



## D7.2 – Case Study on North-West Europe

---

Grant agreement number: 605142      Due date of deliverable: 2015-06-30  
Start date of the project: 2014-06-01      Actual submission date: 2015-06-30  
Duration: 18 months      Deliverable approved:

Lead Beneficiary: Loughborough University (LUNI)

Contributing beneficiaries: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies (HCSS) and  
Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore (UCSC)

Authors: Ksenia Chmutina, Lee Boshier, Andrew Dainty (LUNI), with Tim Sweijs,  
Jacques Mukena, Erik Frinking (HCSS), Barbara Lucini, Marco  
Lombardi (UCSC)

Keywords: North-West Europe; Concepts of Security, EvoCS

Dissemination level: PU

Release Number	Release date	Released by
0.8	19.06.2015	Ksenia Chmutina
0.9	24.06.2015	Ksenia Chmutina
1.0		

## Executive summary

This report constitutes Deliverable 7.2 of the FP7 Security Programme project ‘Evolving Concepts of Security’ (EvoCS, Grant Agreement 605142). This report on Work Package 7 (WP7) of the EvoCS project is chronologically the second deliverable of the work package. The purpose of this deliverable is to report on the North-West Europe (NWE) Case Study by creating a regional profile of the North-West region.

Based on the analysis of the coding data of the UK, the Netherlands and France, workshop with the security experts from the NWE region and the review of the current national and EU level policies, this deliverable discusses the overall perception of security in NWE region. It demonstrates that NWE region shares a lot of similarities in security discourse (Table 1). The most salient core value across the region is physical safety and security, with the most salient security challenge being terrorism and cyber-crime. It also shows the differences that appear within the region as well as between the region and the EU level discourse of security.

**Table 1 Summary of the national and regional profiles**

	<b>UK</b>	<b>France</b>	<b>Netherlands</b>	<b>North-West Europe region</b>
<b>Key Values</b>	Physical safety and security; Economic prosperity and security; Environmental and ecological security	Physical safety and security; Social stability and security; Political stability and security	Physical safety and security; Economic prosperity and security; Social stability and security.	Physical safety and security; Information and cyber security; Social stability and security
<b>Security Challenges</b>	Terrorism; Climate change; Natural hazards; Cybercrime; Energy supply; Food supply	Terrorism; Social instability; Natural hazards; Immigration; Crime	Terrorism; Cybercrime; Climate change; Natural hazards	Terrorism; Cybercrime; Immigration; Natural hazards; Climate change; Energy supply; Food supply
<b>Levels of Action</b>	National	National International	National International	National International
<b>Key Actors</b>	National government Private sector	National government National parliament	National government National parliament	National government National parliament Private sector

# Table of contents

Executive summary.....	2
Table of Contents.....	3
Acronyms.....	4
1. Introduction.....	5
2. Country profiles.....	7
2.1 Description of the North-West Europe region.....	7
2.2 UK.....	8
2.3 France.....	17
2.4 Netherlands.....	27
3. Regional analysis.....	39
3.1 Characterisation of the predominant core values.....	39
3.2 Description of the core dimensions.....	40
3.3 Historical trajectory.....	42
3.4 Overview of current trends.....	45
4. Findings and conclusions.....	48
4.1 Summary of the country and regional profiles.....	48
4.2. Key findings.....	48
5. References	50
6. Appendices.....	55
Appendix A: UK profile.....	55
Appendix B: Timeline of main terrorism events and policies in the UK...	60
Appendix C: Timeline of main natural hazards and climate change related policies in the UK.....	62
Appendix D: Timeline of the main security challenge-related events in France.....	63
Appendix E: Netherlands profile.....	64
Appendix F: The North-West region profile.....	68
Appendix G: List of the ‘influences’ relevant to terrorism threat identified by the workshop participants.....	73

# List of Acronyms

Abbreviation / acronym	Description
AIVD	General Intelligence and Security Service
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear
CT	Counter-terrorism
CTS	Counter-terrorism strategy
DTN	Threat Assessment Terrorism
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
HMG	Her Majesty Government
ICT	Information and communications technology
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ISIS	The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
ISS	Internationale Veiligheids strategie (Dutch International Security Strategy)
IRA	Irish Republican Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCSS	National Cyber Security Strategy
NCTB	National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NSS	National Security Strategy
NWE	North-West Europe
OAS	Organisation Armée secrete
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
SNV	Strategie Nationale Veiligheid (Dutch National Security Strategy)
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
WP	Work package
WTO	World Trade Organisation

# 1 Introduction

The security policies of the European Union need to be effective (in protecting our societies), efficient (in the way these policies are executed), representative (for the security interests of different societies in the Union), in compliance with the EU legal and fundamental rights framework, and perceived as legitimate (by its citizens), and reflect national concerns and priorities as well as European ones. The EvoCS project aims to provide a kaleidoscopic and comprehensive, overview of the key elements of security perceptions. This will feed into the policymaking process by establishing the representativeness and legitimacy of European security policies and their ability to account for the geo-political contexts and stakeholder perspectives across which they must navigate.

The analysis of the secondary literature, the coding and the workshop results led to the development of the North West Europe (NWE) region case study (with the core countries UK, the Netherlands and France), of the EvoCS project. This component of the project involved a combination of quantitative and qualitative methods and datasets that have been combined to identify the dimensions of security over time for this region. A comprehensive coding of over 1,300 relevant documents was also conducted using an analytical framework that is explained in Deliverable 3.1, which has included Government publications, Parliamentary publications, Corporate publications, Newspapers, Academic papers and NGO reports. Insights into the experts' opinion on the security situation in the NWE were reported in Deliverable 7.1. In addition, a state-of-art literature review was carried out in order to create a historical trajectory of the evolution of security concept in NWE.

The analysis of the above-mentioned datasets demonstrated that the issues, influences and trends are all interconnected and systemically intertwined, and it is impossible consider any political, economic, social or technical influence in isolation from the others. However, for the purposes of analysis it is useful to consider each core value as a discrete influence in order to explore how they come together to influence the security discourse.

The analysis have provided insights into: the core values which are at stake (physical security, territorial security, economic security etc.); the perspectives of different stakeholder groups (including government, parliament, media, NGOs, and the private sector); the principal actors who are responsible for protecting these values; the key levels at which action needs to be undertaken to protect these values; and the ethical and human rights issues that are raised in each of the case study country as well as across the region.

The aim of this deliverable is to corroborate and/or recalibrate this analysis, informing the coding and expert opinion from a cross-section of policy makers, academics and practitioners with existing literature and policy content. This approach aimed to overcome the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, revealing something of the provenance of the concept of security and its constituent components from a variety of perspectives.

Perceptions of security are continually evolving, being shaped and re-shaped both by policy influences and in relation to unfolding events. In the process it is possible to distinguish not only key drivers of security perceptions but to identify dominant patterns which emerge as salient in different regions.

Based on the analysis of the data coding in the UK, the Netherlands and France, workshop with the security experts from the NWE region, and the review of the current national and EU level policies, this deliverable discusses the overall perception of security in NWE region. Section 2 presents the analysis of the case study countries by demonstrating the most salient core values and security challenges as well as the country analysis of the future trends. Reflecting the findings of the country profiles and incorporating the discussions of the workshop (see Deliverable 7.1), Section 3 presents the NWE regional profile and highlights the popular security discourse in the region. Section 4 emphasises the most prominent features of the NWE that could potentially influence security developments in the region and the EU and help policy-makers and practitioners navigating a security perceptions in the NWE.

## 2. Country profiles

### 2.1 Description of the North-West Europe region

In the period after the Second World War, the NWE region has been relatively stable from the political and economic perspectives. Nevertheless, a number of security challenges (such as terrorism and natural hazards) have been affecting the region. The case study countries comprising this region include the UK, France and the Netherlands, however a broader regional context (based on the workshop, which was attended by security experts from the case study countries as well as Germany, Belgium, Ireland and Sweden (see Deliverable 7.1)) was also taken into account.

**The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK)** is a sovereign state in Europe off the north-western coast of the European mainland. The UK consists of four countries: England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. The UK has an area of 243,000 km<sup>2</sup>, making it the 80<sup>th</sup> largest sovereign state in the world and the 11<sup>th</sup> largest in Europe. It is the 22<sup>nd</sup> most populous country, with an estimated population of 64.1 million. The United Kingdom is a developed country with the world's 6<sup>th</sup> largest economy by nominal GDP and 14<sup>th</sup> in the Human Development Index ranking. It is a recognised nuclear weapons state with military expenditure ranking 6<sup>th</sup> in the world. Public spending on security areas accounts for approximately 12% of the total budget (£728.7bn). The UK has been a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council since its first session in 1946; it is a member state of the European Union and its predecessor, the European Economic Community, since 1973, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, the Council of Europe, the G7, the G8, the G20, NATO, the OECD, and the WTO. The overarching principles of security have changed with the Conservative and Liberal-Democrat coalition Government coming to power in 2010, and are now focusing on 'all-encompassing' national security that addressed security 'in the round' incorporating linked areas of policy including counter terrorism, international aid and diplomacy, border and cyber security, and homeland defence (as opposed to a security strategy that was primarily focused on defence and Armed Forces).<sup>1</sup>

**France** is a unitary sovereign state of the NWE and other overseas territories. Metropolitan France extends from the Mediterranean Sea to the English Channel and the North Sea, and from the Rhine to the Atlantic Ocean covering 640,679 km<sup>2</sup> with a population of 66.6 million. France is divided into 27 administrative regions (22 regions are located in metropolitan France and 5 are overseas); each region is further subdivided into 101 departments; 101 departments are subdivided into 341 arrondissements, which are subdivided into 4,051 cantons. France is a member of G8 leading industrialised countries, it is ranked as the world's 7<sup>th</sup> and the EU's 2<sup>nd</sup> largest economy. France is one of the founding members of the European Union and member of UN, G20, WTO, OECD and NATO. France is a significant European country due to its geography and its extension from North to South Europe. It can be called a "trait d'union" between the Northern European countries and the Southern European countries: this feature is notable also bearing in mind the cultural background, the political establishment and the economic resources. France can be defined such as a mixed country due to its Northern approaches to security, defence and education as well as Southern approaches to the welfare state, social and health care systems, and social protection. During the last few decades, the cultural traditions, national milieu and social structure have been impacted by the continuing migration waves from the South of the country and the coastal area. France is considered

---

<sup>1</sup> The House of Commons. *UK defence and security policy: a new approach?* 2010.

as the Europe's second largest economy, although in the last few years the economic crisis has influenced the standard of living, above all in the suburbs of the metropolitan areas. France also plays an important role in foreign relations, starting from the decolonisation period, after the Second World War.

**The Kingdom of the Netherlands** is a sovereign state consisting of four countries: the Netherlands in Western Europe, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten in the Caribbean. Three special municipalities in the Caribbean (Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius) are also part of the Netherlands. The European part of the Kingdom borders Germany to the east, Belgium to the south and faces the North Sea and the United Kingdom to the West. With an area of 41,543 km<sup>2</sup> and a population density of 488 people per km<sup>2</sup>, the Netherlands is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. While geographically small, the Netherlands has the 6<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the Euro-zone in terms of nominal Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and the 24<sup>th</sup> largest economy in the world. The Netherlands has the 18<sup>th</sup> largest per capita income, placing it among the world most developed countries.<sup>2</sup> The Netherlands is a member of numerous international organizations, including NATO, the OECD, the European Union, the Council of Europe and the OPCW. More recently, the Netherlands has been campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the United Nation Security Council for the term 2017-2018. Recent challenges both on a national and international level have prompted the government to rethink its security strategy. Examples of these challenges include the effects of the economic crisis, the upheavals in the Middle East and the hundreds of radicalised Dutch citizens who have joined ISIS's ranks, societal polarisation, terrorist attacks in European capitals, and the recent shooting of the Malaysian Airline MH17 over Russia – killing close to 200 Dutch citizens on board. On a national level, several other issues directly affecting Dutch domestic security and prosperity also feature on the Dutch security agenda including climate-related challenges, such as high risk of river and water drainage flooding and declining surface water quality, as a result of extreme intense precipitation and water temperatures.<sup>3</sup> The upsurge of cyberspace related incidents, resulting in thefts of personal records, crucial privacy intrusion as well as frequent revelations of large-scale foreign industrial espionage, have all raised widespread societal concerns. These recent changes triggered by domestic and international tensions have topped up the national security agenda, prompting the country to rethink both its national and international security strategy.

## 2.2 UK

### *2.2.1 Characterisation of the core values*

Overall, 400 publications have been coded in order to identify the most salient core values (Figure 1); for the UK these are:


- Physical safety and security;
- Economic prosperity and security;
- Environmental and ecological security.

---

<sup>2</sup> CIA World Fact book, available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nl.html>

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/the-effects-of-climate-change-in-the-netherlands-2012>





**Figure 1 Security core values in the UK**

Whilst a large number of threats has been coded under each category, it became clear that the majority of the most salient security challenges within the core values fall under the same category (e.g. terrorist attack, extremism, and radicalised Britons can all be covered by ‘terrorism’); therefore the following themes will be explored in the following sections:

- Terrorism (including terrorist attack, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), Irish Republican Army (IRA), terrorist suspects, extremisms, jihadists, radicalised Britons); and
- Climate change and Natural hazards (including extreme weather, flood, drought).

Other salient security challenges which will not be discussed here but which are important for the overall understanding of the UK context include cybercrime, and energy and food supply.

### **2.2.2. Description of the security challenges<sup>4</sup>**

**Actors:** The most prominent actors in the UK security discourse are national government, national parliament and general public, although they play very different roles: national government is the main addressor, national parliament is in the majority an addressee, and the public is seen as a main object of security challenges. Terrorism is the most salient security challenge (although to a different extent) raised by all of the addressors except think tanks and private sector, which are primarily discussing cyber-attacks. As the main addressors, national government and national parliament cover all the security challenges discussed here, whereas academia, international institutions and the EU have no say at all. When it comes to addressees, national parliament and the national government are the main recipients of the information, with the messages about all security challenges distributed in a more or less equal manner. It feels like the national government and national parliament are talking to and amongst themselves, without including many of other actors. The majority of actors act as addressees when it comes to climate change and natural hazards (except for the general public) and terrorism (except for academia). As mentioned earlier, the general public is seen as the main object that is vulnerable to all security challenges in pretty much equal measure.

<sup>4</sup> See appendix A for the visual representation of the data

Interestingly, the general public have little say about security challenges such as terrorism and climate change and is only addressed when it comes to terrorism. All the actors (except think tanks) are perceived to be an object of a terrorism threat. This leads to some interesting thoughts: if the actors are not perceived to be an object of a specific threat, why is it spoken to about this threat? A good example is the national parliament who receives information about terrorism, but is never perceived to be an object of it.

**Levels:** The most prominent level at which the identified security challenges are discussed is national, whereas the discussion at global level is almost non-existent: the only security challenge attributed to the global level is climate change and natural hazards. This security challenge is addressed on all levels, except transnational. All of the security challenges are mentioned at national and subnational (regional/ provincial) levels only. Government and parliament publications briefly touch upon some of the security challenges at local level: it is therefore unclear where the guidance to local authorities should come from. Surprisingly, businesses only mainly focus on national and international levels, despite their operation on local level. Most of the attention to local level is given by the newspapers and academics publications, although this varies depending on the security challenge: natural hazards and climate change is seen as a threat with the local effect by most of the sources.

**Sources:** Whilst all sources cover all of the most salient core values, the situation changes slightly when it comes to the specific security challenges. Climate change is covered in all the sources (although to various degrees), and is the main focus of the NGO and business publications. Parliament publications discuss all of the above-mentioned security challenges, however whilst the main topic of parliament publications is terrorism, as an addressor they do not focus on this security challenge as much. The most consistent in their discussion is private sector: the share of security challenges in business publications correlates with their role as an addressor.

**Human rights and ethical issues:** Human rights and ethical issues are mentioned when it comes to security challenges of terrorism and climate change, however they are hardly ever perceived as a main topic. This finding may be a result of a methodological limitation, as human rights and ethical issues were only coded when explicitly stated. All sources raise human rights and ethical issues, however different publications find different security challenges as a matter of human and ethical concern. For instance, newspapers purely focus on terrorism, whereas parliament publications mention human rights and ethical issues across all of the security challenges.

### 2.2.3. Historical trajectory

#### **Terrorism**

The UK policy 'Protecting the UK against terrorism' states: *"The threat to the UK and our interests from international terrorism is severe. This means that a terrorist attack is highly likely. The terrorist threats we face now are more diverse than before, dispersed across a wider geographical area, and often in countries without effective governance. We therefore face an unpredictable situation, with potentially more frequent, less sophisticated terrorist attacks. The most significant terrorist threat to the UK and our interests overseas comes from the Al Qaida senior leadership based in the border areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan and their affiliates and supporters in other areas."*<sup>5</sup> In addition, it is noted that the threat from terrorists in Yemen and Somalia has significantly increased in recent

---

<sup>5</sup> Home Office, *Protecting the UK against terrorism*. 2014.

years. This includes individuals from the UK travelling to these areas to fight and, in some cases, returning to the UK to plan and conduct operations. A large number of policies have been implemented and influenced by various terrorism events – these are highlighted in Appendix B.

The first Terrorism Act - aimed at terrorism in general rather than being specifically focused on the threat from Northern Ireland and IRA - was passed in 2000; it has since been amended a number of times. The timings of amendments and provisions have been influenced by various events including 9/11 attacks in the USA and the London 7/7 attacks.

The Terrorism Act 2000 provided a very broad definition of terrorism, which included the use or threat of action that involves serious violence against a person, serious damage to property, endangering another person's life, creating a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public, and action designed seriously to interfere with or seriously disrupt an electronic system.<sup>6</sup> These actions were considered as 'acts of terrorism' where two conditions were met: firstly, the use or threat of action is designed to influence the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public; secondly, when the use or threat of action is designed to further a political, religious or ideological cause.

Until 2000 the UK experience with terrorism was dominated by political violence related to Northern Ireland. However, after the 9/11 attacks - and based on the risk from Al-Qaida related and inspired terrorism – the threat of terrorism was understood to come primarily from foreign nationals; thus the focus of policy was on increasing the power of investigation and gathering information as well as deportation or detention of foreign nationals.<sup>7</sup>

CONTEST – the UK Government's strategy for counter-terrorism – was introduced soon after 7/7 (published in 2006, and then revised in 2009 and 2011) with the aim '*to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence*'.<sup>8</sup> It includes four work streams:

- Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks;
- Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism;
- Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack; and
- Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack.

In 2006 a new Terrorism Act was introduced, as a response to the dangers of suicide attacks and the mass casualties they threatened (including attacks on 'soft' non-military civilian targets). The involvement of British citizens led to a significant refocusing of policy and attention towards the prevention of radicalisation. This included new offences of training for terrorism and the indirect encouragement of terrorism. Prevent became the main stream of the counter-terrorism strategy in the UK, and local governments were allocated funding to work with the national government on preventing terrorism.<sup>9</sup>

Since the change of the UK Government in 2010, there have been some significant changes in counter-terrorism policies, e.g. stop-and-search, in particular reflected in the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. A revised Prevent strategy was also launched moving away from looking at preventing

---

<sup>6</sup> HM Government, *The Terrorism Act*, 2000.

<sup>7</sup> Choudhury, T., *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report*, 2012. Institute for Strategic Dialog.

<sup>8</sup> HM Government, *CONTEST: the UK strategy for counter-terrorism*, 2011

<sup>9</sup> Choudhury, T., *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report*, 2012. Institute for Strategic Dialog.

violent extremism, towards non-violent extremist ideas and beyond Al-Qaida-inspired extremism to include other forms of extremism, including right-wing extremism.<sup>10</sup>

The latest Counter-Terrorism and Security Act was introduced in February 2015, with the aim to *“disrupt the ability of people to travel abroad to engage in terrorist activity and then return to the UK, enhance the ability of operational agencies to monitor and control the actions of those who pose a threat, and combat the underlying ideology that feeds, supports and sanctions terrorism”*.<sup>11</sup> The main amendments are highlighted in Appendix B, but it is also worth noticing that the new Act requires schools, colleges and universities to play a greater role in preventing radicalisation. This has led to much criticism – particularly from academics, who argued that it threatens freedom of speech in higher education.<sup>12</sup>

### **Climate change and natural hazards**

In the recent decade, a number of severe weather events (1998 Easter floods; 2007 Summer floods; 2013 Heatwave; 2014 Winter storms and floods) influenced the shift in policy that covers natural hazards encouraging not only the improvements in emergency management, but also in prevention and preparedness (i.e. climate change adaptation).

In the UK policy, climate change and natural hazards are both seen as security issues and are occasionally discussed together (See Appendix C for more details). The main natural hazards UK is prone to according to the National Risk Register are coastal and inland flooding, severe weather (including storms and gales, cold temperature and heavy snow, heatwaves, and droughts), severe effusive (gas-rich) volcanic eruptions abroad, and severe wildfires.<sup>13</sup>

Climate change is often described to be a factor that will increase the intensity of the natural hazards in the future, a ‘risk multiplier’: *“Building resilience will therefore need to consider the impacts of climate change over the lifetime of the infrastructure and make allowances for the magnitude of future hazards in investment decisions to secure the necessary adaptation over time”*.<sup>14</sup> In addition, in the UK context security discourse mainly focuses on climate change adaptation; however the main subject of the majority of the climate change related policies is mitigation (reduction of the GHG emissions), thus excluding these policies from the security context.<sup>15</sup>

A number of political leaders<sup>16</sup> and academics<sup>17</sup> have stated that climate change is now becoming an issue of national security; however National Security strategy does not describe climate change as a risk. UK Climate Change Risk Assessment report explains that climate change is assessed differently because the risk assessment focuses on the long term risks (up to the year 2100) that can aid long-term and short term decisions on adaptation policy, whereas the National Risk Assessment focuses on most significant specific threats and hazards over a five year period, i.e. those that could threaten national security interests, and drives contingency planning for responding to and recovering from these threats and hazards.<sup>18</sup>

---

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Home Office, *The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act*, 2015

<sup>12</sup> *Counter-terrorism and security bill is a threat to freedom of speech at universities*. The Guardian, 2<sup>nd</sup> Feb. 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/feb/02/counter-terrorism-security-bill-threat-freedom-of-speech-universities>

<sup>13</sup> Cabinet Office, *National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies*, 2013.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p.28

<sup>15</sup> Bowen, A. and Rydge, J., *Climate Change Policy in the UK*, 2011

<sup>16</sup> Helm, T., *Ed Miliband: 'Britain is sleepwalking to a climate crisis'*, The Guardian, 15 Feb. 2014

<sup>17</sup> Harris, K., *Climate change in UK security policy: implications for development assistance?*, 2012

<sup>18</sup> HM Government, *UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report*, 2012.

The UK Climate Change Programme was put in place in 1994 with the aim to return carbon emissions to 1990 levels by 2000, and further reduce the emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2010.<sup>19</sup> It became apparent in 2006 that the 2010 target would not be met; this led to the introduction of the 2008 Climate Change Act, which changed the targets to 80% reduction by 2050. However, the adaptation was given more attention too: this led to the creation of the Climate Change Risk Assessment (to be carried out every five years starting in 2012) and, as a result The National Adaptation Programme was established. The main focus of the National Adaptation Programme is on flooding; however a number of other challenges that are also noticed in the National Risk assessment are listed:

- Hotter summers present significant health risks;
- Increasing pressure on the UK's water resources;
- Increases in drought and some pest and diseases could reduce timber yields and quality.

Another side of climate change as a security issue is the prospect of conflict stimulated by changes in social systems driven by actual or perceived climate impacts; this however is not widely discussed in the UK security policy.<sup>20</sup> The Climate Change Risk Assessment states that it *"has mainly examined the risks of a changing climate in the UK – not to the UK from abroad"*.<sup>21</sup> The 2011 Building Stability Overseas Strategy does not give much attention to the mechanisms for dealing with the suggested security challenge of climate change either.<sup>22</sup> The Foresight report 'International Dimensions of Climate Change' however explicitly discusses the implications of global climate change for the UK security; these include:<sup>23</sup>

- an increase in failed states and ungovernable spaces acting as a source of growing insurgent and terrorist activity;
- an increase in calls for international interventions in regions where tensions have been exacerbated;
- more calls for international humanitarian assistance and contingency arrangements are made;
- as a result of more severe and widespread impacts from climate change impacts overseas, UK domestic protests increase, for example due to unrest spread through diaspora communities;
- the expansion of civil nuclear power as nations attempt to decarbonise their energy generation leads to greater risk of nuclear proliferation;
- future defence planning fails to incorporate the full impacts of climate change;
- tensions in the Arctic region present potential trade and conflict risks to the UK.

There is evidence to suggest climate change has been 'securitised', in a sense that there has been a (re)framing of climate change from an environmental/developmental to a security perspective. However, a subsequent change in practice, programming and funding has not yet occurred. The inclusion of climate change and natural hazards into the National Security strategy is a recent development. For example, the MOD Strategic Defence Review of 1998 mentions neither climate change nor natural hazards. The 2008 National Security Strategy and its 2010 update, however,

---

<sup>19</sup> Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions, *Climate Change, The UK Programme*, 2000

<sup>20</sup> Barnett, J. and Adger, W.N., *Climate change, human security and violent conflict*. Political geography, 26 (6), 2007, 639-55.

<sup>21</sup> HM Government, *UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report*, 2012, p. 9

<sup>22</sup> DFID, *Building stability overseas strategy*, 2011.

<sup>23</sup> Foresight, *International Dimensions of Climate Change*. The Government Office for Science, London, 2011.

outline a range of climate security-related 'threats' (i.e. the security implications of climate change).<sup>24</sup>

#### 2.2.4. Overview of current trends

The current National Security Strategy was published on the 18<sup>th</sup> October 2010; its purpose being the use of '*all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security*'.<sup>25</sup> Two main objectives of the newly introduced National Security Strategy are:

- Ensuring a secure and resilience UK by protecting the population, economy, infrastructure and territory from all major risks; and
- Shaping a stable world.

All of the most salient core values and the identified groups of the most prominent security challenges are present in the National Security Strategy, although their salience within it varies. Main areas of the UK security agenda<sup>26</sup> are based on the national Security Risk Assessment and include the following areas of security:

- Strategic defence
- Terrorism
- Cyber security
- Civil emergencies
- Fragile and conflict-affected states
- Energy security
- Border security
- Organised crime
- Counter proliferation and Arms control

These areas are divided into three tiers depending on the likelihood and impact. The most prominent security challenges identified using the EvoCS coding methodology align with the UK security threats:

- **Terrorism** is listed as the highest priority risk (Tier 1 risk); this will remain on the priority list for 5 years. The National Security Strategy states that the principal threat is international terrorism (in particular Al Qaida, its affiliates and those inspired by their ideology), however different types of attacks are expected. As such, lone terrorists ('lone wolves') are hard to detect and thus difficult to prevent. The activities of residual terrorism groups are on the increase and are unlikely to decrease in the nearest future. All of these threats within the terrorism theme have been identified as a part of the coding. One more threat that has been identified is radicalised Britons, which are not explicitly addressed in the National Security Strategy; this is probably due to fact that this issue has become prominent very recently (2014-2015) and thus may be addressed in the next risk assessment.

---

<sup>24</sup> Harris, K., *Climate change in UK security policy: implications for development assistance?*, 2012.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid.

<sup>26</sup> The House of Commons. *UK defence and security policy: a new approach?* 2010.



- **Natural hazards** such as flooding are the highest priority risk (Tier 1 risk), due to the high impact and disruption they can cause. Whilst the Strategy only focuses on floods, the National Risk Register also lists storms and gales, drought, severe effusive (gas-rich) volcanic eruptions abroad, low temperatures and heavy snow, heatwaves, and severe wildfires (which is categorised as a newly assessed risk).<sup>27</sup> Some of these have been addressed in the coding. Natural hazards are grouped together with major accidents and human pandemic disease, which were not as prominent in the coding results. This can be due to the timeframe the coding was focused upon: no major accidents happened in the UK during the investigated year; similarly whilst the pandemic diseases (e.g. were Ebola) were discussed, they did not have much relevance to the UK (e.g. the case of Ebola in the UK happened after the coding was completed).

- **Climate change** is not included in the Tiers of risks but is a security issue (which is aligned with the EC security concerns): *“Our security is vulnerable to the effects of climate change and its impacts on food and water”, concluding that “the physical effects of climate change are likely to become increasingly significant as a ‘risk multiplier’, exacerbating existing tensions around the world”*<sup>28</sup>.

Judging by the review of the government policies and reports and the academic literature, all of the most prominent security challenges will remain salient in the nearest future. The National Security Strategy acknowledges all these security challenges are long-term and cannot be seen as stagnant: the risks in Tiers 2 and 3 can become more pressing and reach Tier 1. Thus all of the security challenges discussed here are significant and require government action to present and mitigate the risks.<sup>29</sup>

As expected, government institutions are seen as prominent actors with regards to all the security challenges; such prominence may be explained by their authorship of the National Security Strategy. Another important actor is the private sector, but the focus around different security challenges is different; here the main themes are climate change and natural hazards, and cyber-attacks. Most likely, the events and the impacts of the events covered under these themes may have the largest impact on the business continuity. The media tends to go for high visibility high impact security challenges – e.g. terrorism – which can potentially create good headlines. An interesting if not strange picture appears when looking at the think tanks: the main focus of their discussion is on the cyber-attacks, however it seems like the security challenges they are perceived to be most vulnerable to is climate change and natural hazards. This result is probably due to the low number of mentions of think tanks and therefore should not be seen as a significant observation.

Terrorism – and in particular radicalisation (although there is an argument that ISIL is losing its power)<sup>30</sup> is a long-term security challenge, which also has a long history, although the shifts in the way terrorism perceived and addressed have been made. The results of the coding have demonstrated that whilst there is a lot of focus on new terrorism threats (such as ISIL), the old threats – IRA – are not forgotten and still play an important role in terrorism discourse. The policy on security measures is responsive and is usually triggered by the terrorist attacks, whereas the focus of the debate is on the potential terrorists, including radicalised Britons. Media pays a lot of attention to

---

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> HM Government, *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*. UK: The Stationery Office, 2010.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid.

<sup>30</sup> The Economist, *Spreading fear, losing ground*, 21<sup>st</sup> March 2015.

terrorism stories (in particular to near-miss incidents), which possibly have an influence on how the issue of terrorism is perceived by the general public. Popular discourse is debating regulatory framework for counter-terrorism: whilst some argue that regulatory framework has to be stricter in order to prevent future incidents, others believe that current policies and laws implemented by the UK government are too tough and go against human rights and ethics. Terrorism is mainly discussed in the national context, however the international context is seen as a root of the problem. The popular discourse perception is that the national government should be responsible for addressing the issue of terrorism, and the government demonstrates its commitment to mitigating the risks by introducing a large variety of policies and regulations, however all of these are very high level and general. In reality the national government expects local governments to respond to the threat, particularly in the emergency situations.

The context in which climate change is discussed is very similar to the one of terrorism: the government is perceived to be the main actor responsible to addressing the security challenge, however the discourse at a national level is generic. The government also emphasises that since the impacts of natural hazards mainly affect local level, it is the local level actors who should be responsible for addressing these challenges. Climate change and natural hazards are connected to other security challenges, in particular food and energy supply, and thus will remain salient, but climate change will get less attention as its impacts are not immediate/ obvious. Natural hazards on the other hand often become a priority (reactively). Climate change will be hard to securitise because it is understood very differently by different government departments (with the environmental side of it being predominant).

Overall – taking into account the nature of the coded publications – it was anticipated that the national level would somehow be more prominent than other levels, with all the security challenges being discussed at the national level. It is however surprising to see the local level playing such a small role in the discussion on security. This may be explained by the fact that in recent years security has become a responsibility of local authorities (under the flag of ‘resilience’), the views of which have not been considered in this analytical framework.<sup>31</sup>

In the majority of cases, the government institutions give a more general picture, whereas other sources focus on specific stories/ objects affected by the discussed security challenges. For example, although terrorism is discussed greatly by the government institutions and the newspapers, the focus of these discussions is slightly different: while the government focuses on terrorism and extremism in general, the newspapers make it more ‘personal’ by talking about ‘suspects’ and ‘Britons’. It also appears that whilst the government institutions and newspaper articles talk about the causes, the private sector and NGOs focus on impacts (e.g. failures, disruption).

With a large number of actors involved in, and affected by, security challenges at different levels, it is becoming more and more difficult to clearly identify security dimensions.<sup>32</sup> The political, governance,

---

<sup>31</sup> In order to provide the consistency in coding, the methodology required the coding of the documents in which the term ‘security’ was explicitly stated. Thus the documents in which the term ‘resilience’ was used as a synonym of ‘security’ were not coded. More information about the coding methodology can be found in: Sweijs, T. et al. Assessing evolving concepts of security. EvoCS project Deliverable 3.1. 2015.

<sup>32</sup> Chmutina, K. Boshier, L., Dainty, A. et al. (2015) D7.1 – Report on North-West Europe regional workshop. Available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>



economic, physical, social, environmental and other dimensions of security are interconnected and form a complex system of inter- and intra - dependent networks that mutually support each other.

## 2.3 France

### 2.3.1 Characterisation of the core values

The coding analysis demonstrates that in France physical safety and security is the most salient core value. Other significant core values are social stability and security, political stability and security, and information and cyber security (Figure 2).




Figure 2 Core values

The social and economic security core values are highly interrelated in the beliefs and matters that they have to face. These findings can be understood taking into account the overall European situation of the current economic crisis and consequent financial losses, political instability, national government weakness and the meltdown of social protection, social and health care systems.

Under these core values, the most prominent security threats identified are:

- Terrorism (including attacks on infrastructure);
- Social instability and lack of social protection related to the economic security issues and the core values of social stability (i.e. social order, welfare state system, health care system; unemployment); and
- Natural hazards (including flooding; pandemic; natural hazards related to environmental crime or those caused by the absence of natural resources protection).

Other important security challenges include crimes and all illegal acts that can be caused at a local or national level; immigration; international alliances; government stability; social and health care systems; lack of economic resources.

### **2.2.2. Description of the security challenges**

**Actors:** The National Government and the Parliament are the two main actors involved in the communication and information of risk and security perception: they play a “double role” because they are at the same time addressor and addressee for security issues. The main security challenges addressed by the National Government are terrorist attacks; cyber-attacks; attacks on France’s scientific and technical potential (i.e. the French energy supply chain); and organised crime. These and other security challenges are addressed by the National Government and its specific Commissions. They play an important operative role aimed at developing emergency response and management.

Specifically, the focus of the National Government is on the security challenges mainly related to the physical security; national Parliament, whilst discussing physical safety and security (such as cyber-crime and terrorism), also pays attention to the security challenges relevant to political stability as well as ‘softer’ issues, such as the military cooperation and the military defense; the forest degradation caused by human related actions; social security. It is important to consider that the national Parliament can be identify as an addressee, but there is a continuing debate with national Government about the establishment of a complete overview of the legal framework and National operative capacities to respond to these specific security challenges.

As an addressor, the role of media is to communicate public opinion and to construct social and collective risk and security perceptions thus playing a role of communication channel between general public and public agency aimed at addressing security needs. Thus the main security challenges the media discusses are those of high visibility and primary interest to the general public, including social security and stability; Internet security; road security at national level; new national plan on railway security et. The peculiarity of the role of media is that they are not the direct addressee of the security challenges and their consequences. Their role can be described such as “vicarious” aimed at building a collective image of the threat itself that can be socialise with other citizens or professionals.

The main addressees are also the national Government and the national Parliament. Specifically national Government and the national Parliament seem to be affected by a reflexive approach due to their double role played in addressing and responding to the object of the security challenges themselves. Therefore they can also be considered responsible for addressing these security challenges, promoting a public debate on security challenges both at national and international levels. Media however is not perceived to be responsible for addressing the security challenges they discuss.

The analysis of coding data shows that specific actors tend to cover specific security challenges. For instance, food security or humanitarian crises are considered by NGOs while the academic sector does not pay much attention to these topics. Furthermore national Government and the national Parliament are focused on international relationships and matters concerning social and health care systems.

The general public plays a role of spectators, demanding protection or response for its security needs. It doesn’t play a participative role in the construction of the security and defence agenda due to political and legislative limits.

The main object of the most prominent security challenges is general public. However other objects such as national government and civil society are also mentioned. After the 2008 economic crisis,

individual and people feel the lack of social protection and the difficulty to avail themselves of the social service or for instance social security check. Another object which has been stricken by the economic crisis is the industrial sector and its negative influence on the national social system.

**Levels:** Regarding the main levels at which the most prominent security challenges are discussed it is possible to distinctly identify that they are considered both at a national and international levels due to their specific features. The security challenges such as foreign terrorist attacks are addressed at an international level while social protection and health care system are addressed at a national level. Regional and local levels are underestimated in connection with the main security challenges identified above, despite the fact that the security challenges would have the largest impact on the local level. Surprisingly, even media sources mainly focus on international and national levels instead of a local level.

**Sources:** The main sources that cover the identified security challenges are publications by government agencies, government speeches, parliamentary publications, newspapers (both daily and weekly), private sector security reports and NGO's reports. The sources, in particular government and academic, have a typical feature of self-reflexivity: it is quite frequent that the same sources are both addressor and addressee of the security challenge, probably making public opinion confused on the information received. Table 2 demonstrates the focus on various sources.

**Table 2 Sources and security challenges**

Sources	Security challenges
1. Government Policy Documents	Terrorist attacks; international relationships; international crises; cyber terrorism; crime; local crime
2. Parliament Publications	Social protection; health care system; unemployment benefit; road security
3. Newspaper articles	Terrorist attacks; flood; internet security; social protection; economic security; political stability; surveillance
4. Corporate publications	Economic security and prosperity; infrastructural vulnerability; internet security; cyber attacks
5. Non-governmental organization reports	Human trafficking; illegal migration; social protection; food security; social protection; health system
6. Academic Papers	Terrorist attacks; international relationships; national security; military cooperation; political collaboration; video surveillance

**Human rights and ethical issues:** Human rights and ethical issues are not well represented in any of the sources. Although terrorist attacks could be seen as closely related to human rights and ethical issues, this was not explicitly discussed by the government publications. Human rights are largely mentioned in NGO's reports and quite often in the academic papers, and are mainly discussed when it comes to the environmental and natural hazards.

A specific attention needs to be paid to the security challenges such as immigration waves, local crime and terrorist attacks. These security challenges and their related issue of human rights are not

explicitly mentioned in the sources considered for the coding. On the contrary these security challenges and most importantly, their negative consequences and effects continue to be a relevant topic for human rights and ethical issue.

For instance, terrorist attacks is not explicitly mentioned by none of the sources coded such as a relevant topic of human rights and ethical issues, but the related issue of human smuggling is a relevant topic for human rights.

### 2.2.3. Historical trajectory

In the last ten years, the evolution of the security concept in France has been affected by different factors such as: a political meltdown, economic crisis, immigration waves, social and urban disorder (see Appendix D for the list of the events that had the most prominent effect on the current security discourse).<sup>33</sup> An important source to better understand the changes within the fight against terrorism is the policy document “La France face au terrorisme”, which explains the new strategy of terrorism attacks, their resources and the new methods of fighting this global phenomena<sup>34</sup>.

In order to understand the historical trajectories and the evolution of the security concept, it is worthwhile to consider the milestones of the French national policy documents such as: the French White Paper 2008 edition,<sup>35</sup> the Information systems defence and security France’s strategy<sup>36</sup> and the French White Paper 2013 edition.<sup>37</sup>

As stated in the French White Paper 2008 edition<sup>38</sup>: “*The post-Cold War era is over. Globalisation now structures international relations. A new appraisal was in order.*” It is clearly explained that a new different strategies for crisis and terrorism management is needed. The aims of the first edition were: “*the White Paper substantially redefines French strategy in a 15-year perspective, embracing both defence and national security. It includes foreign security and domestic security, military means and civilian tools. It responds to risks emanating from either states or non-state actors. In an all-hazards approach, it deals with active, deliberate threats but also with the security implications of major disasters and catastrophes of a non-intentional nature.*” This definition and tasks support the result both of the coding process and desk research.

In France, the defence and national security strategies is considered a political issue to be analysed and contemplates both at national<sup>39</sup> and international levels. The national overview is influenced by the departmental structure of the national State itself, the cultural and historical backgrounds, the

---

<sup>33</sup> La documentation Française. *La France face au terrorisme, Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme*. 2006

<sup>34</sup> General Assembly 04<sup>th</sup> June 2014, Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l’administration générale de la République sur la proposition de Loi (n° 1907) DE MM. Guillaume LARRIVÉ, Éric CIOTTI, Philippe GOUJON et Olivier MARLEIX, *Renforçant la lutte contre l’apologie du terrorisme sur internet*, PAR M. Guillaume LARRIVÉ

<sup>35</sup> Présidence de la République, The French White Paper on defence and national security, 2008 edition

<sup>36</sup> Premier Ministre – Agence nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d’Information, Information systems defence and security France’s strategy, 2011

<sup>37</sup> François Hollande President of the French Republic, French White Paper, Defence and National Security, 2013 edition

<sup>38</sup> Page 3, English edition

[http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les\\_dossiers\\_actualites\\_19/livre\\_blanc\\_sur\\_defense\\_875/index.html](http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index.html)

<sup>39</sup> SGDSN, Partie publique du Plan gouvernemental de vigilance, de prévention et de protection face aux menaces d’actions terroristes, Vigipirate, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2014

national legal framework, the relationship between the central level (i.e. National government) and the regional department.

### **Terrorism**

The first relevant event that occurred in France on 24<sup>th</sup> December 1994, was the hijacking of the Air France flight 8969 by the Armed Islamic Group at Houari Boumedienne Airport (Algiers, Algeria). This is an historical milestone that helps to understand the evolution of addressing terrorist threats in France, considering the last terrorist attacks in Paris in January 2015.

In France terrorist attacks and related issues are not a new challenge. As has been stated by Engene, France has been affected by terrorist threat: *"This extended time frame allows for inclusion of important terrorist campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s, now largely forgotten, such as the OAS [Organisation Armée secrete] campaign in France."*<sup>40</sup> This campaign was primarily focused on the preservation of French colonial experience in Algeria. This points out a specific feature of French terrorism threat: the strong connection between national politics and policy and the international affairs and relationships. Specifically the perception, public debates and government policies of French terrorist threat seems to be affected by the effects caused by its international or bilateral relationships.

Taking into account the events considered for the analysis starting from 1994 (see Appendix D), it is possible to draw attention to the *fil rouge* of the events themselves. For instance the Air France flight 8969 was one of the most important evidence of this connection and its effects and impact on the French nation. Another key feature is its long term and its permanent attention on this security challenge: Pujades and Salam<sup>41</sup> consider the Jihad as a source of terrorist threat for France, with radical Islam and its radicalisation having effects on specific social groups such as the youth.

The most relevant policy document related to terrorist threats in France is the fourth French White Paper on security and defense<sup>42</sup>. The first was published in 1972<sup>43</sup> with the main focus on public order, the international relationships and politics, defense and security. Such focus was due to the historical time and the Cold War significance that influenced the Atlantic Alliance and its common goals. The second White Paper was published in 1994<sup>44</sup> and stated the cultural, governmental and international changes occurred in the last 15 years. Particularly it maintains the same *fil rouge* previously mentioned: attention was paid to international alliance, European Union and national defense. These were treated as the main three pillars of the French political discourse on security and defense.

In this context, terrorism becomes the new vulnerability that the French nation has to face. Specifically terrorism was defined such as the main no military action that can impact the French society and its security discourse.<sup>45</sup> The documents also focus on the typology of terrorist attacks and

---

<sup>40</sup> Jan Oskar Engene (2007), *Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: the TWEED Dataset*, Journal of Peace Research, 44, (1), 109–121

<sup>41</sup> Pujades, D., & Salam, A. (1995). *La tentation du Jihad. L'Islam radical en France*. J.C. Lattes.

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.vie-publique.fr/focus/defense-securite-quatre-livres-blancs-1972-2013.html>

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1972.html>

<sup>44</sup> <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1994.html>

<sup>45</sup> Page 22, <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1994.html>

their features. The third French White Paper on security and defense was released on 2008<sup>46</sup> after the Twin Tower attacks in 2001 that changed the perspectives and approaches to the security issues and their impacts. According to this document, the main innovation was the focus on the prevention and related activities. It is not only aimed at fighting the various threats to the national security, but also it is conceived such as a planning documents in order to prevent the threats at national level as well as those related to foreign policies.

The latest French White Paper released in 2013<sup>47</sup> states the importance of “means for prevention and management of crises”<sup>48</sup> that is more detailed than in the previous documents. Furthermore, terrorism issue is become a current and permanent security challenges that the French nation needs to face.

Based on the analysis of these and other terrorism related policies, the following key features of the terrorism policy can be highlighted:

- a gap between the perception of general public and political discourse;
- focus on international relationships and alliance;
- focus on European Union and the national perspective for the security challenges;
- the recognition of the new vulnerability such as terrorist threats.

Finally, it is possible to sustain that the next French White Paper will include terrorism such as one of the most prominent security challenge for the French national security along the long term security related issue including international relationships (above all the Middle East relationship) and European or bilateral relationships.

### **Natural hazards**

Natural hazards and other related challenges have only recently become prominent, however it is clearly understood that this is an issue the government will face in the nearest future.

Considering the French evolution of public policies addressing natural hazards, they do take into account such as a long term security related issues, although the major focus of French national policies is on the economic losses, business interruption and property damages. French authorities are interested in the possibility to extend the current insurance also for natural hazards or perils.<sup>49</sup>

This approach aligns the evolution of the French policies on natural hazards, their prevention and management: *“the system introduced by the Act of 13 July 1982 for the indemnification of natural catastrophe combines the solidarity inherent to mutualisation (the basis of the institution of insurance) in relation to a given risk and through payment of a premium with the principle of national solidarity via the guarantee granted by the State.”*<sup>50</sup> This principle is a key point also for the operative management of an emergency. In recent years, there has been an improvement in technology used in crisis management and emergency response along the continuing attention to the insurance aspects and the involvement of solidarity principles aimed at crisis response.

Finally the key feature of French policies on natural hazards management is the attention paid on insurance and the economic effects caused by natural hazards: this point is completely

---

<sup>46</sup> [http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les\\_dossiers\\_actualites\\_19/livre\\_blanc\\_sur\\_defense\\_875/index.html](http://archives.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/2008/information/les_dossiers_actualites_19/livre_blanc_sur_defense_875/index.html)

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/134000257.pdf>

<sup>48</sup> Page 96 <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/134000257.pdf>

<sup>49</sup> II World Forum on Catastrophes Programmes, 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2007, Madrid

<sup>50</sup> Caisse Centrale de Reassurance (CCR), Les catastrophe naturelles en France. Avril 2007 [www.ccr.fr](http://www.ccr.fr)

understandable considering the importance of the business continuity for the national critical infrastructure and the importance of the national energy supply chain.

### **Social instability**

French social instability and its related issues of welfare State and social protection have been a key point for the French national policies since the post II World War. According to the documents coded and the desk research conducted, the evolution of the French social protection system has the following key features:

- it is influenced by the national structures and events that impact on the population;
- it is deeply rooted in a cultural perception of public services provided by the State as well as other services provided by the private sector. This is also an essential characteristic of France that it is possible to notice on a multiple perspectives (mixed economy; mixed natural hazards management system; mixed social protection system);
- in France the attention to the social protection, social service and health care system has always been a prominent issue for the national Parliament and national Government. In this context it is possible to find again the gap identified before within the framework of terroristic policies;
- the current political debates and the national trend in the last ten years have been affected by social phenomenon such as social disorder, immigration waves and local criminality.

Specifically, the French case study shows that another major security challenge is social instability related to the social disorder<sup>51</sup> occurred in 2005 in Paris (banlieue in Paris), criminality<sup>52</sup> (as well as local criminality), issues related to the immigration<sup>53</sup>, and the economic crisis in 2008 with its impact on the social protection and health care system. Migrants are seen as a security challenge because they are perceived to be 'as opponents of the home regime', 'as a political risk to the host country', 'as a threat to cultural identity', 'as a social or economic burden' and 'as hostages, risks for the sending country'.

In particular, the security issues linked to the immigration process in France have played a key role in the election campaign for the French political election in 2015.

#### **2.2.4. Overview of current trends**

A general overview of the security challenges makes clear that, at a national level, the security challenges and the related core values are perceived to be long term: particular attention is paid to terrorist attacks and the long term of fighting against these specific security challenges. This is clearly demonstrated in the most important French document on National Security Strategy, "*French White Paper: Defence and National Security*"<sup>54</sup>, released in 2013<sup>55</sup>, with which the identified security challenges are aligned.

The White Paper states the basis of French strategy on security and defense issues. Specifically, it turns its attention on national security (physical safety and security); international alliances and

---

<sup>51</sup> Senat 28<sup>th</sup> August 2013, Question orale sans débat n° 0646S de M. Christian Favier, Besoins de sécurité de la population du Val-de-Marne.

<sup>52</sup> Senat 22<sup>th</sup> November 2013, Question crible thématique n° 0166C de M. Jean-Patrick Courtois (Saône-et-Loire - UMP), La sécurité : les chiffres de la délinquance.

<sup>53</sup> Senat, Question d'actualité au gouvernement n° 0375G de Mme Marie-Christine Blandin (Nord - ECOLO), 18 July 2014

<sup>54</sup> François Hollande President of the French Republic, French White Paper, Defence and National Security, 2013 edition



conflicts and the role of France within European boundaries (political instability and security); the fight against criminal and illicit factions (social security and stability); environmental protection (environmental security and protection); security industry (economic prosperity and security) and terrorism. Whilst the White Paper does not pay much attention to natural hazards and environmental risk assessment, these themes are well considered in other related national documents and in the European and International policy documents for natural hazards and disasters matters.

The White Paper has been written by the national government (and the specific committees for each sub-theme). In line with the coding process, that the national security strategy document tallies with the core values such as physical security and political stability of the national government and newspapers, but it doesn't represent public opinion and the core values of social security and economic prosperity well. For instance the core value of political stability is based on the international alliances between France and other nations, and it is not covered by all sources but only international agencies and national institutions. The analysis identifies a gap between the general public and the institutional agencies which are aimed at responding to the specific security challenges.

In this context, and considering the core values and their distribution and presence among the sources and the focus of the White Paper, it is possible to state that some of them change their influence due to the different sources and research activities considered. The history and trends of the French security as influenced by a double view. On the one hand there is the preponderance of the history of social sécurité after the Second World War and the foundation of a sort of Welfare State, while on the other hand it takes into account the French security in term of national security and national defence. This double perspective continues to be the most predominant vision of the current French security and sécurité debates.

The following security perception pathways can be identified:

1. As stated before, coding analysis highlights that the main core values are those related to physical safety and security as well as those related to political instability, social security and economic prosperity. In particular, these last two core values are considered deeply interconnected due to the domino effects caused by the economic crisis and its influence on social and health care systems. On the contrary, considering the desk research and the historical evolution, it is possible to define two valuable pathways that also seem to be salient for the near future. The first considers the security challenges and security perception related to physical safety and environmental protection: France is a European country where many extreme weather conditions as well as floods or heat waves have frequently taken place. So, in this context it is also important understand the security challenges that have occurred and the levels of risk prevention activities.
2. The second takes into account the terrorist attacks by Islamic groups or individuals that occurred in the last ten years in France and these seem to be the most important security challenges for France and French citizens.

Terrorist threats have become the main security issue in a country like France, defined by many different agencies as one of the most relevant European countries under terrorist attack. Considering this background, it is possible to understand the interconnection between the most prominent core values – physical safety and social order or local crime related issues.



The comparison between coding results and its core values, and desk research and its value provides an interesting turning point in the midst of security perception and identification of security challenges for France. The findings can be summed up according to the Tables 3 and 4, considering their presence in the two different research analyses:

**Table 3 Core Values explicit or latent according to the two different research analyses**

Core Values	Coding Analysis	Desk Research Analysis (Historical Trajectory)
Physical safety and security	Explicit	Explicit
Political instability	Explicit	Latent
Social security and economic prosperity	Explicit	Latent

**Table 4 The most salient security challenges explicit or latent according to the different research analysis**

The most salient security challenges	Coding Analysis	Desk Research Analysis (Historical Trajectory)
Terrorist attacks (including cyber- attacks)	Explicit	Explicit
Social stability and protection (including health care system)	Explicit	Explicit
Flooding	Explicit	Explicit
Climate change	Explicit	Both explicit and latent (the focus is on the effects of climate change)
Illegal immigration	Explicit	Explicit

Two significant trends in the discourse on risk and security perception in France emerge as a result of the analysis of the coding results and secondary sources. The first trend is the multidimensional feature of that security concept that does not allow a clear identification of a specific core value. What can be considered are the main core values that are represented by the security challenges and the sources identified. The second trend concerns the two distinct forms of core values such as explicit or latent. The analysis conducted means “explicit” when the core value is explicitly considered in the sources analysed, or is specifically addressed by the different agencies that are in charge of an effective response to the security challenge observed. On the contrary the analysis marks the core value as “latent”, when the core value is a secondary belief or effect of the main core value, or is completely absent in the sources analysed. Interestingly, the comparison between coding results and secondary data, including the White Paper, exposes a gap in the representation and consideration of social security and economic prosperity: this core value is one of the most prominent core values whereas the White Paper and similar documents give a minor role in the general overview and historical trajectory of France’s security perception. Similarly, regional and local levels are absent in the discussion on the security issues in the secondary sources, while the

coding analysis states that regional and local levels play an important role in addressing security issues, concerning the core values of social stability and economic prosperity.

In terms of the saliency of the most prominent security challenges, the following can be stated:

- Terrorist attacks remain a salient core value that has to be addressed by institutional and international agencies in the near future. This security challenge is incorporated into the core value of physical security as well as political instability (also at an international level and considering international alliances or conflicts) and social security. It also seems to be connected to the general economic crisis that hit European countries and the world in the latest eight years.
- Environmental and natural hazards due to the geography and the territory of France remain fundamental security challenges to be addressed by national, regional and local agencies. The core values related to this security challenge are environmental protection and security and physical security.
- Social instability: has to be considered a prominent security challenge that needs to be addressed by National government, National parliament, private sector and third sector. According to the current analysis, it can jeopardize the national stability, the social security and even the social roots of France based on the universal principles of freedom, justice and solidarity. It is particularly hazardous due to its transversal nature aimed at covering many aspects of human life such as human rights, workplace, household economic well - being.

Taking this analysis into account, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- There is a difference among the core values considered in the coding analysis and those recognised in the French White Paper and related documents. In particular just one of the core values (physical safety and security) seems to be the most prominent in the policy documents, while the others play a minor role in the current security discussion. The coding thus provided a wider representation of the security discourse among the actors whose opinion may not necessarily be considered in the government documents.
- The levels of the coding considered diverse levels such as global, international, regional, national, and local, while the French White Paper shows quite a unique attention to the national perspective and international relationships.
- The sources and actors considered in the coding analysis are underestimated in terms of their roles within security matters and discussions as well as their competences to address security issues. For instance, actors such as general public and media are not well considered in a security discourse despite their roles in being affected by and addressing the security challenges. Such lack of involvement is due to the legal framework, but is also rooted in the cultural tradition that considers experts and operative professionals more trustworthy than ordinary people in order to address and manage security issues and their effects on public and social order.
- The security challenges and core values are differently represented at different levels and by different sources: it can be stated that coding analysis show a more heterogeneous vision on the security perception and its core values, while the French White Paper has a predominant view at the national level, even if it includes the local level for training activities and to reinforce military and civilian defense. Furthermore, it is more focused on the operative

actions to do in order to assure national security such as protection, deterrence, intervention, knowledge and anticipation, prevention showing also the armed forces model.


- Whilst the analysis of the coding documents and the policy publications demonstrated a clear trend that offers a general overview on the topic of security and risk perception, it is important to consider that all the security challenges discussed are interrelated due to their multidimensionality and inner complexity.

## 2.4 Netherlands

### 2.4.1 Characterisation of the core values

Of the 430 publications coded, the three most prominent core values (Figure 3) for the Netherlands are:

- Physical safety and security;
- Economic prosperity and security;
- Social stability and security.



**Figure 3 Security core values in the Netherlands**

Perceptions of security in the Netherlands are dominated by classical notions of physical security, this being the top core value for largest number of mentions in every source analysed except NGOs and private sector, where it came second to economic security. Newspapers were heavily focused on physical security in 2014, with the majority of articles on security mentioning at least one of those core values. In second place is economic security, the most mentioned core value by NGOs and the private sector and the second-most mentioned in government policy documents. In third position is social stability and security, addressed mainly by newspapers and parliamentary publications. Standing out as the main security challenges are: immigration related policies, local criminal activities, drug abuse and drug smuggling, and radicalisation of youth.

Most security challenges affect multiple core values. For example, information and cyber security is affected by cyber-crime, but cyber-crime also affects economic prosperity and security, and cyber-attacks or disruptions have the potential to affect the physical dimension of security, when critical infrastructure is affected. From the coding exercise, two broad themes consisting of a cluster of challenges emerged to be most salient across different discourses:

- Instability and Terrorism (including international crises, integration, radicalisation and polarisation); and
- Cyber security challenges (including cyber-crime, cyber-attacks and cyber vulnerabilities).

Other prominent security challenges include climate change and natural hazards, economic threats, man-made disasters such as nuclear and chemical accidents, energy and electricity, food security and epidemics and diseases (with particular attention to the recent Ebola epidemics in West Africa). All of these concerns are addressed by all sources (although to different extents). NGO publications for example are more concerned about climate change and food security, while man-made disasters and economic threats (i.e. fraud, tax evasions etc.) are mainly talked about in private sector publications. Parliamentary publications draw attention to immigration related concerns, such as the lack of immigrant integration and issues related to refugees and asylum seekers in the Netherlands. In the case of government policy documents, the majority of security challenges identified concern physical security, words such as ‘violence’, ‘accidents’, ‘burglary’, ‘influenza’, ‘fires’, and weather-related threats featuring particularly prominently. Also salient were words which could relate to economic security such as ‘theft’, and ‘supply’.

#### **2.4.2. Description of the security challenges**<sup>56</sup>

**Actors:** The two most prominent actors in security discourses in the Netherlands are the national parliament and the national government. The public is perceived as the main object of security challenges followed by the private sector. Within physical safety and security, the most salient security challenge is terrorism, which is addressed by all actors to various degrees. The media for example pay overwhelming attention to terrorism and conflict with particular emphasis on the Ukraine crisis and the conflicts in the Middle East, all of which are perceived to have a direct or indirect effect on Dutch national security. Government publications appear to have a more balanced take on a broader range of security challenges; ranging from domestic issues such as low level violence, burglary and traffic accident; natural hazards such as storms and floods; to international tensions in Ukraine and the Middle East; thus signaling the government preoccupation with all aspects of physical security. In stark contrast, academic and NGO publications pay little to no attention to terrorism. NGO focus primarily on environmental and ecological issues, while academia shows more concern for social stability, as evidenced by its focus on immigrant related concerns. The analysis also shows that government, academia, and the private sector focus overwhelmingly on themselves as the actors called upon to tackle security issues. Government documents generally call on one of the arms of national or local government, with a small role left for the private sector and no mention of academia. Academia made no attempt to address the government or the private sector in the security challenges it identified. The private sector did mention the other two sectors as salient addressees to tackle security challenges—especially government—but still addressed itself in over half the cases. When analysing who the ‘object’ of security challenges are, particularly striking is

---

<sup>56</sup> See appendix E for the visual representation of the data

newspapers' heavy focus on the general public—though perhaps unsurprising given the need to engage their readership. The private sector generally refers to itself as the main object of security challenges. While actors tend to very much focus on themselves in their own documents, prominent attention is given to the private sector in government policy documents; to government and private sector in academic publications; and to government in private sector documents. Concerns about economic prosperity and security are primarily addressed by the government and the private sector. Of particular significance here are issues pertaining to cyber-crime, which receive overwhelming attention from the government and the private sector. No doubt this is reflective of the need for both the private sector and the government to address cyber related challenges, but it also reveals a lack of awareness from the part of other actors, albeit that if the NCTV Barometers are any measure, this is set to change.<sup>57</sup>

**Levels:** Overall, security challenges are discussed at the national and international level, while the transnational level account for very little; and the global level is almost non-existent. There are however marked differences in regards to the emphasis placed on each level. Within government policy documents the levels mentioned in relation to physical and territorial security are overwhelmingly domestic, with local, provincial, and national discussions accounting for the overwhelming majority of the discourse analysed even if some strategies also touch on the international, transnational and global level. The private sector places more emphasis on the national and international levels, with very little focus on the local, global and transnational levels. Parliamentary publications appear more balanced, except for the global level, which receives seldom mention. Newspapers appeared more mixed. Although domestic events still accounted for the majority of references to physical and territorial security, international affairs played a much more salient role. Considering the main levels and the respective core values considered by all actors based on all sources of the Dutch security discourse, the main focus of the Dutch security discourse lies at the national level. Terrorism and cyber related issues are mainly discussed on the national and international level. Discussions on the global level are almost non-existent across all actors, with the exception of the government and the private sector. NGO publications pay no attention to cyber related issues, and only slightly touch upon terrorism on the local, national and international levels. Government and parliament publications discuss both terrorism and cyber issues on all levels (although the global level account for very little for government, and is non-existent for parliamentary publications). The private sector only focuses on the national and international levels when discussing cyber related issues.

**Sources:** The Dutch national security strategy itself gives prime and equal consideration to territorial, physical, economic, ecological security, and social and political stability.<sup>58</sup> This comprehensive view is complemented by a focus on information and cyber security in other documents.<sup>59</sup> There are noted

---

<sup>57</sup> Ipsos, "NCTV Ipsos Risico- En Crisisbarometer: Basismeting Juni 2014" (Amsterdam: Ipsos, March 7, 2014), [https://www.nctv.nl/Images/risico-en-crisisbarometer-basismeting-juni-2014\\_tcm126-558869.pdf](https://www.nctv.nl/Images/risico-en-crisisbarometer-basismeting-juni-2014_tcm126-558869.pdf).

<sup>58</sup> Rijksoverheid, *Strategie Nationale Veiligheid*, 2007, <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/brochures/2010/06/25/strategie-nationale-veiligheid/factsheet-strategie-nationale-veiligheid.pdf>. For annual progress reports, see Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, "Documenten Strategie Nationale Veiligheid | Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid," webpagina, (November 10, 2014), <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/nv/strategie-nationale-veiligheid/documenten-snv/>.

<sup>59</sup> Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, *Nationale Cyber Security Strategie - Rapport* - Rijksoverheid.nl, rapport, (February 28, 2011), available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/02/28/nationale-cyber-security-strategie.html>; *Nationale Cyber Security Strategie 2* (October 28, 2013), available at

variations regarding the extent to which each source addresses specific security challenges. Terrorism for example is addressed across all sources, particularly by newspapers, while the private sector and the government almost exclusively address cyber security. Newspapers focus predominantly on 'classic' core values of physical and territorial security. Yet it is Dutch academia which is the most balanced in its focus on different core values, addressing the topics in almost equal proportions. Concerns about cyber security receive much more attention from government and the private sector, but less attention in the media. Economic security receives relatively more attention—in particular from the private sector— than some other issues such as identity and environmental issues. Finally, the attention given to territorial security is striking, no doubt induced by the war in Ukraine and, to a lesser extent, the conflicts in the Middle East.

**Human rights and ethical issues:** In Dutch media discourse, terrorism was predominantly discussed as a threat to national security rather than a human rights issue. Also when it comes to terrorism, ethical issues receive considerable attention in government and parliamentary discourse. NGO publications drew attention to basic human right issues, including children's right, freedom of speech, access to health and labour rights. Private sector publications on the other hand focus on information privacy, including the safeguarding of private data and the need to ensure that companies operate within acceptable ethical standards. In parliamentary debates there is reflection on the tension between the protection of basic constitutional rights of citizens and the need to protect physical security from terrorist attacks, specifically in light of the risk posed by returning foreign fighters. Where it comes to external policies to dealing with terrorism, ethical issues receive considerable attention in government and parliamentary discourse. Debates between government and parliament about foreign military interventions always involve arguments relating to international law, promotion of human rights and gender aspects.<sup>60</sup> Upholding international law is by Dutch constitution one of the core tasks of the armed forces.<sup>61</sup> Promoting the international legal order and strengthening and spreading the rule of law in fragile societies are identified as a core Dutch priority in the Dutch international security strategy.<sup>62</sup> In the cyber domain, privacy protection is flagged as one of the priorities in the national cyber strategy, even if the discussion about the appropriate scope of discretionary authority of security services in the cyber domain remains debated, both by parliament, government, the media and NGOs.

---

<http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2013/10/28/nationale-cyber-security-strategie-2.html>; AIVD Annual Report (The Hague, April 23, 2014), available at <https://www.aivd.nl/publicaties/aivd-publicaties/@3251/annual-report-2014/>

<sup>60</sup> See also Sweijts T. (2009) at <http://www.hcss.nl/reports/dutch-military-intervention-decision-making-revisited-getting-a-constitutional-grip-on-21st-century-wars/28/> for an overview of the various criteria involved in Dutch military intervention decision making procedures.

<sup>61</sup> According to Article 97 of the Dutch Constitution: 'There shall be armed forces for the defence and protection of the interests of the Kingdom, and in order to maintain and promote the international legal order.'  
(<http://www.denederlandsegrondwet.nl/9353000/1/j9vviHf299q0sr/vgrndb9f5vzi>, last accessed 13 May 2015,)

<sup>62</sup> A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World – International Security Strategy (June 21, 2013). Available at <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/internationalsecurity-strategy.html>; Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, November 14, 2014. Available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheidturbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html> 48



### **2.4.3. Historical trajectory**

#### **Terrorism**

In the 1970s multiple terrorist attacks perpetrated by discontented South Moluccans -- who felt thwarted by the Dutch government in realising their ambition for an independent state - prompted the Dutch government to first develop policies to address the risk posed by terrorism. But it was not until the attacks of 9/11 that terrorism again returned to the forefront of Dutch policy makers' attention. At the national level, the killings of prominent politician Pim Fortuyn by an environmental extremist in 2002 and film director and publicist Theo van Gogh by a jihadist extremist in 2004, prompted terrorism to receive even greater policy priority, so did the detection of the Hofstad group, a small group of radicalised Muslim extremists. At the international level, the 11-3-2004 bombings in Madrid and the 7/7 London attacks also had a sizeable impact on the counter terrorism discourse. Soon after the events of 9/11 -- in October 2001 - the Dutch government announced its Action Plan Counterterrorism and Security ('Actieplan Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid'). It introduced a number of policy initiatives in rapid succession, including a swift reaction terrorism warning system ('Alerteringssysteem Terrorismebestrijding') for public and private actors, as well as the creation of a collaborative information sharing centre of different public bodies, later dubbed the CT Infobox. The Action plan also included the allocation of greater funds for existing capabilities of security services and law enforcement agencies.<sup>63</sup> 2004 marked the establishment of the Office of the National Coordinator for Counter Terrorism (NCTB) to coordinate all counter terrorism activities, and the introduction of a national periodical Terrorism Threat Assessment Netherlands (DTN). The Dutch counterterrorism approach is by the Dutch government's own admission characterised as 'broad': it focuses both on repression and early stage prevention. The approach was first described in the 2003 letter to parliament Terrorism and the protection of society ('Terrorismebestrijding en bescherming van de samenleving'). Early stage prevention was then further formalised in 2007 in the action plan Polarisation and Radicalisation ('Polarisatie en Radicalisering 2007-2011').<sup>64</sup> The four pillars pronged EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism was launched in 2005 focusing on prevent, protect, pursue and respond. During that same period, the government expanded its discretionary authority by adopting and adapting various laws including the Law on terrorist crimes ('Wet terroristische misdrijven') in 2004 and the Law on expanding the possibilities to detect and prosecute terrorist crimes ('Wet ter verruiming vande mogelijkheden tot opsporing en vervolging van terroristische misdrijven') in 2006.<sup>65</sup> The government also initiated and intensified a number of programs in the field of counter terrorism finance and counter CBRN-proliferation. It also significantly expanded the capacity of the Dutch intelligence services in 2005. Dutch armed forces were deployed to Afghanistan; combating 'international terrorism' being cited by the government as one of the primary reasons to do so.<sup>66</sup>

---

<sup>63</sup> Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, "Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw Over totstandkoming, toepassing, beoordeling en aanpassing van antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland 2001 – 2010" (Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid, January 28, 2011), 37, <https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/persberichten/nederlands-terrorismebeleid-degelykvormgegeven.aspx>.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid, 41-42

<sup>65</sup> Ibid.

<sup>66</sup> B.R. Bot, H.G.J. Kamp, and A.M.A. van ArdenneVan der Hoeven, Kamerbrief 22 December 2005: Nederlandsebijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan 22 december 2005 (The Hague: Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Development cooperation, 2005)

The rise of the right wing anti-Muslim political party spearheaded by Geert Wilders, and the showing of his anti-Muslim film *Fitna* in 2008, created considerable controversy, both in the Netherlands and abroad. It prompted the NCTB to raise the terrorism risk from limited to substantial.<sup>67</sup> But already in 2009 the Dutch government asserted that ‘the group of radicals that is willing to resort to violence to achieve political or religious goals has diminished in size, while there is a greater understanding of the operations of this group.’<sup>68</sup> In 2011 the Dutch government launched its first comprehensive counter terrorism strategy (CTS). The CTS specifically emphasises that it is neither intended as a call to arms in a ‘war on terrorism’, nor as a struggle against specific religious minorities, nor as a Dutch contribution to a ‘clash of civilisations’.<sup>69</sup> It continues to assert that combating terrorism should always take place within the boundaries of the rule of law while respecting the fundamental freedoms of citizens. It then outlines five pillars and eight strategic priorities. The five pillars of the ‘broad approach’ cover the entire spectrum of counterterrorism and consist of:

- Information gathering: intelligence collection and threat assessments
- Prevent: early interventions to prevent radicalisation and terrorist acts
- Defend: defend Dutch society against concrete terrorist threats
- Prepare: Prepare for the impact of a terrorist attack
- Prosecute: identify, prosecute, and bring to justice of persons suspected of being involved (in the preparation of) terrorist activities<sup>70</sup>.

The strategy also lays down the following eight strategic priorities where the Dutch government will focus its efforts on:

- Jihadist battlefield
- Jihadist discourse and propaganda
- Migration and travel movement
- Technology and innovation
- Internet
- CBRN/E
- Radicalised lone wolves
- Security awareness and performance<sup>71</sup>

Since 2009 the salience of the terrorism risk has evolved once again. Ongoing conflicts in the Middle East have precipitated the ‘resurgence of holy violence.’<sup>72</sup> In 2013, the General Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (AIVD) warned that Dutch radical Islamist movements play an active role in promoting the jihad in Syria among Dutch Muslims. Young people leaving the Netherlands to join the war against Syrian president Assad may return traumatized and possibly as

---

<sup>67</sup> See Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Actueel dreigingsniveau | Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid,” webpagina, (April 7, 2015), <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/dtn/actueeldreigingsniveau/>.

<sup>68</sup> As cited in Justitie, “Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw Over totstandkoming, toepassing, beoordeling en aanpassing van antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland 2001 – 2010,” 47.

<sup>69</sup> Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, “Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015 gepresenteerd - Persbericht - Rijksoverheid.nl,” persbericht, (April 19, 2011), 22, <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/persberichten/2011/04/19/nationale-contraterrorismestrategie-2011-2015-gepresenteerd.html>.

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., 38.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., 42.

<sup>72</sup> Tim Sweijs, Jasper Ginn, and Stephan De Spiegeleire, “Barbarism and Religion: The Resurgence of Holy Violence,” in *Strategic Monitor 2015* (The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 2015).



radicalized Islamists, as regularly reported in various media outlets.<sup>73</sup> The annual report of the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service AIVD in its most recent issue focuses on the dangers emanating from Syria, on cyber-espionage and on how the modes of operation of the intelligence services need to be reviewed and/or reformed in the wake of the Snowden revelations.<sup>74</sup> In short, the risk of religiously inspired terrorism therefore features once again prominently on the Dutch security agenda.

### Cyber-crime

In the flurry of cybersecurity strategies published by EU member states in 2011, the first Dutch National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCSS1) was presented as one of the first in February of that year. Now a commonly used name, it was the first significant emergence of the broader concept of cyber and cyber security in an official policy document in the Netherlands.<sup>75</sup>

The purpose of the NCSS1 was to realise a secure, reliable and resilient digital domain through an integral cyber security approach based on public-private partnerships, as well as to seize the ensuing opportunities for society. The strategy of 2011 emphasized the importance of Information and communications technology (ICT) for the Dutch economy and protection against all sorts of disruption was considered very much from this economic perspective. This particular angle cannot be considered surprising as the historical responsibility of ICT up to that time had a significant business continuity element and the topic itself was the responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs. As such, the policy debate in the first decade of this century was primarily dominated by economic and technology issues related to information- and communication systems and information security. Opportunities of ICT systems and their role in stimulating economic and sustainable growth as well as facilitating the interaction between government and citizen (eGovernment) were the key focus of the various ICT agendas that the Dutch central government had published since 2004.<sup>76</sup> Security and ICT as a concept was seen as instrumental – providing security solutions by using ICT – or as a reliability issue – having accessibility to ICT networks and services, and being able to protect the integrity and content of information. During that time, there were other initiatives related to cyber security. The protection of government information distribution systems (intragovernment as well as G2C), the inclusion of cybercrime into a comprehensive approach for crime prevention, and the development of a structure of critical infrastructure sectors and systems in the Netherlands were gradually increasing the security dimension of Dutch cyberpolicy.

Several developments towards 2010, led to a stronger shift in the policy response on cyber. The publication of the National Security Strategy in 2007 was the Dutch first comprehensive response to the changing security environment after the events of 9/11 in 2001. Digital insecurity was considered to be one of the sixteen themes that would require a more holistic approach, next to such risks as radicalisation, flooding, CBRN. This was expressed in the development of scenarios on cyberattacks,

---

<sup>73</sup> See for example, Nieuwsuur, 'AIVD Waarschuwt Voor Jihadgangers,' February 2013, <http://nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/471454-aivd-waarschuwt-voor-jihadgangers.html>.

<sup>74</sup> Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, "Annual Report 2014", (The Hague, April 2015), available at <https://www.aivd.nl/english/publications-press/@3251/annual-report-2014/>.

<sup>75</sup> Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, "Nationale Cyber Security Strategie (NCSS1): Slagkracht door samenwerking", (The Hague, June 2011), available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/02/22/nationale-cyber-security-strategie-slagkracht-door-samenwerking.html>

<sup>76</sup> See for example, Tweede Kamer, "De Rijksbrede ICT-agenda: Beter Presteren Met ICT, Kamerstuk 2003-2004, 26643, nr. 47", (The Hague, February 2004), and Tweede Kamer, "ICT-Agenda 2008-2011: De Gebruiker Centraal In de Digitale Dienstenmaatschappij, Kamerstuk 2007-2008, 26643, nr. 125, (The Hague, June 2008)

cyberespionage, and cyber conflict which were assessed by their likelihood and impact in the Dutch National Risk Assessment. Also, the decision to consolidate the Security department of the Ministry of Home Affairs with the Ministry of Justice into a Ministry of Security and Justice in 2010 reflected a significant upgrade of the position of security in the policy debate in the Netherlands. As stated, the publication of the NCSS1 in 2011 became paramount of the shift from predominantly safeguarding the economic dimension in cyber toward a strong presence of a secure cyberspace overall. It was the Minister of Security and Justice that officially presented the NCSS1 to Parliament.

Following suit, the defence cyber security strategy was rolled out in 2012.<sup>77</sup> This strategy focused on the following issues:

- Attracting cyber professionals to defence
- Intensifying cooperation in national and international context
- Strengthening the knowledge base and the innovative capacity of defense in the digital domain
- Creating a comprehensive approach Strengthening the resilience of digital defence
- Strengthening the intelligence position in the digital domain
- Developing the military power to carry out cyber operations

A sign of the relatively transparent discussion about cybersecurity was the announced ambition to be able to develop and deploy cyber offensive capabilities for the Dutch armed forces, an ambition that only the United States has explicitly announced, despite the fact that many more countries are actually developing offensive cyber.

As the cyber domain is characterized by rapid changes, in October 2013, the Dutch government released a new cyber security strategy, NCSS2.<sup>78</sup> The general approach of the NCSS2 is to seek to broaden the use of cyber communication in the Netherlands, and promote safe use of internet services in an approach that acknowledges the need for public-private cooperation. Amongst the key priorities identified are the creation of resilient cyber systems that promote societal growth, safeguard security and protect freedom.<sup>79</sup>

The new strategy highlights the fact that the understanding of cyber threats has increased in the past years and that priority is now given to taking measures to adequately respond to these security challenges and the changes in the cyber domain. One of such measures is intensified collaboration between public and private actors through networks and strategic coalitions, both nationally and internationally. The NCSS2 also marks a shift from a generic to a risk-based approach, which seeks to find the right balance between the protection of interests against threats, and the level of risk that is acceptable to Dutch citizens. This shift fits the broader transition in Dutch security policy from a normative to a more interest-based approach.

---

<sup>77</sup> It was updated in February 2015

<sup>78</sup> Ministry of Justice and Security, "National Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NCSS2): From Awareness to capability", (The Hague, October 2013 ), available at <https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/national-cyber-security-strategy.html>.

<sup>79</sup> Willem Oosterveld, Tim Sweijts, Sijbren de Jong, and Joshua Polchar, "The Value of Cooperation: Innovation in Dutch Security Perspective", (The Hague: The Hague Security Delta, 2015).available at [https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/images/The\\_Value\\_of\\_Cooperation.pdf](https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/images/The_Value_of_Cooperation.pdf)

Based on this strategy, the Dutch subsequently also developed two national cyber security research agendas, NCSRA I and II.<sup>80</sup> The agenda contains two topics: ‘Security and Trust of Citizens’<sup>81</sup> and ‘Security and Trustworthiness of Infrastructure’.<sup>82</sup> One of its objectives is to ‘strengthen research and analysis capabilities to gain more insight into threats and risks in the digital domain.’<sup>83</sup> It stresses the importance of a multi-stakeholder approach, with public-private partnerships, where relevant cooperating internationally. Specifically, it highlights the value of a multidisciplinary approach, ‘in which the non-technical sub-areas are also included and needed to promote cybersecurity innovation.’<sup>84</sup>

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) issues annual overviews called the Cyber security report, the 4th edition of which was released in July 2014. In this report, the NCSC drew attention to key findings such as the fact that the threat of disruptions as a result of dependence on cyber technology is still increasing; that this is partly the result of developments such as the ‘internet of things’, whereby ever more devices are being linked up to the internet; that the largest threats emanate from states and cybercriminals and that privacy is coming under pressure due to data-gathering and storage trends.<sup>85</sup>

All in all, The Netherlands has a relatively well structured approach toward cybersecurity in Europe and the rest of the world, at least on paper. An overall national cybersecurity strategy which is used to guide both public and private sector initiatives is being kept up to date in an environment which is very dynamic. Based on its principles, a cybersecurity research agenda aims at developing research excellence in the cyber domain as well as developing solutions to the challenges faced by governments, businesses, and citizens alike.

### **2.3.4. Overview of current trends**

The National Security Strategy (Strategie Nationale Veiligheid, SNV) catalogues various risks and provides guidelines to help prepare the Netherlands for different types of crisis. It approaches national security from the point of view of vital interests. These are: 1) territorial security, 2) economic security, 3) environmental security, 4) physical security, and 5) social and political stability.<sup>86</sup> National security is threatened when at least one of these five vital interests is affected to such a degree that there is potential societal disruption. The strategy describes a process which consists of annual risk assessments, based on strategic surveys, risk scenarios and capacity assessments. It is updated annually by so-called progress reports to Parliament. The latest progress report<sup>87</sup> outlined where capacity could and should be improved: cooperation in crisis management,

---

<sup>80</sup> See <https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/nieuws/cyber-security-research-agenda-investeren-in-veiligheid-en-economische-groei.aspx>.

<sup>81</sup> This “includes privacy protection, security of mobile services, data and policy management, and accountability”.

<sup>82</sup> Which “includes malware detection and removal, intrusion detection and prevention, trustworthiness of networks and hardware, software security, security of SCADA/industrial control systems (ICS), and secure operating systems”.

<sup>83</sup> Ministry of Justice and Security, “National Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NCSS2): From Awareness to capability”, (The Hague, October 2013 ), p. 27, available at <https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/national-cyber-security-strategy.html>.

<sup>84</sup> Ibid., p. 26.

<sup>85</sup> Ministry of Security and Justice, “Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 4 (CSAN4)”, (The Hague, October 2014 ), available at <https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/cyber-security-assessment-netherlands-4-cybercrime-and-digital-espionage-remain-the-biggest-threat.html>.

<sup>86</sup> Rijksoverheid, *Strategie Nationale Veiligheid*.

<sup>87</sup> For annual progress reports, see Justitie, “Documenten Strategie Nationale Veiligheid | Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismedebijding en Veiligheid.”

improving information positions, awareness and training, crisis communication and capacity development as such to be put on the international agenda. In addition, the report stressed the need to improve international cooperation in the area of cyber security. In May 2015, it was announced that the process will be further adapted with once every four years a broad overarching all hazard risk assessment complemented by quick risk and capacity assessments in the interval periods between.<sup>88</sup>

Since the publication of the SNS in 2007, the international security environment has further evolved. These changes in the international environment are captured well by the International Security Strategy (ISS), which was published in June 2013 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The ISS assesses the implications of recent developments in the international environment for the strategic interests of the Netherlands.<sup>89</sup> The ISS stresses that, as an open economy, international developments have a direct or indirect impact on Dutch economic security. It emphasises the vulnerability of the Netherlands due to its import dependence of raw materials and energy.

In November 2014, the government issued an addendum to the 2013 ISS, which highlighted fresh challenges such as Russia's annexation of the Crimea and the rise of ISIS in Syria and Iraq. This letter also highlighted developments such as the Ebola crisis, the rise of new non-state actors and of China, as well as the increasing importance of cyber, and demographic and climatological trends.<sup>90</sup>

Instability and terrorism as well as various cyber security challenges are singled out as priorities across these documents. Various annual risk assessments have considered the likelihood and impact of right wing -, left wing- and religious terrorism on Dutch national security. In that context, radicalisation of individuals and societal polarisation between groups were also assessed. Here the impact on social and political stability was deemed especially relevant. Although the likelihood and impact of such challenges were on average assessed to possess a medium probability (scale 1-5, score 3: 'to some extent likely') and medium impact score (scale 1-5, score 3: severe). Large scale societal polarisation was seen as a greater risk (probability: to some extent likely (3); impact: very severe (4)). Cyber espionage and cyber conflict scored significantly higher (probability: probable/highly probable (4/5) and impact: very severe (4)). Extended paralysis of the electricity network due to sabotage was likewise deemed to be a great risk (probability: to some extent probable (3) and impact: very severe (4)).<sup>91</sup> In the policy documents that address dealing with many of these risks, solutions and capabilities at the national and at the local level are predominantly identified with only some attention to international and transnational forms of cooperation.

One of the methodological constraints of the risk assessment approach used in the SNV is that is difficult to assess the magnitude of risk of international developments for Dutch national security

---

<sup>88</sup> Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie, "Kamerbrief over voortgang nationale veiligheid - Kamerstuk - Rijksoverheid.nl," kamerstuk, (May 13, 2015), <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2015/05/14/tk-voortgangsbrief-nationale-veiligheid.html>.

<sup>89</sup> A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World – International Security Strategy (June 21, 2013). Available at <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/internationalsecurity-strategy.html>; Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, November 14, 2014. Available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid-turbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html> 48

<sup>90</sup> Beleidsbrief Internationale Veiligheid – Turbulente Tijden in een Instabiele Omgeving, November 14, 2014. Available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2014/11/14/beleidsbrief-internationale-veiligheid-turbulente-tijden-in-een-instabiele-omgeving.html>

<sup>91</sup> Justitie, "Documenten Strategie Nationale Veiligheid | Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid."

even if – in the words of the Dutch Foreign Ministry - ‘contemporary threats to our security transcend national borders and local barriers. Internal and external security have become inseparable’.<sup>92</sup>

The international security strategy (ISS) complements the national security strategy and – in a longlist of priorities – identifies the risk of religiously inspired terrorism. It also explicitly recognises fragile states and ineffective and illegitimate governance as breeding and training grounds for new generations of terrorists. These may fight far away from Dutch shores but can also return to create havoc in the Netherlands. The tragic events on and after 17 July 2014, when flight MH17 was downed, show the risk of international instability to the physical security of Dutch citizens, so it is asserted in the update. It therefore calls for an internationalist and proactive posture in which prevention is a central element. Global and transnational solutions are propagated here.

Cyber is also identified as an important theme in the international security strategy. Here the emphasis lies on the opportunities that rapid developments in the cyber domain will bring. It refers to the Global Conference on CyberSpace 2015 – held in April 2015 – which was hosted by the Netherlands and brought together a large coalition of countries. The cyber security strategy, the cyber trend reports issued by the National Cyber Security Centre and the annual report of the secret services, specifically flag cybercrime, cyber espionage and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure as key risks to economic security and prosperity as well as to physical security.<sup>93</sup> In dealing with cyber risks, both the local, the national, the international and the transnational level are singled out to be appropriate levels of action.

The government, parliamentary and media security discourses are surprisingly similar – allowing for differences in salience – where it concerns the perception of security challenges related to instability and terrorism, and cyber security. It is likely a reflection of a series of international security developments that have had sizeable effects on Dutch national security and on Dutch national security perceptions and discourses overall. These perceptions will likely develop and evolve further but at the moment they seem to follow similar tracks. Across different discourses the focus has been shifting from internal to external security challenges. In addition to ‘profits’ and ‘principles’, ‘peace’ has once more become a salient theme.<sup>94</sup> As a result, both in governmental, parliamentary and media security discourses, security challenges to physical safety and security and social stability and security (as well as territorial integrity) have now complemented (security) challenges to economic prosperity and human rights.

Also across these security discourses, the levels of action to deal with security challenges include local, national, and international, but also the global and the transnational levels are relatively often mentioned. Government documents talk more about national and local solutions than popular media which is representative of a devolved institutional arrangement that favours production of a large amount of government literature focused on internal affairs, outweighing outward-looking discourse. Also, while the sample of coded government documents spans roughly a decade, the newspaper articles were only from the past year.

---

<sup>92</sup> Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, “A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World - News Item - Government.nl,” June 21, 2013, <http://www.government.nl/news/2013/06/21/a-secure-netherlands-in-a-secure-world.html>.

<sup>93</sup> See sourced cited in fn. 59 as well as “Tendrapporten | NCSC,” accessed May 28, 2015, <https://www.ncsc.nl/dienstverlening/expertise-advies/kennisdeling/tendrapporten>.

<sup>94</sup> J. J. C. Voorhoeve, *Peace, Profits and Principles: A Study of Dutch Foreign Policy* (M. Nijhoff, 1979).

Much emphasis in the Dutch security sector is placed on the importance of cooperation between different disciplines and fields. In particular, a so-called 'triple helix' combining government, business, and academia is held to be the gold standard of collaboration for optimal security outcomes.<sup>95</sup> What the results of the coding also show, however, is the ostensible lack of dialogue between the three sectors of the triple helix in their respective publications: with some exceptions (i.e., cyber), each actor very much continues to feature predominantly both addressor and as addressee in its own publications.

Current trends in Dutch security reflect to a large extent the themes identified in the previous sections. The prominent role of physical security and economic security, the focus on the interrelatedness of Dutch and international security agendas, and the cooperation between multiple sectors are all salient. Each of these trends is also closely interrelated.

The main findings for the Netherlands include:

- Security, in all its different guises, is more than ever back on the national policy agenda;
- While the salience of security challenges varies across discourses and per thematic area, there are also remarkable overlaps; and
- Recent events as well as the examination of the various thematic areas has shown that domestic and international security concerns are interlinked and cross-dimensional;
- Core features of the Dutch security discourse are an emergent focus on physical security and economic security, a renewed international outlook, and increasingly concerned if not yet fully realised efforts to foster cooperation among the various sectors of Dutch society in the interests of security—but also of prosperity. The three can be seen as mutually interdependent since physical and economic security is dependent on global developments and on successful collaboration among actors within the Netherlands.

---

<sup>95</sup> <http://www.hcss.nl/reports/the-value-of-cooperation-innovation-in-dutch-security-in-perspective/162>



## 3. Regional analysis

### 3.1 Characterisation of the predominant core values

Overall, 1,386 publications in three case study countries were coded. The researchers have carried out an intercoder reliability exercise in order to ensure the consistency in coding: a reliability rate of 86% was achieved. According to the coding results (Figure 4) physical safety and security is by far the most salient core value in the NWE region. Other salient core values are social stability and security (in particular in France, where the issue of immigration was very prominent), information and cyber security, and economic prosperity and security. The two latter core values are extremely intertwined, particularly when it comes to the context of cyber-crime. Cultural identity is not seen as a salient core value, however the trends in polarisation and radicalisation in the region are becoming more and more prominent, which may increase the saliency of this core value in the future. At the time of the coding exercise these trends were mostly related to social stability as well as physical safety and security, however this may change in the future.




Figure 4 NWE region core values

Based on the country profile discussions, physical safety and security and economic prosperity and security will be the focus of this analysis, as the former is the most salient core value and the second is the most intertwined core value.

The most salient security challenges across the region are:

- Terrorism (and the effect of national affairs on the national situation, issues of polarisation and radicalisation) ; and
- Cyber security.

Other security challenges that have been discussed in all three countries include immigration (including illegal immigration), natural hazards, climate change, and energy and food supply.

### 3.2 Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights<sup>96</sup>

**Actors:** A variety of actors is involved in the popular discourse of terrorism and cyber-crime. The most prominent addressor in all three case study countries is national government, with its role being particularly noticeable when it comes to addressing the issue of terrorism. In France the national government plays a lesser role as an addressor, and it is the only country where think tanks and international governments have quite a large say in matters of terrorism and cyber-crime threats. The role of private sector as an addressor increases dramatically in the context of the cyber-crime, which is not surprising as they are perceived to also be an object of this security challenge. EU does not act as an addressor in any of the countries, which can be attributed to the limitations of this coding exercise: only national rather than EU level documents (in which EU would probably be the main addressor) were coded.

The actors which are addressed on the issues of terrorism and cyber-crime are also diverse. Again, national government plays the largest role as an addressee, however private sector – particularly in the case of cyber-crime – is also perceived to be an actor who should listen to what addressors have to say. Foreign government also acts as an addressee in the context of terrorism threats: this may be explained by the efforts of all three governments to find the root of the terrorism problem and reduce its impacts. Whilst being by far the largest object of terrorism and cyber-crime across the region, general public at the same time they play a very little role as addressors or addressee, and do not play any role at all in France. The coding results demonstrate that all the actors (except think tanks) are affected by the analysed security challenges to some extent. Interestingly, in the UK government is perceived to be the second largest object of both security challenges.

Overall in the NWE region, national governments, private sector and parliament have the largest say and are the largest recipients of the information. This demonstrates that whilst mostly talking to themselves, governments are also trying to connect with private sector, which is a core of all the case study countries' economies. At the same time there is very little contact with local and regional governments, which are in charge of implementing security-related policies on the ground. Similarly, the general public who is perceived to be the largest object of security challenges is hardly being communicated to, thus it is unclear whether the general public should fully rely on governments' decisions when it comes to security matters.

**Levels:** Security discourse relevant to terrorism and cyber-crime is the most predominant at a national level in all case study countries. Terrorism is discussed at a national level in the UK and Netherlands, whereas France focuses more at an international level. Global level is not a part of the security discourse in the context of the analysed security challenges. Overall in the NWE region, a larger attention is paid to the threat of terrorism at the national level, whereas there is more focus on cyber-crime international and transnational levels. It is surprising that very little discussion is taking place at subnational and local levels, as both security challenges could have a large impact on a local scale. In addition, the main object of these security challenges being general public and private sector, both operating at local level.

**Sources:** Physical safety and security is discussed in all sources in three case study countries, with government and parliament publications covering this core value most. Newspapers pay an approximately similar attention to this core value. The main difference is with academic publications:

---

<sup>96</sup> See Appendix F for visual representation of the coding results



they hardly discuss physical safety and security in France and Netherlands, whereas it plays a large part of the academic discussion in the UK. On the other hand, French NGOs are concerned with physical safety and security more than other NGOs. Economic prosperity and security is also discussed in all the sources, however here the largest discussion is held by private sector (except for France, where all the sources discuss this core value in almost equal share). The UK and Dutch newspapers hardly touch upon these issues, whereas it seems to be an area of interest for the French media.

Terrorism has a wider coverage in a diverse set of sources in all countries, with the national government publications playing the largest role when it comes to the discussion of terrorism, and private sector when it comes to the discussions of cyber-crime. Newspapers also largely cover the threat of terrorism, whereas cyber-crime does not seem to interest them as much. This could be explained by the fact that terrorism-related stories attract more of the audience attention, as the terrorist attack would potentially have a large impact. Parliament and government publications have a more balanced coverage focusing on both issues, however slightly more attention is paid to terrorism. There is a sense that the issue of cyber-crime is being left to private businesses to resolve on its own, with only very few guidance from the government.

NGOs are not discussing the most salient security challenges in the region; their main focus is on food supply, social stability and climate change (Figure 5). The focus of the NGOs' discourse is not surprising: as has been demonstrated in national profiles, NGOs often address the importance of these issues. It should also be noted that the security challenges that are the most prominent in the NGO discourse are also prominent in all of the case study countries, although to a different extent (e.g. climate change and food supply are one of the most salient security challenges in the UK, whereas social stability are prominent in the Netherlands and France).



**Figure 5 Most frequently used security challenges as identified in the NGO publications**

Different publications focus on different levels when it comes to specific security challenges. For example, government publications cover various levels, and whilst national level is prominent (particularly in France and the UK), both terrorism and cyber-crime are discussed in the context of international and transnational levels. French government publications do not however discuss these security challenges at local and subnational levels. Private publications have a slightly different take: for instance, French business publications do not cover the threat of terrorism at all, whereas in the UK terrorism is only discussed at the national level. The Dutch publications, on the other hand, focus

on cyber-crime as a national issue, whereas the UK publications discuss these security challenges at all level. The focus of newspapers is also on a national level: it is particularly prominent in the UK in the context of cyber-crime that is only discussed at this level. Terrorism is however presented at both national and international levels, thus including in the discussion not only the effect but also the cause of the security challenge.

**Human rights and ethical issues:** When it comes to the most salient security challenges discussed here, human rights and ethical issues are hardly touched upon: UK demonstrates the highest concern (although human rights are seen as a ‘mentioned’ rather than the ‘main’ topic, as has already been discussed in the UK profile). The Netherlands does not address these issues at all when it comes to terrorism and cyber-crime, and France only briefly mentions them in parliament publications and newspaper. Overall in the NWE region human rights are most prominently discussed under the Physical safety and security and Social stability and security core values. The word cloud in Figure 6 demonstrates the most frequently used words that describe coded sources relevant to human rights.



Figure 6 Most frequently used words in the description of human rights context in the NWE region

### 3.3 Historical trajectory

First European Security Strategy was implemented in 2003, reviewed in 2008;<sup>97</sup> and its updated version is coming out in 2015. The strategy was created in order to set out the potential security challenges to EU Member States, and to underline what the EU could do, by means of co-operation amongst its members, in response. The five threats identified by the strategy are:

- terrorism;
- the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD);
- regional conflicts;
- state failure; and
- organised crime.

<sup>97</sup> Lundin, E. *From a European Security Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Ten Content-Related Issues*. 2012. Occasional paper. Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

The Strategy emphasises that *'in the context of ever-increasing globalisation, the internal and external aspects of security are inextricably linked'*. Under the heading "Policy implications for Europe" the Strategy said that the EU needed to be more active ("preventive engagement"); more capable (transformation of the member states' armed forces); more coherent (better co-ordination); more effective (working with partners).<sup>98</sup>

The Strategy was reinforced in 2009, with the greater emphasis on globalisation, and – due to EU's expanded borders - with *'a new dimension in the Union for the Mediterranean and the Eastern partnership'*.<sup>99</sup> Key security challenges pointed out in 2009 version of the Strategy include: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; Terrorism and Organised Crime; Cyber security; Energy Security; and Climate change.

The Internal Security Strategy for EU was introduced in 2010; it was defined as *'to enable the European Union to respond to existing and emerging threats to the security of European society, its citizens and organisations in the EU'*.<sup>100</sup> However it was recalled in 2014 and will be replaced by the latest Security Strategy in 2015. As outlined in draft documents and revisions of the new Strategy, the main threats for EU include: serious and organised crime; terrorism, radicalisation, recruitment and financing related to terrorism; cybercrime and the need for cyber security; threats and challenges stemming from the use of new technologies; crises and natural and man-made disasters; and new and emerging threats. A larger focus is also placed on developing connections with external threats, as *'interdependence between internal and external security is constantly growing'*. A special section is given to addressing human rights, which are the key for the security strategy.<sup>101</sup>

As demonstrated in the countries profiles, being the most salient security challenges, terrorism and cyber-crime receive a lot attention from the policy makers, media, businesses and other actors.

**Terrorism** and the events associated with it are perceived to change the security landscape of the NWE regions dramatically: a large number of the events, for instance, have been acknowledged by the security experts not only from the case study countries but also by other NWE countries (see Appendix G for a detailed timeline of terrorism-related events). This security challenge was listed as one of the key 'influences' considered to have shaped security perceptions and seen as significant defining moments in the ways that security has been understood and accounted for in political decision making (other 'influencers' included the end of the Cold War, the fall of Berlin wall etc). In particular, events in London (7/7 attacks) triggered the development of the EU counter-terrorism strategy.<sup>102</sup>

Despite a long experience with terrorism Europe has only recently developed a comprehensive legal and institutional framework for counterterrorism.<sup>103</sup> Terrorism is seen as a serious threat on the EU level and a large number of policies are dedicated to addressing this threat (Table 5).

<sup>98</sup> EC. *European Security Strategy*. Brussels. 2003.

<sup>99</sup> EC. *European Security Strategy: a Secure Europe in a better world*. Brussels. 2009.

<sup>100</sup> EC. *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model*, 5842/2/2010

<sup>101</sup> EC. *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy*. Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting. 4<sup>th</sup> December 2014.

<sup>102</sup> Devoic, B.. *The post-9/11 European Union counterterrorism response: legal institutional framework*. 2012. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*

**Table 5 Selected EU policies on terrorism**

Year	Policy document
2005	EU Counter-Terrorism strategy
2008	Stepping up the fight against terrorism
2010	Terrorist offences
	EU Internal security strategy
	Combating the financing of terrorism
2011	Prevention, preparedness and consequence management of terrorism
	Counter-Terrorism Strategy
2014	Protecting Europe from terrorism risk

Many of the EU strategies on combatting terrorism are developed together with the UN. EU's counter-terrorism strategy is very similar to the one adopted in the UK and is based on four strands: Prevent, Protect, Pursue, Respond. It is pointed out that many of the European terrorist cells are located in the NWE region (the UK, France, Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands),<sup>104</sup> with the EU and each of the countries' responsible organisations trying to identify those in order to prevent future attacks, thus the salience of this security challenge in the NWE is not surprising.

Internet related security challenges – including **cyber-crime** – are also gaining their prominence. Whilst not acknowledged as a separate threat in the 2003 European Security Strategy (although it was included in 'Organised crimes' section), cybersecurity became much more prominent in its 2009 version and will receive a special emphasis in 2015 version.<sup>105</sup> It is certainly considered as a salient security challenge judging by a variety and amount of various programmes, policies and regulations aimed at addressing this challenge (Table 6).

**Table 6 Selected cybercrime- related policy documents**

Year	Title
2009	Communication on Critical Information Infrastructure protection
2011	Achievements and next steps: towards global cyber-security
2012	Critical Information Infrastructure Protection: towards global cyber-security
2013	Cybersecurity Strategy of the European Union – An Open, Safe and Secure Cyberspace
	Directive concerning measures to ensure a high common level of network and information security across the Union

<sup>104</sup> Sanches, R. et al. *Terror cell warning as Europe scrambles to handle threats*. CNN News. 2015.

<sup>105</sup> EC. *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy*. Brussels. 2014.

Cybercrime is acknowledged to have a large effect on the European economy; thus the EC points out the importance of engaging with various stakeholders (including not only the businesses but also general public and in particular children) as well as cross border cooperation.<sup>106</sup>

As pointed out at the workshop, cyber-crimes – and cybersecurity overall – is still largely neglected due to the lack of understanding about technological developments. However some of the cybersecurity related events (such as 2012 DigiNotar cyberattack and 2014 Sony cyberattack) were acknowledged as influencers of future security discourse.

### 3.4 Overview of current trends

As demonstrated in the previous section, the findings of the coding exercise are generally aligned with the review of current EU policies. The most salient security challenges for the NWE region are also prominent in the EU policy discourse, and are becoming more so as the new EU Strategy is being implemented. These results go in line with the results of the NWE regional workshop that took place in January 2015 in London and is described in detail in Deliverable 7.1.<sup>107</sup> The overall findings refer not only to the threats of terrorism and cyber-crime, but to other salient security challenges listed in section 3.1: EU has implemented an Energy Security Strategy;<sup>108</sup> it runs a Food security thematic programme aimed at internal and external food supplies;<sup>109</sup> and has developed an extensive EU Adaptation package with the EU Strategy to Climate Change at its heart.<sup>110</sup> However some differences were also found. For instance, as expected, the EU level documents promote cooperation among the member states as well as with the third country partners, however the specific countries that should take a lead on addressing a particular security challenge are rarely named. On the contrary, the case study countries – whilst mentioning cooperation, focus largely on their own efforts, capacities and capabilities in addressing various security challenges.

Some differences also appeared in the way specific security challenges are perceived as the approach taken by the EU is not fully aligned with the approaches taken in the region. The coding results have demonstrated that whilst terrorism is acknowledged to be an international issue, it is largely dealt with on a national level (e.g. the coding results do not provide a clear picture about the international partners in fight against terrorism). This situation is much clearer on the EU level: it is stated that the EU cooperates on counter-terrorism with countries in the Western Balkans, the Sahel, North Africa, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa and North America, as well as in Asia, and with the US.<sup>111</sup> Another difference is that for the EU one of the most difficult challenges in the development of a counterterrorism framework is the dilemma of security versus human rights: the European Union counterterrorism measures are as much as possible on the side of human rights while remaining effective. The coding results have not demonstrated such a close link to human rights: instead these were mainly neglected in the context of this security challenge.

The NWE region overall demonstrates a good awareness of the cyber-crime issues: such, all the case study countries (and other counties in the region) have adopted national Cybersecurity Strategies

<sup>106</sup> EC. *A digital agenda for Europe: Cybersecurity*. 2015.

<sup>107</sup> Chmutina, K., Boshier, L., Dainty, A. et al. *Workshop Report: North-West Europe*. 2015. Available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>

<sup>108</sup> EC. *European Energy Security Strategy*. 2014.

<sup>109</sup> EC. *The Food Security Thematic Programme*. 2011.

<sup>110</sup> EC. *The EU Strategy to Climate Change*. 2013.

<sup>111</sup> EC. *EU fight against terrorism*. 2015. Available at: <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/?lang=en>

that cover national infrastructure as well as private sectors.<sup>112</sup> The coding results in general go in line with the approach taken by the EU, however NWE region analysis demonstrates that very little attention has been paid to general public – which is the main object of the security challenge – and their role in dealing with cybercrimes in the regional coding; whereas in Europe general public is prominently stated as one of the main addressees.

The analysed countries share a large number of similarities (as has been demonstrated in coding results) but also differ in some aspects. The UK's, France's and the Netherlands' security strategies were written in approximately the same time in late 2000s as they – and a region as a whole – were trying to redefine their approach to national security in light of changes in NATO and expansion of the EU. The national security strategies of these countries share similar way of adopting a risk-based 'all hazards' and 'all of society' approach as the new security direction. The UK and the Netherlands are particularly similar in the way they are addressing the issues of security, whereas France has its specifics. One of the most prominent similarities is the focus on the same security issues, which is demonstrated by the salience of similar core values and security challenges. As demonstrated by the coding results, terrorism is a regional issue which, however, is mainly discussed at a national level. The discourse of terrorism includes not only terrorist attacks but also the issues of radicalisation (in particular in the UK and France) and polarisation (in the Netherlands and France). Supply-related threats (particularly energy supply) provide another good example: despite searching for new energy sources (e.g. fracking) and investing in renewable energy sources (e.g. PV and wind in Germany), NWE region is highly dependent on the fossil fuels supply from politically unstable regions (such as Russia). As demonstrated in the coding results, the main focus of the security discourse is on national level, with national actors playing the most prominent role across the region. At the same time, general public which is perceived as the main object of security challenges hardly plays any role in this discourse.

There are some differences in the way security issues are addressed: for example, the Netherlands is very outward looking, with large focus on the international state (it has even implemented an International Security Strategy)<sup>113</sup>. Both national and international strategies overlap, but it is the only country that explicitly states the role that international affairs play in its security discourse. Although France and the UK acknowledge the role of the international actors, they mainly discuss the issues at a national level. Another example is the perception of the roles within the EU: UK is seeing EU as mainly a trade partner (as many of its security deals are with the USA), whereas the Netherlands and France are more reliant on the EU in terms of security cooperation.

The financial crisis of 2008 is included as a security issue in all the case studies countries, although the discussion of its implications for the security in the UK is largely absent, whereas in Netherlands and France it further reinforced the inward shift, with socio-economic dimensions (such as unemployment; health; security of the elderly; and pensions) attaining greater salience.

The roles NWE region countries play in the EU is another interesting aspect that can influence the future developments in the security on the EU level. The NWE is the largest (in terms of the population and the wealth) in the EU. Whilst all three analysed countries acknowledge that the EU is critical for their security and prosperity, their roles within the EU security agenda differ. The EU acts

---

<sup>112</sup> BSA. *EU Cybersecurity Maturity Dashboard*. 2015.

<sup>113</sup> Ministry of Foreign Affairs. *International Security Strategy*. 2013. Available at: <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/international-security-strategy.html>



as a bloc with all 27 member states discussing issues and unanimously making decisions, but many argue that behind the scenes lies a tacit agreement that the Big Three - France, Germany, and the UK - take the lead on foreign policy, including security matters.<sup>114</sup> In 1998, the UK and France were authors of the Saint-Malo declaration, which led to the creation of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy.<sup>115</sup> These two countries continue to play important roles in the EU security (particularly in NATO), but they are also very protective of their sovereignty.<sup>116</sup> Another strong player whose role has evolved since the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany; however the relationship with Germany within the region is complex. Whilst searching for solutions to similar security challenges (such as global terrorism, sustained instability and uncertainty at Europe's borders), German and British starting points and long terms goals often differ dramatically.<sup>117</sup> Similarly, France whilst criticising others for neither willing to nor letting their interests converge towards EU common interests, itself hardly conforms to this common interest.<sup>118</sup> Netherlands on the other hand prioritises integration with EU also pursue defence cooperation within Europe, both multilaterally - in the context of the Western European Union and the European Security and Defence Policy of the EU - and bilaterally, as in the German-Netherlands Corps.<sup>119</sup> This national stances and roles played in the overall EU security have to be taken into account on the broader European level.

---

<sup>114</sup> Lehne, S. *The big three in European policy*. Carnegie Europe. 2012.

<sup>115</sup> Lidington, D. *EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective*. 2012.

<sup>116</sup> Lehne, S. *The big three in European policy*. Carnegie Europe. 2012.

<sup>117</sup> Institute for German Studies. *Germany, the UK and European security: the end of the 'stille allianz'?* 2005.

<sup>118</sup> Pachta, L. *France: driving force of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy?* 2005.

<sup>119</sup> Dickow, M. et al. *Deepening German-Netherlands Defence Cooperation for Europe's Security Needs*. Working Paper. Research Division EU External Relations. 2013.



## 4. Findings and conclusions

### 4.1 Summary of the country and regional profiles

The NWE region shares similarities but also has very specific differences; security however is at the top of the agenda in the region which is demonstrated by the existence of the National Security Strategies in analysed countries and specific security strategies for particular security challenges.

The UK has a clear strategy of preventing and responding to the main security challenges its facing – which go in line with the coding results. UK's security agenda co-exists with the resilience agenda, the implementation of which is largely the responsibility of the local governments. The main security challenges identified in the UK are terrorism, cyber-crime, climate change and natural hazards, and energy and good supply, with the most salient core values being physical safety and security, economic prosperity and security, and environmental and ecological security.

In France, the security challenges as well as the most salient core values are deeply rooted in the cultural and social backgrounds (for instance the causes of the social disorders or riots) of the Nation; it has the largest focus on the social challenges in the region. The main core values are physical security, political instability, social security and economic prosperity. French security profile represents and to an extent mirrors a turning point for the European security policies, due to its attention to the international alliances and conflicts around the world and their influences and effects on the international political scenario. French security profile can be defined such as a multicultural and multidimensional model aimed at managing the crises and disasters at national and international levels.

The Netherlands is, in many respects, one of most peaceful and prosperous countries in the world. Traditionally security did not top the list of citizens' concerns. But international developments of recent have changed this. Instability in the Middle East, the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, the rivalry with Russia and the downing of MH17 in the summer of 2014—in which 196 Dutch citizens died — each contribute to this change. In addition to these international developments, a number of domestic challenges have stirred new concerns, most notably the gas drilling induced earthquakes in Groningen. The main security challenges identified in the Netherlands are instability and terrorism and cyber-challenges in tandem with the four most salient core values physical safety and security, economic prosperity and security, and social stability and security closely followed by territorial security.

### 4.2 Key findings

As the result of the coding exercise, workshop discussions and extensive literature review, following findings deem to be critical for understanding the future developments in the security discourse in the NWE region:

- **France uniqueness:** French security discourse is closer to the discourse of South-West Europe (Deliverable 5.2) than to the NWE.
- **Future trends:** The current most salient security challenges will remain such in the nearest future although their prominence may change;
- **Events vs trends:** More attention is paid on 'hard security' threats that can be associated with specific events. For example, terrorism is highly visible, the actions of prevention are clear and thus it is easier to prioritise such events over, for instance, climate change, the impacts of which do not occur on a regular basis (although are becoming more frequent).

- **Complexities:** The core values are intertwined; thus it is virtually impossible to refer a specific security challenge or to a specific singular core value. Similarly, it is extremely difficult to identify specific security challenges as they are closely interrelated and are linked to one another;
- **Globalisation:** It is becoming impossible to think about security in domestic (national) context only, as the majority of security challenges are influenced by the situation abroad (either in a specific country or on a global level);
- **Localisation:** At the same time - whilst operating at a global level and being influenced by the global and international events - security 'is coming home':<sup>120</sup> this is demonstrated by the responsibilities taken up by the local governments and private businesses that act locally.
- **Nationalisation:** National level is the most prominent level of the security discourse. National governments and parliaments are the most active actors: they pose as addressors and addressees, although they are not often seen as objects.
- **Regional focus:** Whilst the NWE region countries cooperate in security area and promote integration of the EU, they are not in a rush to cooperate with other – newer – EU member states.
- **Multi-stakeholder engagement:** No single actor, be it the national government, national parliament, or the private sector can address issues pertaining to cyber-crime alone. As a result, there is a need for concerted efforts, and a multi-stakeholder approach to address these issues – both at the domestic and international level. At the domestic level, governments have to cooperate and coordinate with the private sector, through sharing best practices and expertise. At the international level, governments should further increase cooperation with other foreign governments.
- **Dialogues:** There is a strong relationship between governmental institutions and private sector, however general public is largely excluded from this conversation. At the same time, the dialogue does not lead to a large number of actions taken together by the governments and private stakeholder.
- **Widening of security discourse:** Non-security events have become securitised, because such action helps to quickly mobilise resources. For instance, by securitising 'immigration' it could make it more 'justifiable' for policy makers to mobilise resources to deal with the threat of immigration (irrespective of whether immigration actually poses a security threat or not).
- **Human rights:** Human rights are not well reflected in the coding documents, however this does not mean that human rights and ethical value are overlooked. Instead it is highly probable that human and ethical values are intrinsic to the NWE region discussion of security and are therefore 'taken for granted'.
- **Cultural differences:** Cultural identity is not seen as a salient core value, however the trends in polarisation and radicalisation in the region are becoming more and more prominent, which may increase the saliency of this core value in the future.
- **Similar story but different coverage:** Various sources across the region tell the same story in a different manner. For example, climate change is seen as a cause which has to be mitigated in the policy documents whereas media mainly focuses on its impacts (i.e. natural hazards such as flood).

Overall, the results of the NWE region analysis demonstrate that the existing security challenges will remain salient in the nearest future and addressing them require thinking about the global context that can become a driver of the negative influences upon national and local security. Security has been re-framed from national interest to a more local human security-oriented discourse, but at the same national, even regional interest are becoming important again.

---

<sup>120</sup> Coaffee, J and Murakami Wood, D. *Security is coming home: rethinking scale and constructing resilience in the global urban response to terrorist risk*. International Relations. 20 (4), 503-17, 2006.

## 5. References

- Barnett, J. and Adger, W.N (2007). *Climate change, human security and violent conflict*. Political geography, 26 (6), 639-55.
- Bot, B.R., Kamp, H.G.J. and van Ardenne Van der Hoeven, A.M.A. (2005). *Nederlandsebijdrage aan ISAF in Zuid-Afghanistan*. Kamerbrief 22 December.
- Bowen, A. and Rydge, J. (2011). *Climate Change Policy in the UK*. Policy paper. Available at: [http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PP\\_climate-change-policy-uk.pdf](http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/PP_climate-change-policy-uk.pdf) (accessed 16/06/2015).
- BSA (2015). *EU Cybersecurity Maturity Dashboard*. Available at: <http://cybersecurity.bsa.org/> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Cabinet Office (2013). *National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies*. The Stationary office, UK.
- Caisse Centrale de Reassurance (CCR) (2007). *Les catastrophes naturelles en France*. Avril 2007. Available at: [www.ccr.fr](http://www.ccr.fr) (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Central Intelligence Agency (n.d.). *CIA World Fact book*. Available at <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/nl.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Chmutina, K. Boshier, L., Dainty, A. et al. (2015). D7.1 – Report on North-West Europe regional workshop. Available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Choudhury, T. (2012). *Impact of Counter-Terrorism on Communities: UK Background Report*. Report. Institute for Strategic Dialog.
- Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions (2000). *Climate Change, The UK Programme*. The Stationary office, UK.
- Devoic, B. (2012). *The post-9/11 European Union counterterrorism response: legal institutional framework*. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, USA.
- Dickow, M. et al. (2013). *Deepening German-Netherlands Defence Cooperation for Europe's Security Needs*. Working Paper. Research Division EU External Relations. Available at: <http://www.clingendael.nl/publication/deepening-german-netherlands-defence-cooperation-europes-security-needs> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- DFID (2011). *Building stability overseas strategy*. HM Government, UK.
- Engene, J.O. (2007). *Five Decades of Terrorism in Europe: the TWEED Dataset*. Journal of Peace Research, 44, (1), 109–121.
- European Commission (2003). *European Security Strategy*. Brussels.
- European Commission (2009). *European Security Strategy: a Secure Europe in a better world*. Brussels.
- European Commission (2010). *Internal Security Strategy for the European Union: Towards a European Security Model*, 5842/2/2010. Brussels.
- European Commission (2011). *The Food Security Thematic Programme*. Brussels.

- European Commission (2013). *The EU Strategy to Climate Change*. Brussels.
- European Commission (2014). *Development of a renewed European Union Internal Security Strategy*. Justice and Home Affairs Council Meeting. 4<sup>th</sup> December 2014. Brussels.
- European Commission (2014). *European Energy Security Strategy*. Brussels.
- European Commission (2015). *A digital agenda for Europe: Cybersecurity*. Brussels.
- European Commission (2015). *EU fight against terrorism*. Brussels.
- Foresight (2011). *International Dimensions of Climate Change*. Final Project Report. The Government Office for Science, London.
- General Assembly (04<sup>th</sup> June 2014). *Rapport fait au nom de la Commission des lois constitutionnelles, de la législation et de l'administration générale de la République sur la proposition de Loi (n° 1907) DE MM. Guillaume LARRIVÉ, Éric CIOTTI, Philippe GOJON et Olivier MARLEIX, Renforçant la lutte contre l'apologie du terrorisme sur internet, PAR M. Guillaume LARRIVÉ*.
- HM Government (2000). *The Terrorism Act*. The Stationary office, UK.
- HM Government (2010). *A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy*. The Stationery Office, UK.
- HM Government (2011). *CONTEST: the UK strategy for counter-terrorism*. UK.
- HM Government (2012). *UK Climate Change Risk Assessment: Government Report*. The Stationary office, UK.
- Harris, K. (2012). *Climate change in UK security policy: implications for development assistance?* Available at: <http://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-assets/publications-opinion-files/7554.pdf> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Helm, T. (2014). *Ed Miliband: 'Britain is sleepwalking to a climate crisis'*, The Guardian, 15 Feb.
- Home Office (2014). *Protecting the UK against terrorism*. HM Government, UK.
- Home Office (2015). *The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act*. The Stationary Office, UK.
- Institute for German Studies (2005). *Germany, the UK and European security: the end of the 'stille allianz'?* Available at: <http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/Documents/college-social-sciences/government-society/igs/research/Search-for-solutions/security-seminar-briefing-paper.pdf> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Ipsos (2014). *NCTV Ipsos Risico- En Crisisbarometer: Basismeting Juni 2014*. Amsterdam: Ipsos, March 7, 2014. Available at: [https://www.nctv.nl/Images/risico-en-crisisbarometer-basismeting-juni-2014\\_tcm126-558869.pdf](https://www.nctv.nl/Images/risico-en-crisisbarometer-basismeting-juni-2014_tcm126-558869.pdf) (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Lehne, S. (2012). *The big three in European policy*. Carnegie Europe. Available at: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/eu\\_big\\_three1.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/eu_big_three1.pdf) (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Lidington, D. (2012). *EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective*. Speech. Available at: <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-the-uk-perspective> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Lundin, E. (2012). *From a European Security Strategy to a European Global Strategy: Ten Content-Related Issues*. Occasional paper. Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland in het eerste decennium van de 21e eeuw Over totstandkoming, toepassing, beoordeling en aanpassing van antiterrorismemaatregelen in Nederland 2001 – 2010*. Available at: <https://www.nctv.nl/actueel/persberichten/nederlands-terrorismebeleid-degelijkvormgegeven.aspx> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale contraterrorismestrategie 2011-2015 gepresenteerd*. Available at: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Cyber Security Strategie (NCSS1): Slagkracht door samenwerking*. The Hague. Available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/02/22/nationale-cyber-security-strategie-slagkracht-door-samenwerking.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2011). *Nationale Cyber Security Strategie*. Rapport. Available at <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/rapporten/2011/02/28/nationale-cyber-security-strategie.htm> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Actueel dreigingsniveau | Nationaal Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid*. Available at: <https://www.nctv.nl/onderwerpen/tb/dtn/actueeldreigingsniveau/> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie (2015). *Kamerbrief over voortgang nationale veiligheid - Kamerstuk - Rijksoverheid.nl*. Kamerstuk. Available at: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten-en-publicaties/kamerstukken/2015/05/14/tk-voortgangsbrief-nationale-veiligheid.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013). *International Security Strategy*. Available at: <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/international-security-strategy.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations (2015). *Annual Report 2014*. The Hague. Available at <https://www.aivd.nl/english/publications-press/@3251/annual-report-2014/> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministry of Justice and Security (2013). *National Cyber Security Strategy 2 (NCSS2): From Awareness to capability*. The Hague. Available at <https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/national-cyber-security-strategy.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

Ministry of Justice and Security (2014). *Cyber Security Assessment Netherlands 4 (CSAN4)*. The Hague. Available at <https://www.ncsc.nl/english/current-topics/news/cyber-security-assessment-netherlands-4-cybercrime-and-digital-espionage-remain-the-biggest-threat.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

N.A. (2013). *Défense et sécurité : les quatre Livres blancs (1972-2013)*. Available at: <http://www.vie-publique.fr/focus/defense-securite-quatre-livres-blancs-1972-2013.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

N.A. (2015). *Counter-terrorism and security bill is a threat to freedom of speech at universities*. The Guardian,

- 2<sup>nd</sup> Feb. 2015. Available at: <http://www.theguardian.com/education/2015/feb/02/counter-terrorism-security-bill-threat-freedom-of-speech-universities> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency (2013). The effects of Climate Change in the Netherlands: 2012. Available at: <http://www.pbl.nl/en/publications/the-effects-of-climate-change-in-the-netherlands-2012> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Nieuwsuur (2013). AIVD Waarschuwt Voor Jihadgangers. Available at: <http://nieuwsuur.nl/onderwerp/471454-aivd-waarschuwt-voor-jihadgangers.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Oosterveld, W., Sweijs, T., de Jong, S. and Polchar, J. (2015). *The Value of Cooperation: Innovation in Dutch Security Perspective*. The Hague: The Hague Security Delta. Available at [https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/images/The\\_Value\\_of\\_Cooperation.pdf](https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/images/The_Value_of_Cooperation.pdf) (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Pachta, L. (2005). *France: driving force of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy?* Available at: [http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch\\_eur/France\\_Lukas\\_Pachta.pdf](http://www.europeum.org/doc/arch_eur/France_Lukas_Pachta.pdf) (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Premier Ministre (2011). *Agence nationale de la Sécurité des Systèmes d'Information*.
- Présidence de la République (1972). Le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1972. Available at: <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/pdf/le-livre-blanc-sur-la-defense-1972.pdf> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Présidence de la République (1994). Le Livre blanc sur la défense de 1972. Available at <http://www.livreblancdefenseetsecurite.gouv.fr/archives-Livre-blanc-1994.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Présidence de la République (2008). *The French White Paper on defence and national security*, 2008 edition.
- Présidence de la République (2013). *French White Paper, Defence and National Security*, 2013 edition. Available at: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/134000257.pdf> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Pujades, D., and Salam, A. (1995). La tentation du Jihad. In: J.C. Lattes (eds) *L'Islam radical en France*. P.65. Paris.
- Rijksoverheid (2007). *Strategie Nationale Veiligheid*. Available at: <http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/bestanden/documenten-en-publicaties/brochures/2010/06/25/strategie-nationale-veiligheid/factsheet-strategie-nationale-veiligheid.pdf> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- SGDSN (2014). *Partie publique du Plan gouvernemental de vigilance, de prévention et de protection face aux menaces d'actions terroristes*. Vigipirate, 17<sup>th</sup> January 2014.
- Sanches, R. et al. (2015). *Terror cell warning as Europe scrambles to handle threats*. CNN News.
- Secrétariat général de la défense nationale (2006). *La France face au terrorisme, Livre blanc du Gouvernement sur la sécurité intérieure face au terrorisme*. Available at: <http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/064000275/> (accessed 16/06/2015).
- Senat (2013). *Question orale sans débat*, n° 0646S de M. Christian Favier, Besoins de sécurité de la population du Val-de-Marne, 28<sup>th</sup> August 2013.



Senat (2013). *Question crible thématique*, n° 0166C de M. Jean-Patrick Courtois (Saône-et-Loire - UMP), La sécurité : les chiffres de la délinquance. 22th November 2013.

Senat (2014). *Question d'actualité au gouvernement*, n° 0375G de Mme Marie-Christine Blandin (Nord - ECOLO), 18 July 2014.

Sweijts, T., Ginn, J. and De Spiegeleire, S. (2015). *Barbarism and Religion: The Resurgence of Holy Violence*. Strategic Monitor 2015. The Hague: The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies.

The Government of the Netherlands (2013). *A Secure Netherlands in a Secure World – International Security Strategy*. Available at <http://www.government.nl/documents-and-publications/notes/2013/06/21/internationalsecurity-strategy.html> (accessed 16/06/2015).

The House of Commons (2010). *UK defence and security policy: a new approach?* Stationary Office, UK.

The Economist (2015). *Spreading fear, losing ground*, 21<sup>st</sup> March.



## 6. Appendices

### Appendix A: UK profile: graphical representation of the coding results




Figure 7 Role of different actors in the analysed salient security challenges




Figure 8 Security challenges discussed by different Addressors




Figure 9 Comparison across the actors: Who has the largest say?




Figure 10 Comparison of the addressees: who's been talked to the most?




Figure 11 Discourse of security challenges addressed towards Addressees




Figure 12 Who is the main object of security challenges?




Figure 13 Security challenges that different objects are most vulnerable to




Figure 14 Security challenges as discussed at different levels sources (as the main topic)




Figure 15 Distribution of discussions about different security challenges at different levels




Figure 16 Discussions on various security challenges by different sources at different levels




Figure 17 Various levels as covered by different sources




Figure 18 The share of the most prominent core values as covered in different sources




Figure 19 Most prominent security challenges as covered in different sources




Figure 20 Human and ethical values as addressed in different security challenges




Figure 21 Human and ethical values covered by various sources with relation to different security challenges

## Appendix B: Timeline of main terrorism events and policies in the UK<sup>121</sup>

Year	Terrorism Acts and related publications	Description	Other terrorism-related government publications	Terrorist attacks and terrorism related events
2000	The Terrorism Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- gave a broad definition of terrorism for the first time;</li> <li>- provided an extended list of proscribed terrorist organisations beyond those associated with Northern Ireland;</li> <li>- allowed police to detain terrorist suspects for questioning for up to 7 days;</li> <li>- allowed police to stop and search any person or vehicle in designated areas without the need to suspect that person</li> </ul>		IRA terrorist attacks in London <sup>122</sup> in June, July and September
2001	The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- contained measures that had been rejected from the 2000 Act;</li> <li>- allowed Police to operate outside of military bases even for non-terrorist cases;</li> <li>- enabled foreigners to be detained as terrorist suspects indefinitely;</li> <li>- required annual renewal of some provisions in recognition of the political climate</li> </ul>		9/11
2003	Criminal Justice Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- doubled the period of detention of a terrorist suspect for questioning to 14 days;</li> <li>- justified by the claim that forensic analysis of chemical weapons materials might not be complete in 7 day</li> </ul>		IRA terrorist attacks in London (in march, May and August) and Birmingham (November)
2004			Civil Contingencies Act	Bomb attacks on the British consulate and the HSBC building in Islamabad
2005	The Prevention of Terrorism Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- established the "control order" (a form of house arrest)</li> </ul>		Attack on British nationals in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; British national is kidnapped and killed in Iraq
2006	The Terrorism Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- defined the offence of "glorifying" terrorism;</li> <li>- revised the period of detention of terrorist suspect without charge up to 28 days;</li> <li>- justified by the claim that necessary evidence to decide charges might be encrypted on one of thousands of hard disks, and it could take this long to search them</li> </ul>	Countering international terrorism: the UK strategy	London 7/7 bombings
	The Terrorism (UN	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- allowed the Treasury to freeze the assets of suspected terrorists</li> </ul>		

<sup>121</sup>It is also important to bear in mind that other non-terrorism issues may have influenced the development of terrorism related policies (i.e. fuel strike/ blockages, floods, overseas conflicts involving the UK etc.). However these will not be discussed in this report.

<sup>122</sup> Cells in green are the IRA related attacks; in purple are Al-Qaeda or Al-Qaeda inspired related

EvoCS Deliverable 7.1

Report on the NW Europe Case Study Workshop

	Measures) Order			
2007				Glasgow International Airport attack
2008	The Counter-terrorism Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- allowed police questioning of suspects after they have been charged;</li> <li>- required convicted terrorist to notify the police of their whereabouts;</li> <li>- extended extra-territorial jurisdiction of courts over terrorism offences overseas;</li> <li>- interpreted as banning all photographs of the police in public places</li> </ul>	National Security Strategy: security in an interdependent world	Exeter attempted bombing Attacks in Northern Ireland
2009	The Coroner and Justice Act	- extends sentencing provisions in Criminal Justice Act 2003 to terrorism offences		Attacks in Northern Ireland British national killed and kidnapped in North Africa
2010	Terrorist Asset-Freezing Act		National Security strategy: a strong Britain in an age of uncertainty	Attack on British diplomats in Sana, Yemen Attacks in Northern Ireland
2012	The Protection of Freedoms Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- provisions in respect of the destruction, retention, and use of fingerprints, footwear impressions and DNA samples;</li> <li>- reformed aspects of the powers to enter land;</li> <li>- removed the 'stop and search' regulations</li> </ul>	Managing the risk to transport networks from terrorism and other crimes	
			Protecting the UK against terrorism	
2013			Improving the UK's ability to absorb, respond to and recover from emergencies	Murder of Lee Rigby
			National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies	
2015	Counter-Terrorism and Security Act	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- enables the seizure and retention of the passport of a person suspected of leaving the UK for the purpose of a terrorism-related activity outside the UK,</li> <li>- enable the “temporary” exclusion (for up to two years) of individuals from the UK if they are believed to be involved in terrorism-related activity outside the UK</li> <li>- enables the retention of data to identify responsible for sending a communication on the Internet or accessing an Internet communications service.</li> <li>- new security arrangements are included regarding aviation, maritime, and rail transport.</li> </ul>		



## Appendix C: Timeline of main natural hazards and climate change related policies in the UK

Year	Natural hazards	Climate change
2000		Climate Change Programme
2004	Civil Contingencies Act	
2005	Making space for water	
2008	Planning Act	Climate Change Act
2009	The Flood Risk Regulations	
2010	Flood and Water Management Act	
	Strategic framework on improving the resilience of critical infrastructure to disruptions from natural hazards	
2011	Natural Hazards and Infrastructure: Keeping the country running	
2012		The UK climate change risk assessment
2013	National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies	Adapting to Climate Change
	Improving UK's ability to absorb, respond to and recover from emergencies	
	Reducing the threats of flooding and coastal change	
	The national adaptation programme: making the country resilient to a changing climate	
2014	The national flood emergency framework for England	

## Appendix D: Timeline of the main events relevant to the most salient security challenges in France

YEAR	EVENTS
1994	The hijacking of the Air France flight 8969
1995	A series of nuclear tests were conducted in the Pacific Ocean
1996	A nuclear test at Muruora Island
1996	A bomb attack attributed to the Armed Islamic Group against the Gare de Port-Royal in Paris
1998	A terrorist attack by Corsican nationalists who murdered Claude Éignac, prefect of Corsica
1999	Dramatic storm
2001	The factory of AZF de Toulouse was destroyed by an explosion of a stock of ammonia nitrate
2003	An extraordinary heat wave
2005	Social disorder: French banlieue (Paris)
2008	Economic crisis and its impact on social protection system and health care system
2013	Flooding in the Hautes Pyrenees region
2013	An attack by an Islamist on a French soldier in La Défense, a suburb of Paris.
2013	Attack on a French soldier and it seemed like a religious terrorist attack.
2014	The Dijon attack when a man ran into pedestrians with his car yelling Allah u Akbar

## Appendix E: Netherlands profile: graphical representation of the coding results




Figure 22 Role of different actors in the analysed salient security challenges




Figure 23 Most prominent security challenges as covered in different sources




Figure 24 Security challenges discussed by different Addressors




Figure 25 Comparison across the actors: Who has the largest say?




Figure 26 Comparison of the Addressees: who's been talked to the most?




Figure 27 Discourse of security challenges addressed towards Addressees




Figure 28 Who is the main object of security challenges?




Figure 29 Security challenges that different objects are vulnerable to




Figure 30 Security challenges as discussed at different levels sources




Figure 31 Distribution of discussions about different security challenges at different levels




Figure 32 The share of the most prominent core values as covered in different sources




Figure 33 Various levels as covered by different sources

## Appendix F: Description of the security challenges, political actors, levels, and ethics and human rights in the North-West region




Figure 34 Addressors of the most salient security challenges




Figure 35 Addressees of the most salient security challenges




Figure 36 Objects of the most salient security challenges






Figure 37 Overall representation of actors in the NWE region<sup>123</sup>




Figure 38 Levels of discourse




Figure 39 Overview of the levels of discussion in the NWE region

<sup>123</sup> Based on the most salient threats




Figure 40 Core values as covered by various sources in the case study countries




Figure 41 Overview of the discussion about the most prominent values in various sources across the NWE region







Figure 42 Coverage of the most salient security challenges in different sources



**Figure 43** Overview of the coverage of the most salient security challenges by various sources in the NWE region



**Figure 44** Levels of discussion about the most salient security challenges in government publications



**Figure 45** Levels of discussion about the most salient security challenges in business publications




Figure 46 Levels of discussion about the most prominent security challenges in newspapers

## Appendix G: List of the 'influences' relevant to terrorism threat identified by the workshop participants

### 1992

El Al plane flew into flat in Amsterdam  
PIRA condone bombings between 1992-1996  
Bomb in London

### 1993

Bomb in London

### 1996

PIRA Bomb in London  
Manchester PIRA bombing

### 1997

Good Friday Agreement

### 2000

UK Terrorism Act  
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000

### 2001

9/11 Attacks in USA

### 2002

Theo Van Gogh murder in Netherlands

### 2003

Pim Fortuyn murder in Netherlands  
CONTEST strategy in UK

### 2004

Madrid Bombings

### 2005

7/7 bombings in London  
Prevention of Terrorism Act in UK

### 2007

Glasgow Airport attack in UK  
Transatlantic bombing plot leads to screening of liquids & body scans

### 2008

Prevent Strategy in the UK (revised)  
Mumbai terrorist attacks  
Nicky Reilly lone wolf attack in Exeter, UK

### 2009

Detroit failed aviation terrorist attack

### 2010

Ink cartridge bomb plot

### 2011

Anders Breivik attacks in Norway  
Death of Osama Bin Laden

### 2012

London Olympics security  
Operation Yewtree in the UK

### 2013

Lee Rigby murder  
Brussels synagogue attack

### 2014

ISIL video executions  
Boko Haram school girl kidnappings  
UK Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

### 2015

Attack on Charlie Hebdo  
Kosher supermarket attack in Paris