terrorism and armed conflicts, demonstrations, violence against women, vulnerability of critical infrastructures, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, bombings, racist violence, health risks due to illegal abortions, sexual abuse, associated mental and health problems, psychological and physical aggression against civil servants, road-safety, security challenges related to car sharing platforms. Further qualitative analysis points out that public opinion is increasingly concerned about domestic violence (gender violence in Spanish) and the international terrorism due to the impact of the *jihadist* terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa. Recent developments on foreign fighters or home-grown terrorist are causing more political and social unrest as the traditional concern about local terrorism is fading.

Also the core value Environmental and Ecological Security is linked to a broad spectrum of security challenges: insufficient resources available for prevention, early diagnostics and treatment of contagious diseases (Ebola and others), biodiversity conservation, environmental pollution of oil exploration, natural gas supply, food import restrictions, natural hazards, flooding, extreme episodes of ice and snow, illegal exploitation of marine resources and damages of marine environment, acts against underwater cultural heritage, mercury pollution, accidents involving chemical weapons and nuclear risks. Beside the aforementioned desertification process, further qualitative analysis shows that the main perceived security challenge related to this core value is the price of the energy.

With regard to economic prosperity and security, the third core value, the related security challenges are: economic and financial insecurity, energy vulnerability, new poverty maps, welfare society at risk, natural gas supply, long term unemployment, families and children affected by the economic crisis, exploitation of migrant labor, and money laundering.

3.2.2 Actors
According to the coding, the landscape of actors across the West-Mediterranean region presents few important similarities. First, the national government is the main addressor in Italy and Malta (where it is important also as an addressee), and Spain where is still the main interlocutor for the three predominant core values in the national security discourses. At the same time, in all three

countries the private sector has an important say, particularly on cybercrime in Malta and with a strong position as both addressor (20.4%) in Spain (where it is also a relevant addressee). Third, the general public is the prominent object actor across the region, particularly in Italy (where it represents also the main addressee together with the general government), and in Malta where it is particularly concerned on illegal migration. Whilst other actor may play different but significant roles in each national case (e.g. national Parliament and civil society in Italy), the regional landscape is coherent with regards to the leading role of the government and, to a lesser extent, of the private sector, and the position held by the general public. This may represent one of the unifying characters of a regional security discourse which remains nevertheless significantly articulated.

3.2.3 Levels
Concerning the levels of the security discourse, the three countries show important similarities according to the coding. In all three cases the national level is the main one, being the principal dimension for actions by any addressor. This is expected in Malta due to the limited size of the country, but presents an interesting finding for the cases of Spain and Italy, where the local level normally plays quite a significant role. In Spain the low contribution of the local and subnational levels to national security discourse reveals that, despite of the security decentralization that took place in the last decades, those levels are still not considered as prominent as the rest of levels. In Italy, as underlined by further qualitative analysis, in the Italian case the local level should not be underestimated. The Italian security system is shaped in a very important way by the local level - municipalities, provinces and regions– which plays an important role for creating a general framework of security perceptions, identifying some specific challenges, potential risks and threats as well as providing tailored responses.
Finally, it should be noticed that the international role plays a secondary but not marginal role in Malta and Spain, in particular with references to the EU in relation to a number of policies.

3.3 Historical trajectory

As analysed in the previous sections, the historical trajectories of the three countries present obvious specificities and every country is deeply influenced by its own history and experience in the definition of its national security discourse.
By taking into account these different historical trajectories, some considerations can be made in terms of commonalities, and on the other hand in terms of differences. Italy and Malta had similar experience in terms of increase of illegal migration from the MENA region in the last decade, as instability exploded in the Southern and Eastern shores of Mediterranean Sea and both countries represent accessible entry points for the EU due to their geographic position and other factors. Another commonality is the economic recession experienced by Italy and Spain, with the dramatic consequences in terms of unemployment, poverty risk, economic insecurity, social tensions. Both countries also witnessed an increase of the perception of terrorist security challenge, but with a fundamental difference: Spain was directly targeted in 2004 and this changes profoundly its security discourse, while Italian public opinion is influenced by the rising terrorist threat both in Europe and in the MENA region but so far has not experienced a direct attack in Italy. Another relative similarity between the two countries regards the role of the Armed Forces: the shift from territorial

defence to military operations abroad has been important for the security discourse not only for Spain, mainly with the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also for Italy with 25 years of continued and large- scale involvement in international missions ranging from the Balkans to Middle East, Horn of Africa and Central Asia. Finally, all three countries have witnessed an increased importance of natural and man-made disasters, although of different nature: the Prestige sinking in Spain, the two earthquakes of 2009 and 2012 in Italy, the extreme weather events linked to climate change in Malta (droughts, storms, etc). On the other hand, in terms of differences, the historical trajectories of the three countries present diverging characters, particularly in the Maltese case where the impact of economic crisis has been lower, the experience in military operation abroad has been absent, and there has been a growing attention to cybercrime higher than Spain and Italy.

Overall, it seems to emerge a significant convergence of historical trajectories across the West Mediterranean EU region.

3.4 Overview of current trends

A good indicator of current trends is the acknowledgement of the most salient security challenges in national security strategies or other strategic/policy document, since the elaboration of these papers traditionally reflects a process of consultation within the government and with stakeholders aimed to identify relevant trends, threats and risks, beyond the latest media headline on whatever security issue.

In Italy, the most relevant institutional documents in this regards are: 2020 Report-Italian Foreign policy strategy (2008); Report on security intelligence policy and the results achieved in 2014 (2014); National Strategic Framework for Cyberspace Security (2014); White Paper on International Security and Defense (2015). All the above mentioned documents do cover the most salient core values, thus confirming that they are perceived to be salient at the national level. Moreover, by analyzing governmental and ministerial reports that provide guidelines for the national security-related policy for the next years, it emerges that the core value of physical safety and security receive greater attention. It can also to be underlined that some issues are presented in all documents, namely illegal immigration and terroristic attacks. Moreover, the 2014 Report on security intelligence considers economic crisis as a security issue, while the 2015 White Paper places high importance on it as important factor in shaping Italian defence policy.

Malta does not have a National Security Strategy, which makes harder to identify which are the relevant current trends. Actually, Malta is currently developing a national risk assessment, which is expected to identify the vulnerabilities and risks at a national level, incorporating single-risk and multi-risk scenarios. Cybercrime receives 'special treatment' as a Digital Strategy has been introduced in 2014, as mentioned before, thus confirming the trend of growing importance of this issue. Regarding climate change Malta's Economic Vision lists the main drivers for the country's economic prosperity and the first one is 'strengthening competitiveness in energy and climate policy'. Moreover, security of energy supply is often mentioned with regards to the Maltese economic prosperity, since the country is highly dependent on imported prime energy sources for the generation of electricity.

In Spain, the Government adopted a Spain Security Strategy (SSS) in 2011 and a National Security Strategy (NSS) in 2013. The latest document identifies risks such as terrorism, armed conflicts,

organized crime, economic and financial insecurity, cyber threats, uncontrolled migration, weapons of mass destruction, the vulnerability of energy supplies, public services and critical infrastructure together with the traditional emergencies and natural disasters or new risks as espionage and maritime insecurity. The risks of the NSS are not ordered by priority, so it is not possible to compare its salience for the Government.

As a whole, this overview is in line with the coding and the qualitative analysis including with regards to the historical trajectory. An open question regards whether the trends in terms of most salient core values and related security challenges are addressed by policies at EU level. The concrete analysis of the whole range of EU policies regarding economics, migration or climate change is obviously beyond the scope of this report. It is rather useful to highlight few interesting elements from the countries profiles which shed a light on the relation between the national security discourse and the EU level.

Regarding illegal immigration, a prominent security challenge in both Italian and Maltese cases, in 2006 the EU also launched several FRONTEX-led operations in the Central Mediterranean – up to Triton mission initiated in 2014 - providing some support with regards to border patrol and search and rescue efforts. However, these operations have repeatedly been delayed and interrupted, mainly due to the situation of anarchy in Libya as well as budgetary constraints and limited assets. After a strong diplomatic effort by Mediterranean countries like Italy, in June 2015 the Council of the EU has decided a military operation in June 2015 – the EUNAVFOR Med – "to break the business of smugglers and traffickers of people in the Mediterranean",[42] and has found an agreement on the principle of relocation across the EU of migrants rescued by Italian or Maltese authorities. EU countries have generally been reluctant to provide the patrol boats for the FRONTEX missions, as this entails the 'risk' that the country providing the vessels will remain responsible for migrants rescued or intercepted at sea. In the Maltese case, the national government has remained responsible for 90% of the surface coverage in Malta's search and rescue area, even in the framework of Frontex's operations. At the same time, it is worth mentioning that to address the issue of illegal migration, the EU has allocated over 126 million EUR to spend from 2007 to 2013 in the field of asylum, immigration and borders.

The EU has provided an economic support also in the case of major natural disasters occurred in Italy in recent years. Namely, in order to tackle the damages caused by the earthquakes in L'Aquila and in Emilia-Romagna, the EU Solidarity Fund allocated to Italy respectively 493.8 million and 670.2 million Euros. The latter turns out to be the highest amount ever allocated since the establishment of the Fund in 2002. However, the Italian security discourse does not seem aware of the role played by the EU in addressing such a challenge at least from an economic point of view. Indeed, according to the Eurobarometer 383 of June 2012 about the 54% of Italians declare not to be aware of the fact that the EU coordinates civil protection actions, both inside and outside the EU. By the same token, about 69% of Italian citizens don't feel "Well informed" or feel "Not very well informed" about EU civil protection activities.[43]

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[42] Council of the European Union, Press release and statements, "Council establishes EU naval operation to disrupt human smugglers in the Mediterranean", 18 May 2015, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/18-council-establishes-naval-operations-disrupt-human-smugglers-mediterannean/.

[43] F. Di Camillo et al., The Italian Civil Security System, IAI Research Papers n. 11, Nuova Cultura, Rome, February 2014, p. 85, http://www.iai.it/sites/default/files/iairp_11.pdf.

A third interesting element comes from the Spanish security discourse. The crisis has highlighted the speed and virulence of the economic contagion and the difficulties of the different levels of responsibility – including the EU one - to respond to global economic problems that affect national prosperity. Governments cannot address global economic risks alone, but neither can international organizations on their own due to their limited power to address those systemic risks. As a result, in the Spanish case national strategies will likely continue to securitize economic prosperity instead of delegating its responsibility to the freedom of market or to the international governance as they did before. In this manner, it has become increasingly evident that security can be threatened both by financial instability and the lack of adequate global economic governance.

As demonstrated in this section, whilst sharing much of the security challenges not only within the region but also with the EU policy, [44] the case studies also have some prominent differences that affect the overall popular discourse.

4 Findings and conclusions

4.1 Summary of the country profiles

The anlaysis of the three country profiles comprehesively points towards the long-term salience of the predominant core values and threat identified.
In the Italian case, the most prominent security challenges identified by the coding process, namely terrorist attacks, illegal immigration and economic crisis - plus natural disaster resulted from the qualitative analysis - are likely to show different levels of salience in the next years. More specifically, whilst illegal immigration and terrorist attack can be considered as long-term security challenges, economic crisis could progressively lose its salience in the near future. In fact, as the formers represent side-effects of enduring turmoil affecting the MENA region, they will probably continue to pose a credible threat to Italian security and to preserve their salience, since the regional situation seems far from reaching stabilization. Similarly, natural disasters can be regarded as a long-term security challenge given Italian peculiar geologic nature, which determines an high level of exposure to these kind of events. As for economic crisis, instead, the perspective of a slow and gradual recovery from the economic downturn might lead to a decline in the perception of salience of this specific security challenge – although it will remain subject of non-security related public debate. To conclude, in light of these considerations and taking into account the interrelation between security challenges and core values, it follows that the predominant core values, namely physical safety and security, social stability and security and economic prosperity and security are likely to maintain their salience in the near future.

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[44] In this regard, it is worth mentioning that some of the security challenges perceived as prominent at the regional level partly match with those identified by the 2003 European Security Strategy. In fact, the document recognizes Terrorism to be a threat for European security. Furthermore, the EU official document points out State Failure and Regional conflict as potential challenges for EU security, that not directly mentioned as security challenges in the West-Mediterranean region, are closely connected to the threat of Illegal Immigration. For more details, please see: European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003.

In the Maltese case, the findings stemming from the literature review and from the coding exercise are aligned: all of the discussed security challenges - illegal immigration, cybercrime, and extreme weather and climate change – are salient and long-term, and will remain as such in the near future. In addition, it is clear that these security challenges – and the core values within which they are identified – are closely interlinked. Cyber crime is a security challenge all actors are vulnerable to, and the recent introduction of the National Digital Strategy demonstrates a commitment to imminently release a national cybersecurity strategy. Illegal immigration, a relevant security challenge since the 2000s, will remain salient until the political situations in the countries of origins of the immigrants have not improved. In addition, this security threat contributes to the additional challenges within cultural and social core values, insofar ethnic minorities are segregated and exploited rather than integrated, and racist sentiments among the Maltese populations are rising. Climate change has only recently become salient in the national security discourse. A number of existing laws which are in force in Malta demonstrate the country's commitment to mitigation. Securitisation of climate change takes place due to its impacts on other security challenges such as food and energy supply, which in a long-term may affect Malta's economic prosperity and security

In the Spanish case, in the near future current core values will likely remain salient but they can modify their components. In the case of physical security, there is a growing concern about radicalization and violent extremism that interact with new phenomena such as the jihadist terrorism and groups of radical ideology. Concerns about the new type of terrorism replaced the social concern about the national terrorism and its securitization will deserve a prominent place among future priorities of national security discourse. The possible return of foreign fighters to Spanish territory and, above all, the possible radicalization of Muslim citizens of second generation, a phenomenon already seen in some Spanish cities as Ceuta, Melilla and Barcelona, is also worrying. The trend of securitization of economic prosperity will continue in the near future given the convergence of the different security stakeholders in stressing its salience. The lasting current levels of unemployment, especially among young people, combined with the economic inequality that is affecting large segments of the population, could evolve into economic insecurity if social unrest progress into riots and violence. This would affect other core values such as social stability. Domestic violence against women is another component that does not decrease despite the increased social awareness and the securitization of police and judicial response. In the environmental field, the effects of global warming will continue aggravating the problems of drought, desertification and water stress that affect to the most vulnerable territories, affecting economic interests such as tourism, industry and agriculture.

4.2 Key findings

It is possible to outline a regional regional security discourse for the West Mediterranean EU region by drawing from the national discourse. This does not mean that every country in the region shares the same security perceptions, nor that each core value or security challenge enjoys the same degree of salience in every single country. Instead, these findings underline commonalities and complementarities among the national security discourses, and provide an overview that aid a deeper understanding of the popular security discourse in the region.

Starting by core values and most prominent threats, the regional picture is marked by an **high degree of differentiation and fragmentation**, with no single overwhelming predominant core value and a distribution of attention across several core values.

In such landscape, the core value **physical safety and security has a relative greater salience** with respect to the others across the whole region. It is **followed by the economic prosperity and security** core value, which again is salient in the regional security discourse but not really on top of the security agenda (although it may well be the top political priority in general terms).

In other words, the regional security discourse is marked by **two complementary characters**. On the one hand, a kind of **"man of the street" perception of security**, which primarily focuses quite narrowly on the individual, his/her family, house, working place, village or neighbourhood. This core value is felt threatened first by illegal immigration and terrorism across the region, but also by natural disasters and estreme weather related to limate change. On the other hand, a sort **of "it's the economy stupid"[45] perception of security,** whereby the economic crisis has been securitized due to its dramatic and enduring consequences over unemployement and poverty – and therefore economic security.

Yet, the regional security discourse is not at all limited to those core values: **social stability and security, environmental and ecological security, cyber and information security** are the other core values well represented in the regional security discourse. Accordingly, threats such as cybercrime and desertification are relevant issues in such a picture.

Moreover, the picture shows a **great degree of interrelation**, since in many cases a single security challenge affects more core values. For example, **illegal migration** is related to physical safety and security, economic prosperity and security, social stability and security, cultural identity and security. The same goes for **natural and man-made disasters,** which are correlated to physical safety and security, environmental and ecologic security, economic prosperity and security.

To sum up, the regional discourse in West Mediterranean EU seems to **move away from the traditional core value of territorial integrity and security, by rethinking security in economic and environmental terms and by dealing with borders porous to terrorism and illegal migration.**

Another couple of key finding regards the **actors and levels** of the regional discourse. On the first front, the **national government** is the main addressor across the region, followed by the **private sector**, while the general public is the prominent object actor. With regards to levels, in all three countries the **national level** is the most important, the principal dimension for actions whoever is the actor that calls for an action.

If we couple these two findings on actors and levels, this tells something interesting about the **dominant political framework** for the countries in the West Mediterranean EU. Indeed, it seems to be that national level and national government are still the two main points of reference for the security discourse. Despite the **pressure towards EU level** to address challenges which are by nature global or at least European, as well as the **shift towards local identities**, interests, and levels experiences by several EU countries – including Italy and Spain – in recent years, Italian, Spanish

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[45] The quotation "It's the economy, stupid" was attributed to Bill Clinton presidential campaign in 1992, when he won against the incumbent president George Bush his rival was leading the US during the successful end of the Cold War, also tanks to his strong focus on national economy.

and Maltese public opinion still look mainly to their respective **governments** - while the political class and the private sector still talk mainly to the **national audience**.

Such element may contribute to explain why the **EU role** with regards to some of the most prominent threats of each national discourse, i.e. the economic support to address earthquakes' effects in Italy or illegal migration in Malta, **it not that evident** in the eyes of the respective popular discourse. This finding should be read also as warning towards the possible future impact of European actors – including EU institutions and other Member States – in this regional security discourse.

Finally, a key finding stem from the analysis of the **historical trajectory** of the three countries in the West Mediterranean EU region. In fact, seems to emerge a strong **convergence between Italy and Spain,** since both countries: had experienced similar dramatic economic recession in recent years; have witnessed an increase of the perception of terrorist threat, although with difference intensity; have shifted Armed Forces' role from territorial defence to military operations abroad. **Malta case is somehow different** in this regard, because of a number of reasons. At the same time, **Malta and Italy had similar experience** in terms of increase of illegal migration from the MENA region in the last decade. On top of this, **all three countries** have witnessed an increased importance of natural and man-made disasters, although of different nature.

To some extent, the sum of the historical trajectories of the three countries can be summarized at regional level in the following way: **Italy presents almost all key characters of the overall historical trajectory of the region, which are largely shared by Spain and partly shared by Malta**. There are important **overlaps and commonalities** among the three countries and particularly between Spain and Italy and between Italy and Malta, while the **major differences** are present between **Spain and Malta** which metaphorically lie at the opposite ends of a regional spectrum centered on Italy.

4.3 Recommendations for decision-makers and stakeholders

The analysis of the security discourse in West Mediterranean EU is not sufficient per se to formulate concrete policy-recommendation since the rationale was to understand how the popular discourse perceives actors, levels, core values and most prominent security challenges rather than to discuss the formulation and implementation of specific policies. Bearing in mind this caveat, some recommendations can be elaborated for decision makers and stakeholders interested in the regional security discourse and the related security policies, in particularly from the EU institutions point of view – but not only.

1) **Most of the prominent security challenges linked to the salient core values should be addressed more from the EU level policies.** Overall, there is little positive consideration in the regional discourse for the contribution given by the Union to address the threats on the spotlight, concerning for example economic crisis, illegal migration and natural disasters/extreme weather linked to climate change. For example, it is worth noticed that the EU Civil Protection Mechanism has undergone a reform process since 2013 to ensure 24/7 monitoring of request for assistance, and to ensure a set of response capacity tools (the so-called "Modules") pre-committed by Member States that are available for deployment also

in non-EU Member States. Despite such example of improvements, the state of the art of the regional discourse includes the perception of an inadequate role played by the Union on several policy areas related to predominant threats. This perception may result from problem within a certain EU policy and/or from a problem of communication about this EU policy: in any case, it is a problem to be addressed.

2) **The national level should be the target of actions from policy-makers and stakeholders since it is the main level for the security discourse.** Although initiatives at local level may have a certain impact depending on the policy-area, the target audience and the circumstances, the national level is where the security perceptions are shaped and therefore the main arena for action – in terms of both policies and discourse.

3) **National governments and the private sector should be considered the main interlocutors for policy-makers and stakeholders,** since they are the main actors in the regional security discourse. Once again, the picture is more articulated and NGOs, think tanks, academia, etc, do play a role in the national security discourse. Yet the largest say belongs to these two actors, which therefore deserve a priority engagement.

4) **Engagement of different stakeholders by national government is critical**. The analysis of national security strategies or security-related documents highlighted the limited contribution by non-institutional stakeholders to their drafting, and this aspect should be addressed. Risk assessment as well as definition of an adequate prevention or response mechanism would need to be elaborated through an inclusive dialogue among central governments and other relevant actors, including the private sector but also the broader public. National institutions should devolve more attention to their communication strategies, and work for the convergence of their perceptions of security and those of other relevant stakeholders. Such a process would lead to the elaboration of documents reporting shared visions and common perceptions in the security domain, thus ensuring a broader support to the resulting public policies.

5) **Breaking the myths about illegal immigration and terrorism is important.** More attention should be devoted to the debate concerning illegal immigration and/or terrorism that can be distorted by extreme (sometimes racist) positions that often influence public perception. This trend could produce additional security challenges within the two core values of social stability and cultural identity. EU and national institutions, in cooperation with think tanks and academia, should try to engage a debate on this including the broader public, by providing the public opinion with a clear and complete picture of these issues. More specifically, the logic behind this idea is to dispel some myths through the explanation of concrete facts and figures provided by academia and think tanks, with support of national institutions in terms of communication tools.

6) **The degree of convergence among national historical trajectories should be taken in high consideration.** That means not to expect such a transformative impact from external actions, for example from EU level, on trends which are deep-rooted and long term in the region. In turn, this also implies not to rise expectations on the positive effects of such

actions, which would likely be disappointed given the persistence of certain issues and characters in the national and/or regional picture.

7) **A "one solution fits all" approach deos not work.** The regional report shows that each country has its peculiarities when it comes to the security discourse. Such aspects should be taken into consideration in view of a strengthened and coordinatated approach between national and EU institutional actors when defining the action and response to the most prominent threats, in order to elaborate a targeted approach that meet the needs of each country. In other words, despite the importance of convergence at regional and EU level, policy-makers should not fall into the illusion that "one solution fits all".

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