



D 6.2 – Case Study on the Eastern EU Border

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Executive Summary

	Lithuania	Poland	Hungary	Eastern EU Border Region
Key Values	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Territorial integrity and security 2. Political stability and security 3. Social stability and security 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Physical safety and security 2. Economic prosperity and security 3. Territorial integrity and security 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Economic Stability and Security 2. Physical Safety and Security 3. Territorial Integrity and Security 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Territorial Integrity and Security 2. Political Stability and Security 3. Physical Safety and Security
Security Challenges (Note: Not ranked in order of importance)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ukrainian crisis 2. Energy security 3. Eurozone integration 4. Cyber threats 5. Road safety 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ukrainian crisis 2. Energy security 3. Unemployment 4. Demographic trends 5. Eurozone integration 6. Road safety 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Foreign ownership of land 2. Energy security 3. Unemployment 4. Demographic trends 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Ukrainian crisis 2. Energy security 3. Unemployment 4. Demographic trends 5. Road safety
Levels of Action (Note: Ranked in order of importance)	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National 2. (tie) International (abroad) 3. (tie) Regional (transnational) 4. Subnational (Province/state/region) 5. Local (municipality/commune) 6. Global (world) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National 2. International (abroad) 3. Regional (transnational) 4. Local (municipality/commune) 5. Subnational (Province/state/region) 6. Global (world) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National 2. Regional (transnational) 3. International (abroad) 4. Global (world) 5. Subnational (Province/state/region) 6. Local (municipality/commune) 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. National 2. International (abroad) 3. Regional (transnational) 4. Local (municipality/commune) 5. Subnational (Province/state/region) 6. Global (world)
Key Actors (Note: >50%)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National government • National parliament 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General public or individual citizen(s) • National government 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National government • National Parliament 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National government • National parliament

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List of Acronyms

Abbreviation / acronym	Description
CBOS	Public Opinion Research Centre (Pl: Centrum Badań Opinii Społecznej)
CERT-LT	Lithuanian National Computer Emergency Response Team
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DDoS	Distributed Denial of Service
DURC	Dual Use Research of Concern
ECHR	European Court of Human Rights
EEB	East European Border
EU	European Union
EvoCS	Evolving Concept of Security
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Corruption Perceptions Index
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (also IS, ISIL)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PLN	Polish National Currency (złoty)
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1 Introduction

Member States at the eastern European Union border form a very special group of countries. They have a common Cold War history of limited sovereignty and civil resistance to authoritarian rule. They share experience of democratic changes of 1989, followed by political and economic transformation and, eventually, accession to the transatlantic (NATO) and European (EU) integration frameworks accomplished between 1999 and 2007. This rich record provides a strong foundation for communality in their approach to security, reinforced by their geopolitical position on the “Eastern flank” of both EU and NATO, and relative distance to Southern and Western Europe, generating asymmetric threats like terrorism, or non-military security challenges, for instance uncontrolled migration. Yet, there are differences between them when it comes to threat perceptions, strategic interests in security policy, and the tools and methods chosen to implement it.

How such differences appear in practice is illustrated by the countries chosen as case studies for the “Eastern EU Border” analysis of the EvoCS project. Moving southwards through the region: Lithuania, Poland and Hungary have their very own specific characteristics which strongly affect the understanding of the notion of security among their civil society, opinion leaders, political elites, academia and business. This report is meant to explore these differences, indicating their possible sources and consequences for the regional profile, or “concept” of security.

Lithuania represents a sub-group of the region – the “Baltic three”, which also comprises Estonia and Latvia. These are three countries that regained independence following the end of the cold war, and only after more than 50 years within the Soviet Union. Further, they are small states, economically dependent on Russia and linked to their former dominium strongly due to large Russian-speaking minorities. Ever since the resurgent tensions between the West and Russia, and mostly after the annexation of Crimea and the start of Moscow-sponsored insurgency in Eastern Ukraine, the Baltic States have been indicated as the most vulnerable part of EU and NATO. The exposure of those countries to hybrid warfare is of particular concern for Allies from NATO and partners from the EU.

Poland, in turn, is the largest country in the region, aiming – even if not openly – to take a position as the leader in Central-Eastern Europe. Over the last 20 years, the Polish economy has sustained continuous, positive growth, though its energy sector remains dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies. The large population, augmented by significant diasporas in Europe and America, dynamic growth and size of its economy, unique geopolitical position and the image of the country which “dismantled” the communist system, all mean that Poland has significant resources at its disposal to pursue its strategic interests relative to other countries in the region. Despite these factors, Poland remains prone to a number of threats generated by both state and non-state actors, even if there has never been a serious attack or terrorist act on Polish territory to date.

Finally, Hungary represents the Visegrad Group (comprising Slovakia, Czech Republic and Poland, analyzed however as a separate case) – a caucus of medium-size states in the very center of Central-Eastern Europe. Situated between Poland and the Baltic States when it comes to both population and the size of its economy, Hungary is much more entangled in the regional interplay of economic and political interests. It develops close relations with Russia and openly declares it does not feel threatened by Russian policy and military potential. It tries to pursue active policy vis-à-vis its diaspora in Ukraine, Romania and Slovakia and struggles to recover from long-lasting economic crisis, which undermined welfare perspectives for large parts of its population. Finally, it is following a

narrative critical of the current shape of European integration processes, which often finds it at odds with Brussels' political institutions.

This brief look at the most basic characteristics of the three countries chosen as case studies allows one to argue that they capture the diversity of the region, which is often seen as largely homogenous. This report will provide a more detailed analysis of the commonalties and divergences, based on original EvoCS methodology, between the three countries, and the roots and consequences thereof.

2 Country profiles

2.1 Lithuania

Security discourse in Lithuania attracts great public interest and willingness to get involved in problem solving. The most important security risks and threats are considered to be ones whose potential consequences are the most immediate to Lithuania. While analyzing Lithuanian public discourse, it might be noted that various interpretations of its security concept become a part of presentation of daily information, and the security concept itself becomes important factor in the framing and perception of risks. The Lithuania case study seeks to identify the principles of construction and presentation of security discourse, as well as the risk types and risk localization which gain the most attention. It is also relevant to determine the participants of Lithuanian security discourse and opinion shapers, most frequently referenced countries, and the events considered as the most relevant to the framing of security discourse.

Research puts Lithuanian public discourse into the following individual fields of security themes: territorial integrity, political stability, psychological security, ecological security, cultural identity, economic welfare, and information and cyber security. The results of this research reveal that attention on risk types is unevenly distributed in the context of security, as some risks are considered more important and more relevant than others. More than half of all security-related texts fall into the category of territorial security and political stability. In case of even the smallest potential military threat to Lithuania, other themes are made less relevant, resulting in the greatest attention paid to territorial integrity and political stability.

It might be assumed that discourse on military security is the prevailing one and considered as the most important in Lithuania. This trend occurs because of historical memory, particularly the period of occupation, the consequences of which remain relevant in current Lithuanian society. The most important topic in Lithuanian military discourse is Russian policy in Eastern Europe, especially regarding Ukraine. Slightly less than in case of military security, a significant number of texts deal with political stability and the resulting threats to the state of Lithuania. Information and cyber security is one of the more relevant topics in this context – mostly because of Russian propaganda and the threat of cyber attacks.

Economic and social security aspects are characterized by similar positions. Taking into account the general context, it can be assumed that these areas are not priorities in Lithuania with respect to security conceptions in comparison with discourse on military security. The least attention in the general context of researched texts is given to ecological security and the related threats, as well as to psychological security and preservation of cultural identity.

2.1.1 Characterization of the core values

Analyzing Lithuanian public discourse for references to security in the period of 01-11-2013 – 31-10-2014, texts selected included public documents, academic publications, media articles, information, provided by NGOs and private sector.




Figure 1: Salience of Core Values for Lithuania

According to research results, “territorial integrity and security” (22,72%) and “political stability and security” (20,98%) are the most salient core values in the Lithuanian security discourse. These are followed by “social stability and security” (15,20%), “information and cyber security” (14,89%) and “economic prosperity and security” (13,38%). Conversely, the least relevant topics were “physical safety and security” (5,54%), “environmental and ecological security” (4,67%) and “cultural identity and security” (2,61%). The main topics in Lithuanian security discourse were territorial integrity and political stability, which include - the “Russian factor”, Ukrainian-Russian conflict, propaganda and the information war in media.

2.1.2 Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights

While analyzing the case of Lithuania, the prevailing levels defining security localization are local, national and international. The research revealed that security in Lithuanian public discourse is mainly concentrated at the national level. The state is seen as the key security actor/subject; over half of the analyzed texts referred to threats to the state. Although Lithuanian national security is the most relevant and most frequently discussed topic, the literature also focused on identification of national threats of other countries, for example, while generally speaking about security of the Baltic countries. Slightly more than one third of the texts dealt with international security and threats by emphasizing the regions of international conflicts. The least attention was paid to sub-national, transnational and global security contexts.

Research revealed that security, relating to Lithuania, was considered as the most relevant, as Lithuania was referred to in approximately 80 percent of the analyzed texts. Other countries (Russia, Ukraine, USA, EU, and Poland) also played an important role in Lithuanian security discourse. Russia is referred to in over one third of documents discussing security or threats. Following the information

collected during research, it might be assumed that the relevance in specific discourse of risks and threats relating to Russia is mainly influenced by historical experience, state policy and diplomatic relations of Lithuania and Russia.

Throughout the research period, Ukraine is referred to in over a quarter of texts. It might be stated that the relevance of the events that have taken place in Ukraine was mainly influenced by political and military situations, which is commonly perceived as a threat to Lithuania and other countries, particularly within the Eastern and Central European region.

USA is referred to in nearly every sixth text on relations between Russia and Ukraine, where the United States of America is considered one of the main strategic and ideological partners and allies in the event of threats to national or international security. What is more, the USA is often mentioned when presenting the results of various research on security and threats, and NATO positions, especially in academic articles.

The European Union stands out as an individual international actor in the category of states. In the information and political agenda of Lithuania, the European Union is more relevant and important than other world countries as it is referred to in over one in six texts. What is more, the texts, especially media discourse, describe security and risks related with other states. Great attention is paid to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, positions of countries in the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership, especially Moldova and Georgia. However, the references to these countries can be considered as random as their security and threats are not included in the spectrum of the most relevant ones to Lithuania.

Although a total of 43 countries were referred to in articles during the research period, the attention given to the five most frequently mentioned countries (Russia, Ukraine, USA, EU, Poland), comprises 88% of all references identified in the texts. It can be assumed that only a narrow stretch of threats is comprehensively reflected, while other threats are only mentioned without detailed discussion. The priority in discourse is given to the countries with the potential to have the greatest impact on Lithuania's and the world order, and security dynamics.

Another interesting issue for analysis, apart from core values, types of threats and the actors involved in Lithuanian security discourse, are its participants. In this case, it is essential to find out what contributed to shaping opinions in the context of security. Politicians and government officials, scientists, and professionals of individual fields are usually in the center of discourse. Manifestation of other discourse participants (NGOs representatives, private sector, society) by participation in public discussion is limited.

The assessment of security problems usually invokes the view of politicians or government officials on the prevailing situation. This phenomenon may be related with the personal ambitions of Lithuanian politicians to be visible and to take an active part not only in legislation or governance processes, but also in social life. Thus, by speaking on relevant security risks topics at various levels they are able to indirectly communicate with potential voters, in attempts to shape public opinion.

2.1.2.1 Territorial integrity and security

In 2014, there were a particularly large number of texts (scientific publications, public documents, media articles), related to Russian aggression in the context of security. It might be stated that this radical change of situation was largely influenced by events in Ukraine, and Russia's policy with respect to this country. Usually, Russian aggression was associated with military threats – more than

twice as often as with political and other security threats. In addition to this topic, international (EU, NATO) security and the national security of Lithuania were commonly discussed.

Throughout the research period, the crisis in Ukraine was closely related to Russian aggression. It was the second most frequent subject, associated with security, in media discourse. In case of crisis in Ukraine and Russian aggression, the largest attention was paid to military and political discourses. However, Russian aggression was commonly discussed as an international risk, while the crisis in Ukraine was more often presented as a national problem in the media. It allows stating that events in Ukraine became important not only because of the situation itself (military aggression, security of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea), but also because of the possible transfer of Russian aggression to other countries. Russian aggression is perceived and presented as a more frightening phenomenon on the regional or global level than as something specific to the crisis in Ukraine. Military and political stability risk type, international – regional risk localization, and the frightening nature of discourse prevail in the texts and documents on this subject.

Russian threat is obvious its securitization, and it has already taken root in Lithuanian security discourse, however, this consideration of Russia is not the only and not necessarily the best alternative of Lithuanian politics.¹

Gražina Miniutaitė is very accurate in describing the importance of confrontation between East and West in Lithuanian foreign policy: “the Baltic countries <...> were creating the narrative of belonging to the West, where the East had to play the role of threatening “others”. The West is associated with prosperity, security, and democracy, while the East – with poverty, uncertainty, and insecurity. Positive identification with Europe is related with separation from non Europe with particular emphasis on the threats, posed by Russia”.²

According to realists and geopoliticians, US military power in Europe, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, is vital for Lithuania with respect to “hard” security, while the conflict or collapse of Western collective security structures poses an existential threat to it as to the subject of foreign policy.³

Events in Ukraine have had a direct impact not only on Lithuanian energy security, but also on understandings of energy security. Russian actions with respect to Ukraine revealed what some analysts had said much earlier: while living next to Russia, we cannot lose vigilance because threats to security (including energy) always exist. If most Western European countries have considered the threats arising from Russia, and suspiciousness of the Baltic countries, as poorly reasoned so far, the real Russian threat is now clear, while the Baltic countries have already felt its consequences long before (first of all, as a result of high prices for energy resources). The events in Ukraine highlighted yet another important aspect – the drawbacks of planning policy.⁴

The Baltic countries recognize that they are in the periphery of Europe, they understand their minority, resulting insignificance in policy circles, and the vulnerabilities these lead to. As a consequence, perceptions of insecurity remain an integral part of national identity for the three Baltic countries at the beginning of the twenty first century.⁵

¹ N. Statkus, K. Paulauskas, Tarp Geopolitikos ir postmoderno: kur link sukti Lietuvos užsienio politikai? 2008, P. 39.

² G. Miniutaitė, “Convergent Geography and Divergent Identities: A decade of transformation in the Baltic states”, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16, 2, 2003, P. 214.

³ Č. Laurinavičius, E. Motieka, N. Statkus, Baltijos valstybių geopolitikos bruožai. XX amžius. 2005. P. 192.

⁴ Energy Security Research Centre, Lietuvos energetinis saugumas: metinė apžvalga, 2013-2014, 2015, Vytautas Magnus university, P. 46.

⁵ D. Jakniūnaitė, Baltijos valstybės ir Rusija: liminali dvišalių santykių būseną, 2013, Politologija, 2013 3 (71), 41.

2.1.2.2 Social prosperity and economic security

Health risks and social health aspects were the most often referred topics in Lithuanian public discourse following Russian aggression and the crisis in Ukraine. Furthermore, the field of social stability of society is rarely discussed at international or global levels; assessments are usually presented at the national or local level. The most relevant themes in the context of social risks in Lithuania include pension, benefit systems and children's rights protection.

As for health risks, the theme of African swine fever is present and attracted considerable media attention in January-February, 2014, when discourse had not yet been filled with military and political topics. This theme mostly discussed issues of animal safety and measures to prevent the spread of this type of fever. What is more, the economic factor was also significant here, since as information that Swine fever had spread to Lithuania appeared, the country's meat export to other states was disturbed. This event is presented as a national threat. Security, next to this topic, was referred to only in the form of threat perception.

The theme of Lithuanian national security defines risk localization. This is one of the few themes in Lithuania where the concept of security is dominant, while its nature is more often neutral rather than frightening. National security is commonly associated with aspects of military and political stability. In this context, there are two main partners in security and defense policy: USA and Poland.

Economic well being and security are also a dominant type of risk. However, while analyzing the themes of economic problems, other types of risks are often included as economic factors. For example, Russian aggression and the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine led to the sanctions against Russia, conditioned by decisions of Western politicians, which caused a response to EU countries and, thus, disrupted imports and exports, and resulted in economic crisis. In the case of Lithuania, a particularly relevant economic aspect is the threat of Euro currency implementation, since citizens are afraid of possible increase in prices due to the change in currency.

2.1.2.3 Information and cyber security

In 2013, one of the largest cyber attacks (DDoS) against news portal "Delfi.lt" took place. This website slowed down or was completely unavailable from abroad for a time, while the attack itself lasted two days. In the event of these cyber attacks against media, there is a threat that even bigger attacks can take place in the future in Lithuania.

According to "CERT-LT", the number of cyber incidents increased by 43 percent during 2014. The tense political situation in the sphere of international relations does not decrease, while threats to cyber security continue to grow. Media, being the major public informer and bearing the function of mass mobilization, attracts substantial attention from other countries as well. The threat of cyberattacks, seeking to shift popular opinions, is considered a crucial future challenge for Lithuanian media, including the largest online news portals, television, etc.. The attack against one of the largest Lithuanian news portal "Delfi.lt" could be initial one. Therefore, clear risk and appropriate communication should be provided, seeking to reduce the impact of real threat.

Russia more and more often expresses its dissatisfaction with the development of the Russian information space in the Baltic States. The public declarations of this powerful neighbor show the intentions of Russia to strengthen its impact on the information space and to enhance its position in the mass media. Russia's dominance in the mass media of the Commonwealth of Independent States

as well as of the Baltic States has considerably decreased over the last decade. The governments of former Soviet countries have adapted their national language policies with an eye to reducing Russian-language media in their countries. There is a problem with the free information space which is filled up by other countries, interested in the development of their influence on the Baltic States as well as on all formerly socialist countries.

The Russian information space is important for the Lithuania. The expansion of the information space becomes the political ambition of Russia. Russian is the most popular foreign language among the citizens of the Baltic States. Taking into consideration the circumstances, Russia tries to fill up the information space with meaningful and qualitative mass media products and increase its influence in the region. There is one more issue in the former Communist countries: a number of households do not watch national television, preferring Russian programming. The policy of the Baltic States does not support national, high-quality mass media production and does not develop the prospects for future information policy. There are no national strategies for information policy, perspectives of the information space or the presentation of the country abroad.

With reference to the Russian media propaganda content, it is important to know that viewers watching Russian television believe they watch the same programs as viewers in Moscow. However, this is not true. The people do not see the difference between national and Russian television programs. Moreover, Russian humor becomes an integral part of viewers' ideas. Russian television shows and films are purchased cheaply by commercial television stations in the Baltic States. Where there is demand there will be supply. The demand for the Russian production dates back to the times when the Russian language was an obligatory subject at school. Thus, the supply does not reflect the situation in the market. The First Baltic Channel is an example of the subdivision of the state television as well as the state-sponsored information process. The population of Lithuania is not homogenous and there are several national minorities. There are Russian-speaking citizens in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia who receive all their information, including about the country they live in, from the First Baltic Channel or other Russian channels. Russia thus has the opportunity to exert considerable influence. A part of the Russian information must exist in Lithuania because Russia is the largest neighboring country. However, there should be an adequate balance, indicated by the information policy of each of the countries.

The Russian media regularly launch propaganda campaigns against Lithuania on the territory of Russia. The elements of propaganda can be seen in the reports of Russian media, the public speeches of politicians as well as in the political and economic blackmail. The temporary cooling of relations is caused by the actions of the Russian government, which has been strongly supported by Russian media. Regular propaganda attacks on Lithuania can be interpreted as Moscow's aim to destroy the unity of the Baltic States. It is true that Russia has an impact on Russian-sponsored mass media in the Baltic States, but the Kremlin does not affect the national media in those countries. It is worth discussing the concept of the Russia's new foreign policy. The Baltic States are the places to be invested, with an emphasis on energy and media sectors. There is an opinion that the Baltic States consider the problem to be a local one. The Russian media industry wants to enter the markets of former Communist countries as well as the European one.

This conclusion is based on the data revealing substantial use of Russian television channels and radio stations in Lithuania. However, it is obvious that Russian media are mainly popular among Russians and Poles who live in the Baltic States. Lithuanians, Latvians and Estonians are strongly pro-Western. Searching for evidence of Russian influence, data regarding the usage of Russian media productions are related to social tendencies. Those people who are interested in the Russian information space have pro-Russian sentiments. However, those who never use Russian media have may also share positive opinion about Russia.

The Russian mass media have considerable influence in Lithuania as well as in all former Soviet states, since there are a number of people who know the Russian language. The mass media of the Baltic States should not distance themselves from Russia and Russian information. Currently, Lithuania and Russia experience an imbalance in the information space, with Russia enjoying the favorable position. The balancing of information could be considered the solution to this problem.

2.1.2.4 Human Rights and Ethics

Human rights and ethics are unfairly misrepresented in the coding results. Since Lithuania's accession to the EU, regress rather than progress with respect to human rights has been noticed. More detailed analysis of this situation revealed that the obvious drawbacks occur as a result of the lack of legal documents, e.g., the Law on Ethnic Minorities, refusal to adopt the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages or regulations against discrimination (law or education discrimination, regulation of problems, related with usage of minority language, adaptation of special procedure for ethnic minorities during Lithuanian language examination).⁶

Lithuania lacks regulation of legal solutions and guarantees of the rights of ethnic minorities. This sequence of events takes place even after countless international legal obligations related with protection of specific social groups. Lithuania is the country in Europe, that first ratified the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, however, the Law on Ethnic Minorities expired after some time. Thus, since 2012, the lack of defending law has been noticed.⁷

2.1.3 Selected characteristic in relation to salience of values, addresses and addressors

In information, provided by security discourse, "threat" is a more-of used concept than that of "risk", and securitization discourse is one of the key discourses in this context. The concept of "security" is essentially characterized by a more positive tone than either "threat" or "risk" in Lithuania. It might be identified that risk is more used, while speaking of security and social stability. A threat, as a concept, is commonly applied for naming aspects of security regarding territorial integrity. Threats and frightening discourse prevail in media discourse, while security and risk factors are more frequently presented in academic publications and public documents.

News flow, related with security issues, is large in Lithuania. Thus, media must carry out news selection and filter only the most relevant events. Russian aggression, referred to in more than one in five texts, evinces what threat is presented as most important in Lithuanian public discourse. It is important to note that military threats, hostile policies of other states and the generally poor international security situation are perceived as dangerous to Lithuania not only in the military, political and economical sense, but also with respect to cultural identity and information security. These texts focus on Russian propaganda, which is directed towards Lithuania, and threats of military potential, sanctions, and limitation of economic relations.

Furthermore, significant attention was paid on to Ukrainian crisis during the research period, and in many cases Russian aggression and the Ukrainian crisis were mentioned as inseparable topics. Other themes of political aspects related with the threat of Russia to Lithuania were also frequently

⁶ European Foundation of Human Rights, „Žmogaus teisių įgyvendinimas Lietuvoje 2012–2013 metais“ ataskaita. Source: <http://lt.efhr.eu/2014/08/22/glausta-efhr-zmogaus-teisiu-paisymas-lietuvoje-2012-2013-metais-ataskaita>

⁷ Ibid.

discussed, including national security, military conflict, and energy security issues. In the context of military discourse, great attention was attracted by social security themes, which were completely unrelated with it previously, as well as the threat of African swine fever in Lithuania.

Other themes, subject to less attention, however still important in security discourse should be mentioned; eight texts referred to technologies, fifteen texts discussed the euro and issues of the Economic Community, nine texts spoke about child psychology, six texts presented information on climate change, eleven texts gave information on road safety and accidents, six texts referred to animal welfare and protection, twenty one texts talked about ethnic minorities in Lithuania, twelve texts referred to migration, market, natural disasters and pollution, four documents discussed abortion, twenty four – national identity and referendum on the sale of land to foreigners.

Looking at “addressor & addressee and addressee” coding results, the dominant actors were the national government, the national (domestic) parliament and regional state apparatus’ (domestic). International institutions, the general public or individual citizen(s), civil society, and foreign governments also made some mention of security issues. These actors were mostly engaged in the discourse on “political stability and security”, “territorial integrity and security”, “information and cyber security”.

With regards to “territorial integrity and security” and “political stability and security” the majority of discourse came from the national government, the parliament, international institutions, and also regional state apparatus’. Considering “information and cyber security” and “economic prosperity and security” it was the national government and the parliament. Regarding “cultural identity and security” and “environmental and ecological security” core values, the actor who spoke most was again, the national government. However, on issues of “social stability and security” and “physical safety and security” it was not only the national government, but also civil society and the general public or individual citizen(s) who contributed to discussions.

Looking at “addressor & addressee and addressor” coding results, the dominant actors who were considered obliged to work on particular security issues were the national government, the national (domestic) parliament, academia and research institutes, and international institutions. These actors are most closely linked with the “political stability and security” and “territorial integrity and security” values. With regards to these two core values, the most important actors were the national government and the parliament as well as academia and research institutes.

2.1.4 Historical trajectory and overview of current trends

The national security strategy of Lithuania, developed in 2012, provides long-term strategic direction for various areas of public administration, whereby national security system development, foreign defence and domestic policy priorities are introduced for ensuring the national security of the state.⁸ What is more, the strategy presents a vision of secure state development to the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, in order to ensure each member of the society is ready to contribute to its implementation.

Favourable internal and external factors include the following: functioning democratic institutions; protection of citizens’ rights and freedoms; implementation of control of civil armed forces; respect of the international community for the independence of the Republic of Lithuania; an open, transparent, and non-confrontational security policy implemented by the Republic of Lithuania; membership in NATO, EU, and other international security organizations; and friendly

⁸ Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania. Source:
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=4445&p_k=1&p_d=126816;

inter-state relations.⁹ “However, the state can face challenges of national budget consolidation and sustainability of public finances. Although there is no direct military threat to state sovereignty and territorial integrity, the security environment is dynamic, complex, and difficult to forecast; it is affected not only by military actions, but also by political, and economic, social, cultural, technological, natural challenges, and events in other fields”¹⁰.

The strategy emphasizes that the factors, dangers and threats of external risk which national security institutions must pay particular attention to are economic and energy dependence, nuclear energy development in the region (when done without following international nuclear energy safety standards), activity of other states against the Republic of Lithuania, cyber attacks. Key internal factors, dangers and threats are uneven social and economic development, corruption, and high emigration rates.¹¹

The document also introduces priorities and tasks of implementation of national security policy, which will provide conditions for consistent pursuit of national security objectives, as stipulated in the Law on the Basics of National Security, i.e., through the concerted efforts of the state and its citizens, to develop and strengthen democracy, to ensure the safe existence of the nation, and internal and external security of the state, to deter any potential aggressor and to defend the independence, territorial integrity and constitutional order of the state of Lithuania.¹²

2.1.5 Conclusions

When discussing the prevailing security discourse in Lithuania, it might be stated that the most attention is paid to national security and the resulting threats, with the most often mentioned countries being: Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine, which together occupy 80% of the total discourse. Usually, the role of opinion formers is assigned to researchers/practitioners and politicians/government officials. The analyzed texts are dominated by discourse of neutral and frightening tones, while positive discourse is extremely rare.

After reviewing the most relevant events in Lithuanian public discourse during the research period and the trends of their formulation and presentation, it might be concluded that perception of Russia as a threat is presented as the essential one and attracts the greatest public attention. The topics of territorial integrity and information and political security are the main ones in Lithuania, which are conditioned by the factor of Russia.

Focus on themes of security and risk is unevenly distributed in Lithuanian public discourse; one set of themes (territorial integrity, political, information security), is highlighted more often, while the others are set aside (cultural factor, ecological problems, psychological security). During the research period, most of the media attention was given to themes related to Russian aggression, the crisis in Ukraine, and information public space and social well-being in Lithuania. All of Lithuania’s bordering countries were among the most frequently referenced states, however, the security and threat events related with them failed to catch up to the issue of Russian aggression in respect of hazard assessment degree

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

2.2 Poland

Among the Central and Eastern European members of the European Union, Poland is the largest, and with its population of over 38.4 million¹³, the most populous. According to the International Monetary Fund, in terms of GDP, Poland was the 9th biggest economy in the EU¹⁴. Despite the economic crisis-driven obstacles, Poland is steadily catching up economically with Western EU countries¹⁵. It has also proven to be an ambitious political player within the EU and NATO. Poland also marks its security presence by engaging in, and strengthening cooperation in the regional formats, i.e. the Weimar Triangle, Visegrad Group, and bilateral cooperation with the Baltic states.

Recent history and the post-1989 transformation experience, as well as the East flanking position within both EU and NATO, make the country's security perceptions particularly sensitive to its neighborhood beyond the EU's Eastern border. Poland has been a consistent supporter of democratic reforms in the Eastern European (post-Soviet) countries and is in favour of building and strengthening their links with the EU and NATO. At the same time, increasing demand for energy coupled with the country's reliance on external energy sources, i.e. gas and oil dependency on Russia and other former USSR states, not only pose a potential challenge to the country's internal economy, social and political stability but also limit its political clout in its relations with the European Union's Eastern neighborhood.

The crisis in Ukraine has had a considerable bearing on perceptions of security. In April 2014, public opinion polls noted the highest sense of military threat among Poles since 1991. As the conflict between Russia and Ukraine broke out, almost a half of the respondents of public opinion polls (47%) believed that there is a direct threat to Polish independence. Similar sense of risks (44%) was noted only in 1991, at the time when many were concerned whether the Soviet Union, still existing at the time, would accept the democratic changes taking place in Poland. When compared with the data from December 2013, there is a striking contrast, with those results pointing to only one person in five expressing concerns about Poland's territorial security. According to that poll, the vast majority of Poles (74%) believed that independence of Poland was not at risk. Only 16% of respondents at that time were convinced that such a threat existed¹⁶.

Despite the above results, the long run overall assessments point to broadly understood physical safety and security as well as economic stability and security as the most prominent core values of security. This is reflected by the public awareness survey conducted in 2012, which pointed to the economic and financial crisis as a top threat to Poland's security gaining 6,43 on the average threat assessment scale from one to ten. At that time, threats of military or nuclear attack against the territory of Poland were at the bottom of the list, scoring 2.02 and 1.67 respectively¹⁷. Certainly, one

¹³ <http://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/population/population/population-size-and-structure-of-population-and-vital-statistics-in-poland-by-territorial-divison-as-of-december-31-2014,3,13.html>

¹⁴ 2012 GDP in current prices, USD-denominated, IMF, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2014.

¹⁵ According to Eurostat data, Poland's GDP per capita in 1995 was 43% of the average of EU countries, in 2000 it was 48%, and in 2013 – already 67%, see Macroeconomic Analysis of Polish Economy, Ministry of Treasury of the Republic of Poland, available at <http://www.msp.gov.pl/en/polish-economy/macroeconomic-analysis/6404,Macroeconomic-Analysis-of-Polish-Economy.html> (accessed 22 June 2015).

¹⁶ CBOS, Opinie o bezpieczeństwie narodowym, February 2013, p. 3.

¹⁷ White Book, p. 78. Reference to CBOS, Assessment of the State of National Security. The Report from the Survey Conducted by the CBOS at Request of the National Security Bureau, January 2012. The survey was conducted on 1–8 December 2011 on a representative random sample of 950 Polish citizens by direct interviewing of respondents at their homes.

should draw a line between traditionally understood, state oriented security perspective concerned with the independence and inviolability of borders and between security perceived in broader economic, social or political terms. Respondents to the survey in 2012, when asked about what the security of the country depended on, among top three factors indicated: a modern army (definitely strengthens the security 48%, rather strengthens the security 37%), military alliances (definitely strengthens the security 44%, rather strengthens the security 39%) and then a high level economic development of the country (definitely strengthens the security 38%, rather strengthens the security 42%)¹⁸.

2.2.1 Characterization of the core values

Coding conducted for Poland (201 sources) revealed the following hierarchy of the eight core values: Physical safety and security (1), Economic prosperity and security (2), Territorial integrity and security (3), Political stability and security (4), Information and cyber security (5), Environmental and ecological security (6), Cultural identity and security (7). These core values generally match the challenges identified in the strategic security documents. However, the coding exercise allowed these core values to be placed in a hierarchy.




Figure 2: Core value rankings, Poland

Although, conducted against a limited probe of sources (201), the coding exercise enabled us to identify and verify the salience of specific security values.

¹⁸ White Book, p. 80.

The coding exercise confirmed that nowadays, it is difficult to approach security discourse solely from a traditional, politico-military perspective. Although the focus of the national security debate is on the national level, it is supplemented by a considerable international dimension. Discussing and responding to security challenges is impossible without drawing links between core values, security challenges, subject actors and security objects present and relevant across various levels, ranging from municipality through to the United Nations Security Council. Only then one can identify which threats and subjects should be the primary focus of security providers at various levels of security action, whether there is a possibility to reach a solidarity of interests between the actors involved and at which level a given security issue will be best dealt with.

2.2.2 Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights

2.2.2.1 Physical safety and security

Physical safety and security is a broad concept consisting of a number of issues relevant for maintenance of multilayered internal security. This core value reflects the physical safety and security of state institutions, citizens, common and individual tangible and intangible assets against non-military threats. The latter include crime, terrorism, and counterintelligence, as well as law and public order-related challenges or the state's (insufficient) protection potential (through specialized services and guards) and other threats to public security stemming for instance from technical and natural disasters. Under the chapeau of physical safety and security one can also include threats to the functioning of critical infrastructure, including critical ICT systems, cyber-crime or attacks. Importantly, information and cyber security was classified as a separate core value, and therefore did not contribute to the overall predominance of this core value.

Physical safety and security relates to the state's ability to react in the event of a threat involving the protection of legal order, life and health of citizens and property against illegal actions and the consequences of natural and/or technical disasters. It concerns measures designed to safeguard the physical integrity of systems, spaces, objects and human beings. It could therefore concern both individuals and groups of individuals, as well as the infrastructure they depend on.

The need to improve Poland's national security system in order to limit the dispersion or duplication of responsibilities of specific entities and to increase the level of coordination between them is a systemic challenge which is mentioned across most governmental sources. Regarding physical safety and security, this challenge is reflected in insufficient coordination between crisis management structures, relevant institutions and private actors. This also relates to insufficient coordination and delimitation of the scope of activities and responsibilities within the civil protection system.

Road traffic safety is the most often mentioned security challenge in relation to physical safety and security. The scale of this phenomenon and its presence in the public debate including in the media, parliamentary and governmental sources makes it one of the key aspects discussed under the core value of safety and security. This is not surprising given the fact that the number of traffic-related accidents, including deadly accidents, in Poland remains among the highest in the EU. The debate concerns, among other things, changes in road traffic regulations, in particular the adoption of stricter regulations regarding speeding in built-up areas or in the vicinity of schools etc. as well as improvement of road and rail infrastructure.

The government sources examined stress the salience of potential threats to the undisrupted functioning of critical infrastructure and access thereto as one of key aspects of national security. There are two general groups of risks to be considered here. First, potential risks in maintenance and

protection of critical infrastructure which require high levels of cooperation between the government, local authorities, private operators and owners. Second, possible attacks (including cyber-attacks) on, or destruction of national critical infrastructure, which may bear serious consequences for national and regional security. There is a need to increase the efficiency of these structures in order to build greater resistance to both non-military and military threats, including various states of emergency.

Poland, due to its geographical positioning, over the past years has suffered from extensive floods (for example in 1997 and in 2010). These events have exposed deficiencies and inequalities between various regions of the country in terms of providing flood protection infrastructure. Flood prevention is an important element of the discourse relating to physical safety and security, in particular within parliamentary sources, and concerns mostly local/regional levels.

Organized crime (economic, drug and criminal) is mentioned in all national security strategies as a threat to national security, sometimes in strict relation to terrorism. However, compared to the 90's, the organized crime scene today does not represent the same level of organization and hierarchy as it used to. Unsurprisingly, crime or public disorder-related challenges appear most often in newspaper sources, which point to instances of hooliganism, petty crimes and theft. One of the common challenges mentioned was public unrest and/or hooliganism appearing in the context of mass events related to football matches, protests or demonstrations, or even performances given by controversial artists.

Internal and external cyber-crime is commonly listed and discussed as a security challenge. Possible cyber-attacks will gain even more salience in the near future. One of the main challenges in this regard are the difficulties pertaining to delimiting the scope of responsibilities for addressing cyber security threats between various state agencies and private actors.

Challenges pertaining to possible terrorist attacks are commonly recognized as a threat falling within the context of physical safety and security (as opposed to territorial security and integrity). Importantly, however, terrorism as a security challenge is understood mainly through the international dimension – jihadist terrorist threats. Given Poland's religious and ethnic homogeneity, terrorism is rarely, if ever, considered as posing a direct threat to Poland's security. Such risks are considered in relation to, for example, the conflict in Syria (and the increasing number of Europeans joining armed jihadist opposition), or more directly, in relation to Polish embassies and forces participating in international peace or stabilization operations.

Other security challenges relevant to physical safety and security are closely linked with other core values, namely social security and political stability and security. These include demographic related challenges (decrease in birth-rate, increase in emigration, ageing society affecting social security system), limited access to health services, the Ebola virus, food safety and security, unhealthy eating habits, obesity among children and youth or the misapplication of dual use research of concern (DURC).

2.2.2.2 Economic Prosperity and Security

Economic prosperity and security is strongly linked with other core values, in particular with territorial integrity but also social and political stability. The economy directly concerns individuals, households, companies, private and state entities, the labor market, national and international trade, the public finance sector, energy, infrastructure (including critical infrastructure), the defence industry and military security. Any serious disturbance to the fragile economic and financial stability of the region may have an impact on Poland's security.

At the local and national levels, demographic crisis and migration to- and out of Poland due to labour shortages, together with continuously decreasing birthrates are seen as posing serious challenges to economic security. At the same time, these phenomena reflect the present security deficiencies in this regard. The prolonged state of low-level financial security and the financial crisis in the Euro zone are seen as potentially aggravating economic disproportions and disparities within Polish society as well as between Poland and other EU Member States. Specific concerns relate to, among other things, high unemployment rates, low internet infrastructure density, low levels of social capital, social exclusion of large families, the elderly and persons with disabilities, and unequal access to goods and services.

Although Poland did not directly suffer from the negative consequence of the economic crises of the past decade and its GDP *per capita* has steadily been increasing, the country is still in the process of eliminating the development gap in relation to Western European economies. The general challenges it faces are the potential stagnation of economic growth and being caught in the middle-income economy trap. In this context, the European Union level is of primary concern for economic stability and security, as is reflected in the debate on whether and when to join the Euro zone and the potential consequence of this move.

At a regional (international) level, financial and economic crisis is seen in the increased tendency of the EU member states to think through the lens of state (individual) or regional objectives. Deterioration of relations between the EU and Russia and the international sanctions – tit for tat has led to backlashes posing a potential political and economic challenge. Coupled with a lack of common security perceptions and mutual understanding thereof, the result is a decrease in solidarity and radicalization across European societies.

Energy comes across as key for economic security in terms of internal and regional economic stability. Poland's dependence upon deliveries of natural gas and crude oil from external sources, mainly from Russia, and its limited abilities of transporting and storing energy carriers makes energy security an important political pressure tool. The security challenges stemming from Poland's increasing demand for energy and the country's dependence on one major external supplier were recently strengthened by the Ukraine crisis. The most commonly mentioned challenges linked to energy security include: transmission lines from Russia to Western Europe bypassing Poland and Central and Eastern Europe; cut off in supplies as a result of Russia treating energy as means of political pressure; dependence of the reliability of supplies on relations with producers and exporters of energy carriers (instability in Russia and transit countries – Ukraine, Belarus); downgrading of the energy infrastructure; systemic loss of control over Polish energy resources to the advantage of foreign companies; EU policy related to limiting greenhouse gas emissions leading to decline of a substantial part of Polish heavy industry.

Public opinion polls from 2014 show a strong increase in the sense of military and economic insecurity triggered, among other things, by Polish overreliance on Russian energy resources. The polls show stronger support for solutions offering renewable energy (58%) and nuclear power generation (48%) energy sources¹⁹. In January 2014, the Ministry of Economy adopted the Polish Nuclear Power Programme, which determines the priorities of Polish energy policy regarding nuclear

¹⁹ J. Ćwiek-Karpowicz, Poles perception of energy security and nuclear energy in the midst of the Ukraine crisis, PISM Bulletin No. 110 (705), 25 August 2014.

power²⁰. However, some NGO actors specifically view nuclear power as a challenge to physical safety and security, and most importantly to the environment²¹.

2.2.2.3 Territorial integrity and security

Perceptions of security challenges to territorial integrity originate from several factors. The most prominent of these is political and social instability in the countries to the east of Poland, the proximity of frozen conflicts coupled with the region's simultaneous military growth. Other factors often mentioned include the erosion of arms control, transparency and confidence building regimes in Europe, risks of destabilization of the Euro-Atlantic security order and the weakening of EU structures. Another group of challenges relates to the insufficient preparedness for modern asymmetric and cyber warfare. However, current major security challenges to territorial integrity originate mainly from the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. According to the common narrative, this conflict confirms and exposes Russia's expansionist politics and its potential to destabilize not only neighboring countries, but the current political and normative world order. This conflict holds multilayered implications for Poland's security, and has revealed existing tensions in the region. At the same time it has substantiated the placement of traditionally understood threats in the center of the security discourse in Poland.

Prior to the crisis in Ukraine and the subsequent annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation, possible eruption of an armed conflict immediate to and threatening Poland's territory was considered to be unlikely. Government and parliamentary sources have long recognized the risks of rapid deployments of military assets, practical demonstrations of strength or military blackmail as challenges, which should not be underestimated. However, before the "Maidan protests" and the subsequent conflict in Eastern Ukraine, direct, armed threat was viewed as highly improbable. The escalation of the Ukraine crisis has contributed to a significant shift in the general perceptions. Today, an eruption of a large-scale conflict in Poland's immediate neighborhood that could eventually spill into Poland's territory is one of the publically and officially discussed scenarios.

Since 2001, Poland's defence spending has been fixed at 1,95% of GDP, which is among the highest among EU and NATO member states. Following the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the government plans to increase defence spending to 2% of GDP as of 2016²². Emphasis is put on modernizing military equipment to achieve greater inter-operability and compatibility of the Polish armed forces. The armed forces modernization programme for 2013-2022 is worth approximately PLN 400 billion and is one of the largest public investments ever made by Poland since 1989²³. The modernization programme was preceded by two other significant reforms: suspension of the universal draft in 2008, and the 2014 re-design of the command structure. These two changes were conducted with the

²⁰ Polish Nuclear Power Programme, Ministry of Economy, January 2014, available at: <http://www.mg.gov.pl/Bezpieczenstwo+gospodarcze/Energetyka+jadrowa/Program+polskiej+energetyki+jadrowej>.

²¹ Greenpeace, Atom w Polsce – ślepa uliczka rządu, informacja prasowa, 27 January 2014, available in Polish at: <http://www.greenpeace.org/poland/pl/wydarzenia/polska/Atom-w-Polsce---lepa-uliczka-rzdu/>.

²² Prime Minister's Annual Address, Increase in defence spending <https://www.premier.gov.pl/en/expose.html#16601>, see also Orędzie Prezydenta z okazji Święta Wolności, 15 sierpnia 2014, available at <http://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/wydarzenia/5599,Oredzie-Prezydenta-z-okazji-Swieta-Wolnosci.html>.

²³ The Fund for Modernisation of the Polish Army was created based on article 11 of the Law on reconstruction and technical modernization and financing of the Polish Armed Forces of 2007, Journal of Laws 2009, item 67, as amended; See also Technical Modernisation Plan and Program of Development of Polish Armed Forces for years 2013-2022, <http://archiwalny.mon.gov.pl/en/artukul/13792>.

objective of adapting the armed forces to requirements of modern battlefields, particularly with regards to territorial defence scenarios.

The importance of territorial integrity and security for Poland is also reflected in its external policy, which aims at sustaining cohesion and credibility of NATO and developing a functioning Common Security and Defence Policy within the EU. Poland is an advocate of detailed contingency plans, which would specify allied response to conventional military conflict in Central and Eastern Europe, and of conducting regular live exercises verifying these plans. Poland's goal was to change the NATO defence posture by deploying NATO forces and other assets (equipment, training centers etc.) in Central Europe, including in Poland. Following the eruption of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, Poland has very actively pursued all these goals.

Nevertheless, for the moment, the actual challenges for Poland posed by the ongoing conflict and sanctions policy toward Russia are of an economic nature. Interestingly, the crisis in Ukraine has also given rise to concerns in parliamentary circles with regards to the international and political marginalization of Poland due to its weak standing in the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine and general disinterest in global issues, including peace processes beyond Europe.

The threat of military conflict or a frozen conflict in the close neighbourhood of the EU is also strongly linked with social and political stability and security. The major challenge pointed to in this context is the lack of cooperation among EU Member States, as well as between the EU and the US, to the extent which may jeopardize the *status quo* of the Euro-Atlantic order, its security, social and political stability and prosperity.

2.2.3 Selected characteristic in relation to salience of values, addresses and addressors

Looking at the salience of actors engaged in the security discourse as addressors and addressees, there is a clearly visible dominance of the national government, the parliament and the EU. Academia also seems to be an important element. Unsurprisingly, physical safety and security as well as social stability and security, these are the areas of security in which regional state apparatus gains importance. The actors engaged in the discourse regarding economic stability and security are the national government the parliament and the EU, followed by academia and the private sector.

The most prominent actors (addressors and addressees) with regards to territorial integrity are the national government, the parliament, and academia, as well as the European Union and international organizations. The presence of academia in this list can be explained by the fact that academic articles analyzed included publications going as far back as ten years, and the selection of articles often concerned Poland's accession to NATO. The two other most commonly mentioned values in academic sources are social stability and security, economic prosperity and security, information and cyber security, and political stability, leaving cultural identity and security far behind. Interestingly, when analyzing salience per source, territorial integrity is the most salient value mentioned in academic sources and the second in parliamentary debates and media sources. However, although the government is among the most salient addressors, territorial integrity as such is not of common concern in the strategic documents (it occupies one of the three lowest ranking positions, preceding only cultural identity and security, the least salient core value across the majority of sources). To that end, one must keep in mind the specificity of government sources, which list and discuss practically all core values as equally relevant for the overall security landscape. Certainly, the Government is aware of the broadening concept of security, which is reflected in policy making and planning.

Looking at media sources, physical safety and security takes the lead, followed by territorial integrity and economic prosperity, political stability and social stability, and information and cyber security. Given that the media sources analyzed provide news rather than analysis or policy planning, there is no surprise in the media's focus on these topics. At the same time, these sources express actual perceptions.

Parliamentary publications point out economic prosperity as the highest-ranking core value, followed by physical safety and security and territorial integrity. Parliamentary debates, compared with other sources, tend to put greater focus on energy-related environmental aspects of security, which reflect the link often made between economy and environment in the energy security debate (not a core value as such).

The private sector is unsurprisingly concerned mainly with economic prosperity and security, which is followed (far behind) by social stability and security and territorial integrity and security, as well as information and cyber security. Interestingly, according to the data analyzed within this category, there is very little interest in security aspects pertaining to physical safety and security.

The NGO sector, on the other hand places political stability and security on the par with cyber and information security as the two most salient core values. These two are followed by social security and stability, physical safety and security, cultural identity and economic prosperity and security as well as territorial integrity. The predominance of political stability and security and cyber and information security may derive from the fact that the NGO sector is the largest and most active actor pushing for and engaging in public debate concerning data retention and the right to privacy as well as broadly understood good governance issues. A relatively high ranking of cultural identity reflects the fact that NGOs often fund and promote activities pertaining to inter cultural dialogue and sustainable local development, through means such as education and scholarship programs.

2.2.4 Historical trajectory and overview of current trends

Article 5 of the 1997 Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides: *The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development.*

Article 5 of the Constitution sets out the agenda of the government's strategic framework of national interests and corresponding strategic objectives in the fields of security and development. It also divides the strategic policy into two general groups of interests: development and security. The development interests are elaborated in integrated development strategies. The coding exercise for Poland has proven to value and weigh against one another the values which represent a wide spectrum of human as well as institutional, state and non-state activity, which are considered across strategic documents.

Following 1989 and the fall of communism, Poland stepped through the iron curtain and faced numerous challenges related to the transformation of its political, social and economic system. The main objective was to join NATO and then the EU. These two organizations were perceived as the pillars of the state's security, warning off potential aggressors. The changes the country embarked on at that time are reflected in the strategic documents of the time, which stressed Poland's inherent membership in the family of countries belonging to Western civilization.

The most recent National Security Strategy of November 2014, referring to article 5 of the Constitution, lists the following core national security interests and sets corresponding security objectives:

- possession of effective national security capacities, ensuring readiness and ability to prevent threats, including deterrence, defence and protection against them, as well as elimination of their consequences;
- strong international position of Poland and membership in reliable international security systems;
- individual and collective protection of citizens against threats to their life and health, as well as against the violation, loss or degradation of goods (tangible and intangible) which are important for them;
- ensuring that citizens freely enjoy freedoms and rights, without detriment to the safety of others and of the security of the state, as well as assuring national identity and cultural heritage;
- ensuring a sustainable and balanced development of the social and economic potential of the state, with particular attention paid to environmental protection, as well as living conditions and health of people as the basis of existence.

Reading the coding findings in light of the above list from previous National Security Strategies (respectively of 2003 and 2007), one cannot object that the Polish concept of security has adopted a comprehensive understanding of security and addressed a broad spectrum of non-military security interests. However, a comprehensive approach to security policy seems to be overshadowed by a visible recurrence of politico-military threats in the discourse relating to security. Since 2010, the focus of executive discourse has shifted to more traditional military threats and away from non-military considerations, such as those related to economic development, legal reforms and social stability²⁴, (which had been more prominent in the years following Poland's accession to NATO). Today, next to the country's membership in NATO and the EU, maintaining and developing national defence capabilities has become the primary pillar of national security. At the same time, erosion of the Euro-Atlantic security architecture continues to pose the largest potential threat to Poland's overall security in the long-term perspective.

Despite some considerable differences across sources, the top three core values gained a relatively high ranking compared to other core values. It is evident that territorial integrity has become one of the key elements of the security debate throughout 2013 as the Ukraine crisis developed and eventually led to an open conflict between Russia and the West. The hierarchy revealed by the coding indicates that territorial integrity, preceded by physical safety and security and followed by economic stability, will certainly remain one of the most salient security concerns in the coming years. This is determined by Poland's political and geographical positioning in the EU, NATO and in the region as well as the relevance of the conflict for other areas of security including economy and the energy sector. The important factors which are missing from this study, but will gradually gain importance in the public discourse, are the conflict with ISIS and its expansion as well as the refugee crisis in the Mediterranean. It is evident that over the past years cyber and information security has

²⁴ National Security Strategy from 2003, what is also visible in the one from 2007, stressed "the shift from the classical risks that decrease in importance and towards the unconventional risks that originate with hardly identifiable non-state entities".

emerged as an important aspect of security, however, it is yet to increase in its importance in the overall perception of security.

2.2.5 Human Rights and Ethics

Human rights and ethics, an important complementing element of the project, is underestimated in the coding results. This is due to the fact that human rights are rarely referred to in explicit security terms, which was the case only in relation to a few articulated human rights and ethics security issues.

Territorial integrity and political stability. Considering human rights and security internationally, the focus on the crisis in Ukraine prompted by concerns due to the potential violation of the right of self-determination and the prohibition of aggression as jeopardizing the commonly accepted basic principles of international law and relations between states. Ethics are also mentioned in relation to the challenges related to the EU's migration policy and humanitarian crisis in the EU's neighborhood. Emerging economies, on the other hand, are often linked with an alternative approach to democratic values, ambiguous approaches to human rights standards, labor and welfare rights and environmental issues.

At the national level, human rights are linked with security in the context of the CIA rendition center in the north of Poland and the European Court of Human Rights judgements in the *Al Nashiri* and *Abu Zubayda* cases. These judgements stress the clash between providing security from terrorism and ensuring such basic human rights as freedom from torture and the right to fair trial. The ECHR found that Poland violated these rights, among others, by allowing for torture to take place on its territory and by its passive approach to investigating alleged violations in question. All this was done in the name of fighting terrorism and building stronger, reliable ties with the United States.

Physical safety and stability, social stability and security economic stability and security. In the time period between November 2013 and October 2014, the ratification of the Council of Europe's Convention on countering violence against women and domestic violence was among hotly debated issues in the parliament, media and general public. Some groups opposed this human rights treaty claiming that it puts at risk national cultural identity and value systems. The debate was broadly covered in parliamentary debates, the media and NGO reports. Another human rights issue which appeared in relation to security was discrimination. Specifically, in relation to national and social minorities, in particular Roma, persons with disabilities, and the elderly. However, the most common problem raised in the sources were surveillance and data retention, which pose risks of unjustified limitation of one's rights to personal freedom, privacy and data protection. The ethical issues that arise in relation to economic stability and security touch upon social exclusion of vulnerable groups, climate and environmental protection in relation to energy.

In relation to the core value of political stability and security, a number of sources mentioned the phenomenon of legislative inflation as a threat to good governance. A few sources referred to the challenge posed by regulations excessively interfering in freedom of speech not justified by the necessity to ensure public order and state security. Freedom of speech was also mentioned in parliamentary sources by the political opposition noting the lack of pluralism in the media.

2.2.6 Conclusion

Since the fall of communism and following the period of transformation, Poland's security is often defined as dependent on its membership in NATO and in the European Union. The country's security perceptions are therefore strongly linked with its eastern flanking position in both of these


organizations. The results of this research project have been strongly influenced by the crisis between Russia and Ukraine, which confirmed the experts' views that currently, the most salient challenge to Poland's security will arise from the political and democratic instability in its eastern neighborhood. Potential crisis in the region is seen as possibly affecting not necessarily Poland's territorial integrity directly, but as destabilizing the country's economy, political and social stability. At the same time, however, the coding shows the relevance of a comprehensive approach to the security discourse which gives due consideration to the very broadly defined categories of physical safety and security and economic prosperity.

2.3 Hungary

According to the research data, the security discourse in Hungary is shaped mainly with regard to threats concerning the stability of the internal systems of the country, the greatest of those being the functioning of democracy in Hungary. Other topics connected (in)directly to the internal system of the country – such as war, terrorism, crime and environmental issues – are subjects of the discourse to a lesser extent. Substantial portions of the issues outlined are present-driven but the emergence of those does not necessarily lie in the examined period. Still, the discourse is mainly lead by current events, and party politics and the government may place their focus on entirely different topics.

2.3.1 Core values and prominent threats

According to our research findings, “economic prosperity and security” and “physical safety and security” are the most salient core values in the Hungarian security discourse. These are followed by “territorial integrity and security” and “political stability and security” with an insignificant difference between them (15.3% and 14.7%, respectively).



To understand the different discourses in relation to these core values, the most prominent categories of perceived threats have been selected and analysed according to their relevance with regards to the core values. While occasionally threats correlate with a single core value, most threats are seen as undermining more than one core value.

Elements considered to threaten democracy or democratic institutions and values constitute the most prevalent themes in the data (22% of the cases are involved). These threats are mainly connected to the core values of political stability, cultural identity, physical safety, and economic prosperity. The second most salient theme is connected to the independence of Hungary. These concerns are most likely to relate to the core values of territorial integrity, economic and environmental security. The next theme that emerges from the discourse, employment and social security, falls into the cross-section of the core values of social and economic security. Perceived

threats in this realm are expressed through particular issues, such as problems in public and higher education, low employment rates, and the lack of social security in Hungary. More than a quarter of the cases under analysis involved the theme of energy security. Concerns of this sort were related mainly to the values of environmental and economic security, but were also connected to those of territorial integrity and physical safety. The significant theme of inequalities and threats connected to minority groups invoked the core values of cultural identity and social stability. In the Hungarian security discourse, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict mainly appeared as a threat to territorial integrity, cultural identity, and physical safety. Elements regarding the so-called “demographic crisis” – such as the increasing rate of emigration, low birth rate and population decline rates – are mainly connected to the core values of social stability, economic prosperity, and territorial integrity.

As regards the most recurring connections of the core value of economic prosperity with various threats, these include energy security, and demography, national sovereignty, employment rate and social security.

Regarding addressors, 60% of security issues communicated by academia and research centres and 45% of issues conveyed by the Hungarian government concerned economic security. Themes addressed in the civil sphere and by the Hungarian government showed similar distributions; 39% of these were connected to the core value of economic prosperity and security. In relation to economic security, the three main addressees, the Hungarian government, the European Union and the national parliament, were referenced to similar extents (39-40%).

2.3.2 Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights

2.3.2.1 Sources

Nearly half (48%) of the 280 variable sample came from newspaper articles, with an additional 35% from reports made by parliament. The remainder of the sample contained: academic publications (9%), government policy documents (5%), and NGO reports (3%). Among the characteristics of the Hungarian sample was the complete lack of the private sector resources that involved securitisation. In addition, resources coming from the civil sphere did not reach the desired proportion since it is common for civil organizations to publish reports on certain topics rather than annual summary reports. We see inadequacy regarding government policy documents referring to regional (subnational) issues that stems from the Hungarian state’s ever-increasing centralization of legislation and state administration.

Numerous dissimilarities can be noticed regarding the proportion of threats occurring in the resources. Threats concerning democracy are addressed mainly by the left-wing newspaper, parliamentary publications and NGOs, far more often than by academic resources and policy documents. Threats concerning the sovereignty of Hungary are transmitted mostly by parliament and the academic sector, and those connected to employment rates were focused on by parliament and the left-wing newspaper. The issue of energy security was emphasised by the left-wing paper as frequently as by the right-wing press; however, the resources most concerned about this theme were NGOs, policy documents of the government and academic sources. Threats concerning minorities were mentioned mostly by NGOs and the left-wing newspaper; demographic problems were addressed primarily by the left-wing newspaper and parliament. It is interesting to note that the theme of the conflict in Ukraine is attached exclusively to the media, more particularly to the right-wing paper.

2.3.2.2 Addressors, addressees, and object actors

The Hungarian government and the Parliament emerge both as addressors and addressees in the national security discourse. The general public is seen mostly as an object actor.

Given the above, only the threats addressed by parliament and the government were analysed. Notably, parliament addressed threats concerning democracy (30%, while the government did so in only 8% of the cases examined), the sovereignty of Hungary, the issue of employment rates and social security as well as demographic problems. On the other hand, threats concerning energy security, minorities, and the Ukrainian-Russian conflict were addressed mostly by the government.

2.3.2.3 Subject actors

In addition to the topics addressed, subject actors responsible for particular threats were also examined. Surprisingly, threats assigned to Hungary's responsibility were the largest group (47%) of all. Threats included in this group were those related to the current government, previous governments, systemic or historical issues, certain parties in parliament or political groups, Hungarian institutions (such as the police or the courts), and Hungarian society as a whole (or parts of it, such as particular ethnic groups). Second came the group of threats originating from beyond state borders (23%), such as foreign governments (especially Russia in the current sample), international organisations (EU, NATO), or foreigners (or a specific group of foreigners, e.g. refugees or immigrants). Eleven percent of the subject actors grouped around crime (e.g. cybercrime, organised crime, corruption, human trafficking, black market, or crimes and public safety in general). Eight per cent of the threats were connected to war and terrorism (including the conflict in Ukraine). The lowest proportion belonged to the private sectors (7%) and problems caused by the environment (4%).

Subject actors relate strongly to the threats outlined. Those cases where Hungary appeared as the primary subject of concern related to democracy in 35% of cases, issues of the employment rate in 26%, and the sovereignty of the country in 16%. Threats assigned to other countries, foreign groups or organisations mostly concerned the sovereignty of Hungary, the Ukrainian-Russian conflict and energy security. Threats related to crime were seen to mostly target democracy, while issues of wars came into prominence in relation with the conflict in Ukraine. In the outlined discourse, the responsibility of the private sector was mentioned mostly concerning issues of employment rates, the sovereignty of the country and energy security.

2.3.2.4 Levels

Perceived security threats in the examined sample appear mainly on the national level (48%). This is followed by the transnational (19%), international (17%) and global levels (7%). Smaller levels (e.g. regional, local) have the lowest salience (6 and 4% respectively).

Local and subnational levels were mentioned in connection with the following themes: those ones threatening the employment rate and social security as well as those concerning minorities. The conflict in Ukraine, issues of energy security and the sovereignty of the country occurred mainly on the international and regional levels. None of the outlined threat-themes appeared prominently on the global level; however, among the core values 27% of the environmental issues and 80% of cyber-crime appears on this level.

2.3.2.5 Human rights

Placing the focus on ethical and human rights issues typified 10% of the cases in the security discourse. The percentage was higher than the average regarding threats concerning minorities (20%) and threats concerning democracy (20%).

2.3.2.6 Current political trends and the threats to democracy

In 2010, Viktor Orbán and his right-wing conservative-populist party (Fidesz) won the general election against the formerly governing left-wing socialist party MSZP, and formed a government supported by a parliamentary majority of more than two-thirds. Before 2010, left-wing parties rapidly lost their popularity, while the far-right Jobbik party gained popularity just as swiftly. Since 2010, Fidesz have passed a new Constitution and major legal reforms that required the two-thirds majority. Fidesz won again in the 2014 general elections, narrowly losing out on its two-thirds majority in Parliament. Left-wing parties collectively gathered only 19% of votes, while far-right Jobbik earned 20%.

Since 2010, Orbán and Fidesz have been using the overwhelming majority gained in the democratic process to centralise control in all the main realms of law and policy. Drastic changes were implemented in line with a more centralised and nationalistic approach to taxation law and the tax system, education, the social security system, electoral law, public administration, the Constitution, and many other policy sectors. The measures taken were well received by the population due to publicity framing them in a populist, demagogic manner. Today, many see Orbán as the leader of the hard-working people and families, and a vanguard of a small, but strong, independent Hungary. Many analysts ascribe Orbán's success to the frustrations following the economic crisis. Reactions to the crisis were amplified by disappointment left over from the 1990's. The achievements expected from the post-Communist transformation process and democratisation remained unmet. As a consequence, Hungarian society's nostalgia for soft dictatorship, characteristic of the late-Communist years, has once again become perceptible. For many people, those years meant not having to worry about employment; the all-powerful state provided social security, and although the standard of living was low, social disparities were comparatively small.

In 2014 – the main time period of this research – Hungary appeared many times in the international press, related to anti-democratic acts of its government. Events that caught the international public's attention were mostly in the context of Hungary's economic and political connections with Russia and Hungary's anti-EU actions. In July 2014, Viktor Orbán said: "Today, the world tries to understand systems which are not Western, not liberal, maybe not even democracies; yet they are successful", and mentioned China, Russia and Turkey as positive examples. "I don't think that our European Union membership precludes us from building an illiberal new state based on national foundations", Orbán commented.

The Hungarian government has also been criticised because of its anti-democratic moves against NGOs and the freedom of speech, particularly after they published a blacklist of "suspicious", critical NGOs. The rationale behind this list was the "Norway Grants" (EAA/Norway Grants - Civil Funds) programme, which was part of an agreement between the EU and Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein, aimed at funding projects in less-developed European economies. János Lázár (Secretary of State for the Prime Minister's Office) accused Norway of meddling in Hungary's internal political affairs by supporting NGOs (i.e. awarding grants to NGOs), and requested government access to, and a say in, the grants' independent selection procedure. The Hungarian consortium responsible for the selection procedure, and several of the award-winning NGOs, were monitored and raided. Several registered NGOs' tax numbers were suspended during the process, which paralysed the work of these

organisations. These organisations that were investigated worked mainly in the fields of human rights, women's and LGBTQ rights, Roma rights, democracy education and transparency.

Another topic appearing in the data as a prominent threat towards democracy was the long-debated issue of classified communist-era informant files. Between 1945 and 1990, an extensive network of informants were working in the Communist system, and according to leaked information about this network, politicians that are still active today were also involved. The proposed legislation to eliminate the classified status of these documents and to make informant files public, has been blocked by the parliamentary majority several times in past years.

Another salient topic regarding the disintegration of democracy as a perceived threat concerned the media. According to accusations leveled at the government, the new media law forces journalists to exercise self-censorship, and threatens the freedom of speech. The newly modified electoral law, and youth emigration as a consequence of anti-democratic events, also appeared in the data as highlighted topics. The topics related to this theme, described above, tend to identify the government, and Viktor Orbán in particular, as the sources of threats to democracy and the related core values, and are usually addressed by the examined left-wing newspapers, NGOs, or left-wing liberal opposition parties.

2.3.2.7 Independence, sovereignty of Hungary

Until 1989, Hungary existed either as a part of, or dependent on, another state or entity. The most important Hungarian holidays also prove that fighting for independence became a significant part of national identity: on March 15th Hungary commemorates the war of independence against the Austro-Hungarian Empire and in October – the revolution against the Stalinist dictatorship of 1956. During the years of the democratic transition, these two events were embedded in party politics and the commemorations became platforms for (raising) political issues, therefore the theme of independence gained new perspectives while developing in parallel to the line of present social problems.

After the regime change, different, sometimes radical, views of Hungary's sovereignty emerged first after joining NATO in 1999, and then the EU in 2004. Today, the most radical views are related to Jobbik, a far-right political party, and to its public statements. Jobbik's often explicit anti-NATO and anti-EU views decreased after the party gained seats in parliament, but even today Jobbik is not entirely devoid of radical expressions that depict an independent Hungary with a strong military, and independent economic and political path.

During the time period of the research, Jobbik and some Jobbik-aligned extreme political elements voiced concerns over Hungarian land belonging to foreign owners. In 2014, a Jobbik representative claimed: "The biggest danger for Hungary from Jobbik's perspective is that foreigners can buy agricultural land here. It's a danger for our sovereignty." Beside the issue of land ownership, Jobbik has come up with views against multinational companies or firms owned by foreigners, as well as against „foreign interests“ within Hungarian politics.

The ruling party, Fidesz, communicated these "threats" towards Hungary's sovereignty somewhat differently. For example, during the latest round of EU parliamentary elections, it displayed an anti-EU and anti-IMF attitude, embedded in the following slogan: "Our message to Brussels: Respect Hungarians!" In the field of economy, one of the most significant actions of Fidesz was raising the tax for multinational companies drastically in order to provide advantages to small family businesses.

Hungarian parliamentary elections were held during the period when this research was conducted. The main issue raised by Fidesz's campaign was the so called "overhead cost reduction taskforce", which meant the introduction of statutes aiming at the reduction of overhead costs (mostly the prices of electricity and gas). This brought wide popularity to the party, but received criticism from the EU, so "the protection of overhead cost reduction against Brussels" became part of the campaign of Fidesz.

2.3.2.8 Energy security

Based on the data, the issue of the Hungarian sovereignty shows strong connections with the theme of energy security. The fight for energy sovereignty became part of the communication of Fidesz in relation to overhead cost reduction, with actions undertaken including the government's agreement with Russia in 2014 to expand the country's nuclear power plant with a Russian loan. According to the plans, the Paks power plant, built in the '80s, will be expanded with two new blocks by 2023 (Paks II). The construction will be carried out by Russia's Rosatom and most of the finances (10 out of 12 billion Euros) supplied by a loan from Russia. Orbán received various attacks in connection with the agreement. Besides possible accidents and the threat to physical security, many organisations raised environment- and corruption- related issues, as well as problems stemming from the deepening political and economic relationship between Hungary and Russia. By way of detail, other issues under the energy security hat included the independence of gas supplies and storage.

2.3.2.9 Unemployment, lack of social security, education

One of the largest issues in the period following regime change has been the high unemployment rate caused by a declining number of workplaces. This concerns mostly those with less formal education, typically those from the countryside. The collapse of socialist era industry resulted in many untrained, mostly Roma, individuals living on the peripheries of society. There was a significant turn in 2008 regarding the politics of unemployment when then left-wing Gyurcsány government introduced the first public-work program with the slogan "job instead of benefits". The program has gone through numerous changes since then and according to the plans of the government, the dole would be abolished by 2018 and instead focus will be placed on public-work. Public workers would assist in tasks given by local councils in exchange for the unemployment allowance (which is below the minimum wage).

As regards educational issues, there have also been a number of changes in the education system since the '90s. More specifically, the introduction of an education plan based on competence development aimed to expand high schools and to narrow vocational training. However, since 2010, the education system has again been reformed, this time in line with a strongly centralised concept. One of the most important actions was that the government decreased the upper age limit of compulsory education from 18 to 16.

2.3.2.10 Minority groups and inequalities

The Roma are the most sizeable minority in Hungary; their proportion of the population (based on the most recent census) is 3%, however, other research estimates that the actual number is closer to 5-8%. After the democratic transition, the majority of low-educated Roma population lost their jobs, and nowadays most of them are marginalised and live in poverty. The attitude of Hungarian society towards the Roma is highly characterised by preconceptions and racism: in 2013, ¾ of the society agreed with the following statement: "Crime is in the Roma's blood". Based on Amnesty International's annual report from 2014-15 on human rights, Roma suffer discrimination on most institutional levels, especially regarding police and court actions, but also in healthcare and

education. Concerning school segregation, numerous lawsuits were in process during the time period of this research, where Roma rights organisations raised their voices against Minister of Human Resources Zoltán Balog's statute which enabled segregation in schools.

The so-called "Miskolc case" which is about the elimination of Roma ghettos by evicting them appears often in the data. In this case, the leadership of Miskolc, one of the largest cities in Hungary, enjoyed major support from the non-Roma population. The city began demolishing the houses of Roma illegally, and offered money to those moving outside the city.

In the past years, Jobbik, the far-right Hungarian party often based its party program on the anti-Roma sentiments of the population, which also appears in the data. Representatives of Jobbik have claimed multiple times that Roma are responsible for the problems of public safety and the majority of crimes happening primarily in the villages.

In the data we can also find threats related to gender equality, high unemployment rates, political participation and the traditional-conservative family politics of the government. The discourse concerning immigration has always been part of public debates, although due to the low number of refugees arriving to Hungary, this had remained relatively low-level. However, during the past years the number of the refugees using Hungary as a transit point to the West have increased, and so has the xenophobia of the population and debates.

2.3.2.11 Demographic issues

The "crisis of demography" has been an on-going part of discourse since the regime change. Similarly to the previous themes, significant differences can be perceived between the statements of left- and right-wing parties. Whereas the government ascribes the problem to the disintegration of the traditional family model and declining birth rates to the insecure living standards of families, the left-wing liberals consider emigration among the related topics.

Similarly to other European countries, the problem of an ageing population, mainly connected with low birth rates and rising life expectancies, is also an issue in Hungary. Emigration is another aspect of the demographic problem; however, we do not possess reliable migration data. According to various statistics, the number of Hungarians migrating has been increasing year over year, and migrants traditionally move to Germany or Austria. In addition, in the past few years the United Kingdom has become a popular host country among the highly qualified and young.

2.3.2.12 External threats: wars and terrorism

In the Hungarian security discourse, traditional security threats, such as those of war or terrorism, have received insignificant mention. The main topic most often related to the above domain has been the Russian-Ukrainian conflict that evolved during the time of this research. Although the conflict often appeared in the resources examined as a security threat, in most cases specific fears such as battles crossing the borders of Hungary did not appear; on the contrary, thinking / speaking about "the war happening beyond the border of Hungary" was rather typical. Two important themes were related to the Ukrainian-Russian conflict: the previously mentioned energy security and the issue of the safety of Hungarians beyond the borders. The latter concerned the physical safety and the encroachment of the rights and cultural identity of the 170 000-200 000 Hungarian nationals living in Ukraine.

2.3.3 Overview of the current trends

Core values described in the research appear in the National Security Strategy of 2012 and in other connected national strategies, but the emphasis is often different. While the threat perception snapshot made by the research is seen as a reflection of current issues, the document concerns more traditional, slow-burning security threats.

While the addressor of the National Security Strategy (2012) is the Hungarian government, its covered fields and threats are more closely connected with EU and NATO frames of reference. These frames often contradict Hungarian national discourse, including topics addressed by the government, as is visible in the data collected by EvoCS.

Unlike the analysed data, the National Security Strategy places greater emphasis on traditional security issues (mainly the threat of war) and global security challenges. In these cases, EU and NATO appear as allies to Hungary facing the same dangers, and sharing the same objectives and interests. On the contrary, the data of the research contained herein includes mentions of threats, often transmitted by the government itself, where these organisations (the EU and NATO) appear as subject actors, that is, as threatening the sovereignty of Hungary.

Based on the data used for this research, the threat of war is quite marginal at the moment. Similarly, the national strategy deals with Hungarian nationals beyond the borders, but with a focus on culture.

Energy security is less prominent in the national security strategy than in the current research, which may be partially attributed to the difference between the time periods of the two resources. The least emphasised core value in the national strategy is the theme of social and political safety, which occurs mainly on a transnational, European or regional level, contrary to the data set collected by this survey, which firmly outlines the responsibility of the country in this domain – above all with respect to the threat to the democratic fundament of the country.

Regarding human rights and the Hungarian protection of minority rights, the strategy takes the emergence of these rights for granted. However, as has been shown, according to the data of the research, dangers connected to this topic form one of the most significant groups of threats.

3 Regional concept of security

3.1 Characterization of the core values

Assessing national security priorities in the East European Border Region (EEB), three countries were chosen to act as samples from which data on threat perceptions could be extracted; these states were Poland, Hungary and Lithuania. Analyses were conducted using a total of 662 published sources including newspaper articles (64%), parliamentary publications (21%), academic publications (7%), government policy documents (4%), reports made by NGOs (3%) and private sector reports (2%). These documents were categorized according to the security threats they identified. The noted threats were then segmented according to which of the eight core values (listed below) they represented, and ranked based on incidence. Core values critical to the threat(s) identified were given increased weighting relative to other values which were only marginally related to the particular text being examined.

The majority of core values analyzed across Poland, Hungary and Lithuania grouped quite closely (in terms of frequency of mention) into two distinct tiers of salience.

Tier 1	Tier 2
Territorial Integrity and Security	Information and Cyber Security
Economic Prosperity and Security	Environmental and Ecological Security
Political Stability and Security	Cultural Identity and Security
Physical Safety and Security	
Social Stability and Security	

It is important to recognize the presence of one significant outlier among these results; “Physical Safety and Security” in Lithuania appears in only 5,5% of examined literature as the primary topic. The presence of this core value in the Tier 1 list is due to comparatively high statistics from the other two countries, having scored 24,3% in Poland and 18% in Hungary, resulting in a (weighted) total salience of 16,6%

According to the results, for each of the states discussed, “Territorial Integrity and Security” ranked as the most prominent of the *shared* values, representing 19,3% of mentions. It scored first in Lithuanian discourse (22,7%), third in Poland (16,5%), and third in Hungary (15,3%). “Political Stability and Security” placed second in the hierarchy of shared values, representing 17,6% of the relevant discourse. While in Hungary and Poland it ranked fourth (with 14,7% and 11,6%, respectively), it placed second in Lithuania (21%).

Meanwhile, the Tier 2 core values scored significantly lower across all three states, each representing less than 10% of the (weighted) distribution rankings. The “Information and Cyber Security” core value accounted for 8,2% of the overall debate, “Environmental and Ecological Security” for 6,4%, and “Cultural Identity and Security” a mere 4%. The distribution of results between Poland, Hungary and Lithuania was such that the core value rankings for any two states would tend to correlate relatively closely, with this correlation being becoming skewed when statistics from the third state were considered as well.

These results largely mirrored the findings produced by the 2015 EvoCS Eastern EU Border Workshop, where “Economic Prosperity and Security” and “Territorial Integrity and Security” ranked as the two most critical core values, albeit in the opposite order to the list presented above. Similarly, the three ‘Tier 2’ values were ranked as least important by EEB workshop participants²⁵. It must be noted that while this workshop discussed only Poland and Hungary, the EvoCS research project has included Lithuania as well, which may account for some of the changes in value rankings between the two projects.

3.2 Security challenges and threats, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights

The Ukrainian crisis was noted in both Polish and Lithuanian literature as posing a direct threat to territorial integrity due to the potential for spillover to seriously affect regional and global stability. In contrast, Hungarian sources cited the foreign ownership of land, a topic favored by the far-right party Jobbik, as posing a threat to territorial integrity and security²⁶. The Hungarian concerns appeared to be more politically motivated than those of Poland and Lithuania.

As described in the Lithuanian case study, the chief threats to “Territorial Integrity and Security”, namely those originating from Russia, are also closely related to the “Economic Prosperity and Security” core value through the nexus of energy. This relationship also holds for Poland, which shares a reliance on Russian oil and gas supplies. While Hungary also retains a dependence on Russian energy resources, energy security in Hungary is associated more closely with “Economic Prosperity and Security” as well as “Environmental and Ecological Security,” and less with notions of territorial integrity.

Literature from Poland and Hungary also describes the threats emanating from high unemployment rates and worrying demographic trends, with low birth rates and emigration affecting economic prospects. Poland and Lithuania share concerns over the possible implications of joining the Euro-zone. In all three states, the mention of a threat from terrorist attacks was present only in the international dimension (in relation to assets and citizens abroad). Perceptions of threats originating from cyber attacks were largely confined to Lithuania, with the topic given only minor consideration in Poland. Perhaps surprisingly, Poland and Lithuania also assigned importance to the security challenges posed by road traffic safety, though the issue was more prevalent in Polish discourse.

Poland, Hungary and Lithuania all identified the national government as both an addressor and addressee of the various threats mentioned. Polish and Hungarian data additionally identified their national parliaments as playing both roles. Poland was the only state of the three analyzed to also cite the European Union as an addressor and addressee, while Lithuania was unique in that researchers and practitioners were also cast in both roles.

National governments found themselves playing the role of addressor in 29,6% of cases, followed by national parliaments, who were identified as addressors for 19,8% of topics. Of the other actors examined, none were noted as addressors in over 10% of cases, with the general public/individual

²⁵ Institute of International Affairs; Instituto Affari Internazionali; Procon (2015): “Report on the Eastern EU Border Regional Workshop,” p. 14 (available at <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/53>)

²⁶ See: Hungary Country Profile

citizen(s) filling the role in a scant 1,9% of cases. The most popular topics, regardless of addressor, were “Political Stability and Security” as well as “Territorial Integrity and Security,” each of which made up an average 17% of the discussion of any given addressor. Curiously, the second most important core value, “Economic Prosperity and Security,” only accounted for an average 13% of the attention of addressors, with the majority of the attention devoted to it coming from the private sector (representing 27,3% of the discussion).

3.1 Historical trajectories

Throughout the Cold War, all three of the states addressed in this case study belonged to the communist bloc, with Lithuania existing not as a satellite, but rather a part of the Soviet Union proper. Lack of formal sovereignty (in case of Lithuania) or a practical inability to exercise it (in the cases of Poland and Hungary) together with the deep inefficiencies of a centrally planned economy formed among the peoples of these states a very distinct understanding of security. For the (slightly more than) 25 years following the collapse of the communist bloc, the difficult experiences of communism have remained a sturdy foundation on which Poles’, Hungarians’ and Lithuanians’ have built their approaches to security. Among their considerations were the fear of inter-state conflict resulting from confrontational Soviet policies towards western liberal democracies, domestic violence following Soviet intervention (Hungary had suffered it full-scale in 1956, Poland was allegedly threatened in 1980 and – as a result – imposed martial law, Lithuania had to fight back Soviet forces attempting to seize Parliament and other governmental buildings following a declaration of independence in January 1991), as well as abuse from oppressive security forces and the drastic worsening of economic situation due to numerous shortages caused by the centrally planned economy. For demographic reasons, security discourse in all three of the case study countries has been shaped in the period 1991-2015, mostly by the generation of people who lived under the communism and very often actively worked against it (former underground opposition or trade union leaders, intellectuals etc.). Consequently, it has resembled some basic tenets of thinking about security, formed under very particular socio-economic and political circumstances.

As the coding exercise shows, territorial integrity and security is the most salient core value contained in regional security discourse. Within all three, countries it also ranks among the top three most salient core values (it is first in case of Lithuania) and it is explicitly linked with the crisis in Ukraine and the Russian policy towards the West. This result is not surprising and can be considered a direct consequence of the lack of real sovereignty experienced by these states for the better part of half of the 20th century. A brief look at the foreign policy priorities of all three analyzed countries supports this argument. Following the end of the cold war these states undertook the political commitments of integrating with European Union and NATO, both considered mostly (NATO) or to a large extent (EU) as security guarantees. As the literature from the period between the break-up of the Warsaw Pact and the entry of individual countries to NATO (Poland and Hungary in 1999, Lithuania in 2004) stresses, the three countries perceived their geopolitical environment as a “grey security zone”, where use of force was not excluded either as a result of the attempt to restore the Soviet zone of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, or as an effect of tensions within the post-Soviet space. In other words, the dominant notion in the concept of security assumed that the very existence of the sovereign state was endangered. Such a threat perception was distinctively indifferent to asymmetric and non-military threats, which – as security studies literature argues – are

hardly able to destroy the statehood, and rather pose a disruptive potential. As a result, threats such as terrorism, organized crime, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, uncontrolled migrations, climate change or destructive ideologies have never been recognized as imminent security challenges by the countries of the region.

Following the accession to NATO and EU, all the three states received the formal and practical security guarantees, which their peoples sought. To some extent, it “freed” the security discourse, which became more diversified and began to place more attention on non-military and asymmetric threats. The “global war on terror” announced by the US in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks was the first test of Polish, Hungarian and Lithuanian readiness to engage in combatting a threat which had not been seen a direct security challenge from their national points of view. All three states supported the US throughout the anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan, first in the bilateral mission “Operation Enduring Freedom”, then in NATO’s ISAF. Their participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom, initiated in March 2003 by the US attack on Iraq, was also presented as a commitment to fight a global problem – the proliferation on the weapons of mass destruction. The participation in the European Union’s military CSDP operations in Africa (in DR Congo, Chad, Mali, Central African Republic) was portrayed as a response to humanitarian disasters – again a global issue. All these missions influenced security discourse, which was enriched by new elements. Yet, there was also a very practical rationale for the engagement in expeditionary operations – the desire to develop better bilateral relations with the US, rightly seen as a pillar of NATO and the ultimate guarantee of European security, and improve its general position in the Alliance and EU. The participation in ISAF operations in Afghanistan was quite openly presented, for instance by Polish political leaders, not as an action to combat threats undermining the security of Poland, but as proof of solidarity with those Allies, who did have direct security interests in Central Asia. In other words, it was a move aimed to boost the Polish position in NATO (and in case of African CSDP missions – in EU), and aimed to strengthen the Polish position in discussions on the place and role of Russia in the European security policy, and consequently reinforce security of the country by practical military actions (like advance military plans for potential crises, military exercises etc.). Engagement in policies tackling non-military threats was, thus, a function of a broader policy, more or less still focused on the primary goal of securing the state against the possible hostile policies/actions of Russia. The 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia has served for some of the countries in the region as a further confirmation of their well-established perceptions of the potential threat emanating from Russian policies towards the post-Soviet space and the former communist bloc member states in Central and Eastern Europe.

The dominant position of politico-military threats in the general threat perceptions of Central and Eastern European countries has been the decisive factor shaping regional approaches to the war in Ukraine, which – despite some national variations in terms of response – has been considered a regional security threat over the course of 2014 and 2015. Responses from Poland and Lithuania were broadly similar, with questions of military containment of Russia to prevent escalation of the conflict to other theatres, including the Baltic States (being members of NATO), and de-escalation of hostilities in Ukraine coming to the fore. As a result, both states took steps to draw increased EU and NATO attention to events in Ukraine, while simultaneously requesting greater assurances of protection from the United States, viewing Washington as the point actor in addressing this threat. Lithuania stands as the only NATO member officially pledging the transfer of lethal weapons to Ukraine, while Poland has engaged in the training of Ukrainian military forces and provided

assistance for security sector reforms. Both countries were also voiced interest in changing NATO policies on not stationing permanent military units within the territories of NATO members admitted after 1999. As of summer 2015, the rotational presence of some combat units for exercises and training has been the extent of NATO's response to Russian hostile policies in Ukraine and towards the West. Nonetheless, the Baltic States and Poland have formed a clear caucus of countries standing in favor of permanent deployments of NATO forces on their territories.

Against this background, Hungarian responses to the crisis in Ukraine were primarily directed at questions of energy supplies and the physical security of citizens living beyond its borders. Similar to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Hungary was not keen to call for "reassuring" military measures from NATO and advocated a more balanced view of the roots and implications of the crisis in Ukraine. Hungarian political leaders were also openly critical regarding Ukraine's new leadership, which took power following the 2014 popular elections. Consequently, Hungary became a practical illustration of the regional split, which left those countries having a tough stance towards Russia (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and, from South-Eastern Europe – Romania) on one side, and those, which displayed some understanding of Russian policies and willingness to engage with Russia despite the on-going crisis (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovakia), on the other.

The place and role of the remaining top core values in the evolution of the security concept in the Eastern EU Border region is also notable. They are: economic prosperity and security, political stability and security, physical safety and security, which placed respectively second, third and fourth in the salience hierarchy. Hungarian case study revealed that the most salient core value is economic prosperity and security followed by physical safety and security. In case of Poland physical safety and security comes first, before economic prosperity and security. In both countries territorial integrity and security ranks third in the salience hierarchy. It is only Lithuania, where territorial integrity and security dominates the security discourse. The reasons for the high salience of these core values can be ascribed to the popular perception of the peoples of the Eastern EU Border countries as still catching up with the European economic development, democratic government standards and the general life quality.

These drivers have their roots again in Communist times and the experiences of transformation following the break-up of the Soviet bloc, which involved the political system and economy likewise. Regarding the latter, transformations involved legal and regulatory frameworks, which had to be adjusted to European Union *aquis*, with a simultaneous emphasis was placed on increasing levels of GDP *per capita*. The last 25 years have been unequivocally perceived (according to public opinions) as the great march towards achieving Western levels of economic and social development. As of 2014, Polish and Hungarian GDP per capita stand at 68% of the EU-28 average (in purchasing power parity) while the Lithuanian figure is 74%²⁷. Even today, pro-humanitarian assistance campaigns claiming that Central Eastern Europe is a rich region in the global scale and thus is obliged to help Africa, stir controversies, and none of the countries examined meet the EU's target output level of 0,33% GDP on the official development assistance. Further, the period of transformation left many parts of society disappointed with the pace of progress and inequality that emerged as a result of the redistribution of its benefits, mostly regarding employment conditions, healthcare, education, and transport infrastructure. The economic crisis, which began in 2008, has further struck the countries

²⁷ Data according to Eurostat. <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>.

of the region with the exception of Poland, which has never fallen into recession, though at the price of rapidly and drastically increased levels of sovereign debt. All these elements combine to justify the prominence of the economic prosperity and security core value, although its salience in individual case is even more noticeable.

A common denominator for regional perceptions of threats to economic prosperity and security is, however, the dependency on Russia with regards to gas, oil and to some extent also electricity. Levels of dependency vary from country to country; Lithuania is 100% dependent on gas imported from Russia, while Poland and Hungary hover around 60-65%. Regarding crude oil, the dependency of all three countries on Russia is between 85% and 95%²⁸. Lithuania also imports electricity from Russian power stations in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Russia-Ukrainian conflicts over gas sales in 2009, which resulted in the halt of supplies, have made the countries of Central and Eastern Europe seek tools to diminish their dependency, which has appeared increasingly as a security policy issue rather than an economic problem. This has been reflected well in the security discourse of the three countries, which developed energy security as a distinct category of security that requires both political attention and theoretical study.

The post-1991 transformations in the region have also meant democratization of political systems and the necessity of developing entirely new political cultures. These challenges came with accompanying difficulties. All studied countries have adopted high democratic government standards like constitutional responsibility of top posts in the state, fair elections, rule of law system protecting basic rights of the defendants, freedom of speech, freedom of political action etc. However, political culture has remained low and required development over time, and the 25 years following the end of the communist system have been marked many times by governmental turmoil – turbulent coalitions, premature elections and corruption scandals, which have undermined trust in the political leadership. Regarding the latter, the Transparency International Perceived Corruption Index places Poland, Lithuania and Hungary in the top 60 least corrupted countries in the world; but their individual ranks – respectively 35th, 39th and 47th – are far behind the leading Denmark (1st), Germany (12th) and United Kingdom (14th)²⁹. When it comes to political stability, since 1991, Poland has had 14 different prime ministers (Waldemar Pawlak is the only politician who has led the government twice), Lithuania also 14 and Hungary 9. For comparison, Germany has had 3 chancellors and the United Kingdom 4 prime ministers over the same period of time. It may be argued, thus, that the high salience of the political stability and security core value in the region is precisely because of the difficult experiences of this period of transformation, during which turmoil among the political elites hampered reforms and made public opinion uncertain of the socio-economic development trajectory of the state. Of course, a large number of prime ministers does not necessarily imply political instability. The number of leaders may be related to varying national systems of governance, in which changes of political leadership do not mean inconsistency in policy implementation. However, for the countries of the EEB region, the latter is a genuine problem, and the number of subsequent governments can be used as an illustration of this issue. Poland, Lithuania and Hungary have not truly enjoyed political stability if this term is understood to mean policy continuity, be it in the economic, social or other realms.

²⁸ All data according to Eurostat <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat>

²⁹ Data according to Transparency International IPC index for 2014. <http://www.transparency.org>

Finally, the high salience of the physical safety and security core value in the region can be explained twofold. Firstly, it is the result of the usual awareness of individuals of the threats to their own security, generated by crime, transport accidents or other unusual threats. Secondly, and according to the coding results, it is due of the predominance of the road safety issue in the security discourse. Indeed, the countries studied exceeded EU averages regarding fatalities caused by car accidents; in absolute numbers, in 2013, over 3300 people perished in Poland as a result of automobile accidents. Despite being much smaller – in terms of the population and territory – these figures stood at nearly 600 for Hungary and 260 in Lithuania. In 2014, Poland had 84 fatalities per 1 mln citizens, Lithuania – 90 and Hungary 63. These numbers represent a significant improvement, reached over the last 25 years, resulting from investments in better roads, traffic control capabilities and social awareness campaigns. Meanwhile The EU average over the same period was 51, with leading countries like Netherland and United Kingdom (28 fatalities per 1 mln citizens), Sweden (29) and Denmark (30) falling well below³⁰.

3.2 Overview of current trends

Analysis of historical trajectories regarding the development and roles of the most most salient core values in the Eastern EU Border region leaves little doubt of the factors currently shaping the security discourse, as well as those most likely to do so in the future. These are: the evolution of Russian policy towards the post-Soviet space, Central and Eastern Europe, and the West, along with the dynamics of national economic/social and political development of the countries in the region. However, there are some issues that, while they currently occupy the margins of regional security discourse, hold significant potential to play more prominent roles in the near future. Indeed, some signs of their growing significance are already visible. These topics are: the rapid development of threats to cyber/informational security, the problems of uncontrolled migration to the EU, and the growing popularity of disruptive ideologies, accompanied by questioning the liberal democratic order in Europe.

Current trends with regards to the above issues are diversified. Despite many efforts, the conflict in Ukraine is far from frozen, and it remains as one of the top issues regarding security in the Central and Eastern Europe region. Russia has also not ceased its prevocational policies towards NATO; it continues probing of the boundaries or air- and sea space of Allies, conducts flash exercises on a large scale, and sustains an information war, trying to win popular support for its own narrative of both the Ukrainian crisis and generally – the reasons for the poor state of its relations with the West. Consequently, the Russian issue is one of the key elements of security discourse in the region, and the dominant one whenever security is considered in the traditional politico-military manner, or – according to the coding exercise – involves the territorial integrity and security core value.

Considering the economic and social development of the states in the Eastern EU Border region, there is also a sustained trend visible. The economic crisis, though now a part of history, has undermined trust in key elements of national economic and financial systems as well as political elites. Although the European Commission forecasts are good for the three countries, predicting GDP growth in the range of 3.4% in 2016, worries over rising unemployment and consequently the

³⁰ All data according the European Commission Directorate General for Mobility and Transport, www.ec.europa.eu

pauperization of large parts of society – or forced emigration to western EU member states – are high, particularly given that sovereign debt levels (as seen by the EC) have not decreased³¹. All these issues are hotly debated in Poland, Hungary and Lithuania in connection with the questioned future of the Eurozone – the Greek issue has generated questions on the future condition of the Union and the viability of the European project as such. This goes in pair with the still hampered attempts to reform healthcare, education, infrastructure and the justice system.

At the same time the relegation of “Information and Cyber Security” to the bottom half of threat perception rankings in each Poland, Lithuania and Hungary appears to discount increasingly technologically-adept opponents, and shifts from overt to covert warfare. The realm of “Information and Cyber Security” also overlaps several other threat categories, including the Tier 1-ranked “Economic Prosperity and Security,” “Political Stability and Security,” and “Social Stability and Security.” While perceptions of the Information and Cyber threat may be low, to discount or delay reactions to this threat as a result could bring decidedly negative consequences in the near future.

Finally, the security discourse in the Eastern EU Border region apparently does not pay attention to the issue of uncontrolled migration to the EU or the rising popularity of disruptive ideologies. Meanwhile, as of summer 2015, the migration crisis has badly struck not only the countries of southern Europe – Italy, Greece or Spain - but also the United Kingdom (through large-scale attempts to cross to UK via the Eurotunnel in French Calais) and Hungary, which has been constructing a fence on its border with Serbia to stop the flow of illegal migrants from the Western Balkans. Further, as some studies show, there are more and more citizens of the EU engaged in the fight on the side of ISIS or in the Eastern Ukraine. The latter display a far-right ideology, the former – the political Islamism. Both question the basic principles of the democratic and liberal order that has laid the foundations for modern statehood in Europe. The spread of these ideologies is also possible thanks to advances in information technologies, such as the social media phenomenon. These two issues are only now winning a place in the security discourse, yet they are likely to shape it more in the years to come as there exist neither quick solutions, nor there is anything in the Central and Eastern European countries that would make them immune to threats generated by these processes.

³¹ Spring 2015 Economic Forecast, data for respective countries
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu/forecasts

4 Findings and conclusions

4.1 Summary of the country and regional profiles

The national security threats identified in Polish, Lithuanian and Hungarian literature have tended to follow a pattern of significant overlap between any two states, with this correlation lessening once the third state is considered as well. It is unknown whether this trend would persist if responses from additional EEB states were added to the study, though discourse in Latvia and Estonia tends to broadly mirror that of Lithuania. The potential for future developments in EU-Russia relations, as well as continued fighting in Ukraine, to influence regional threat perceptions explains the need for continued monitoring and analysis.

The situation in Lithuania carries many similarities to that of Poland, with Russian aggression and the Ukrainian conflict posing the most concrete threats, followed by (and related to) energy security, once again due to the reliance on Russian supplies. As a result of past experiences, Lithuania is also more aware of threats in the realm of information and cyber security, certainly much more so than Poland or Hungary. Threats to territorial, social and political security are the most acute in Lithuania, where they overshadow economic concerns and thus have considerable power to drive policymaking. When examining domestic matters, Lithuania does share some concerns with its neighbours, and like Poland, considers improving road safety a pertinent topic for future discussion.

While Poland has made considerable progress tackling its earlier problems (such as organized crime and low levels of economic development), contemporary Poland faces a new set of difficulties, not all of which have internal origins and/or solutions. Chief among these are threats emanating from the east, where a hybrid war in Ukraine and increasingly aggressive Russian actions resonate strongly with an already security-sensitive public wary of its eastern neighbours. While economic development has remained high on the public agenda, the concern is less with achieving modernization than maintaining the pace of growth and continuing to close the gap with western European states. Together with economic security, a modern military and strong defensive alliances are considered the best assurances for a stable future.

Hungary finds itself in a slightly different situation, owing largely to its more friendly posture with Russia. Despite greater reassurance in the realm of territorial security, an overreliance on Russian energy sources means that Hungary still finds itself vulnerable to conflicts in the east. Domestically, increasing foreign ownership of land appears as a primary concern for citizens, and is something that political parties such as Jobbik capitalize on to secure support. As with Poland, maintaining economic growth is a lasting concern for Hungary, where demographic trends of an aging population and growing emigration have the potential to influence patterns across multiple sectors, many of which up to now had been positive, if left unchecked.

Consequently, the Eastern EU Border region seems to display a reasonably coherent security concept, even if there are differences in accents, such as the salience hierarchy of the individual core values (physical safety and security; economic prosperity and security; political stability and security) or the threats linked with them, which are otherwise quite similar (road traffic accidents, economic consequences of Eurozone integration/crisis, unemployment, energy security breaches). However, referring to the Ukrainian crisis and Russian policy factors, which occupy high place in the security discourse in Lithuania, Hungary and Poland, one has to acknowledge a clear spilt in the region, resembling the general divisions within the EU. It is justified to argue that the division will petrify between Member States which perceive Russia as a long-term threat to the Central and Eastern European region, if not for the EU, and the countries which view Russia as a huge economic partner and a necessary element of the policy architecture in Europe. Of course, one cannot exclude further hostile actions of Russia, which would likely stir a wave of solidarity in the EU, particularly if they were targeted at one of the Union's member states (e.g. the most vulnerable Baltic States). Within the toolkit of Hybrid warfare Russia is able to employ conventional, irregular, information, terrorist and/or criminal tactics to pursue its policy goals, widely seen as rebuilding a sphere of influence within the post-Soviet and post-communist space. If such developments take place, the security discourse in the EU, and all the more in the region, would be centered entirely on Russian threat. But a more likely scenario is that of a sustained conflict in Ukraine, accompanied by concessionary steps towards Russia from selected partners in the EU. The Eastern EU Border region is already a potential target for Russian advances, though countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia attempt to balance their threat perceptions in military and geopolitical terms with the necessity to sustain economic and social relations with Russia. Consequently, the region is not and will not be unified when it comes to its policy towards the Ukrainian crisis, the model of the EU's engagement for reforms of the Ukrainian state, and, obviously, towards Russia.

4.2 Conclusions and recommendations

The Eastern EU Border region security concept calls for attention at the EU level. Following the decision of the European Council of 25-26 June 2015, the EU will prepare a new strategy for its external actions, or a "global strategy". This implies building on the already conducted (under the lead of the HR/VP Federica Mogherini) phase of the re-evaluation of the Union's security environment and its capacity to shape it, and formulating EU interests regarding key global issues, including security challenges, its goals as regards the shape of international environment around it, including security environment, and finally tools and methods it wants to use to meet its aims and secure its interests. This process cannot go without properly addressing the security concept, or in other words, the threat perceptions of Central and Eastern EU member states, which itself revolves around the politico-military and economic/energy security threats. Despite the fact that the EU is not truly capable of engaging in defence, following the security interests of many of its member states, which see NATO as the international vehicle for safeguarding their security, it has to address the particularly difficult situation facing countries of the region. Prone to various methods of destabilization on the part of Russia, they need reassurances not only from NATO or the US, but also – if not more importantly – from the EU. These reassurances should take a tailored form and build on the capabilities the EU has already developed for the purpose of both CSDP and the internal security policies, such as counter-terrorism or cooperation in civil protection. By definition, the hybrid

warfare, which is seen as the gravest threat to the states of the EEB region, exploits the vulnerabilities of the targeted states. As a result, it is critical to acknowledge that countries of the EEB region have some clear gaps in their economic, law enforcement, governance and other systems, including critical infrastructures, such as electronic communication grids in order to create effective solutions. The EU could enter precisely this niche, where national capabilities are underdeveloped, and where NATO is limited by its purely military character. A reinforced cooperation of police and special forces under – possibly – EU new policy instrument, designed to help the member states identify and close the gaps in their non-military security system.

Another conclusion for the EU that stems from the EEB region analysis is that European engagement into the reforms of these countries economies is still necessary. The Union has already redistributed billions of Euros to the Central and Eastern EU member states to promote convergence; thanks to this money, many reforms and investments were possible. However, in the upcoming financial perspectives, this region cannot be forgotten to the favor of the states that suffered most from the 2008 crisis – targeted redistribution programmes should help fix the structural problems of their economies.

Finally, the EU should work more on the reciprocal acknowledgment of the different priorities within the concept of security of EEB region Member States by countries from other regions of the Union, and vice-versa. European solidarity demands the review of national threat perceptions in order to compile a complete picture of the security environment both within, and outside the EU.

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6 Annexes

6.1 Annex “A”: Lithuanian profile – graphical representation of the coding results




Figure 1: Breakdown of Lithuanian sources




Figure 2: Salience per source (Lithuania)




Figure 3: Levels of Action (Lithuania)




Figure 4: Human rights as part of the discussion (Lithuania)




Figure 5: Core values and addressors (Lithuania)




Figure 6: Core values and addressees (Lithuania)

6.2 Annex “B”: Polish profile – graphical representation of the coding results




Figure 1: Breakdown of Polish sources




Figure 2: Core values and frequency of mention (Poland)




Figure 3: Levels of action (Poland)




Figure 4: Core values and addressors (Poland)




Figure 5: Core values and addressees (Poland)




Figure 6: Human rights in the discussion (Poland)

6.3 Annex “C”: Hungarian Profile – graphical representation of the coding results




Figure 1: Core values in Hungary




Figure 2: Core values ranked by threat (Hungary)




Figure 3: "Economic Prosperity and Security" breakdown (Hungary)




Figure 4: Distribution of sources (Hungary)




Figure 5: Perceptions of actors (Hungary)




Figure 6: Ranking of actors (Hungary)




Figure 7: Levels of action (Hungary)

6.4 Annex “D”: Regional profile: visual representation of the coding results




Figure 1: Overall distribution of sources




Figure 2: Overall EEB core value rankings




Figure 3: EEB core value distribution – absolute numbers.




Figure 4: Core values according to newspaper articles




Figure 5: Core values according to parliamentary sources




Figure 6: Core values according to government sources




Figure 7: Core values according to academic sources




Figure 8: Core values according to private sector sources




Figure 9: Core values according to NGOs




Figure 10: EEB levels of action




Figure 11: Core values and addressors, EEB




Figure 12: Core values and addressees, EEB




Figure 13: Core values and human rights, EEB