EvoCS

Evolving Concept of Security

Evolving Concept of Security

D8.1 – Report on the regional workshop

Grant agreement number:	605142	Due date of deliverable: 28th February 2015
Start date of the project:	2014-06-01	Actual submission date: 27th February 2015
Duration:	18 months	Deliverable approved: Y

Authors: Dr. Miloš Jovanović, Vesselin Petkov, Maria Radziejowska and Antonia Todorova

Lead Beneficiary: 1 Fraunhofer

Contributing beneficiaries: 4 PISM and 9 Procon

Monitoring of possible Ethical issues EMIS: 6 SSSUP

Keywords: South-Eastern Europe; Concepts of Security, Balkans, EvoCS

Dissemination level: PU

Release History

This page is used to follow the deliverable production. All release numbers prior to the submission to EC should be numbered 0.x.

Release 1.0 is the first official version submitted to the EC

The rows including release numbers for non-official versions shall be deleted when the document is submitted to EC.

Please give details in the table below about successive releases:

Release Number	Release date	Released by
0.9	17.02.15	Milos Jovanovic
0.91	20.02.15	EMIS screening
0.92	24.02.15	Joachim Burbiel
1.00	28.2.15	Milos Jovanovic

Executive Summary

The present deliverable reports on the EvoCS regional case study information session and workshop conducted 26th and 27th January 2015 in Sofia (Bulgaria).

The report includes an overview of the group of participants, descriptions on the different sessions (e.g. a voting session) and details on the discussions during the workshop. The annex consists of the presentations and a paper which were used at these events.

Table of content

List of Acronyms

Abbreviation / acronym	Description
ICF	Informed Consent Form
ISIL	Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
SEE	South-Eastern Europe
TTIP	Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

1 Introduction

The present deliverable is a report on the information session and regional workshop for work package (WP) 8 "Case Study D: South-Eastern Europe" of the EvoCS project. The date for the workshop was chosen based on the general outline of the project. At the beginning of EvoCS, an analytical framework was created to study a number of countries from four European regions. At the beginning of the case study work packages, a number of changes were introduced to the analytical framework, based on first tests of the analysis of secondary literature with the framework. The workshops thus fell into a phase of the projects, where preliminary results of the case study analysis were on hand and could be presented to the participants of the workshop. Nevertheless, their input could still be used to improve the case study analysis.

The following two sections deal with the participants and their backgrounds (section 2) and the informed consent form (section 3) which was handed out to them in order to be able to use their feedback in the case studies. Next, section 4 reports on the information session, which took place one day before the workshop. Section 5 represents the main section of the present deliverable, as it reports on the workshop itself, its contents, discussions and the feedback of the participants. Finally, section 6 gives concluding remarks to the whole report. The annex contains all relevant documents for the workshop.

2 Participants

The goal of the EvoCS regional workshop on the South-Eastern European region in Sofia was to attract a broad audience from the region's countries. Since the information session and the workshop for this region were held back-to-back there was a certain overlap between both participant groups.

The target group for the workshop were policy makers from the security area who are involved, for example, with writing national or international security strategies. But the selection of participants also included researchers and practitioners from the security sector. The participants of the information session were similar to the ones of the workshop. Additionally, a number of students from the field of political science, studying at the University of Sofia, took part. In total, 26 people attended the information session and 38 took part in the workshop. The following is a general description of this group of people, without describing individual participants in order to protect their privacy.

Of the 38 participants of the workshop the largest part came from Bulgaria (29) which is not a surprise given the fact that the workshop took place in that country. Two Bulgarian participants were experts in the security sectors of Albania, Macedonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina, thus adding expertise on those three countries of the region to the workshop. Additionally, there were participants from Serbia, Greece, Kosovo, Romania and Turkey, the last in the form of a consortium member (PISM). The experts thus covered almost the whole region, with the exception of Slovenia, Croatia and Montenegro (Hungary being part of the EvoCS Eastern EU Border region).

The participants of the workshop came from very heterogeneous backgrounds: There were a number of policy makers or people working with policy makers of different ministries, like the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the offices of the President and of the Prime Minister. One Bulgarian member of the European Parliament was not able to attend in person but sent a note which was read at the workshop. One national cybersecurity coordinator and former ambassador at large for energy security was present along with directors and members of a number of think tanks from the region. Two representatives from the security press also took part. The defence industry was represented at the event in the form of a chairman of a chapter of an armed forces electronics and intelligence association. On the researchers' side, participants came from universities and research institutes. As a whole, the group of participants was diversified and high level. Six partners of the consortium from Procon (Bulgaria), PISM (Poland) and Fraunhofer INT (Germany) were present and actively took part in both the information session and the workshop.

3 Informed Consent Form (ICF)

The workshop was carried out in line with the measures and best practices adopted by the consortium in order to enforce research activity compliance with ethical and fundamental rights standards.[1] The ICF – that includes an information sheet describing the project and its specific research activities - was sent to the participants before the workshop via email and was distributed in hard copy during the workshop itself. After participants have read, understood and signed the ICF, it was then collected by the EvoCS researchers responsible for running the workshop. 15 (Fifteen) of 38 participants in the workshop consented - voluntarily and specifically - to have their personal or professional views or opinions on the evolving concept of security in South-Eastern Europe associated with their names, surnames and affiliations and, then, published in the current dissemination report. The affiliations of the fifteen participants are:

- Bulgarian Ministry of Interior
- Association of Reserve Officers "Atlantic"
- Sofia University
- Bulgarian Army Newspaper
- Regional Cooperation Council
- Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes
- University of the Peloponnese
- Kosovar Center for Security Studies
- PISM
- EURISC Foundation
- Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Serbia
- Procon
- Fraunhofer INT

Of course the view expressed by the participants does not represent the view or the official positions of the above mentioned institutions. For the sake of better reading quality, no participant was quoted using their name and/or affiliation in the present report in order not to mix those participant who signed the ICF with those who didn't.

No ethical "incident" emerged during the workshop.

---

[1] See EvoCS EMIS Ref.Doc No. 5, which is available to all Project partners.

4 Information session (26th January 2015)

The information session took place at the Grand Hotel Sofia, the same venue that was chosen for the workshop on the next day. The session took place from 19 until 21 o'clock and was devised to be an informal meeting of the workshop participants and the members of the EvoCS consortium. In addition to that, the session was open to students (see section 2). The consortium members were present to discuss the EvoCS project with the participants and answer questions they might have on the project and related topics.

5 Regional workshop on South-Eastern Europe (27th January 2015)

5.1 Welcome words and presentation of the project

After some words of welcome from both Procon and Fraunhofer representatives, the regional workshop on South-Eastern Europe started with a short general presentation of the EvoCS project by Fraunhofer INT.

5.2 Tour de table

PISM then took the lead to moderate the Tour de Table. Every participant was given a printed picture showing something that was not specifically related to security (e.g. a picture of three ducks). Each participant was then asked to tell everyone his or her name, affiliation and an interpretation as to how the picture relates to security. This method was already used at the workshop for the Eastern EU border region in Warsaw on 13th January 2015. The advantage of this method is that the participants stay interested in the various interpretations of the different pictures and listen to each other. The interpretations were quite different and are repeated here in the form of keywords along with the general affiliation of the participant (Table 1):

Table 1 : Results of the Tour de Table

General affiliation of participant	Interpretation of picture
Think-tank	Societal trust
University	Freedom from violence
Diplomat, analyst	Uncivil behaviour, no security without stability, development of the European youth
Politics	Individual security, too many security issues in one bag, fragmentation
Security advisor	Connection between science and policy, family of nations, security and comfort; What do we have in common? What are the differences? What are our resources? Is there a will to cooperate?
Politics, analyst	The need for people to stay fit
Policy maker, military	Social security
Politics	Critical infrastructure

Security management	Asymmetric warfare
International organisations	Crossroads, many options for the drivers
Diplomat	Cooperation
Politics	Know about future challenges before they happen
Defence	Human individual security
NGO	Refugees
Military	Global security, environmental security
Press	Traditional aspect of security
Research	Wild west, different rules; the future is unpredictable
Research, military	Discrimination, freedom of movement; possible terrorist attacks
International organisation	Perception of threats, complex security issues
Research	Personal security and safety, poverty, unemployment
Analyst	Happiness
Research	Preciousness of security

Apart from keeping the participants interested in what everyone says about the pictures, the interpretations served as a framework for the discussions during the workshop.

At the end of the Tour de Table, the message from Bulgarian MEP Mariya Gabriel was translated and read to the participants. She spoke about the European Security Strategy of 2003 and current security challenges to the EU like the fight against terrorism (e.g. the attack on Charlie Hebdo), ISIL, illegal immigration, and Ebola. Furthermore, she noted the problem of weighing security vs. freedom and the need for solidarity and a common system for migration and asylum (for example through an increase in the budget of FRONTEX). Finally, she concluded that the EU's internal security strategy needed updating and additional efforts to increase security were required in several areas, including the fight against xenophobia, changes in the regime of the European arrest warrant in order to apply to citizens of third countries, legal assistance in cooperation with EUROJUST and EUROPOL, prevention of radicalisation, cooperation of the EU with other international security actors (UN, NATO, OSCE, the African Union), as prevention and enhanced cooperation represent the answer to today's challenges.

5.3 Brainstorming: The security concepts of the region (use of voting hardware)

During the next session of the workshop, voting hardware from Turning Point was used to give participants the opportunity to express opinions in a direct way. Every participant was given a voting card and Fraunhofer INT explained the use of the technology. Fraunhofer INT also moderated the voting process. The questions are based on the EvoCS analytical framework and the preliminary results of coding for Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey. The slides with all results can be found in annex 1, while only the most salient questions and results are discussed in this section.

It was interesting to observe that for most questions, the results were very clear and the answers were not evenly distributed on all possible answers. For the first question (see Figure 1) the participants were of the clear opinion that "Political stability and security" were the most important core value, while three core values did not receive any vote at all. At this point, a passionate discussion erupted over the question whether political stability or economic stability is the foundation from which the other follows. One of the examples given was Bulgaria in the 90s, which was called an island of stability on the Balkans while still suffering economically.


Figure 1 : Results of the voting on question 1

At a first glance, it might seem that question 2 (see Figure 2) gave a broad range of answers. But while discussing the question, it became clear that for the participants "Corruption" and "Organised Crime" go hand in hand and almost constitute a common answer category.

From a regional point of view, which one of the following threats is the most relevant?

A. Energy security

B. Corruption

C. Terrorism

D. Natural disasters

E. Illegal immigration

F. Cyber security

G. Organised crime

H. Ethnic tensions

Figure 2 : Results of the voting on question 2

Question 3 was answered by the participants using only three of eight categories (see Figure 3). For most participants "National Governments" were the most important actor, followed by NATO and the EU. Question 4 (see Figure 4) was not discussed in detail due to time constraints.

From a regional point of view, which one of the following security actors is the most important one?

A. EU

B. NATO

C. National governments

D. NGOs

E. Private sector

F. Civil society

G. Academia

H. Media

**Figure 3 : Results of the voting on question 3**

Figure 4 : Results of the voting on question 4

Another interesting result are the answers to question 5 (see Figure 5). For most of the participants "Fundamental human rights" are the most important issues for the region. One has to keep in mind though, that this category of issues is rather broad and includes some of the more specific issues in the other answers. This would also explain why the results for this question are spread among more answers than the other questions. Similar to question 4, this question was not discussed in detail during the workshop.

Finally, the last question 6 (see Figure 6) had only two answer possibilities. With 68% of the participants expressing that existing regional formats for cooperation improve security in the SEE, the question was not decisively answered. Participants debated whether one can speak of SEE as a region in terms of security perceptions and interests, and if so, how to delimit the region. They raised that technical cooperation is possible on certain issues, however, the most successful initiatives take place at a bilateral level and that there is need for greater focus on regional interests to trigger cooperation, including for instance in the area of energy and migration.

The results were discussed with the participants and the last question paved the way for the next session.

From a regional point of view, which one of the following ethical issues is the most important one?

A. Fundamental human rights

B. Rights of minorities

C. Rights of women

D. Civil rights

E. Refugees' rights

F. Privacy rights

G. Freedom of speech

H. Religious freedom

Figure 5 : Results of the voting on question 5

Do you think the existing regional formats of cooperation (e.g. SEECAP?) improve security in South-Eastern Europe?

A. Yes

B. No

Figure 6 : Results of the voting on question 6

5.4   Discussion on the SEE non-paper

Before the workshop, a non-paper was drafted by a member of Procon in order to discuss its fictional content. This non-paper is fictional but based on the South East Europe Common Assessment Paper on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities (SEECAP). SEECAP details the security and risk perceptions of SEE countries under various security-relevant headings like "security environment", "social and democratic development" etc. The entire text of the non-papercan be found in annex 2.

Serbian participants remarked that SEECAP was the first document signed by a democratic government of Serbia and that it is a very important format for Serbian security. However, parts of it should be reformed, so these participants strongly supported the views expressed in the non-paper. This could mean that if such a non-paper is one of the results of EvoCS, policy makers in SEE would actually be able to use it for their decision making. One participant from a university remarked that the non-paper appears realistic and that national systems of security would have to be adapted to the European dimension to cope with crises like the financial crisis. Another participant with a political background pointed to the fact that in point 3 (which describes the future relation between the EU and Russia) the USA is missing. The same participant expressed the opinion that point 4 of the non-paper (about the prosperity of the European nations and the need to leave the policy of budget austerity) is the most central one. In this context, the relevance of TTIP was also mentioned. A researcher said that from her point of view the non-paper should include three different scenarios: business-as-usual, a negative outlook and a positive one. She also said that the actual results from EvoCS should take these kinds of scenarios into account. The non-paper was received very differently from another political participant who said that all of the points are at least questionable. Specifically though, he completely disagreed with point 2 (which is about the EU building its own essential defence capacity) saying that it was senseless to copy capabilities that already exist within the NATO framework. Concerning point 3, this participant said that Russia is definitely not a valuable partner for the countries of SEE and that the recommendation expressed in this point is unacceptable. He also disagrees with point 4, saying that especially SEE (with the exception of Turkey) has to keep its policy of austerity. Finally, another participant with a political background said that point 5 (which speaks about the corrupt political systems in SEE) was highly relevant.

5.5 The security concepts of Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey – Preliminary research findings

In this session Procon and Fraunhofer presented their preliminary research findings for three countries of SEE (Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey). The complete slides can be found in annex 3. During and after each presentation, the participants had the opportunity to discuss the results and ask questions.

5.5.1 Bulgaria

The presentation for Bulgaria by Procon was opened with a number of slides addressing the methodology behind the results. Specifically, the presentation sought to explain the main categories used in the EvoCS Codebook (Deliverable 3.1[2]), namely "sources", "values", "actors", "levels" and "Ethics". Procon provided a detailed account of the sources analysed, incl. government policy documents, parliamentary publications, newspaper articles, employers' association statements, NGO reports, and academic publications.

The presentation further explained the eight core values used to assess the perceptions of security in a national context, namely:

1/ Physical safety and security

2/ Territorial integrity and security

3/ Environmental and ecological security

4/ Social stability and security

5/ Cultural identity and security

6/ Political stability and security

7/ Economic prosperity and security

8/ Information and cyber security

According to the results presented by Procon, the various actors in the Bulgarian security discourse attach the greatest value to "Political stability and security", followed by "Economic prosperity and security" and "Social stability and security". Interestingly, while the Parliament has been heavily concerned with the political stability, the government's focus has been on economy. Also worth noting is the fact that environmental security has its peak in the academic literature, while the private sector and the NGOs value economic prosperity the most. With respect to the actors, the government emerged as an overwhelming player, both designing (as "Addressor") and implementing policies (as "Addressee"). Concerning "levels of action", the most important level in Bulgaria was the national one, followed by the international level. The core value most often mentioned together with ethical issues was again "Social stability and security", followed by the political and cultural dimension. Finally, the Bulgarian security cloud was formed around terms related to the unfinished business of security sector reform (i.e. the reform in the Ministry of Interior), the financial crisis of

---

[2] Downloadable here: http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/49

2014 (especially the fall of the Corporate Commercial Bank), and Russia. However, all of this was connected to heavy signs of wide-spread corruption in Bulgaria.

Based on these results, the findings were interpreted as follows:

- Often in the Bulgarian political discourse, "securitization" is replaced with "problematisation", meaning that problems are discussed but not effectively addressed by policies.
- The focus in Bulgaria is predominantly internal, e.g. on unfinished reform business, fight against corruption, etc.
- The government is an overwhelming and often overstretched actor.
- External threats for Bulgaria are coming from the east (Russia's policy in the Black Sea) and south (illegal migration).

During the presentation for Bulgaria, one of the participants noted that from his point of view, more than just two newspapers should have been considered for the coding exercise. Other participants noted that indeed immigration issues were of high importance in Bulgaria and that there was not enough cooperation as well as sufficient resources in SEE. Also, one participant questioned whether Bulgarian citizens had enough confidence in their national identity.

5.5.2   Serbia

After giving a similar introduction to the methodology and the coded sources (a total of 100 sources was used for this case study) Fraunhofer INT started the presentation of the preliminary results concerning Serbia. It is quite clear that according to these results the different Serbian actors have a broad range of core values, which they discuss with only "Physical safety and security" being salient, followed by "Economic prosperity and security". It is also quite interesting that the national government and parliament complement each other and together cover all of the core values. The picture is similar with other actors, but at the time of the presentation only two sources had been coded each for the "NGOs" and the "Private sector" and thus those results cannot be considered to be representative. Considering the "Addressors" and "Addressees", it is interesting that mostly the national government and parliament talk to each other while most other actors address the general public. Taking a closer look at the levels one could see that the most important level was the national one (similar to the other countries of SEE), followed by the subnational and local one. The core value most often mentioned together with ethical issues was again "Physical safety and security" this time followed by "Social stability and security" and "Territorial integrity and security". Finally, a look at the security cloud (a word cloud created from the clustered terms of the "Security challenges" field) showed that "Kosovo" was still a prominent topic, along with "Traffic security", "Corruption", "Organized crime", "Terrorism" and "Cyber security".

Based on these results, the findings were interpreted as follows:

- Kosovo has become an issue of "Physical safety and security". Formerly, it was probably an issue of "Territorial integrity" but with the Kosovo War ending in 1999, the actors in Serbia have moved on. Now the security situation of the Serbian community in Northern Kosovo is the main topic discussed.
- Apart from that, the country has a broad range of security issues with few foci

- There is a balance of topics between the different actors
- Serbia's discussions on security are mostly on the national level

During the discussion of the results, one participant said that Kosovo should be considered as a separate national case study. Another participant said that Serbia, as a state, had a far stronger nationalistic identity than, for example, Bulgaria. Therefore, it would be advisable to conduct such studies in a way that reflect the "real people's perspective" that would allow seeing whether these reflect the governments' perspectives. Finally, two participants confirmed that the results of the coding align well with their impression of the Serbian security discourse.

5.5.3   Turkey

The presentation for Turkey by Procon started with a brief explanation of the coded sources, highlighting the lack of two important government strategies, which are strictly confidential, as an example of oversecuritization - a specific feature of the Turkish case. Turkey's Red Book of security is confidential. Additionally, Turkey hasn't updated its National Defense Strategy since 2006.

Before introducing the preliminary results, the security cloud was shown. The main security challenges were identified as terrorism, refugees, ISIL, dependency, energy, Syria and energy dependency. Additional details about the main events for the past year were added in order to clarify the situation in Turkey, such as the Soma mine accident and leaks for which the Gulen movement was accused as well as Turkish citizens kidnapped in Iraq by ISIL. The salience of values showed predominance of "Territorial integrity and security", followed by "Physical safety and security" and "Political stability and security". The government was singled out as the main actor – something that can be clearly seen in all the figures, including "Value by addressor" and "Actors" graphics. The most important level was national, followed by international and transnational. The core values most often mentioned together with ethical issues were "Political stability and security", followed by "Physical safety and security".

Based on these results, the findings were interpreted as follows:

- Major security concerns are terrorism as an external threat and "parallel state" as an internal threat.

- Two important processes are ongoing in Turkey - securitization of the Gulen movement and desecuritization of the Kurdish issue.

- Government is a dominant and 'hegemonic' actor. Civil society remains the weakest political actor

One participant asked whether or not Turkey had several religious identities in comparison to national identities.

5.5.4   General discussion

After the presentation of each national case study, the floor was opened for a general discussion on the methodology and the results. One participant remarked that the methodology was valuable to get a better understanding of the national dynamics in order to increase security cooperation. He

hoped that EvoCS could contribute to some form of advance warning (forecasting future security problems) and that this would be valuable research for policy makers. In general, he noted that the EU needed a better disaster consequence management and that the SEE region had a regional energy dependency along with a more general dependency concerning the internet. From his point of view, the most pressing security issues were immigration, border security, corruption and organized crime (which was reflected in the national case studies).

A participant involved in the process of security policy-making in Bulgaria expressed hopes that the methodology would be useful in updating the Bulgarian national security strategy, which was adopted in 2011 and did not reflect important changes in the security environment.

A number of participants mentioned that there is variety of security interests and approaches among the states of the region: Turkey has "big ambitions" and "secret strategies", Serbia seems "surrounded by enemies" and Bulgaria which, in this context could be described as a "free rider in security" not caring about hard security issues. However, none of these states could be described as an "internationalist" capable of sacrifice in the name of international security. Furthermore, one participant noted that these countries also bear different identities (Turkey – religious, Serbia – nationalist, Bulgaria – unclear, focused rather on "habits than anything else"). What all three have in common is the fact that the national governments are perceived as being responsible for everything. Also, from some participants' point of view, interdependence between countries in SEE, which is a core factor of the EU, is non-existent. Participants agreed that there is a need for creating more interdependencies between states in the region that will boost increase in security cooperation.

5.6 A regional security concept for South-Eastern Europe − Science fiction or reality (Final discussion)

At the beginning of the final discussion, Vesselin Petkov from the EvoCS consortium asked the participants of the workshop to remember that they should think about what they had learned and what they will take with them from the workshop.

With this frame in mind, the first person to start the discussion was a participant with a political background saying that in the second stage of the case study analysis, the researchers should address energy security for SEE as being one of the more important aspects. Gas and energy transmission lines in general have a high integration value (interdependence) for the region. This fact has a number of economic implications and is a challenge, but also a big chance for SEE. Another participant, also with a political background, remarked that the regional concept of security is linked to the national concepts. SEE is in a special situation, because it involves some countries that are EU members and some that are not. Similarly, some countries are part of NATO and some are not (also, some like Serbia have declared military neutrality). However, membership in these international organizations does not change who your neighbors are. From this participant's point of view, the main challenges for SEE come and are controlled from outside the region. There is no chance for any one country to deal with the security problems all by itself. Again, this is seen as a challenge, but also as chance. Finally, the participant highlighted that there are two different perceptions of security in SEE: One is the view of the public, the other the view of institutions like the government.

The topics "Cyber security" and a society's cyber resilience were underlined by another participant from the political sphere. He said that in Bulgaria a multistakeholder approach to this security problem exists and that the topic knows no national borders. He also said that the whole sector is growing and that SEE needs a common security image for this sector.

Another participant with a research background said that the whole EvoCS methodology should be applied to Kosovo and its documents, especially for the agreements between Kosovo and Serbia. According to a local survey, the population in Kosovo is of the opinion that the dialogue with Serbia is useless and that this should be taken into account for the Serbian case study. The researcher was backed by another participant (with a background in an NGO) who said that it would make sense to have more case studies for SEE.

The results of the three national case studies can be translated to Romania, too, claimed another researcher, but he also stressed that the final product of EvoCS should appeal to national policy-makers, so that they can use the results in their work. He noted that in SEE some security issues are often mentioned in documents, but at the same time real policies were non-existent. In the same vein, a political expert noted that similarly to the three national case studies, there is a gap between the general population and the government in Albania and Macedonia and that the official government perspective on security is similar. But there are also some slight differences: for example, in Macedonia territorial integrity is very much an issue, along with cultural identity. Finally, a participant who is an expert on Bosnia & Herzegovina shared his thoughts about the three national case studies in comparison with tis SEE state. From his point of view, the situation in Bosnia is different from all the others and the EvoCS methodology would not work here. He sees a threat in

Bosnia's great potential for Jihad warriors travelling to ISIL and back. Also, he sees the general situation as being one of great tension. Even small sparks might lead to considerable riots.

The last comment was from a participant who works with an NGO. She hopes that the EvoCS project will contribute a small part to a better cooperation between the countries of SEE.

6 Concluding remarks

The regional case study workshop for SEE was of great importance for the EvoCS project. On the one hand, it served, along with the information session, to broaden awareness of the project and present the preliminary results to relevant experts from the realms of policy, research and industry. On the other hand, the feedback received from these experts can now be used by the researchers of Procon, PISM and Fraunhofer INT to improve the national case studies. In addition to that, valuable insights were given as to possible aspects of a regional concept of security for SEE.

The use of the voting software was generally received positively by the participants but some of them remarked that the results would have been drastically different if they had had the possibility of giving multiple answers and not just one for each question. This would have led to a weaker focus on certain answers.

The non-paper was discussed strongly with very different opinions waged as to how realistic its contents were. This will be helpful for the researchers since a part of the final results of EvoCS is supposed to take the form of policy briefs.

In general, the methodology was received positively by the experts. The same is true for the preliminary results. It is interesting to note that many of the results actually reflected the results of the voting session. There was no rejection by any of the participants regarding the methodology or the results. However, there was one note that the methodology would not work for certain countries, e.g. Bosnia. The present lead author does not share this opinion, since Bosnia is not very different from e.g. Serbia, but the feedback will be noted in the final version of the case study.

Also, the experiences made at the workshop for SEE will help the other case study WPs to compare their results and feedback in order to improve their regional case studies.

7 Annexes

7.1 Annex 1 – Results of the voting sessions

From a regional point of view, which one of the following core values is the most important one?

A. Physical safety and security

B. Territorial integrity and security

C. Environmental and ecological security

D. Cultural identity and security

E. Social stability and security

F. Political stability and security

G. Economic prosperity and security

H. Information and cyber security

From a regional point of view, which one of the following threats is the most relevant?

A. Energy security

B. Corruption

C. Terrorism

D. Natural disasters

E. Illegal immigration

F. Cyber security

G. Organised crime

H. Ethnic tensions

From a regional point of view, which one of the following security actors is the most important one?

A. EU

B. NATO

C. National governments

D. NGOs

E. Private sector

F. Civil society

G. Academia

H. Media

From a regional point of view, which one of the following levels is the most important one, when thinking about regional security?

A. Local (municipality/commune)

B. Subnational (province/state/region)

C. National (country)

D. International (bilateral)

E. Regional (multilateral)

F. Global

From a regional point of view, which one of the following ethical issues is the most important one?

A. Fundamental human rights

B. Rights of minorities

C. Rights of women

D. Civil rights

E. Refugees' rights

F. Privacy rights

G. Freedom of speech

H. Religious freedom

Do you think the existing regional formats of cooperation (e.g. SEECAP?) improve security in South-Eastern Europe?

A. Yes

B. No

© Fraunhofer

7.2 Annex 2 – SEE non-paper

The Next European Security Strategy

The View of South Eastern Europe

A non-paper

On 29 May 2001 in Budapest, the Foreign Ministers of all South Eastern European countries endorsed *The South East Europe Common Assessment Paper* (SEECAP) on Regional Security Challenges and Opportunities with the idea that common perceptions of the security challenges facing the region would promote common action to address these challenges and will ultimately lead to security strategies and defence planning based on these agreed common perceptions.

Fifteen years later South Eastern Europe demonstrates significant achievements. For the first time in history a growing number of SEE countries belong to the European Union (EU), sharing the benefits and responsibilities for the common future of Europe "whole and free and at peace."

However, **the region still faces some formidable challenges**.

With the continuing impact of the 2008-09 financial crisis, the unexpected developments in Ukraine and the area of the Black Sea, as well as the explosion of terrorism in the Middle East and North Africa and waves of immigration, the leaders of the SEE countries confirmed that the stable security environment continues to be of vital importance for the stability of Europe and the region. From this point of view, the **SEE community feels responsible to contribute to the discussion on the common European problems and perspectives**.

1. EU Member States have developed their own socioeconomic models, reflecting their history and their collective choices. Each of the national models is underpinned by shared values such as solidarity and cohesion, equal opportunities and the fight against all forms of discrimination, universal access to education and healthcare, quality of life and quality in work, sustainable development and the involvement of civil society. The SEE countries believe that **a strong "European dimension"** should reinforce national systems and is of **priority** in developing country-specific political, economic, social and security architectures.

2. The Common Foreign and Security Policy ambitions need to be revisited in view of the on-going crises in Ukraine, Syria, and Iraq as well as the spread of international terrorism. In close strategic perspective, **Europe should build its own essential defence capacity** that can be sufficient to manage crises in the neighbourhood without reliance of the US. SEE will continue to provide relevant to their capacity contributions to the common European defence capabilities.

3. The EU-Russia relations are and will continue to be the core pillar of the European security relations. **Russia is a valuable partner of the SEE countries** and this capacity could be used to diminish recent frictions and improve the mutually beneficial exchange. According to the SEE countries, the EU should consider Moscow's proposal for a new "Eurasia security system" positively.

4. The core of the EU policy is the prosperity of nations. Prosperity, based both on strong economic performance and comprehensive social policy, is what makes Europe different from all other

continents. The SEE countries share the understanding that EU should **leave the policy of budget austerity** and permit more flexible financial policy in order to avoid decline of the social status of European citizens.

5. At the same time, the countries see the **highly party-centred and corrupt political system as a core threat to their internal stability**. Ineffective rule of law systems contribute to the spread of corruption and criminality. Resolving this problem is our top priority, and SEE will appreciate any support from EU and Member States.

6. The obviously **inefficient governance and the deficit of democracy** affect the consolidation of regional societies:

- **Weak governments** and fragile political coalitions and alliances are not able to provide necessary goods and services and implement sound fiscal and regulatory policies, establish and maintain rule of law, and gain public trust;
- **Weak legal economies** are plagued by crime, illegal trade and trafficking, energy shortages, inadequate infrastructure, strained budgets, unemployment, poverty, and increasing gaps between the rich and the poor;
- The **threat of ethnic and religion-inspired conflicts** has been significantly reduced throughout the region, is not completely removed. Unresolved issues related to sovereignty and self-determination still keep some inter-ethnic and inter-state relations tense;
- **The shrinking of legitimate political and economic space, promoted by ruling ethnocrats, accelerates criminalisation of politics.**

These local obstacles to economic growth, stability, and progress toward democracy highlight the need for **effective and accountable politicians and public administration** at all levels and development of good governance capacities. Such efforts need to be **driven by local,** practical needs and both local and regional strategies, voiced by regional players.

7.3   Annex 3 – The security concepts of Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey

7.3.1   Bulgaria

**EvoCS Regional Workshop
South-Eastern Europe
Sofia, 27 January 2015**

This project has received funding from the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme for research, technological development and demonstration under grant agreement no. 605142

Vesselin Petkov, Procon

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH FINDINGS BULGARIA

Methodology

Sources

Values

Levels

Actors

Perceptions

Ethics and Human rights

Sources – Almost 300 entries analysed

Government policy documents – 14

Newspaper articles – 139

NGO reports – 29

Parliamentary publications – 62

Academic publications – 24

Private sector – 20

Sources –
Almost 300 entries examined

Government policy documents – from 01/01/2010 on

Private sector, Newspaper articles, Parliamentary
publications – 1/11/2013- 31/10/2014

Academic publications – since 2004

Values – EIGHT aspects of life
actors what to make secure

1/ Physical safety and security

2/ Territorial integrity and security

3/ Environmental and ecological security

4/ Social stability and security

Values

5/ Cultural identity and security

6/ Political stability and security

7/ Economic prosperity and security

8/ Information and cyber security

Levels

Local

Subnational

National

International

Transnational

Global

Actors

Addressor

Addressee

Object

Subject

Value by source

Value by source

Value by source

Value by addressor

Value by addressor

Salience of values

Actors

Levels

Ethics by value

#hashtags

1.	lack	62
2.	security	55
3.	national	25
4.	corruption	23
5.	state	23

#hashtags

6.	political	22
7.	energy	21
8.	increased	17
9.	sector	17
10.	intelligence	17
11.	bulgarian	16
12.	russia	16
13.	bank	16
14.	crisis	15
15.	level	15

Bulgaria's security cloud

Reading EvoCS findings

"Problematisation" vs. "securitisation"

Inward focus – corruption, rule of law, stability of institutions

Government as an overwhelming and an overstreched actor

A country looking east

Connect with EvoCS

Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/evocs.project

Twitter: @EvoCS_Project

Webiste: www.evocs-project.eu

Vesselin Petkov
Phone: + 359 887 433 799
E-mail: vesselin.petkov@procon.bg

7.3.2 Serbia

Dr. Miloš Jovanović

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH FINDINGS SERBIA

Methodology

Sources

Values

Levels

Actors

Perceptions

Ethics and Human rights

Sources – Ca. 100 items coded

- **Government policy documents – 9**
(e.g. National strategy for the fight against corruption in the Republic of Serbia from 2013 to 2018)

- **Newspaper articles – 30**
(from Politika and Blic)

- **NGO reports – 2**
(e.g. Belgrade center for human rights)

Sources – Ca. 100 items coded

- **Parliamentary publications – 50**
(National parliament of Serbia and otvoreniparlament.rs)

- **Academic publications – 8**
(various academic journals)

- **Private sector – 2**
(e.g. from NIS)

Sources – Ca. 100 items coded

- Government policy documents – from 01/01/2009 on

- Private sector, Newspaper articles, Parliamentary publications – 1/11/2013- 31/10/2014

- Academic publications – since 1999

Values – eight aspects of life

1/ Physical safety and security

2/ Territorial integrity and security

3/ Environmental and ecological security

4/ Social stability and security

Values – eight aspects of life

5/ Cultural identity and security

6/ Political stability and security

7/ Economic prosperity and security

8/ Information and cyber security

Value by source

Legend:
- Physical safety and security
- Territorial integrity and security
- Environmental and ecological security
- Cultural identity and security
- Social stability and security
- Political stability and security
- Economic prosperity and security
- Information and cyber security

Value by source

Value by source

Salience of values

Actors

Addressor

Addressee

Object

Subject

Actors

Value by addressor

Value by addressor

Levels of perception

Local

Subnational

National

International

Transnational

Global

Levels

Ethics by value

Serbia's security cloud

Reading EvoCS findings

- Kosovo has become an issue of "Physical safety and security"

- Apart from that, a broad range of security issues with few foci

- Balance of topics between the different actors

- Serbia's discussions on security are mostly on the national level

7.3.3   Turkey

Antonia Todorova, Procon

PRELIMINARY RESEARCH FINDINGS TURKEY

Sources –
100 entries analyzed

Government policy documents – 11

Newspaper articles – 31

NGO reports – 5

Parliamentary publications – 31

Academic publications – 10

Private sector – 12

Sources –
100 entries examined

Government policy documents   from 01/01/2010 on

Parliamentary publications
Private sector   1/11/2013 - 31/10/2014
Newspaper articles

Academic publications   since 2004

Turkey's security cloud

TURKEY
November 2013- October 2014

December 2013 – Corruption scandal, involved high AKP officials, in response government removed 350 police officers, accusing the Gulen movement

March 2014 – Top secret Syria meeting leaked, ban on You Tube

May 2014 - **Soma mining accident** – 301 miners dead

June 2014 - 46 Turkish citizens were kidnapped in Mosul by **ISIL** and kept for 101 days

October 2014– 18 miners trapped underground after a flood

October 2014 - ISIL advance in Kobane – violent clashes in 35 provinces in Turkey

Refugee Flow – over 1.550.000 Registered Syrian Refugees

# Salience of values

Value by source

Value by source

# Value by source

Value by addressor

Value by addressor

Actors

Levels

Ethics by value

Reading EvoCS findings

Major security concerns – terrorism as an external threat and "parallel state" as an internal threat.

Securitization of the Gulen movement and desecuritization of Kurdish issue.

Government as a dominant and 'hegemonic' actor. Civil society remains the weakest political actor