



*Evolving Concept of Security*

## D8.2 – Case Study on South-Eastern Europe

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## Executive Summary

The present deliverable reports on the evolving concepts of security of Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey. It does so in the form of national (or country) case studies which are then aggregated into a regional case study on South-Eastern Europe. The methodology used is based on the EvoCS deliverables 3.1 “Finalised analytical framework” and 4.1 “Tools for methodological support: templates, criteria and IT requirements” (see references section). Each national (and the regional) case study reports on key core values, security challenges, main levels of action, main actors, historical trajectory of the evolving concepts of security, and trends for the near future. The abstract of these results can be found below in Table 1. The final chapter of this report summarises the profiles, gives the key findings and formulates recommendations for security decision makers and other relevant stakeholders.

This report is one of four, the others covering the regions of North-Western Europe, West-Mediterranean Europe and the Eastern EU border. The final deliverable 9.1 “Final report on the evolving concept of security” gives a synopsis of all regional case studies.

**Table 1 : Summary of the national and regional profiles**

	<b>Bulgaria</b>	<b>Serbia</b>	<b>Turkey</b>	<b>South-Eastern Europe</b>
<b>Key Core Values</b>	Political stability and security; Economic prosperity and security; Social stability and security	Physical safety and security; Economic prosperity and security; Social stability and security	Territorial integrity and security; Physical safety and security; Political safety and security	Physical safety and security; Political safety and security; Economic prosperity and security
<b>Key Security Challenges</b>	Corruption; Organised crime; Emigration and demographic crisis; Relations with Russia; Delayed reforms in the security and law enforcement sector	Societal transformation/Civil challenges; Organized/petty crime; Discrimination; Corruption; Kosovo and aftereffects of Yugoslav wars	Terrorism; Syria War; ISIL; “parallel state”, the Gulen network; Refugees; Energy dependency	Corruption; Energy security; Work safety; Natural disasters; Discrimination (and other social challenges)
<b>Levels of Action</b>	National	National	National	National
<b>Key Actors</b>	National government	National government; National parliament	National government	National governments; National parliaments

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## List of Acronyms

Abbreviation / acronym	Description
<b>CSD</b>	Centre for the Study of Democracy
<b>DHKP-C</b>	Revolutionary People's Liberation Party-Front
<b>EU</b>	European Union
<b>EULEX</b>	European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
<b>IBDA-C</b>	Great Eastern Islamic Raiders- Front
<b>LGBT</b>	lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
<b>MoD</b>	Ministry of Defence
<b>Moi</b>	Ministry of Interior
<b>NATO</b>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<b>PKK</b>	Kurdistan Workers Party
<b>SEE</b>	South-Eastern Europe

# 1 Introduction

The region of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) constitutes an area that stands out in a number of striking ways.<sup>1</sup> In comparison to the other three EvoCS areas<sup>2</sup>, not all countries in this region are part of the EU (e.g. Albania or Macedonia) but are striving to become part of it, some of them are in NATO (like Bulgaria and Greece), while one (Serbia) has declared neutrality. In recent history, the countries of SEE have been part of three different blocs, i.e. the western and eastern bloc and the movement of non-aligned countries. All this changed with the end of the cold war. While the western bloc countries (like Greece) kept their orientation to the West, countries like Bulgaria or Romania (which were part of the Eastern bloc) started the transformation of their societies and economies, also oriented towards the West. Yugoslavia, a founding member of the non-aligned movement (the movement was founded in Belgrade in 1961) broke apart in civil war during the 1990s.

In this regional case study, you will find three countries, which have been studied in more detail: Bulgaria, Serbia and Turkey.

The western part of SEE, which constitutes the territory of former Yugoslavia, is a part of the region where the worst European military conflicts after World War II took place, with ethnic tensions breaking out even recently, like in Macedonia in early 2015. Serbia was a major party during the Yugoslav civil wars. Serbian society was also embedded in the broader context of socialist Yugoslavia and in the last two decades had to adjust to a new political and economic system. It does not have NATO or EU membership but is a candidate country for the latter, and has strong ties to Russia. Serbia has an ongoing territorial conflict with one of its (former<sup>3</sup>) provinces: Kosovo and Metohija.

Serbia's direct neighbour – Bulgaria – is an EU and NATO member. Bulgaria also has traditional ties with Russia and was part of the Eastern bloc. This is also the reason why Bulgaria still struggles with transformation processes of its society and economy.

The Republic of Turkey has been a candidate country for the EU for more than a decade and is a NATO member. It has a common border with crisis-stricken states like Syria or Iraq. Along with similar security discourses as in the other countries of the region, Turkey faces a couple of unique internal (e.g. the Gulen movement), external (for example, groups fighting in the Syrian civil war) and transnational (e.g. the Kurdistan Workers Party PKK) threats. Together, these three national case studies represent a good sample of the diversity of the security discourse in SEE. Each of these countries has a number of unique security challenges and some that are common to all of them.

Section 2 deals with general descriptions of the region and three national case studies. These descriptions include the rationale for why they were chosen for closer study and what constitutes their uniqueness in the context of the EvoCS project.

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<sup>1</sup> The region includes the following countries: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Romania, Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey.

<sup>2</sup> See EvoCS deliverables D5.2, D6.2 and D7.2 for the respective regional case studies. Available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>

<sup>3</sup> Kosovo has been recognized by over 100 states. However, for EvoCS, Kosovo was treated as an internal province of Serbia in accordance with UNSCR 1244 and to include Kosovo in the national case study.

Section 3 deals with the so-called country profiles. These have, broadly spoken, two parts. The first one is mostly based on the results of the coding process which was conducted during the EvoCS process.<sup>4</sup> This includes the sub-sections on “Characterization of the core values” and “Security challenges and threats, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights”. The second part then broadens the analytical base by including literature on each countries security concepts and needs. This is what constitutes the sub-sections on “Historical trajectory” in which the results of the first part are put into perspective and “Overview of current trends” which looks at the security trends of each respective country. Section 4 comprises the regional profile where the results of the country profiles are analysed on an aggregate level. Finally, section 5 summarizes and reflects the findings and conclusions of the case study on SEE.

You will find the figures and tables, to which the sections refer to, in the annex (section 7). Cited literature is noted in the text by footnotes and can also be found in the bibliography (section 6) at the end of this document.

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<sup>4</sup> See EvoCS deliverable 3.1. “Finalised Analytical Framework - Assessing Evolving Concepts of Security” and 4.1 “Tools for methodological support: templates, criteria, and IT requirements” (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/deliverables>)

## 2 Description of South-Eastern Europe and the case study countries

### 2.1 South-Eastern Europe and the selection of case study countries

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The EvoCS region of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) constitutes an area that stands out in a number of striking ways. First of all, in comparison to the other three areas, not all countries in this region are part of the EU, some of them are in NATO, while one has declared neutrality. In the western part of SEE, on the territory of former Yugoslavia, the worst military conflict after World War II took place and even today ethnic tensions are breaking out again and again. Taking these characteristics into account, the EvoCS project had ample reasons to consider SEE as a case study region.

Keeping the specialties in mind, three countries were chosen for a more detailed analysis of the security discourse. The first country case study is Bulgaria, an EU and NATO member. Bulgaria's direct neighbour and second national case study is Serbia, a country that was a major party during the Yugoslav civil war in the 1990s. It is no NATO and EU member but a candidate country for the latter, and also has strong ties to Russia. Also, Serbia has an ongoing territorial conflict with one<sup>5</sup> of its (former) provinces: Kosovo and Metohija. Finally, with the greater part of its territory in Asia, lies the third country case study: the Republic of Turkey.

### 2.2 Bulgaria

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Bulgaria represents a unique example from the colourful catalogue of EvoCS national case studies combining some significant achievements, such as non-violent regime change in 1989, stability during the transition period and membership in NATO and the EU, with a number of weaknesses and vulnerabilities, such as poor governance, corruption, demographic crisis, low confidence in institutions and in the political system and, importantly, some serious democratic, social and moral deficits. In the international aspect of security, Bulgaria stands out as a peculiar object of the EvoCS study process, as it houses membership in NATO and advanced military co-operation with the United States, and special public attitudes toward Russia. This has strong impact on the internal political process and creates an impression in Moscow that Bulgaria is a weak link in the Euro-Atlantic system and can be used as a door to the region of South Eastern Europe thus weakening European cohesion.

A typical way of thinking about the Balkans is framed exclusively by the impact of three paradigms: historical legacy, transition towards democracy and European integration. In the past two decades these have been used both as analytical tools and as "silver bullet" explanations of reality, but in practice none of them actually helps us understand what is happening in Bulgarian politics today. The "legacy" paradigm is in fact a cover of the ethno-political perspective. The "democratic transition" discourse has placed the focus on the formal institutional change, rather than on societal developments. "Integration" has turned into an expert-driven substitute of reforms and policies.

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<sup>5</sup> The other being Vojvodina in the North.



These policy approaches disregarded the citizens' thinking of democracy, i.e. not so much in terms of institutional settings, but from the point of view of the state-citizen relations. As a result, the internal logic of security and stability perceptions has been and continues to be influenced by three powerful factors: the widening gap between the society and the elite, the growing distrust in the way the country is governed, and, finally, the emergence of structural democratic deficit. Bulgarians still see their country's arrival in Europe through a prism of de-industrialisation, rising social inequality and corrupted governance.

Efforts to emancipate from the "historical ties" with Russia are another feature of the case of Bulgaria. The two countries have been bound during the Cold War in a unique manner, far beyond the visible facade. This somewhat covert legacy has been explored and manipulated by forces in both Russia and Bulgaria. Domestically, the heirs of the former communist party and the State Security apparatus, as well as new-born "nationalistic" forces have built a political agenda along the thesis that the European path is artificial and foisted while the road with Russia is natural and has always been good for Bulgaria. Turning the telescope around, Bulgaria is a perfect example of how Russia uses a fusion of political and economic propaganda, and covert means to undermine a democratic process.

The cumulative effect from democratic deficit, corruption and poor governance is the lack of serious economic and social progress. Despite relatively good control over the financial crisis, growth is not sustainable, and the escape from poverty doesn't seem to be near. Emigration and a demographic collapse were born out of a deteriorating political and social environment. With more than 3 million Bulgarians having left the country in the past 23 years, this has deeply hurt the Bulgarian economy and the country's political system and has made society more vulnerable and insecure.

Surrounded by a complicating security milieu, Bulgaria is safe from war, but not because of the strength of its armed forces. The country's recent security concerns are rooted in the domestic developments, rather than in the external environment.

## 2.3 Serbia

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Situated in the centre of the SEE case study region, Serbia has in the past decades all-too-often been in the centre of European security discourses as well. After the civil war of the republics of former Yugoslavia ended in the 90s, Serbia continues to be perceived as a security problem in the discourse of both Eastern and Western Europe. This perception is rooted in internal security challenges, the most prominent being the challenged status of Serbia's southern autonomous province Kosovo and Metohija (Republic of Kosovo for the countries that recognized Kosovo's declaration of independence from February 2008). Even today Kosovo remains an internal security challenge for Serbia, a fact that was also confirmed by the EvoCS national case study of this country (see section 3.2).

However, Kosovo is but one aspect of the security discourse of this Southeast European country. Among the more recent security challenges, discussions on the security of Serbian roads and railroads can be found as well as debates on energy security and the question on how to deal with Serbian citizens who leave the country in order to fight in crisis areas like Syria or Ukraine and how to subsequently monitor and reintegrate them into Serbian society again. The unresolved status and non-recognition of Kosovo's independence complicates some of these discourses immensely. On the

contrary, Serbia's relationship with its northern province of Vojvodina seems to have improved in the last decades. Discussions on the autonomy status of the province are raised now and then, but in general, there seem to be no security challenges specific to this province.

Apart from recent discussions, there also remains the open question of Serbia's geopolitical orientation which makes the country almost unique in Europe. Serbia has proclaimed itself neutral with a clear political will to become part of the European Union. On the other hand, Serbia is a traditional ally of the Russian Federation (and has an individual free trade agreement with this country) and has up to the writing of this project deliverable resisted any attempts to join the EU's economic sanctions against Russia. Not all of these long terms discussion come from the area of security concerns, but they play a relevant role for some of them nonetheless.

Serbia also has a number of "traditional" security challenges, which it shares with a number of its neighbours. Chief among these is the discussion on corruption in the political and economic sector and the persistent problem of organized crime. Also, problems with the discrimination of ethnic minorities (like the Roma community) and the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community (e.g. the problems with the annual organization of the pride parade in Belgrade) are a recurring topic in Serbia's security discourses.

These challenges are most often discussed on a national level, in the cases of Kosovo and Vojvodina sometimes on the sub-national level, which is also a characteristic specific to the region of South-Eastern Europe.

This combination of "traditional", current and long-term security challenges, some of them unique to Serbia, some of them part of the regional discussion, and their perception by specific Serbian actors on typical levels is the framework in which the national case study was conducted and whose results are used to formulate recommendations for future security strategies and Europe's end-users in the security sector.

## 2.4 Turkey

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Located at the juncture of security challenges, both in the European Southern and Eastern Neighbourhood, Turkey is a crucial EU partner country in the prevention of the spread of a whole set of classic and asymmetric threats into Europe. As a NATO country, Turkey's military capacity and contribution to NATO operations as well as in the EU missions in the Western Balkans provide a crucial asset for the security and the stability of Europe and in balancing the military powers in its neighbourhood. The EU security and counter-terrorism cooperation with Turkey has gained a new level of importance, following the emergence of new security challenges, e.g. foreign fighters. Turkey is also a country of transit for irregular migrants, and therefore it's a key partner for the prevention of illegal migration to the EU and for the prevention of the security and economic challenges. Located in the proximity of energy resources of the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East and the East Mediterranean, Turkey has a potentially important role in the diversification of energy supply sources and contributes to the energy security of Europe. At the same time, with a high level of investment and a considerable bilateral trade, Turkish businesses are contributing to the economic security of the South-East Europe, an important factor for the political stability in the region.

On the other hand, however, Turkey faces challenges to its own security and stability. The main threats Turkey is exposed to are the ones to its territorial integrity and security, as well as to its

physical safety, generated by both state and non-state actors. Turkey is also exposed to domestic terror threats from various terror organisations including the Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê (PKK), the far leftist groups (i.e. The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party–Front DHKP-C) or religious fundamentalists (i.e. Kurdish Hezbollah). Turkey has already suffered from mortar and artillery fire coming from the Syrian War within its territory. It's also exposed to threats from different fighting groups in Syria, including the Islamic State, the Al-Nusra and the Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat (PYD).

In addition, Turkey faces increasing challenges to its political, economic and social stability. The excessive power centralization, as well as the presence of informal groups such as the Gulen movement, has affected the effective functioning of the institutions, not only the judiciary, but other institutions guaranteeing the stability, - with consequences on political and economic stability. In addition, the weakening of democracy, freedoms and the rule of law have introduced new challenges to Turkey's political, economic and social stability. The weakening of civic freedoms, the rule of law, declining political liberalism, media and academic freedom, in addition to a polarizing political rhetoric are among the factors that pose challenges to Turkey's stability. As one of the consequences, Turkey experienced, for example, the Gezi Park protests, in May 2013.

Finally, Turkey has additional challenges, which, in longer term, might become threats. In its north, the Ukraine-Russia conflict and the deepening division between Moscow and the West affects its security environment. Furthermore, Turkey is also surrounded by frozen conflicts, including the Cyprus, Transnistria (in Moldova), Nagorn-Karabakh (in Azerbaijan), South-Ossetia and Abkhazia conflicts (both in Georgia). Although these conflicts are mainly stable, the unresolved Cyprus conflict emerges as a potential risk due to the disputes over the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) in the East Mediterranean. Turkey is the world's biggest refugee host, providing a home to nearly 2 million refugees. The presence of refugees represent an economic challenge (Turkey has already spent \$4.5 billion since 2011) and a potential security problem. Turkey is also highly vulnerable against cyber threats. In the same time, Turkey has a high level of energy dependency on Russia and has one of the fastest increases in energy supply demand. Lastly, Turkey is also exposed to additional challenges to the physical safety and security to its people, due to the high risk of natural disasters (i.e. earthquake), and has one of the lowest records of work safety in Europe.

On the one hand, Turkey plays a crucial role for the European security, and it is therefore a necessity for the European Security Strategies to address the shared security problems. On the other hand, Turkey's security challenges are surprisingly similar in many ways to other European countries, which provides the EU the ability to address them, - and therefore an ideal candidate for studying in this project.

## 3 Country profiles

### 3.1 Bulgaria

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From a distance Bulgaria is often seen as a corner at the far end of the continent next to the Orient and Russia's *blizkoe zarubezhie* – an exotic political marsh plagued by corruption; a place of rich nature but poor governance; a destination for low cost tourism but also of low salaries, suffering from a continuous brain-drain and “exporting” pick-pocketers of the Roma minority. At the same time, the issue of the Bulgarian immigrants working in the UK was turned into a political tide against the EU *acquis communautaire*. Next to that, European politicians and media have only rarely recognised Bulgaria's success in maintaining macroeconomic stability when countries in the neighbourhood have been collapsing. Little, if any, attention was paid to Bulgaria's excellent cooperation with the US and European secret services in the international fight against drug trafficking. The same applies to the engagement of Bulgarian military in NATO and US-led operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq. Instead, Bulgaria is frequently reminded Vladimir Chizhov's “off the record” provocation<sup>6</sup> “You are our Trojan Horse in the EU,” negligently omitting the end of the sentence: “...in a good way.”

No doubt, the picture of today's Bulgaria is so colourful and deformed that outside observers may qualify it as a disappointing abstraction. Curiously, many Bulgarians would agree. The key problem is that, on the one hand, for 25 years the Bulgarians have made a lot to transform the political system and the economy, to contribute to a common or allied foreign policy and to develop a civil society. On the other hand, the democratic deficit is as big, as inefficient and corrupt have been the governments and the administration. Societal progress is so slow that people simply do not notice it. No one would dare to determine Bulgarian transition as successful – the people expected much more. All this creates a specific environment for examining the contemporary security of Bulgaria.

#### 3.1.1 Characterization of the core values

According to the EvoCS preliminary research findings<sup>7</sup>, various actors in the Bulgarian security discourse attach the greatest degree of salience to “Political stability and security”, followed by “Economic prosperity and security” and “Social stability and security.” (see Figure 1 in the annex) In order to understand why such a combination dominates over traditional Balkan concerns such as territorial integrity, the study looks for what makes individuals and society so insecure despite the country's membership in EU since January 2007 and in NATO since April 2004.

Political stability/instability, economic prosperity/stagnation and social stability/ fluctuation are jointly determined. In the case of Bulgaria, oligarchic looting of national assets and the functioning of the political system as a façade hiding weakness and inability to govern in the public interest marked a trend towards de-modernisation. After 25 years of transition, marked by the electoral preference's swaying from the former Communist Party, via the Saviour archetype (former Tsar Simeon II's party

<sup>6</sup> Permanent Representative, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the European Union.

<sup>7</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): “Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe) (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

won the 2001 general election and Simeon II was elected prime-minister after he promised to solve Bulgaria's problems in 800 days) to the Strong hand character (former police general Boyko Borisov is serving his second mandate as prime-minister); the lack of institutional capacity and will to manage the social imbalances on all sides of the political spectrum; corrupted administration, and economic emigration combined created an environment, characterised by a sense of overall insecurity.

The causal link among the three core values is exemplified by the observation that any political instability<sup>8</sup> immediately leads to worsening the financial situation (in 2014, Bulgaria had the second highest increase of budget deficit in the EU, after Cyprus) that is reflected in only tiny social status growth (23% of Bulgarians live under the poverty bar). According to a Harvard study "One strong argument underlying this relationship is based upon the effects of uncertainty on productive economic decisions, such [as] investment, production or labour supply. A high propensity of a change of government is associated with uncertainty about the new policies of a potential new government; risk-averse economic agents may hesitate to take economic initiatives or may "exit" the economy, by investing abroad. Conversely, foreign investors prefer a stable political environment, with less policy uncertainty and less uncertainty about property rights."<sup>9</sup>

The impact of the **political stability** on security perceptions is regarded in Bulgaria as highest as a result of three factors: "traditional" respect to the government (inherited from the communist years) as "a source of everything," the relatively high percentage of the population that depends on the political will for their social survival, and the overall fatigue from a utterly prolonged transition. In the context of the legacy paradigm, political stability and social security and equality have been perceived as the most prominent achievements of the communist era that had to be preserved. Accordingly, the democratic process overall, and the political parties and politicians during the transition have been judged primarily on the basis of their views and actions to protect the abovementioned achievements. Thus, politics was reduced to a clash between those that maintain political stability and others that challenge it.

From a social status point of view, the decline in the standard of living, the emergence of mass poverty and high unemployment rates are seen by the authors<sup>10</sup> as the most sensitive failure of democratic governance, market economy and, since 2007, the membership in the EU. In a period of only six years (1992-97) the financial system collapsed twice and many lost all their savings. Ironically, in both cases it was the ruling party of former communists that caused enormous suffering. A structural effect of these political failures was the dramatic rise of social outsiders. Millions of people of all generations lost their middle class status. In theory, every day citizens enjoy thousands of choices, but in practice they do not have any. Logically, fewer people vote in recent years, and those who rarely participate in the elections are just those marginalised – the poor and the unemployed. Even

<sup>8</sup> "Political instability" is defined as the propensity for change in the executive, either by "constitutional" or "unconstitutional" means. The last two regular government mandates were terminated after public protests, respectively in February 2013 and July 2014.

<sup>9</sup> Alberto Alesina, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini, and Phillip Swagel, "Political instability and economic growth," *Journal of Economic Growth* 1, no. 2 (1996): 189-211, available at <http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00138862>.

<sup>10</sup> Similar are the views expressed in discussions, speeches and papers by Ivan Krastev, Ognyan Minchev, the Institute for Market Economics, Open Society and others, who studied the reasons for recent expansion of public protests. These factors are seen also as main reasons for emigration of BG youth and the high social inequality. In terms of EvoCS coding results, unemployment and poverty are among the highest ranking challenges as regards the social dimension.

the EU membership did not change the social map of Bulgaria significantly due to the continued effects of the gap between the reform agenda and the short- and mid-term expectations of citizens.<sup>11</sup>

The transition paradigm encompassed all political, economic and social demands. In 1989-1997, the transition was viewed only as democratisation and marketization. Democratisation was seen exclusively as the opposite to authoritarianism. Transition towards market economy followed the principle of “reduced role of the state,” assuming that that is bound to increase economic efficiency. After a corrupt and strategically very chaotic mass privatisation, Bulgaria continued to live in an environment of continuous reforms. This created a sense of an unfinished transition, with the main consequences being the growing gap between public expectations and the elite’s agenda, more protests and less political activity, low confidence in politicians and institutions and a sense of discontent.

The impact of the **economic prosperity** core value on security is very controversial. The most popular questions (even recently) in this respect are: “Why our economy develops so slowly and why we fail to reduce the distance to the developed European countries? Is this due to the misguided policies of the past 25 years or to the starting base (which was very low, regardless of some nostalgic views)?” Despite starting from a relatively low level, Bulgaria did not achieve an economic breakthrough. There was a period of faster development between 2001 and 2008, with a growth rate of 6 % in two of those years, and real GDP growth of 51 % - way above the average for the EU. At the same time, GDP in purchasing power parity increased from 40 % to 47 % as compared to the average level in the EU. A positive reading of these numbers was that Bulgarian economy was growing faster than the average for developed countries. The downside reading was that the achievements were not sufficient to allow Bulgaria to overtake any other member of the European Union.<sup>12</sup>

The impact of the **social stability** on security of Bulgaria is viewed through the wider and growing social (in) equality. The relative difference in income between the richest and the poorest 20 % of the population in the country is among the highest in the EU. In addition, in the period 2001-2008 it grew by over 84 %. The number of people at risk of poverty or social exclusion in Bulgaria is the highest in the EU.<sup>13</sup> From the perspective of social equality, Bulgaria is a state of deprivations, resulting from the processes of transition, privatisation, fraud, erroneous economic ideas, the war in Yugoslavia, pension reform, financial crisis, political populism, corruption, poor governance, oligarchic relations, the crisis in Ukraine, etc.

In conclusion, the three most salient “core values” in the initial EvoCS study indicate that the country’s recent security concerns are rooted in the domestic developments, rather than in the external environment. The “enemy from within” is the combination of democratic deficit, poor governance and lack of trust in the institutional ability to regulate the social relationships in favour of the ordinary citizens.

<sup>11</sup> Ivan Krastev, *The Inflexibility Trap: Frustrated Societies, Weak States, and Democracy* (Bratislava: UNDP, 2002).

<sup>12</sup> According to Roumen Avramov, a Bulgarian economist and economy historian, available at [www.mediapool.bg/da-si-nai-bedniyat-v-kluba-na-bogatite-e-mnogo-po-boleznenoto-otkolkoto-da-si-beden-izvan-nego-news218625.html](http://www.mediapool.bg/da-si-nai-bedniyat-v-kluba-na-bogatite-e-mnogo-po-boleznenoto-otkolkoto-da-si-beden-izvan-nego-news218625.html).

<sup>13</sup> Stoyan Hristov, *Inequality in Bulgaria – dynamics, comparative analysis and reasons* (Sofia: Institute for Market Economics, 2013); available at [http://ime.bg/var/images/Inequality\\_full\\_text.pdf](http://ime.bg/var/images/Inequality_full_text.pdf). The author of the report points to difficulties in comparing data before and after 2006-2007, when Bulgaria adopted the European methodology for social research (EU-SILC).



### 3.1.2 The Core Values in the Security Context

As already underlined, a serious gap exists between the political elite's agenda and societal demands in Bulgaria. The breach is not only in the political, economic and social areas, but in security as well. Mistrust in institutions, including those from the security sector, is reflected in a thought-provoking discrepancy between public threat perceptions and the institutional documents on security. Institutions (National Security Agency, MoD, MoI) used to emphasise international terrorism as a security threat even before the terrorist act in Burgas (18 July 2012). However, for the society, the essential threats have always been those that could lead to political instability, financial collapse and further social decline. Recently, the two perceptions were brought closer by the growing migration pressure from the Arabian-African arc of violence. With the "help" of incapable institutions and due to concerns voiced by radicalised politicians, the Bulgarians started to think of the migrants first of all as potential terrorists. As a result, a 30 km long wire fence along the border with Turkey was built in order to limit the number of illegal migrants without serious media and public opposition.

A similar discrepancy is seen when threats to the political stability are discussed. According to a report by the then Minister of Interior,<sup>14</sup> issued in 2013, the main source of political insecurity was the civil protest, protesters being divided into two categories: "spontaneous protesters," seeking change in the government, and "motivated protesters," whose number was growing, because their suspected organisers pursued political goals. In contrast, EvoCS sources show that people feel insecure, in the political aspect, as a consequence of long lasting political confrontation, lack of essential reforms in critical sectors, and political corruption in all forms throughout the political establishment and institutions. Those have led to division, hatred and tensions in society, with their cumulative effect being a stable negative attitude toward political parties, politics, and politicians. Ignoring the rules of political competition and involving institutions in the process of political confrontation, this further caused a serious decline in the credibility of security sector institutions. An impressive illustration of the consequences of such lasting distrust is Ivan Krastev's observation that the Bulgarian public space is full of compromising documents, recordings and rumours: "The totalitarian utopia of people spying for the government is progressively replaced by a utopia of people spying on the government."<sup>15</sup> Obviously, trust can be destroyed from both sides. The problem was recognised in the 2014 annual report of the Ministry of Defence on the state of defence and the armed forces that stated: "In this regard, issues of concern are the attempts to manipulate public opinion through disinformation, propaganda campaigns, media manipulation, use of social networks for disinformation, attempts by populist party leaders to manipulate groups of voters in order to cause a confusion among the population, and others."<sup>16</sup>

The economic aspect of security is deeply rooted in public perceptions as people are used to think that "it would be good for me only if the state is in a good shape." Notably, the period after the financial collapse of 1996-97 (with the socialists in power) has been the longest one of positive development in terms of GDP growth in the history of Bulgaria since 1878. In addition, the extremely re-

<sup>14</sup> Current risks and threats to the national security of the Republic of Bulgaria, Report by the Minister of the Interior to the Consultative Council for National Security, 20 November 2013, available in Bulgarian language only at [www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/32924394-C30B-4C6E-B0C2-EEBDD103A43E/0/DOKLADKSN201113FINAL.docx](http://www.mvr.bg/NR/rdonlyres/32924394-C30B-4C6E-B0C2-EEBDD103A43E/0/DOKLADKSN201113FINAL.docx).

<sup>15</sup> Ivan Krastev, *In Mistrust We Trust: Can Democracy Survive When We Don't Trust Our Leaders?* (TED Books, 2013).

<sup>16</sup> Available in Bulgarian language at [www.md.government.bg/bg/doc/drugi/20150327\\_Doklad\\_MO\\_2014.pdf](http://www.md.government.bg/bg/doc/drugi/20150327_Doklad_MO_2014.pdf).

strictive manner of managing the public finances during the international financial crisis that hit Bulgaria in 2009-2013 did not shake the macro parameters seriously. But while budgetary discipline was sustained, many companies on the market went bankrupt and unemployment and poverty rose.

There are three main factors that make the Bulgarians extremely sensitive, suspicious and frustrated when it comes to economic aspects of security. First is the sense of de-industrialisation of the country. Despite that the current GDP is almost twice the highest one during communism (\$28.5 in 1987 against over \$54 bln in 2013 in purchasing power parity),<sup>17</sup> people still believe that democracy and market economy came at the expense of closing “the symbols of Bulgarian heavy industry.” Industrialisation was the pearl of the communist platform. However, people do not know or do not want to know anything about the competitiveness of those Soviet technologies. The abolishment of the industrial assets did not change the life of hundreds of thousands of people for the better.

The second factor is the belief of the public that mass privatisation during the 1990s was totally corrupt and party driven, and strongly influenced by the former security apparatus. As a result, various privatisation schemes were carried out in morally outrageous ways. But the privatisation was not illegal. According to Krasen Stanchev, “Quite the contrary: the most foolish and inappropriate privatisation approaches and procedures were in strict compliance of what was stipulated in the Privatisation Law (changed 29 times between 1992 and 2004).”<sup>18</sup> Bulgarians relate economy with security so strongly because the most visible figures that benefited from privatisation were former regime nomenclature, organised criminals, former sportsmen on behalf of the former security services, and foreign investors with very dubious sources of capital. The people felt cheated, robbed and socially disqualified.

The third factor is the collapse of the agriculture sector during the transitional period. Within the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance of the former socialist countries Bulgaria was famous with agricultural production and canned foods. The sectorial reform was accompanied by return of once nationalised land to the original owners or their successors and depopulation of villages, which caused a complete collapse of the sector in only two years (1992-1993). In recent years the agricultural sector generated 5-7% of the GDP. It is one of the sectors that have a positive export trade balance, generated from the export of cereal products, while vegetables and fruits are mostly imported. However, the sense of most of the Bulgarians is that the country has lost a significant component of the national economic capacity. Relatively high prices of imported and domestic food products put food in second place in household expenditures, after heating and electricity.

### 3.1.3 Security challenges and threats, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights

In the case of Bulgaria, institutional statements on security challenges and threats and EvoCS results differ considerably. Institutions list “existing and emerging new sources of tension as the crisis in Ukraine; outstanding security issues in the Western Balkans; on-going conflicts in Afghanistan, the Middle East and North Africa; asymmetric threats and major transnational terrorism; proliferation of

<sup>17</sup> Source: The World Bank development indicators, available at [www.google.bg/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9\\_&met\\_y=ny\\_gdp\\_mktcp\\_cd&idim=country:BGR&hl=en&dl=en](http://www.google.bg/publicdata/explore?ds=d5bncppjof8f9_&met_y=ny_gdp_mktcp_cd&idim=country:BGR&hl=en&dl=en).

<sup>18</sup> Stanchev, Krasen. *Bulgarian Economy: What the Politicians Do Not See* (Sofia: Institute for Market Economics, 2012). Available in Bulgarian language at <http://ime.bg/bg/articles/ikonomikata-na-bylgariya-kakvo-ne-vidjat-politicitel/>.



weapons of mass destruction; the increase in military potentials; globalisation and easy access to modern information technology; organized crime; illicit trafficking of people, weapons and drugs; cyber threats; demographic, environmental and energy problems; technical risks and natural disasters and others.”<sup>19</sup> The EvoCS preliminary research findings however have identified quite a different list of issues and priorities.<sup>20</sup> The results of the coding exercise could be read as “people say, we lack security.”<sup>21</sup> It is not so much about the attributes of the state as “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity,” but security in the political-social domain where challenges and vulnerabilities shape peoples’ demands for security and progress. It is not about enemies and armed forces, but about high level corruption, organised crime, administrative fraud, wide-spread petty crime – all “covered” by uniquely ineffective justice and law enforcement sector that facilitates penetration of foreign interests and allows massive fraud as in the recent case of Corporate Trade Bank (CTB).

The threat perception gap between the institutional security discourse and the “people say, we lack security” speaks of the character of the Bulgarian nation. Michael Minkov, co-author and follower of Geert Hofstede,<sup>22</sup> believes that the overall feeling of insecurity stems from the high and constant stress the nation has been exposed to during the communist dictatorship as well as during the transition.<sup>23</sup> According to the method of Hofstede/Minkov, several characteristics contribute to the chronic frustration and the feeling of insecurity of the Bulgarians:

- *Bulgarians feel distanced from the real power.* The belief is that their ability to influence government policy is very limited. The democratic process, as it is, does not change their lives. The sense of socio-political distance and insignificance is amplified by the fact of unacceptably high social inequality. As a result, political activity is visibly reduced, the number of political parties-mayflies increases, and populism and nationalism spread.
- *The nation strives to avoid uncertainty.* The dominant socio-political factor for this cultural dimension is the prolonged transition from extremely stable, secure and equalised society through chaos and two internal collapses towards a very shaky internal and international situation at present. Even achieving membership in NATO and the EU did not convince Bulgarians that they can deal with big problems. Stress is a cultural phenomenon, whose impact on the political and public behaviour is very visible when it is necessary to reflect on any national security challenge. Recently, the impact of this characteristic was demonstrated by the lack of solidarity towards the not so big number of immigrants, crossing the borders legally or illegally. High societal and personal stress creates a feeling of general dissatisfaction with everything – politics, government, state, NATO, EU. According to the latest Eurostat survey on quality of life, the Bulgarians are the least satisfied nation in Europe.<sup>24</sup>
- *Most people are short- to mid-term oriented.* For many, as the membership in NATO is a fact,

<sup>19</sup> Quotation from the Government’s Annual Report on Defence and Armed Forces (2014), available in Bulgarian language at [www.md.government.bg/bg/doc/drugi/20150327\\_Doklad\\_MO\\_2014.pdf](http://www.md.government.bg/bg/doc/drugi/20150327_Doklad_MO_2014.pdf) (translated by the authors).

<sup>20</sup> See EvoCS Deliverable 8.1 “Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe” by Miloš Jovanović, Vesselin Petkov, Maria Radziejowska and Antonia Todorova, 27 February 2015.

<sup>21</sup> “Lack” and “security” occupy 1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> rank, respectively with 65 and 55 hashtags, in Vesselin Petkov’s Preliminary Research Findings on Bulgaria.

<sup>22</sup> Hofstede, Geert and Minkov, Michael: *Cultures and Organisations: Software of the Mind*, 3rd edition (New York: McGraw-Hill USA, 2010).

<sup>23</sup> Opinion in the introduction to the Bulgarian translation of the book.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, the map at [http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Quality\\_of\\_life\\_in\\_Europe\\_-\\_facts\\_and\\_views\\_-\\_overall\\_life\\_satisfaction](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Quality_of_life_in_Europe_-_facts_and_views_-_overall_life_satisfaction).

the country should not spend on defence modernisation. People prefer to get a symbolic increase of pensions now, than to see the government investing their money in something that will bring significant results after a decade. After 25 years of tectonic post-communist changes, they prefer the status quo and evolutionary developments than radical reforms aiming high future benefits.

- *Bulgarians are collectivists by tradition, but in a specific manner.* Collectivism is about the “close circle” – family, relatives, colleagues. Everything else – town, society, state, nation, allies is “external” and thus less or not important. On the other hand, when outside their “close circle”, individualism dominates the ability of Bulgarians to work in teams. From a security point of view, this characteristic is reflected in the unwillingness to volunteer in case of accidents, to send soldiers fighting “for others,” or donate to the unknown.
- *Bulgarians are status quo, consensus, and tradition- oriented.* Ironically, the 50 years of Cold War were a period of unmatched stability, especially as compared to the previous half a century, when the Bulgarians fought in four major wars. So any threat to the national security should be very immediate to cause a reaction. Respectively, long-term investments in security are often seen as a waste of limited resources.

*Corruption* is turning into the main destructive factor in all aspects of the life. The tenth consecutive report of the Centre for the Study of Democracy (CSD) is titled “Anti-corruption Policies against State Capture.”<sup>25</sup> The threat of “state capture” is real, as the report has identified “...the highest levels of participation of Bulgarians in corrupted deals for the past 15 years. On average, 158 000 corrupt transactions per month have been registered in 2014.”<sup>26</sup> Manifestations of political corruption have reached alarming proportions, replacing petty bribery both as the dominant concern and as the cause of most social and economic damages. Its scope and viability generated intensive public protests and strong reactions from EU and the US. Political parties, executives at ministerial and agency level and local leadership are the key players. One can recall the cases of Mr. Delyan Peevski (MP and shadow owner of numerous businesses, including media), who in June 2013 was appointed as chief of the National Security Agency,<sup>27</sup> the failure of Ponzi-scheme Corporate Trade Bank (BGN 4.2 bln out of its total assets of BGN 6.6 bln turned out to be toxic), the saga of the South Stream pipeline, etc. These examples illustrate how high level corruption turns into a national security threat. According to another CSD report, the political parties’ “political investments” (vote buying and control of voters) has increased from 9-9.5 % in 2009 to about 12-13 % in 2014.<sup>28</sup> The key actors are bundled with national and local oligarchs up to a degree, in which any national interest can be sacrificed in the name of personal, group or party interests. According to the same report, “...the capture of the state by private interests has reached even the most powerful law enforcement institutions – prosecutors, financial intelligence and the Central Bank.” The international dimension of political corruption is illus-

<sup>25</sup> “Corruption” and “state” occupy 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> rank as hashtags in Vesselin Petkov’s Preliminary Research Findings of Bulgaria.

<sup>26</sup> Centre for the Study of Democracy, *Anti-corruption Policies Against State Capture* (Sofia: Centre for the Study of Democracy, 2014). Available in Bulgarian language at [www.csd.bg/index.php?id=275](http://www.csd.bg/index.php?id=275).

<sup>27</sup> After the comic promotion of Peevski, tens of thousands of people filled Sofia’s main boulevard in mid-2013 to protest. According to opinion polls, fully 70 per cent of the public supported the demonstrators.

<sup>28</sup> Center for Study of Democracy, *Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Bulgaria (2013-14)* (Sofia: CSD, 2014). Available in Bulgarian language at [www.csd.bg/artShowbg.php?id=17200](http://www.csd.bg/artShowbg.php?id=17200).

trated by the adoption of specific legislation in the interest of Gazprom during the coalition government of Plamen Oresharski.

At the same time, at social level, more often than not corrupt transactions are carried out at the initiative of public administration employees pressuring citizens who need to use their administrative services. Generally, the Bulgarians do not accept corruption, but they are forced to participate. This indicates a structural governance problem in the Bulgarian society: corruption poses an additional cost for the use of administrative services for both citizens and businesses. The sharp reaction of the EU by extending the application of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism shows the common concern with the country's regress in tackling systemic and political corruption. US, Germany, the UK and others provide financial and expert support for strengthening the law enforcement capacity and moving ahead on the issue of judicial reform. US Ambassador Marcie B. Ries stressed in a public speech in 2013 that "...the most challenging and sensitive part of our relationship" was "our work together to combat organized crime and strengthen the rule of law in Bulgaria."<sup>29</sup> Similarly, then UK Ambassador Jonathan Allen said in 2013 "Bulgarians report widespread corruption across society and Bulgaria remains a high risk country for corruption. We do not see high-level cases being brought against individuals."<sup>30</sup> The threat is solemn enough because, as Time magazine bitterly concludes, "For Bulgaria, democracy doesn't necessarily mean prosperity."<sup>31</sup>

*Organised crime* in Bulgaria is a by-product of the transition. It originates from a combination of various internal and regional factors. Among the former are the collapse of the state in the first half of the 90s, the plundering of public property, corrupt privatisation, and apparent and hidden collaboration of the police with crime. The main external factors are the embargo against former Yugoslavia and the pressure exerted by criminal networks from Russia, Ukraine and Chechnya, from East Asia and South America to use Bulgarian traffic channels to Western Europe. Some observers believe that the basis of recent organised crime are the contraband channels inherited from the communist regime that have been "privatised" in the early 1990s with the "help" of corrupt security officers. Indicative about the nature of the crime is the unique fact that former athletes or high-ranking members of the security forces have led almost all major criminal groups. In the 1990s, the organised crime widely used murder and other forms of violence, perpetrated with virtual impunity. After the gradual legalisation of criminal business, the main shifted to public finances, targeted via corrupt politicians, government officials, prosecutors and judges. The way the Corporate Trade Bank was brought down signals that in Bulgaria organised crime can easily be defined as criminal-in-origin networks, gradually involving politicians and senior civil servants. These networks have evolved and currently control significant financial resources. Besides, not all of their activities are criminal, what makes it hard to fight them. The good news is that the Bulgarian society seems to have finally grown to taking radical and comprehensive measures for fighting organised crime and corruption. Recently, amendments in the Constitution have been proposed that are expected to improve effectiveness of law enforcement,

<sup>29</sup> Marcie B. Ries, "The U.S. - Bulgaria Partnership – Built on a Foundation of Shared Values," Remarks to the Atlantic Club, 30 January 2013, available at [www.amcham.bg/Files/Press Releases/Ambassador\\_Ries\\_AtlanticClub\\_Remarks\\_ENG.doc](http://www.amcham.bg/Files/Press%20Releases/Ambassador_Ries_AtlanticClub_Remarks_ENG.doc).

<sup>30</sup> Speech by British Ambassador Jonathan Allen: "Should I be an Optimist or a Pessimist for Bulgaria?" Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 11 April 2013, available at <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/british-ambassador-jonathan-allen-should-i-be-an-optimist-or-a-pessimist-for-bulgaria>.

<sup>31</sup> Laurent, Olivier, "Broken Dreams: The Aftermath of 25 Years of Democracy in Bulgaria," *Time Magazine*, 10 March 2015. Available at <http://time.com/3731816/bulgaria-democracy>.

along with several other legal and organisational measures taking on high-level mafia-type networks and political and administrative fraud.

In the political-economic-social nexus, the issue of *Roma integration* could be singled out as a slow-burning development with potentially dangerous repercussions for the functioning of the state. According to the latest census in Bulgaria (2011), Roma is the third-largest ethnic group in the country with 4.9% of the total population, or 325 343 people, growing by 0.2% as compared to 2001. Efforts to solve Roma problems began with the industrialisation of the country after 1910. Under communism, drastic measures, such as the ban on nomadism and renaming with Bulgarian names have been applied in combination with integration incentives, such as compulsory education, affordable housing, “reserved seats” in universities and others. The existence of military engineering corps and construction troops equipped Roma men with work skills and a minimum sense of discipline. All of the above, however, had only limited impact. Now, decades later, the results of the 2011 census are striking – about a fifth of the Roma minority in Bulgaria have not completed primary school, illiterate Roma women being three times more than men. The problem of Roma education affects their employment. In the current economic crisis and persistently high levels of unemployment in some regions of Bulgaria, this problem becomes even more acute – only 19.35% of all Roma over 15 years of age have jobs. The picture is complicated by three additional problems – poor health (12.6 % of the total Roma population in the country, including children, has some disabilities or a serious chronic disease), poor housing conditions (presence of Roma ghettos where every fourth home is illegally built) and poverty that lead to a dramatic increase in criminal activities among Roma, as well as to a particularly sensitive issue for Bulgarian society – abandoning Roma children in social institutions and selling children abroad.<sup>32</sup> After the accession of Bulgaria to the EU, the devastating raids of Roma in Europe forced a number of countries and the European Commission to take special measures. At home, a National Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria for Roma Integration (2012-2020) has been approved by the Parliament.<sup>33</sup>

*Emigration and demographic crisis* are other multi-faceted problems deeply affecting society. The case of Bulgaria exhibits most negative demographic trends in the EU, as noted in an official report by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. Their combined effect will lead to an average annual decrease of population by 35 thousand. According to 2012 data, 1.6 mln women are in childbearing age. Their number has decreased by 310 thousand between 1990 and 2010, and by the end of 2015 is expected to fall by another 223 thousand, while in 2030 it will be around 900 thousand. It has been forecasted also that Bulgaria will lose 2.2 mln of its 7.7 mln population by 2060.<sup>34</sup>

Negative demographics are exacerbated by economic emigration. According to the National Statistical Institute, 28 727 Bulgarians changed their official address to a country abroad in 2014. The most preferred destination for emigrants is Germany, followed by the United Kingdom, and Spain.<sup>35</sup> According to Krastev, “mass emigration of people mostly aged between 25 and 50 has dramatically hurt the Bulgarian economy and its political system. Businesses complain about a shortage of qualified la-

<sup>32</sup> Popova, Juliana. Integration of Roma Communities in Bulgaria and Romania (OP “Human Resources Development,” 2012), available in Bulgarian language at [www.fromroma.eu/uploads/images/PDF/Doklad%20Juliana%20Popova.pdf](http://www.fromroma.eu/uploads/images/PDF/Doklad%20Juliana%20Popova.pdf).

<sup>33</sup> The strategy is available in Bulgarian language at [www.nccedi.government.bg/page.php?category=125&id=1740](http://www.nccedi.government.bg/page.php?category=125&id=1740).

<sup>34</sup> *The 2015 Ageing Report: Economic and budgetary projections for the 28 EU Member States (2013-2060)*, European Economy 3 (2015), available at [http://ec.europa.eu/economy\\_finance/publications/european\\_economy/2015/pdf/ee3\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2015/pdf/ee3_en.pdf).

<sup>35</sup> As the report has been quoted by Sega Daily at [www.segabg.com/article.php?id=747848](http://www.segabg.com/article.php?id=747848).

bour. Bulgaria's health system is deprived of well-trained nurses who can earn several times more by taking care of a family in London than working at a low-paid local hospital. Most of Bulgaria's best graduates do not apply to study at Bulgarian universities, thus depriving them of talent: after the Chinese, Bulgarians are now the second biggest foreign student community in Germany."<sup>36</sup>

*Relations with Russia* are a specific challenge for Bulgaria, with its special place in Kremlin's European energy strategy.<sup>37</sup> It will not be far-fetched to say that Bulgaria's energy system is under the full control of corporate oligarchies in Moscow and in Sofia. The way Kremlin approaches Bulgaria is by proposing a package of multi-billion projects (whose actual price is never publicly known initially) and using the energy oligarchs, socialist party affiliates and media to pressure Bulgarian governments. The Burgas-Alexandroupolis oil pipeline was developed in the early 1990s, and a framework agreement between Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria was signed in Athens in 2007 (17 years later!). The project envisaged almost no benefits for Bulgaria but posed high environmental risks and other liabilities for the Bulgarian Black Sea coast, a popular tourist area. Consequently, Bulgarian participation in the project was revoked in 2010. Immediately after the collapse of this project, another one—the South Stream gas pipeline—was inked in late 2012. Bulgarian analysts believe that the project has been initiated in a Kremlin attempt to compromise the EU's Third Energy Package to become effective next year. However, according to Ognian Minchev, "...the most controversial Russian project in Bulgaria is the planned Belene power plant, designed to be the first Russian-technology nuclear site on EU soil. For a decade after 2002, Belene developed as a corrupt and completely illegitimate business project, aimed at producing abundant and expensive electricity in a country with excess capacity in a region of declining electricity demand. As the Bulgarian government terminated the Belene project in early 2012, pro-Russian energy lobbies opened a noisy campaign in favour of the project, which ended up in a referendum on nuclear energy that failed to produce clear results." The doubling and tripling of electricity bills in January 2013, that later led to the government's resignation, is widely believed to have been an orchestrated manipulation aimed at provoking open public discontent and street protests. Minchev rightly suggested: "The Bulgarian crisis might prove a case study for destabilisation in Eastern Europe."<sup>38</sup>

Russia's influence on the economy and, through it, on the political system and foreign policy of Bulgaria, has been built up during the Cold War and modified during the transition. Main transmitters of influence are the former communist party, renamed as Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the old cadres of the special services and diplomatic corps that empower their pawns in key sectors of the economy. The second circle, created to influence the public opinion, includes bought or bribed media, sponsored foundations, NGOs and academics. The model that works successfully and has been tried in a different context, was recently "enriched" by funding small parties, represented in Parliament<sup>39</sup> (thus offsetting the current decline of the Socialist Party), arrogant diplomatic pressure on various occasions, and direct propaganda aimed at discrediting Bulgarian politicians and policies. The prob-

<sup>36</sup> Ivan Krastev's column in *The Guardian*, *Britain's gain is Eastern Europe's brain drain*, available at [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/24/britain-east-europe-brain-drain-bulgaria](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/mar/24/britain-east-europe-brain-drain-bulgaria).

<sup>37</sup> "Energy" is ranked 7th and "Russia" is 12th as hashtags in the EvoCS preliminary research findings on Bulgaria.

<sup>38</sup> Minchev, Ognian, *Russia's Energy Monopoly Topples the Bulgarian Government*. Posted on March 4, 2013 at <http://www.gmfus.org/blog/2013/03/04/russia's-energy-monopoly-topples-bulgarian-government>

<sup>39</sup> Both "Ataka" and "Patriotic front"—now in Parliament—were born in Burgas, where the Lucoil refinery is extremely influential. Ataka's election campaign started in Moscow and ended in Sofia with Iosif Kobzon's (currently on the EU sanctions list) live show. Both parties plus the socialists are against any sanctions against Russia.



lem is structural and will continue to exist, at least until the door for Russia to Europe through the Balkans is not closed.

*Delayed reforms in the security and law enforcement sector* are regarded by society as a serious challenge and part of the problem. The plan for defence reform 2000-2004 is the only realised plan within the sector. Recently, a package of four laws to put in order the national security governance and to regulate military and civilian intelligence and the government's guard service have been passed at first reading in the Parliament. The positive element is that the security services will finally function on a legislative base, but the prospective acts contain very few "reforms" inside. Even stronger, the public demands reforms of the judicial system, in order to protect prosecutors and judges from external (corrupt and political) influences and to make overall law enforcement effective. It is still to be seen whether such far-reaching reforms will require constitutional amendments and, if so, could there be a qualified parliamentary majority to adopt them.

### 3.1.4 Current Trends

Bulgarians live in uncertain times. Uncertainty is both national and external, with many profound socio-psychological effects that may change the country's behaviour on security issues completely. However, the current economic stress impacts everyday life, consumption has shrunk, public expenditures are cut. The state and the people have tightened their belts, obviously frightened for the future. As Ivan Krastev noted, Bulgaria still manages to avoid economic and social breakdown that has destabilised several European countries. Economy is slowly recovering from the crisis, there are no mass street protests, and the bank system is stable (except for CTB).<sup>40</sup> However, people have lost faith in a brighter future. EU membership turned out not to be the sole driver for growth. NATO guarantees are not well understood, and nationalists preach not to rely on them. Still, people do not seem to realise that most of the problems cannot be solved quickly, or by the government alone.

The EvoCS South East European regional workshop (Deliverable 8.1) correctly reflects the current public and political focus on stability in political, economic and social domains in Bulgaria. This trend will continue to dominate, especially if tensions with Russia deescalate. Neither the current crisis in Macedonia, nor the migration pressure can take a priority place for a longer period of time.

In the political domain, the core issue of concern is the government's stability and the sustainability of the pro-reform parliamentary majority. The centre-right coalition is stable so far, but tough reforms are still ahead – judicial reform, healthcare optimisation, social security system reform to cope with a serious deficit, security sector reform and others. The role of the pro-Russian forces is seriously limited. However, Kremlin is ambitious to maintain its presence and role in the Balkans (Moscow's nervous reaction on the recent crisis in Macedonia illustrates how strong their interest is<sup>41</sup>) and further steps may activate Russian advocates.

In the economic domain, the core question is how to maintain macroeconomic stability and at the same time find resources to stimulate business activities and finance social programmes. International experts believe that "...the country will remain on a sustainable fiscal trajectory due in part to

<sup>40</sup> Interview for 24 hours newspaper, available in Bulgarian language at [www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=736872](http://www.24chasa.bg/Article.asp?ArticleId=736872).

<sup>41</sup> See for example Elena Holodny, "The Kremlin thinks that the massive protests rocking a Balkan nation are an outside job to hurt Russia," Business Insider, 20 May 2015, available at <http://www.businessinsider.com/russia-lavrov-macedonia-protests-2015-5>.

its exceptionally low public load.”<sup>42</sup> A serious financial risk factor is the perspective of Greece, as there are several Greek-owned banks in Bulgaria, several thousand companies and considerable trade exchange. Real GDP growth will depend on the political stability, the ability of the government to attract foreign direct investments again, to increase further the effective use of EU funding and provide internal resource for investments. The experts believe that a growth of 1-2% for the next 2-3 years is a realistic perspective.<sup>43</sup>

In the social domain corruption and organised crime will continue to present the most serious problems with impact on security. The good news is that there is a strong and sustainable, both external and internal, pressure on executive, legislative and judicial powers finally to achieve significant results.

### 3.1.5 Conclusions for the Bulgarian country profile

At institutional level, which is a subject of this section, Bulgaria shares the European institutional threat perception within the comprehensive approach to security. The state leadership, with a few exceptions from the opposition, shares the understanding that recent Russian aggression against Ukraine and its provocative military behaviour have completely changed the security landscape. The basic conclusions are that Bulgaria cannot rely on international treaties or international institutions outside NATO and EU to protect its borders; the economic interdependence turns out to be a source of insecurity rather than of security; the Moscow’s so-called hybrid war has blurred the border between war and peace and, as result, peace cannot be taken for granted anymore.

At public level (as reflected by media and experts), Bulgarian society is mostly inward focused – on corruption and political populism, organised crime and massive petty crime; political and institutional stability. As the civil society is still in the process of consolidation, the government is seen as an overwhelmed and overstretched security actor (see Figure 2 in the annex).

Generally, as a state, society and culture, Bulgaria is very vulnerable. Its capacity to recover and develop after political, financial and security shocks has been tested with limited success, but has not been significantly strengthened. Fragility is still tackled not by strategy, but by expanding the scope of security far beyond the capacity of the government to manage various issues. Bulgarian society is systematically problematizing the challenges and threats discussed above, but the authorities still fail to make them “political problems of security” as they do not see rational solutions. Instead, governments have become champions of drafting strategies that no one can or cares to follow.

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<sup>42</sup> See Bulgaria Country Risk Report, BMI Research, 27 May 2015, available at <http://store.bmi-research.com/bulgaria-country-risk-report.html>.

<sup>43</sup> The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development forecasts 1-1.5% growth.

## 3.2 Serbia

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### 3.2.1 Characterization of core values

The coding for the Serbian case study has led to some expected results but has also shown some interesting and surprising characteristics of this south-east European country. Taking all 336 sources into account the most often contained core value (see also Figure 3 for the share of each core value of the total number of “main topic” characterisations) is, by far, “Physical safety and security” with a total number of 223 items in which it is the main topic. This was expected by the present author, because Serbia has a recent history of civil wars (Yugoslav wars) and social crises (Kosovo crisis) and it is probable that in such a country’s security discourse core values like “physical safety and security” will take a prominent place. In addition to that, there is probably a certain coding bias, because “Physical safety and security” is a rather broad core value, especially when compared to “Information and cyber security”.

The second most often discussed core value in Serbia (in 111 items) is “Economic prosperity and security”, while “Social stability and security” ranks third with 64 items.

Finally, the last five ranks are comprised of “Territorial integrity and security” (48 items), “Information and cyber security” (40 items), “Political stability and security” (31 items), “Environmental and ecological security” (24 items) and, with only 12 items where it is a main topic, “Cultural identity and security”.

The main source contributing to this ranking is of course the “Newspaper articles” which with 212 items make up almost two thirds of the whole coding data set. Taking into account only this source type, the ranking is very similar, with the first three core values being the same. The next large group of source items is the “Parliamentary publications” with 70 items. Again, the first two most prominent core values are the same. The third in this case is “Territorial integrity and security” which in the complete set is ranked fourth. Finally, with 18 items, the source item category of “Government Policy Documents” also has a similar ranking to the first two, except that ranks 1 and 2 are exchanged: 1. “Economic prosperity and security” (11 items); 2. “Physical safety and security” (10 items); 3. “Social stability and security” (6 items). This shows that the ranks for the three most prominent core values are robust, even though the source item categories have a very different number of items in them.

In addition to the core values, the coding process included the possibility to characterize certain “security challenges” for each coded item. These challenges were then clustered into broader themes. The mentions were counted, but these numbers need to be treated with care, since the number of coded security challenges and their clustering can be a highly subjective method. On the other side, the clusters give a good overview of the security challenges which are being discussed inside the items. In total, 21 theme clusters were identified (see Table 2 for the complete list). One has to keep in mind that this number depends on the person performing the clustering. For example, there are three clusters called “Kosovo – Judicial” (dealing with the question of Kosovo’s independence and its after-effects), “Kosovo – Violence” (dealing with the physical security of Kosovo’s population, mostly the Serbian minority in the north) and “Yugoslav wars” (which includes the after-effects of the Yugoslav wars in general, like situation of Serbian refugees from Croatia or Bosnia). All three could also be put together into one cluster named “The after-effects of the



Yugoslav wars”. As such, this cluster would be among the top-5 themes, ranked by number of mentions. Again, the number of mentions depends very much on how the borders between clusters are chosen and how a mention is counted. The list of themes will thus only be used to illustrate what recurring themes of security challenges were found during coding.

Among the most often mentioned security challenges is a cluster that was named “Societal transformation/Civil challenges”. Behind this theme lie generic challenges like the security of children or security at work. But it also includes challenges which are being discussed in other countries as well like hooliganism or violence at sports events in general. This is a recurring problem in Serbia where soccer matches sometimes end in violence between supporters and where some of the paramilitary forces of the Yugoslav civil war were recruited from hooligan fans of Serbian soccer clubs.<sup>44</sup> This cluster also includes challenges like the stability of the Serbian political system, illegal immigration and threats to civil rights. This shows that the theme cluster is very broad.

On the contrary, another theme cluster that has a high number of mentions is about “organized/petty crime”. The security challenges inside of this cluster are also much narrower than the aforementioned one. Apart from organized crime itself, security challenges inside of this cluster include drug trafficking, human trafficking, the rise of criminality and money laundering. One security challenge that is mentioned a couple of times deals with “car bombs”, but this is mostly due to one single event at the Belgrade zoo at which a car was found that allegedly had a bomb attached to it. The media reported a couple of times on this incident and the possible backgrounds.<sup>45</sup> The cluster on “Corruption” which has been mentioned on a much lesser degree is related to this one. The areas where corruption is discussed includes the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)

What is also mentioned often is “traffic security”, which constitutes a theme cluster of itself. This theme includes aviation and railroad security, the security of roads and bridges and the theft of parts of the railroad infrastructure. This is again a very narrow theme cluster but it seems to be prominent due to the discussion of changing laws dealing with traffic security in 2014.<sup>46</sup> This discussion was prompted by a number of severe car accidents.

The cluster on “Discrimination” includes a very broad number of security challenges discussed, like ethnic and religious tensions. In more detail, this includes violence against ethnic minorities, like Albanians in Vojvodina or Roma in general and the religious tensions in the south of Serbia (Preševo valley and Sandžak). This also includes violence, discrimination, hate speeches and hate crimes against Serbia’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community.

The “Cyber and information challenges” can be found among those clusters that are mentioned a medium number of times. The cluster has the broadest number of security challenges of all clusters. The challenges described rank from the stealing of internet passwords, and hacker attacks on ATM machines to attacks on the Serbian cyber infrastructure and video surveillance.

Both the “Kosovo – Violence” and “Kosovo- Judicial” clusters deal with security challenges that originate or are related to Serbia’s southern province, which declared its independence. Discussed

<sup>44</sup> See for example Schlichte, Klaus: „Na krilima patriotisma[sic!] – On the Wings of Patriotism“ Armed Forces & Society 36(2), p. 310-326

<sup>45</sup> See for example Tanjug: „Demontirana bomba sa džipa kod Kalemegdana“ Politika, 21<sup>st</sup> October 2014 (available in Serbian language at: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Hronika/Demontirana-bomba-sa-dzipa-kod-Kalemegdana.lt.html>)

<sup>46</sup> See for example: Tanjug (2014): “Mihajlović: Za sedam dana predlozi za izmenu zakona”, Politika Online, 26. November 2015 (available in Serbian language at: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Politika/Mihajlovic-Za-sedam-dana-predlozi-za-izmenu-zakona.lt.html>)

are challenges like war crimes, the dialogue of Belgrade and Priština, and the border security of Kosovo. One main challenge however is the situation of the Serbian community in the north of Kosovo.

There is also a cluster on “Economic challenges” which includes discussions on the financial crisis in Europe, privatizations and weapons exports. Keeping in mind that Serbia was part of a socialist country only a little more than two decades ago explains the relevance of this cluster to the Serbian public.

Finally, there is a cluster on “International relations” which is about Serbia’s geostrategic positions and its relationships to other countries like Russia or Albania and the situation of Serbian refugees in other countries, for example in the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina and a cluster on “Health challenges” which mainly focuses on “Food security”.

There are about 10 more clusters which have not been mentioned yet. This is due to their low frequency of coming up in the coding. Those are clusters about “Ecological challenges”, “Media/Freedom of Speech”, or “Natural hazards” and “Man-made hazards”. Some of these could be merged with the already mentioned clusters but parts of their security challenges will be discussed in the next sub-section where they connect to security challenges in the more often mentioned clusters.

It is interesting to note that the often-mentioned clusters of challenges are similar to others which can be found in the literature. For example, the “Serbia 2014 Crime and Safety Report” by the United States Department of State’s Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) gives the following names to the main sections: “Crime Threats” (the content has a high overlap with what is described in the “Organized crime” cluster and a certain overlap with topics from the “Societal transformation/Civil challenges” and “Corruption” clusters), “Overall Road Safety Situation” (similar to the “Traffic security” cluster), “Political, Economic, Religious, and Ethnic Violence” (similar to the “Discrimination”, “Kosovo” and “Yugoslav wars” clusters) and “Post-specific Concerns” which include the topics from a number of other clusters like “natural hazards” and “man-made hazards”. It is also interesting to note what this report does not include like challenges from the “Cyber and information challenges” and “Media/Freedom of Speech” clusters. But this is probably due to the target group of this report being American Embassy employees and US citizens in general.<sup>47</sup>

### 3.2.2 Security challenges and threats, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights

In this sub-section, the results of the coding process will be highlighted in more detail and connected with other factors, which were part of the coding process.

Looking at the **actors**, the most prominent one in the Serbian security discourse is the national government, with 74 items in which it is the addressor and another 109 in which it is both the addressor and the addressee (for a total of 183 items in which it is either the addressor of both addressor and addressee). While the private sector is often an addressor of security challenges, taking together both the category “Addressor” and “Both Addressor and Addressee” the second

<sup>47</sup> OSAC (2014): “Serbia 2014 Crime and Safety Report” (available at <https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15156>)

most prominent actor in this view is the national parliament with a total of 77 items (22 as addressor and 55 as both addressor and addressee). It is interesting to note the large difference of 183 and 77 items between these two actors and the fact that the Serbian national parliament often addresses the government, so this is a kind of closed communication channel. Both actors talk mostly about the “Physical safety and security” (e.g. the organized crime cluster and traffic security) and “Economic prosperity and security” core value and the least about the “Information and cyber security” and “Cultural identity and security” core value which is in line with the general ranking of these core values. It makes sense that these two actors are the most prominent ones and that the things they are trying to address are also the most salient core values in the country. The third most prominent actor is the private sector with a combined item count of 48 (unsurprisingly, the core value most often connected to this addressor is “Economic prosperity and security”), followed closely by “Civil society” with 44 (whose main core value is “Physical safety and security”). The least prominent actors are the European Union with only 7 items in which it is either the addressor both the addressor and addressee, and the “Think tanks and policy institutes” with the same amount of items. International institutions (12 items) and the “General public or individual citizen(s)” (16 items) are also among the lower ranked actors in this category. The main object of the security challenges is overwhelmingly the “General public or individual citizen(s)” with 196 items (across all core values). Second with only 27 items is the “Private sector” and with 14 items the “Regional state apparatus (domestic)”. “Think tanks and policy institutes” have in the framework of this coding never been identified as the object actor along with “Academia and research institutes” who have only 1 item identifying them as the object actor (see also Table 3 in the annex for further details).

Again, similar to the other countries of the SEE region, and indeed to most countries analysed in the framework of the EvoCS project, the most important **level** the security discourse takes place at is the national one (235 items). With only 88 items, the second most important level is the local one (compared with other EvoCS country case studies, this number is still high). Even though Serbia has two autonomous provinces (one of them being Kosovo with whom the ongoing dispute is about its declaration of independence) the subnational level ranks only third by number of items in which it is one of the main levels. Indeed, even if the sources on Kosovo are left out of the analysis, there are only very few items that deal with Vojvodina (the northern province) alone. Of course, this only reflects that the Serbian security discourse mostly takes place on a national level. The two least important levels in this context are “Global (world)” (16 items) and “International (abroad)” (30 items) (see Table 4 and Figure 5 in the annex for more details).

According to the results of the coding the **source type** that deals the most (looking at the percentage of core values in each of the source types) with the most salient “Physical safety and security” (and thus themes like “Organized/Petty crime” and “Societal transformation/Civil challenges”) are the newspaper articles. Following them are the “Parliamentary Publications” and the “Government Policy Documents”. “Economic prosperity and security” (the second most salient core value in Serbia) is mostly discussed in publications from the “Private Sector” and the “Government Policy Documents” and “Parliamentary Publications”. Finally, the core value of “Social stability and security” takes up the most room in the publications from “NGOs”, Academia and “Newspaper Articles”. It is interesting to note that here the government and parliament are not as prominently as with the first two core values. But even taking that into account, again, the most important addressors are reflected in their related source types (see Figure 4 in the annex).

Looking at **human rights and ethical issues** the data from the coding shows clearly that the most prominent actor is “Civil society” with 15 items where it is the addressor and ethical issues are either the main topic (8 times) or mentioned (7 times). The second and third most prominent actors in this context are the national government (being the addressor a total 9 times) and national parliament (6 times). Six actors are either never the addressor in the ethical context or only once or twice: “Private sector”, “European Union”, “Regional state apparatus (domestic)” (all zero), “Think tanks and policy institutes”, “Foreign Government” (each 1 time) and the “Media” only twice. This illustrates that the most important actor is civil society, together with the same actors who are the most prominent ones in the security discourse in general (see Table 5 in the annex for more details). From the perspective of the security challenge clusters or themes, fundamental rights and ethical issues can be found most often in combination with the “Discrimination” cluster. Here, the fundamental human rights and ethical issues focus on the situation of the LGBT community, chauvinism and extremism in parts of Serbia and discrimination against the Roma minority but it can also be found in the cluster on “Media/Freedom of Speech” where it deals with the curbing of the rights of the media.

### 3.2.3 Historical trajectory and overview of current trends

In this sub-section, the security challenge clusters will be brought together with the results of other literature, in order to identify how short or long-term these security challenges in Serbia are. To do this, the sub-section looks back at the last decade of Serbian history (in some cases looking even further back).

Since the cluster on **“Societal transformation/Civil challenges”** consists of a very broad amount of security challenges, only a number of them were put in the context of historical trajectory. One has to remember at this point, that Serbian society went through a number of transformations in the last decades. With the rise to power of Slobodan Milošević at the end of 80s and the early 90s, Serbian society transformed from a society living in a socialistic country to one in which multiparty elections were possible.<sup>48</sup> However, Milošević and his party (the Socialist Party of Serbia, in Serbian: Socijalistička Partija Srbije, SDS) dominated the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (later then the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro). Finally, on October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2000 Milošević’s rule was ended due to the pressure caused by protests in connection with vote manipulations for general elections. Since then, Serbia has been a parliamentary democracy. All of these events have had their impact on Serbian society and its transformation, which in turn influenced its view on the security challenges it faces. As mentioned above (see sub-section 3.2.1) violence during sports events and hooliganism have been a long-term problem in Serbian society. During the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s, some extreme supporters of Serbian soccer teams were recruited into paramilitary units to fight in Bosnia or Croatia.<sup>49</sup> And while this security challenge seems to slowly be tackled, soccer matches can still be the place where nationalist and ethnic tensions are being vented.<sup>50</sup> This will probably remain a problem in the next years, since for example Serbia’s youth unemployment in the last decade has

<sup>48</sup> See for example: Sundhaussen, Holm: „Geschichte Serbiens“, Böhlau Verlag, p. 412

<sup>49</sup> See for example: Dolić, Dubravko: „Die Fußballnationalmannschaft als ‚Trägerin nationaler Würde‘?“ in: Lösche, Peter et al. (2002): „Fußballwelten: Zum Verhältnis von Sport, Politik, Ökonomie und Gesellschaft“, Springer Fachmedien, Wiesbaden, p. 162

<sup>50</sup> See for example: Vukosavljević, Danijela (2014): „Službe podbacile u obezbeđenju utakmice“, Politika (available online in Serbian language: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/dogadjaji-dana/Sluzbe-podbacile-u-obezbedjenju-utakmice.lt.html>)

more or less remained at about 50%.<sup>51</sup> Nearly connected to this cluster, is also the cluster on **“Discrimination”** which included ethnical, sexual and religious discrimination. There are indications that for some minorities (e.g. the Bulgarian minority in Southern Serbia<sup>52</sup>) the situation in Serbia is unproblematic and that they are able to enjoy their rights to the full extent. The problems of the Roma minority, violence against the LGBT community and conflict between ethnic Albanians and Serbians, however, seem to be of a much longer-term nature.

From this background, the clusters on **“Organized/Petty crime”** and **“Corruption”** can also be put into a historical perspective. One of the effects of the civil wars in the 1990s and the sanctions imposed by the United Nations Security Council was a rise in organized crime and corruption. For example, Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Yugoslavia in 65<sup>th</sup> place (of 88) in 1998, 80<sup>th</sup> place (of 90, so almost last) in 2000 and 106<sup>th</sup> place (of 133) in 2003. Ever since then, Serbia has been climbing the rank and stabilized its score: in 2014 it holds a rank of 78 (of 175 countries).<sup>53</sup> Similar to other countries that have a problem with organized crime and corruption, the main actors in this field had strong connections to politicians. Also, parts of the police were involved in the actions of organized crime actors.<sup>54</sup> However, there are also attempts to change this situation. For example, Serbia in 2009 established an independent “Anti-corruption agency”<sup>55</sup> in order to cope with the problem of corruption. But some authors have also argued that this agency does not have a strong impact on the practice of corruption and rather acts as a nice “decoration” to show that the country is trying to deal with its problems.<sup>56</sup> But there is also pressure on the Serbian government to “decriminalize” the country as a preparation for Serbia’s eventual accession to the EU. Some authors see new impulses for this through the new coalition government of the Serbian Progressive Party and the Socialist Party of Serbia (the former party of Slobodan Milošević) which rule the country since 2014 (and mostly since 2012 as well), since some of the Serbian governments’ politicians (e.g. from the Democratic Party) were involved in some cases of corruption.<sup>57</sup> In sum, the situation of this security theme in Serbia seems to be progressing in a positive way, but it will continue to be an important aspect of the Serbian security discourse.

Taken together, the clusters on **“Kosovo – Judicial”**, **“Kosovo – Violence”** and **“Yugoslav wars”** are among the top most discussed in the framework of the coding findings. From a historical perspective, there seems to be a certain trend to these challenges, which will possibly be important for Serbia in the future as well. Important discussions in the academic literature on Kosovo are the question of the

<sup>51</sup> United Nations Development Programme (2014): “Human Development Report 2014” (available at: [http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=bqed7l430i2r6\\_&ctype=l&met\\_y=indicator\\_110906&hl=en\\_US&dl=en\\_US#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met\\_y=indicator\\_110906&scale\\_y=lin&ind\\_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:18403&ifdim=country&hl=en\\_US&dl=en\\_US&ind=false](http://www.google.com/publicdata/explore?ds=bqed7l430i2r6_&ctype=l&met_y=indicator_110906&hl=en_US&dl=en_US#!ctype=l&strail=false&bcs=d&nselm=h&met_y=indicator_110906&scale_y=lin&ind_y=false&rdim=country&idim=country:18403&ifdim=country&hl=en_US&dl=en_US&ind=false))

<sup>52</sup> Novaković, Igor; Petrović, Žarko & Jakišić, Tijana (2013): “ISAC Policy Perspective - Relations between Serbia and Bulgaria, position of Bulgarian minority in Serbia and process of European integration”, ISAC (available at: <http://www.isac-fund.org/download/ISAC-POLICY-PERSPECTIVE-6e.pdf>)

<sup>53</sup> Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (various years) (available at: <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/>)

<sup>54</sup> Stojarová, Věra (2007): “Organized Crime in the Western Balkans”, HUMSEC Journal 1, pp. 98-101

<sup>55</sup> <http://www.acas.rs/about-acas/acas-establishment/>

<sup>56</sup> Dirmiši, Arjan (2013): “Komparativna analiza studija slučaja Albanije, Bosne i Hercegovine, Crne Gore, Hrvatske, Kosova UNSB 1244, Makedonije i Srbije”, BCBO (available in Serbian language at: [http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/2013\\_komparativna\\_analiza\\_studija\\_slucaja.pdf](http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/2013_komparativna_analiza_studija_slucaja.pdf))

<sup>57</sup> IFIMES (2013): “Srbija: Dekriminalizacija Srbije” (available in Serbian language at: <http://www.ifimes.org/ba/8600-srbija-dekriminalizacija-srbije>)

legitimacy of Kosovo's declaration of independence of 2008<sup>58</sup> and what Kosovo's status will be<sup>59</sup>. The former is also repeatedly cited in discussions about the legitimacy of the declarations of independence of e.g. Abkhazia or Crimea.<sup>60</sup> Interestingly, the question about the future status of Kosovo was not mentioned often in the security discourse in 2014. Of course, the coding shows that this is still discussed in Serbia but mostly it is the academic literature and the one or the other parliamentarian that deal with it. The newspapers, on the other hand, discuss the situation of the Serbian communities in Kosovo and their day-to-day problems. For example, an article describes the situation of the Serbian orthodox priests in the Dečani monastery<sup>61</sup>. It seems quite possible that 16 years after the NATO bombardment of 1999 and seven years after the declaration of independence public opinion has moved to a pragmatic acceptance that from the point of view Kosovo might still be a part of Serbia but the reality is quite different. But on the other hand, the situation of the Serbs living in Kosovo is still of great importance for the public discourse. Even if the Serbian government should accept Kosovar independence at some point in the near future<sup>62</sup> the situation of their co-nationals (in Kosovo proper or as refugees or expatriates elsewhere) would stay an important aspect of the Serbian security discourse (similarly to the situation of Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia<sup>63</sup>).

Up to now, the above described clusters seem to have been of importance in the Serbian security discourse and will continue to do so in the future. However, there is also at least one example from the coding for a theme cluster that seems to have been more short- or medium-term. The cluster on **"Traffic security"** deals with security challenges such as the theft of parts of the railroad infrastructure and electrical cables. However, this cluster is mentioned very often and the apparent reason for this is that in 2013/2014 the Serbian parliament and government discussed the change of traffic laws, designed to reduce the number of deaths caused by traffic.<sup>64</sup> Looking at the number of road deaths per year in Serbia, however, it seems that since 2010 (a new traffic law was passed in 2011) have been stable.<sup>65</sup> The topic will probably be a recurring one in the future, but probably parliament and the government will not discuss changes to the law every year.

<sup>58</sup> See for example: Milano, Enrico (2010): „The Security Council and Territorial Sovereignty: The Case of Kosovo“, *International Community Law Review*, 12, pp. 171-189

<sup>59</sup> See for example: Liotta, P.H.(2002): „After Kosovo – Terminal Ambiguity“, *Problems of Post-Communism* 49/3, pp. 23-32

<sup>60</sup> See for example: Schallast, Christoph (2014): „Die Krim und der europäische Traum“, *Frankfurter Rundschau*, 01. April 2014 (available in German language at: <http://www.fr-online.de/meinung/gastbeitrag--die-krim-und-der-europaeische-traum,1472602,26723818.html>)

<sup>61</sup> Čalić, Jelena (2014): „Teodosije traži bodljikavu žicu oko Visokih Dečana“, *Politika Online*, 15. October 2014 (available in Serbian language at: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/dogadjaji-dana/Teodosije-trazi-bodljikavu-zicu-oko-Visokih-Decana.lt.html>)

<sup>62</sup> Not for example the following: APA (2014): „Kosovo als 'Bestandteil' Serbiens: Belgrad will Verfassung ändern“, *Der Standard*, 13. December 2015 (available in German language at: <http://derstandard.at/2000009342872/Kosovo-als-Bestandteil-Serbiens-Belgrad-will-Verfassung-aendern>)

<sup>63</sup> There are a number of Serbian clubs, associations and NGOs that were formed by refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. See for example: [www.zuknikolatesla.org](http://www.zuknikolatesla.org)

<sup>64</sup> Vukosavljević, Danijela (2013): „Novi zakon o saobraćaju – vožnja sa nula promila“, *Politika Online*, 17. January 2013 (available in Serbian language at: <http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Hronika/Novi-zakon-o-saobracaju-voznja-sa-nula-promila.lt.html>)

<sup>65</sup> Babic, Boris (2014): „Serbia's killer drivers: mocking the law“, *dpa international*, 14. December 2014 (available at: <http://www.dpa-international.com/news/international/serbias-killer-drivers-mocking-the-law-a-43613621.html>)

<sup>66</sup> OECD/ITF (2014): „Serbia“, *Road Safety Annual Report 2014*, OECD Publishing, p. 430 (available at DOI: 10.1787/irtad-2014-36-en)



### 3.2.4 Findings and conclusions

In a report from 2012, the “Beogradski centar za bezbednosnu politiku (BCBP)” (Belgrade Centre for Security Policy) gives almost a hundred recommendations for the Serbian security sector, clustered into 12 more general themes. Looking at the names of these 12 themes and comparing them with this country profiles findings, it becomes apparent that there is a certain overlap. For example, there are 11 recommendations under the heading “Representation of women and national minorities” which deal with similar topics as the long-term security theme “Discrimination” found in the EvoCS project. The recommendations deal with quotas for women in the police and army and the possibilities for national minorities to take part in the security sector. Another theme from the report can be compared to a cross-cluster theme from the EvoCS findings: “The protection of human rights”. This theme includes topics that are similar to security challenges from the “Cyber and information challenges”, “Societal transformation/Civil challenges” and “Health challenges”. On the other hand, most of the themes from the report cannot precisely be pinpointed to the clusters from the findings. For example, themes like “The role of NGOs in the control of the security sector” or “The court’s control of the security sector” are parts of some of the security challenges from the findings but are not discussed very often. The reason for this can be the fact that an NGO like the BCBP is giving the recommendations here and that the recommendations are of a general nature.<sup>67</sup> Additionally, a publication from the ISAC fund (International and Security Affairs Centre) states that the “biggest threats” in the Western Balkan region are the “status of Kosovo” and the “internal situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina”. The report also mentions organized crime, international drug trafficking and international terrorism as important security issues for the Western Balkans.<sup>68</sup> All of these challenges were also identified through the coding exercise.

This coding exercise of the EvoCS project has also shown that in the Serbian case, most of the identified security themes are indeed long-term challenges for this country. The clear European perspective of the Serbian government will probably lead to each of the security challenges being dealt with in due time. Also, the multitude of Serbian strategies<sup>69</sup> shows that the Serbian security challenges are addressed by the most important actors, i.e. the government and the parliament. However, there are also some challenges that run contrary to the Serbian attempts to join the EU. For example, the security clusters dealing with Kosovo and the after-effects of the Yugoslav wars provide a conundrum for Serbian politicians, since the EU expects a fruitful dialogue between Belgrade and Priština on the one hand while the Serbian public still sees Kosovo as a part of Serbia (even though the present analysis has shown that this is viewed in a rather pragmatic light). Serbian public opinion polls also show that the “Negotiations with Priština” are seen as the “most significant process of Serbia’s accession to the EU over the past [2014] year”.<sup>70</sup>

Also, one of the longest strategies (in terms of page numbers) which can be found on the website of the general secretariat of the Serbian government is the one on the “Strategy on Improvement of the

<sup>67</sup> BCBP (2012): „Godišnjak reforme sektora bezbednosti u Srbiji“, Belgrade (available at: [http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/\(2\)\\_preporuke\\_20121225\\_132314.pdf](http://www.bezbednost.org/upload/document/(2)_preporuke_20121225_132314.pdf))

<sup>68</sup> ISAC (2011): “Serbia and Albania – Preparing for a new start”, Grafolik, Belgrade, p. 11-13 (available at: <http://www.isac-fund.org/download/sr-al-ENG.pdf>)

<sup>69</sup> See: <http://www.gs.gov.rs/lat/strategije-vs.html>

<sup>70</sup> Serbian European Integration Office (2014): “European Orientation of the Serbian Citizens” (available at: [http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna\\_dokumenta/istrazivanja\\_javnog\\_mnjenja/opinionio\\_poll\\_dec\\_14.pdf](http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/nacionalna_dokumenta/istrazivanja_javnog_mnjenja/opinionio_poll_dec_14.pdf))

Status of Roma in the Republic of Serbia”, published in 2009.<sup>71</sup> This shows that the government is seriously trying to tackle the problem, among others, of discrimination of this national minority and has been doing so for a couple of years. But the coding results also show that the whole cluster on “Discrimination” in general and specifically the situation of the Roma people is still being mentioned in the present Serbian security discourse.

What can be said for Serbia’s politicians is probably also true for Serbia’s public. There is a strong feeling that the EU is constantly trying to apply pressure on Serbia, the lever being its attempts to join the EU. Support for the EU membership is at about 45% for 2014 (with an all-time high of 73% in November 2009)<sup>72</sup> so the question of Serbia’s geopolitical orientation will be one of the most important ones in the next years and one that has a strong impact on Serbia’s concept of security. Competing with Serbia’s orientation towards the EU are internal calls for the country to orientate more towards Russia.<sup>73</sup> In addition to that, Serbia has declared its military neutrality in 2007.<sup>74</sup> It is competing views like this that will have to be taken into account by the EU when trying to shape Serbia’s future concept of security together with important Serbian actors.

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<sup>71</sup> Serbian Government (2009): „Стратегија за унапређивање положаја Рома у Републици Србији“ (available in Serbian language at: [http://www.srbija.gov.rs/extfile/sr/107688/strategija\\_romi0080\\_cyr.zip](http://www.srbija.gov.rs/extfile/sr/107688/strategija_romi0080_cyr.zip))

<sup>72</sup> See footnote 66.

<sup>73</sup> Petrović, Žarko (2010): „The influence of Russia on Events in Serbia“, Democracy and Security in Southeastern Europe, pp.33-37 (available at: <http://www.isac-fund.org/download/academic/Demokracija-i-sigurnost-br1-Zarko-Petrovic-Eng.pdf>)

<sup>74</sup> Novaković, Igor (2012): “Neutrality in Europe in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century and the Case of Serbia”, ISAC Fund, Belgrade (available at: [http://www.isac-fund.org/download/Neutrality\\_in\\_Europe\\_in\\_the\\_XXI\\_century\\_and\\_the\\_Case\\_of\\_Serbia.pdf](http://www.isac-fund.org/download/Neutrality_in_Europe_in_the_XXI_century_and_the_Case_of_Serbia.pdf))



### 3.3 Turkey

#### 3.3.1 Characterization of the core values

According to the EvoCS preliminary research findings (Deliverable 8.1<sup>75</sup>), the security discourse in Turkey attaches the greatest degree of salience to the “territorial integrity”. The “physical safety” and the “political stability” are given a nearly equal place in the security discourse, and they are followed by the “economic prosperity”. Turkey’s security discourse gives rather less much place to the “social stability”, even lesser to the “cultural identity” and “environmental security” that follow later, and are both are equally addressed. The smallest share of core value in Turkey is identified as the “information and cyber security”. The salience of values showed predominance of “Territorial integrity and security”, followed by “Physical safety and security” and “Political stability and security” and finally by ‘the economic stability’. The most prominent threat is terrorism as an external threat and the “parallel state”, the Gulen community as internal threat. The main security challenges are identified as terrorism, refugees, ISIL, dependency, energy, Syria and energy dependency.

Turkey distinguishes itself from the rest of the South East Europe region because of the primacy given to the “territorial integrity” in its security discourse.<sup>76</sup> The reason can be read in the external threats Turkey is exposed to due to the neighbouring conflict in Syria and Iraq. But the roots of the concern on the territorial integrity, and how the Syrian conflict further shapes the security concept in Turkey, is also largely related to Turkey’s long history of the threats to its territorial integrity.

Traditionally, the “usual suspect” threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity would be the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The PKK has begun its armed insurgency in 1984 with the final aim to establish an independent socialist state on a region shared by four countries: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria. The organization has a developed transnational network in the region, with logistical, organizational and public relations support from the members of the PKK diaspora in Europe. Holding a million dollars - industry of illegal arms and drugs trafficking between Central Asia, the Middle East and Europe.<sup>77</sup>

The PKK has benefited from various non-state actors, but also state actors according to the international context. The PKK’s leader Abdullah Ocalan lived in Syria for several years, and before he was captured at a Greek Embassy in Kenya, he has been hosted in several countries including Italy.<sup>78</sup> Greek Cyprus also supported PKK by allowing its leaders to travel freely by providing them with passports. Abdullah Öcalan, the founder of PKK, has been caught with a Cypriot passport to the name of Mavros Lazaros.<sup>79</sup> Moreover, the PKK had a TV broadcasting studio in Denmark, and was operating

<sup>75</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): “Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe) (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

<sup>76</sup> Ibid.

<sup>77</sup> For more details on PKK’s narcotics network, see: U.S. Department of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (2014): “International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Turkey Country report” (available at <http://www.state.gov/i/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2014/vol1/223081.htm>); U.S. Congress, Library of Congress, Federal Research Division (2002): “Nexus Among Terrorists, Narcotics Traffickers, Weapons proliferators, and organised Crime networks in Western Europe” (available at: [http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope\\_NEXUS.pdf](http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/WestEurope_NEXUS.pdf))

<sup>78</sup> For a timeline on Ocalan’s capture, see The Journal of Turkish Weekly, *Ocalan’s Capture: A Timeline*, March 2009 (available at: <http://www.turkishweekly.net/2009/03/07/news/ocalans-capture-a-timeline/>)

<sup>79</sup> Hurriyet Daily News (1999): “Greek Cypriot passport found on Ocalan” (available at: <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=438&n=greek-cypriot-passport-found-on-ocalan-1999-02-18>)

under several “businessmen associations” in Europe<sup>80</sup>. Danielle Mitterand, the widow of the former French president, has visited Ocalan. In addition, during the most deathliest conflict years in 1990’s, Turkey’s European partners have been most critical about Turkey’s human rights record during the conflict. Their criticism however was reflected in Turkey’s security context as “another” Western attempt to divide Turkey.

Indeed, the PKK’s use of ethnic separatist arguments, and the support it has received from state-actors has provided sufficient arguments for the Turkish opinion-shapers and the public, about the perceived validity of Turkey’s so-called “Sevres Syndrome”. The “Sevres Syndrome” has been a popular belief for several decades in Turkey that outsiders forces (mainly the West) would be conspiring to weaken Turkey and divide it into pieces. The term originates from the Treaty of Sevres on 1920, when the Ottoman Empire was defeated at the end of the World war I together with other Central Powers, and started the partition of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Empire had already lost large territories in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Black Sea region to new nations after the emergence of the nationalist movements in Europe and the weakening of the Empire simultaneously. It is worth noting that in that sense, when the modern republic of Turkey was founded around 40% of the Turkish citizens are estimated to have arrived from territories that remain outside today’s Turkey. The “Sevres Syndrome”, the threat perception on the territorial integrity and the fear of being forced to leave, has therefore their roots in the personal family history of millions of Turkish citizens. In that sense, it is only normal that the conflict with the PKK, which has taken lives to nearly 40.000 Turkish citizens and has an estimated cost of \$4billion, has alienated the Sevres Syndrome.<sup>81</sup>

After several failed attempts to a ceasefire in 1993, 1996, 1997-2001, 2002-2005 and 2009-2011, the 2013 peace negotiations have started a de-securitization of the PKK in the Turkish political context. Surely, the change in the PKK’s demands has been an important factor. The PKK has replaced its earlier request for an independent “Kurdistan” with the demand for “democratic autonomy”. However, the devil is in the detail: the extent of the level of requested autonomy is still not cleared publicly.

The developments in the Syrian conflict and more precisely in Northern Syria therefore can be perceived in Turkey as an issue directly related to Turkey’s territorial integrity. Indeed, despite the continuing ceasefire since 2013, the PKK has continued to recruit militants among the Turkish citizens at the same speed as in the years of continuing armed conflict. In addition, it has strengthened its positioning within Turkey, as it formed newly established youth branches in the cities and metropolis in the west of Turkey. The PKK hasn’t left the Turkish territory and it has neither left arms inside Turkey, and in contrary, has formed “sleeping cell”. The existence of these sleeping cells suggests that in case the ceasefire is interrupted Turkey risks to experience a new level of violence in several important cities. The events on October 2014 can constitute an example to this new level of potential

<sup>80</sup> For the PKK diaspora and its illegal activities in Europe, see: Onay, Abdulkadir (2008): “PKK Criminal Networks and Fronts in Europe”, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy (available at: <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/pkk-criminal-networks-and-fronts-in-europe>)

<sup>81</sup> For more on the Sevres Syndrome and the PKK, see: Jung, Dietrich (2003): “The Sevres Syndrome: the Turkish Foreign Policy and its Historical Legacies” (available at: [http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives\\_roll/2003\\_07-09/jung\\_sevres/jung\\_sevres.html](http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_roll/2003_07-09/jung_sevres/jung_sevres.html))

violence. The protests that have started in 35 provinces in Turkey in support of the Kobane conflict in Syria turned violent and have taken lives to 40 citizens in two days.<sup>82</sup>

The issue of Syrian PKK's self-positioning in the future Syrian government therefore is a crucial issue. They have so far not integrated in the opposition groups supported by Turkey and other allies fighting against the Damascus regime. They have in addition declared "cantons" in northern Syria, perceived in Turkey as steps to the formation of a future independent Kurdish State, yet one governed by the PYD. Therefore, despite the securitisation of the PKK in the domestic political rhetoric, in an international dimension, the PKK again becomes a threat to the territorial integrity. Developments in Northern Syria therefore affects both Turkey's position in the Syrian conflict and the prospects of the PKK peace process due to the unclear definition of the "democratic autonomy" and the expectations on it that may be affected by the extend of the "canton" style governance declared by the PKK in Syria.

The PKK however is not the only factor that makes the Syrian conflict as an issue of "territorial integrity" in Turkey. Indeed, a number of threats that could be relevant for the "political stability" and "physical safety" also become relevant in some cases for the "territorial integrity". On March 2014, a top secret meeting between high level Turkish officials on a potential Turkish intervention in Syria has leaked to the internet. The Gulen community, a social/religious network lead by Fethullah Gulen and now a competitor to the Turkey's ruling Justice and Development party, has been accused for the spying. The level of the Gulen network's capacity, and its undermining of Turkey's high level security interests for political gains, have resulted in perceiving this issue as one of main security threats.<sup>83</sup>

Yet the leaks on a potential Turkish intervention in Syria also highlight another factor of threat posed by the Syrian conflict. Turkey has succeeded to remain an "island of stability" in an instable neighbourhood that experienced several wars. Turkey may risk intervening in Syria if its new engagement rules will be violated which may end up for the country to be involved in decades long conflicts in the Middle East. It becomes even more complicated with other reported "sleeping cells" on the Turkish territory. Turkey has its own foreign fighters syndrome, in addition, there are suspicions over potential terrorists crossing in Turkey hidden with thousands of refugees coming to Turkey on weekly basis. 51 Turkish citizens have lost their lives in the deadliest terror attack in Turkish history in the southern town of Reyhanli, in Hatay on May 2014.

Many of these above-mentioned issues can also be perceived among factors that are related with the two other values, the "physical safety" and the "political stability". More than 70 Turkish citizens have already lost their lives from mortar shells falling from the conflict in Syria. The public is concerned about a possible greater Turkish involvement in Syria is the potential effect it could have on the "sleeping cells" of various factions fighting against each other in Turkey. There already had been attempts on the lives of Turkish citizens: 46 Turkish citizens were kidnapped in Mosul by the Islamic State, and there have already been bombings attributed to the Islamic State within the Turkish territory (i.e. in Istanbul on January 2015; in Diyarbakir on June 2015). There are also

<sup>82</sup> International Crisis Group (2014): "Turkey and the PKK: Saving the Peace Process" (available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/234-turkey-and-the-pkk-saving-the-peace-process.pdf> )

<sup>83</sup> For more details on the Gulen Network, see: Rodrik, Dani (2013): "Erdogan is not Turkey's only problem", Project Syndicate (available at: <http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/the-gulenist-subversion-of-turkey-by-dani-rodrik> )

concerns about the “youth branches” of the PKK that may act independently in case the peace process doesn’t correspond to their own final expectations.<sup>84</sup>

However, the mutual level of salience given to the “physical safety” and the “political stability” highlights another aspect of the recent developments in the Turkish politics. First, there has been increasing level of concerns on the stability of Turkey’s state institutions. Second, the Turkish parliament’s level of representation of the Turkish public has been put in question, especially once the ruling party has increasingly diminished the level of participatory democracy in the decisions concerning the citizens’ life. Third, the level of state repression on the peaceful protestors, and the government’s failing to manage the events, have also been interpreted as potential weakening of the political stability. Finally, the physical safety is also related to the workers’ safety and therefore the discussions on the conditions of security in daily lives of the Turkish citizens.

The stability of Turkey’s institutions has especially attracted focus after the former allies, the AKP government and the Gulen movement, have turned enemies. Gulen network has succeeded in infiltrating Turkey’s judiciary, police and the police intelligence and gained an important capability in manipulating the judiciary to its own final aims. Since 2008, it has lead important court cases against the military, officials, journalists and civil society activists that were perceived as opponent to the network. By then, there had already been considerable concerns among the opposition, however, the government’s capacity of shaping opinions and addressing security threats was taking a support by the Gulen network’s domestic and international public relations capacity. However, once the Gulen movement and the AKP government distanced themselves from each other, the Gulen network has been defined as “the parallel state”, it has been defined also as one of main threats to Turkey’s political stability. That’s how, therefore, the leaks in December 2014 on alleged corruption and graft scandals of high level officials were therefore interpreted within the context of political stability and a “coup” attempt against the government. The government, as a dominant and hegemonic actor in shaping the threat perception as a main addressor, has succeeded to prioritize the “political stability” over the context of the leaks.

Effective functioning of the institutions have become an issue of political stability in Turkey in recent years, with effects on the physical safety. The checks and balances that can serve as mechanisms to ensure both the political stability and the physical safety, have weakened together with the possibility for the national parliament (political parties in opposition) and the civil society actors to participate in the democratic processes. Several mega projects including the nuclear power plant to be built in a region under risk of earthquake, for example, have been initiated in violation of procedural standards. The violation of standards in the work safety have resulted in the high number of mine accidents and other work related deaths in Turkey. The Soma mine accident cost the lives of 301 miners on May 2014. While the incident was labelled as a “killing” rather than an accident, it also shows to the extent to which in Turkish threat perception the political stability can be related to the physical safety. The Gezi protests have also provided additional examples. The government has used the “political stability” and the “physical safety” values in the same time in describing the protestors.

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<sup>84</sup> For more details on the effects of the Syria War on Turkey, see: International Crisis Group (2013): “Blurring the Borders: Syrian Spillover Risks for Turkey” ( available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/publication-type/media-releases/2013/europe/blurring-the-borders-syrian-spillover-risks-for-turkey.aspx> ); International Crisis Group (2014): “The Rising Costs of Turkey’s Syrian Quagmire” (available at: <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/230-the-rising-costs-of-turkey-s-syrian-quagmire.pdf> )

According to the declarations by the government, the protestors would be attempting at the political stability with the use of violence for this aim.

### 3.3.2 Security challenges and threats, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights

The government is a dominant and “hegemonic” actor in Turkey, as it’s clearly seen in both the ‘Value by addressor’ and ‘actors’. The civil society remains the weakest political actor. The national government and the parliament are the dominant addressor on the threat, while the government is the addressee and the main object is the general public. The most important level is the national, followed by much lesser extent with international and transnational (see also Figure 7).<sup>85</sup>

The most visible gaps among the addressors in terms of their focus are: the newspaper and the parliament’s focus on the territorial integrity, the private sector and the academia mainly focus on the economy, and their visibly less focus on the physical safety, and finally the NGO’s main focus on the cultural identity. The actors who have these visible gaps in their focus are generally not the responsible for addressing these threats, apart from the parliament’s focus on the territorial integrity. The physical safety and the territorial integrity are the most addressed threats (see Figure 6 in the annex for more details). The physical safety is mainly covered by the government, newspaper and the NGO’s, whereas the territorial integrity mainly covered by the newspaper and the parliament.

In terms of ethics and human rights, political and physical threats figure the most ethically reflected ones, whereas the environment, followed by the cyber threat are the least.

### 3.3.3 Historical trajectory

Two important official documents (the Red Book of Security and the National Defence Strategy) are strictly confidential in Turkey.<sup>86</sup> However, the National Security Council decisions and the National Security Politics Document, published by the Secretariat-General of the National Security Council, are a reference on Turkey’s threat perception. The terror has been a constant and priority threat in the last 10 years, together with the ‘regressive movements’. In addition, the Cyprus, the Armenian issues, the conflicts in the neighbouring countries are also often mentioned in these documents. While the securitization of the Gulen movement has gained an increase, the Cyprus issue, which didn’t figure on the last National Security Council Decisions, can be said to be on de-securitization.<sup>87</sup>

The most prominent threat for Turkey in the last decade has been the terror from various actors, among which figures the PKK as the biggest and threatens the territorial integrity. Several attempts for peace in previous years had failed, and despite the ongoing ceasefire since 2013, there still had casualties occasionally. Other terror groups rather threatens the physical safety. Two other prominent terror groups include the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front (DHKP-C) and the

<sup>85</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): “Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe) (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

<sup>86</sup> Ibid.

<sup>87</sup> Turkish Secretariat-General of the National Security Council Press releases (various years): (available in Turkish language at: <http://www.mgk.gov.tr/index.php/milli-guvenlik-kurulu/mgk-basin-aciklamalari/basin-aciklamalari-arsivi>)

Great Eastern Islamic Raiders- Front (IBDA-C). In addition, since the beginning of the Syrian war, Turkey is also under threat from various groups fighting in Syria. An explosion in the southern town of Reyhanli in 2013 has killed 53 persons and been the deadliest terror attack in the Turkish history, and is attributed to Al Qaida.<sup>88</sup> More than 80 Turkish citizens, in addition, have lost lives due to mortars, shooting and explosions on or near the border with Syria. In addition, Turkish citizens were kidnapped by the Islamic State in 2014. Turkey is one of the main roads for foreign fighters who pose a threat, in addition, different fighting groups in Syria affect the security in Turkey: 40 citizens lost their lives during the Kobane protests in 2014. Turkey is also said to be under risk of a spill over of the Syrian war. Turkey also hosts nearly 2 million of refugees fleeing the war, many of whom live in towns where there are occasionally tensions with Turkish locals.<sup>89</sup>

Among other issues that threaten the physical safety, the traffic accidents are among the biggest threats, as nearly 4.000 persons lose live each year.<sup>90</sup> Working safety is also highly poor, as work incidents have been increasing in the last ten years, and reached 1886 casualties in 2014. In addition, Turkey is also under the risk of natural disasters. The poor state of safety standards in the construction sector makes weak building and infrastructure that cause high level of casualties in case of earthquakes.<sup>91</sup> The violence against the women has also been an unaddressed issue for several years.<sup>92</sup> Political and social instability, as well as issues related to cultural identity is also among factors that are debated in Turkey especially since the 2007 general elections when the Justice and Development Party (AKP) won high number of seats in the parliament. The Gezi protests in 2013 where 4 million have participated actively, is among many other protests that take place regularly in Turkey.

The stability and the independence of its institutions are also highly debated in Turkey, due to two specific reasons mainly: the power centralisation around the executive and the president , and the Gulen movement (the 'parallel state') . The low level of trust in the state institutions (28,3% trust in the judiciary: 4,1% 'fully trust' in the Judiciary, 24,2 'trust' in the judiciary) is a case for potential political instability.<sup>93</sup> The economic instability is not a threat since the structural reforms after the 2001 economic crisis, however the energy dependency is at a critical level for Turkey.<sup>94</sup> Turkey in addition is very weak on information and cyber security. The leaks from high level of meetings to the internet, which have been attributed to the Gulen movement, are also a sign of the weak state of information safety. Environmental security is also a growing issue as the reports from the ministry of

<sup>88</sup> For a list of physical threats from non-state actors to Turkey, see: EDAM Center for Economics and Foreign Policy Studies (2015): "Nuclear Security: A Turkish Perspective" (available at [http://edam.org.tr/document/NuclearBook3/edam\\_nucphysec2015\\_full.pdf](http://edam.org.tr/document/NuclearBook3/edam_nucphysec2015_full.pdf) )

<sup>89</sup> For more details on the Syrian refugees in Turkey, see UNHCR (various years): "Syria Regional Refugee Response" (available at: <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/country.php?id=224> )

<sup>90</sup> Turkish Statistical Institute (various years): "Accident Statistics" (available in Turkish at: <http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreHaberBultenleri.do?id=18510> )

<sup>91</sup> The World Bank (2013): "Preparing for the Big One: Learning from Disaster in Turkey" (available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/07/preparing-for-big-one-learning-from-disaster-in-turkey> )

<sup>92</sup> Hacettepe University (2014): "Violence against Women in Turkey" (available in Turkish at: [http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/TKAA2014\\_Ozet\\_Rapor.pdf](http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/TKAA2014_Ozet_Rapor.pdf) )

<sup>93</sup> Kadirhas University(2015): "Turkey's Social-Political Trends" (available at: <http://www.khas.edu.tr/uploads/pdf-doc-vb/news/TSSEA20OCAK2015.pdf> )

<sup>94</sup> For more details on Turkey's energy dependency, see: International Energy Agency (2013): "Oil&Gas Security, Emergency Response of IEA Countries" (available at: [https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013\\_Turkey\\_Country\\_Chapterfinal\\_with\\_last\\_page.pdf](https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/2013_Turkey_Country_Chapterfinal_with_last_page.pdf) )



environment are neglected, and the considerable projects (i.e. nuclear power plant) cause a great threat to environment.<sup>95</sup>

### 3.3.4 Current trends

Turkey experiences a transformation in both the threats and their perception. The Kurdish issue is on a process of desecuritisation thanks to the peace process.<sup>96</sup> However the PKK's ceasing of arms inside Turkey is still expected to take some years, and despite the declared mutual commitment to the ceasefire, the group is expected to be a long term threat in view of the developments in Northern Syria. The ongoing civil war in Syria is expected to last for many more years, however an effective strategy can control the potential risks it poses on Turkey: an effective control of the borders, increased shared of intelligence cooperation between states, are only among few initial steps that Turkey has already been boosting its efforts on. The territorial integrity and the physical safety are likely to figure as threat in the long term. The work safety, environmental safety, violence against the women are issues that can be addressed in shorter terms, however, the natural disaster require long-term urban transformation projects. The physical safety therefore can be increased in short term, however addressing the physical threats will require a long term.

The Gulen movement, who has deeply infiltrated in Turkey's institutions, economy, education sector and social networks is also likely to remain a long term threat. Together with the decreased level of separation of powers, therefore, the political stability and social stability risk to exist for longer term. Turkey has recently initiated several initiatives to strengthen its information and cyber security that are expected to address the issue in short term. The energy dependency however is a long term threat as Turkey's dependence to foreign suppliers and the dominance of Russia will remain high in the next years. However, in long term the economic stability risks to become a threat. The trade deficit, the income gap, the lack of economic reforms, heavy dependence on foreign direct investment are among factors that increase the economic stability and require a long term transformation to address the issue.<sup>97</sup>

An important development that will shape Turkey's "political stability" and the "physical safety" has been the 7 June parliamentary elections.<sup>98</sup> First, the 13 years AKP majority rule has left its place to a government that will present a more plural façade. This means, the AKPs' weight on the Turkish bureaucracy, on institutions that remain from the 1980 military coup (i.e. Radio and Television Supreme Council) that served to have the government as a main addressor will be more pluralistic. In view of the differences of the addresses values by the parliament and the government, we can expect a change in the threat perceptions. The elections result have also made important consequences in preventing a further centralization of power by the president, but also gave an important public message against the polarizing rhetoric and in support of the autonomy of the

<sup>95</sup> Turkish Medical Association (2015): "Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant CED report evaluation" (available in Turkish at: <http://www.ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/akkuyu-5144.html>)

<sup>96</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): "Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe" (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

<sup>97</sup> Colombo, Jesse (2014): "Why The Worst Is Still Ahead For Turkey's Bubble Economy", Forbes (available at: <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jessecolombo/2014/03/05/why-the-worst-is-still-ahead-for-turkeys-bubble-economy/>)

<sup>98</sup> Turkish Supreme Electoral Council (2015): "7 June Parliamentary elections" (available in Turkish at: <http://www.ysk.gov.tr/ysk/content/conn/YSKUCM/path/Contribution%20Folders/SecmenIslemleri/Secimler/2015MV/D.pdf>)



institutions. Therefore, not only the short and long-term risks concerning the political stability have been prevented; but the results may also affect the perceived threats to physical safety. There is likely to have an improvement in the checks and balances mechanisms, an increase independence and impartiality of the judiciary.

It is also expected to decrease the long-term risks for the economy as it is expected to guarantee the independence of central bank which has also recently been targeted by the Turkish leaders due to its independent decisions. Turkey however will have to undertake considerable reformation of its economic structure to coop with the middle income trap. Turkish income per capita hasn't increased since 2007, and Turkey is highly dependent on the foreign direct investments which are needed to maintain its economic growth.<sup>99</sup> A more sustainable economic model has been in the elections campaign of several political parties. Its effects on the social and cultural stability may also be already visible: Turkish parliament has now a more pluralistic representation due to the number of female, religious and ethnic minorities that have succeeded to gain seats as parliamentarians. Therefore, the less polarizing rhetoric expected after the elections, can also introduce a system open to improving the cultural and social stability by addressing the potentially problematic issues.

Second, despite the 10% parliamentary threshold, the Kurdish-lead Peoples' Democracy Party (HDP) has succeeded to get in the parliament. This has two consequences: The parliament is expected to become the centre for the peace process, and therefore the process will be more on a healthy ground. The Kurdish political movement finds democratic means to address its demands, and in addition, the steps that will be taken to resolve the PKK problem will proceed through legal, stable achievements by the parliament. This is a different situation from the earlier years when the government lead by the AKP was the only actor addressing the issue.

The HDP's success in getting in the parliament however may have greater effects in the Kurdish political movement, where the civil-military relations are still not regulated, and the political party had been under the authority of the armed group. In case the HDP succeeds in empowering itself it is also likely to bring a new tone in the Kurdish peace process: the HDP has transformed itself from an ethnic/nationalist party into a Turkey-wide party. In case the HDP succeeds to maintain this transformation and to gain weight within the Kurdish movement, the Kurdish problem can further desecuritize.<sup>100</sup>

However, there are still risks that may evolve both from the parliament's and the different actors within the Kurdish political movement. On the one hand, in view of the developments on Northern Syria, the parliament may be reluctant on introducing certain steps in the resolution of the Kurdish problem, especially when it concerns the level of decentralization. On the other hand, the Kurdish armed militia of the Kurdish political movement, - the PKK and its "sleeping cells" in Turkey, or other actors of the movement (i.e. PKK diaspora in Europe) may be reluctant in empowering the HDP. Democratisation of the Kurdish political movement will therefore be one of the important determinants in the long-term threat perception from the PKK. In the same time, several other actors may also attempt to derail the process: the bombings of the HDP's electoral campaign in Diyarbakir

<sup>99</sup> For more information on the Turkish economy, see: OECD Economic Surveys (2014): "Turkey overview" (available at: [http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Overview\\_Turkey\\_2014.pdf](http://www.oecd.org/eco/surveys/Overview_Turkey_2014.pdf) )

<sup>100</sup> Ozcelik Burcu (2015): "What the HDP Success Means for Turkey", Carnegie Endowment (available at: <http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/06/11/what-hdp-success-means-for-turkey/i9q2> )

on June 2015, supposedly by a militant of the Islamic State, is only one example on how the peace process can be put at risk by other actors.

The elections result will also introduce changes in the foreign policy and therefore in the perception of the foreign threats. Turkish foreign policy which has gained in ambitions during the AKP has fined itself in a “precious loneliness” in recent years after failures in major countries especially in the neighbourhood. The former Turkish government has abandoned the secular and non-interfering principles of the traditional principles of the Turkish foreign policy. That will not only contribute in the development of better economy and trade relations with the neighbouring states, but the return to a non-ideological foreign policy and to an interest –based foreign policy may also contribute in the stabilization of Turkey’s relations. Building better ties with countries in the East Mediterranean, for example, can help Turkey preventing potential destabilization in the region due to the energy resources.

On the other hand, information and cyber security may be more addressed threats in the long term. Turkey had a power cut on March 2015 in more than half of its cities that had lasted more than 7 hours. This brought to light a new level of discussion regarding the insufficiency of Turkey’s critical infrastructure in terms of the cyber security. Since then, several media outlets have represented research reports on the necessity of improving the cyber security both at public and private level.<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>101</sup> Bekdil, Burak Ege (2015): “Turkey Seeks National Plan for Cyber Threats” (available at: <http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/policy-budget/cyber/2015/02/21/turkey-cyber-tubitak-cybersecurity-ssm-software/23636627/> )

## 4 Regional analysis

The following section aggregates the findings of the above three country profiles and constitutes a regional analysis of the region of South-Eastern Europe. In this context, one has to keep in mind that adding another country to the analysis or substituting one of the existing ones, the results can change significantly, especially in a region with such heterogeneous states as this part of Europe.

### 4.1 Characterization of the core values

In total, 1005 sources were analysed for the regional case study on South-Eastern Europe. Of these, almost exactly a third was analysed for each of the three countries which were studied more in-depth (Bulgaria, 33.3%; Serbia, 33.5% and Turkey, 33.1%; see also Figure 8). Similarly, almost a third of the analysed source items were in the analysed country's local language, with an exception of 48 sources which were in English (these were from the source category "Academic Publications"). Most of the analysed items come from the category "Newspaper Article", followed by "Parliamentary Publication". The two categories with the least amount of source items are "Private Sector" (4.6%) and "Government Policy Document" (4.7%) (see also Figure 9).

The most salient core value with a share of almost 26% (counting only indications of "Main Topic") is "Physical Safety and Security", followed by "Political Stability and Security" (19.89%) and very closely "Economic Prosperity and Security" (19.19%). The least share is in "Cultural Identity and Security" (2.88%), "Environmental and Ecological Security" (3.78%) and "Information and Cyber Security" (5.46%). In short, one can divide the core values in the SEE into three groups, with an almost equal share (for more details, see Figure 10):

- High salience: "Physical Safety and Security", "Political Stability and Security" and "Economic Prosperity and Security"
- Medium salience: "Territorial Integrity and Security" and "Social Stability and Security"
- Low salience: "Environmental and Ecological Security" and "Information and Cyber Security"

Comparing this to a non-representative voting of regional experts during a workshop in Sofia, the important core values from the point of view of the experts was in a way both similar and different.<sup>102</sup> For them, the most important core value was "Political Stability and Security", followed by "Economic Prosperity and Security" and "Territorial Integrity and Security". The main difference lies with "Physical Safety and Security" which according to the coding is the most salient core value but in the view of the experts was among the least important ones. Of course, comparing these two results should be taken with a grain of salt, but noting differences and overlaps is of interest for the present analysis.

The main security challenges of the region are varies since most of them can be found in two of the analysed countries, but only a few in all three of them. One example is corruption, something that can be found across the region, along with the challenge of energy security. Some challenges shared

<sup>102</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): "Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe), p. 11 (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

by two of the analysed countries are safety at work, natural disasters and discrimination (and other social challenges). The experts from the above mentioned workshop said that the most relevant threat from their point of view were “Corruption”, “Organized Crime” and “Ethnic Tensions”, whereas “Natural Disasters”, “Illegal Immigration” and “Cyber Security” were viewed as not being relevant at all.<sup>103</sup>

## 4.2 Security challenges and threats, political actors, levels and ethics & human rights

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The most prominent **actor** of the SEE is, similar to what was found in each of the country profiles, the national governments (almost 40%). Also similar to the country profiles, the second most prominent actor are the national parliaments (ca. 22%). The rest of the actors all have a share of below 10% (see Figure 11 in the annex for more details). Similarly, the same two actors are the most prominent on the side of the addressees, with the national governments having a share of 34% and the national parliaments 16%. Again, none of the other actors surpasses a share of 10% (see Figure 12 in the annex for more details). The situation is a bit different for the object actors. With 57%, the main actor here is the “General public or individual citizen(s)”, followed by the “Private Sector” with almost 11%. The other actors again have a share of below 10% here (for details, see Figure 13 in the annex). Most of this does not come as a surprise, since the picture was similar in each of the country profiles. For the SEE actors the opinion of the experts from the regional workshop overlap with the results of the coding: almost half of the experts think that the “National governments” are the most important actors in the region. But the experts also thought that the “EU” and “NATO” were very important actors. This was not reflected in the coding exercise, where, for example, the national parliaments are more prominent.<sup>104</sup>

The main **level** at which the security discourse of the region takes place is overwhelmingly the national one (63%). Interestingly, the second largest share lies on the local level with ca. 13%. All other levels are below 10% with the global level having a share of only about 1% (see Figure 14 in the annex for more details). Again, the results from the coding are very different from the opinion of the workshop experts. From their point of view, the regional is the most important one (in the coding, this level received a share of ca. 6% only) followed by the national one.<sup>105</sup>

## 4.3 Historical trajectory

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Looking at the regional analysis of the coding, one has to keep in mind that it is an aggregation of the three national case studies. Thus, including an additional country would probably change a number of the results for the SEE region. For example, including Greece in the regional analysis might shift the focus of the core values from “Physical safety and security” to “Economic prosperity and

<sup>103</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): “Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe), p. 12 (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. p.13

security” (due to the prolonged effects of the financial crisis, while including Bosnia & Herzegovina or Macedonia might shift the core values towards “Territorial integrity and security” (due to the repeating discussions on independence for the Serbian entity inside of Bosnia and the recent outbreaks of violence in Macedonia).

As mentioned above, the countries of SEE have been part of three different blocs, i.e. the western and eastern bloc and the movement of non-aligned countries in recent history. This changed with the end of the cold war. While the western bloc countries (like Greece) kept their orientation to the West, countries like Bulgaria or Romania started the transformation of their societies and economies, also oriented towards the West. Yugoslavia, a founding member of the non-aligned movement (the movement was founded in Belgrade in 1961) broke apart in a civil war. But even before that, the SEE region has been a region divided between power blocs, for example during the 19<sup>th</sup> and the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, when the western part of the Balkans was part of Austria-Hungary and the eastern part (mostly) subject to the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, the common struggle for independence of the countries of SEE could be seen as an element that in a way makes them similar to each other (apart from Turkey, of course, which is the successor of the Ottoman Empire).

Similarly to the above discussed difference in salient core values, SEE is diverse in the security challenges the countries face, even though certain common issues can be identified. For example, Serbia still observes the conflict with Kosovo and Metohija as an important security issue, but the issue has changed its focus. While it was (and to a certain but much weaker degree still is) an issue of territorial integrity and security, nowadays discussions concentrate on the situation of the Serbian community in Kosovo and their well-being.<sup>106</sup> Turkey has had a comparable issue with its Kurdish minority (which has also weakened in recent years due to an on-going peace process). Serbia and Bulgaria are both struggling with the integration of their Roma communities, even though both countries have adopted national strategies for this<sup>107</sup>. All of these issues are probably long-term.

One also has to keep in mind that SEE is the only European region that does not have a historically established geopolitical configuration. In this region, each country struggles to be a central pillar while no country wants to be “periphery”. Also a certain level of chronic mutual mistrust exists in the region which has led to a low level of good political relations among the countries. Only during the last decade is the intra-regional trade and investment exchange growing. For the first time, neighbours are seen as sources of prosperity, not regarded as threats. The typically European mutual interdependence is thus finally extended to SEE. Interdependence is also what connects SEE with the European security strategy.

#### 4.4 Overview of current trends

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In general, the comparison of the three national studies has shown that many similarities exist between at least two of them. More seldom are similarities between all three countries and if in

<sup>106</sup> Jovanović, Miloš; Petkov, Vesselin, Radziejowska, Maria and Todorova, Antonia (2015): “Regional Workshop on South-Eastern Europe) (available at: <http://evocs-project.eu/download/file/fid/55>)

<sup>107</sup> For the Serbian case (in Serbian Cyrillic): Vlada Srbije (2009b). *Стратегија за унапређивање положаја Рома у Републици Србији*. Available at: [http://www.srbija.gov.rs/extfile/sr/107688/strategija\\_romi0080\\_cyr.zip](http://www.srbija.gov.rs/extfile/sr/107688/strategija_romi0080_cyr.zip) (accessed 05/06/2015)

future studies other states of the region are analysed in more detail, the similarities will probably become even rarer.

There seem to be quite different perceptions of threats in the region. In Bulgaria, there is a vertical gap in the perception between the general public and the government (for example, the Roma people are perceived as a source of petty criminality, which is recognised as a problem by the political class but no political solution is seen), while in Serbia and Turkey the gap seems to be of a horizontal nature, probably due to different ethnic and social groupings. For instance, the Roma are a group that has a comparable potential for conflict with the majority population in both Serbia and Bulgaria (exemplified by their discrimination, high education problems, unemployment, health problems etc.). Finally, this can lead, or in parts has already led to non-acceptance and segregation of this group.

Another difference between Bulgaria on the one hand and both Serbia and Turkey on the other seems to be the perception of the origin of a number of threats. In Bulgaria, the origin seems to stem from internal, societal or political problems while the other two countries have experienced civil war, or war-like events. Also, Turkey's neighbours are much less stable, compared to the European neighbours of both Serbia and Bulgaria.

One security challenge that seems to be virulent in all countries is corruption, both in the political as in the security sector. Also, the public of Serbia and Turkey seem to have a rather negative outlook on the EU as a security actor while in Bulgaria this is the other way around. One reason for this might be that Russia has an interest in extending its influence, both political and economic, in these countries.

Again, what all countries seem to have in common is the fact that core values like cyber and information security or security challenges like climate change are not perceived as very important. One interpretation for this could be that this region has dealt and deals with more "pressing" problems, like the security of its borders (Turkey), the physical security of its citizens (Serbia) or simply the economic well-being of its citizens (Bulgaria). However, this might also be a simple question of labelling the problem. Serbia and Bulgaria for example have a discourse on natural disasters like floods, but those are not linked to a more general discussion on climate change and measures to mitigate the problems. This is possibly another characteristic of this region.

Finally, the security discourse of all three countries seems to be focused on finding short-term solutions to long-term problems (e.g. corruption). This might be one of the reasons why problems like organized crime have a long history in these countries with only incremental improvements over the years. On the other hand, all analysed countries have a plethora of national security strategies that take into account and address all of the above mentioned security challenges.<sup>108</sup> However, a number of them are already a couple of years old (e.g. the strategy for the Roma was published in 2009, the same year the Serbian national security strategy was published).<sup>109</sup> Also, the key problem seems to lie in the implementation of both the strategies and laws.

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<sup>108</sup> For Serbia, see: <http://www.gs.gov.rs/lat/strategije-vs.html>

<sup>109</sup> Vlada Srbije (2009a): „Стратегија националне безбедности Републике Србије“ (available in Serbian at: <http://www.gs.gov.rs/doc/strategije/Startegija%20nacionalne%20bezbednosti.docx>)

## 5 Findings and conclusions

### 5.1 Summary of the country and regional profiles

The Bulgarian case study showed that Bulgaria as a state, society and culture is very vulnerable. The security landscape for that country has changed significantly due to the recent events in Ukraine which has blurred the border between war and peace and which is perceived as a threat. The country is mostly inward-focused, with its main security challenges in that area being corruption, organised crime and massive petty crime. Political and institutional stability is a main issue as well. Even though all of this is known to the political decision makers, the trend is to systematically problematize security challenges (due to the public asking for it), even beyond the capacity of the government's capabilities. Because of this, the government is perceived as being overwhelmed and overstretched.

In Serbia, the case study led to similar results. Security challenges like corruption and organised crime are prominent in the Serbian security discourse. In addition to that, Serbia is still concerned with the after-effects of the Yugoslav wars, like the status of Kosovo, the situation of the Serbian community in Kosovo and the situation of the civil war refugees in general. Similarly to Bulgaria, Russia has an influence on the Serbian security situation which is probably even stronger due to the fact that Serbia is not a member of either EU or NATO, even though Serbia is striving to become a member of the EU. A considerable part of the Serbian public security discourse has an ethical and fundamental human rights aspect, especially the discussions from the "discrimination" cluster.

Turkey, on the other hand, has a number of quite different security challenges due to its geopolitical situation and the ruling party's ambition to build a kind of authoritarian state. For example, the border to Syria has led to future potential problems with the PKK's ceasing of arms. However, the success of the Kurdish-lead Peoples' Democracy Parts (HDP) in the elections of June 2015 might lead to a more democratic and calm continuation of the peace process. Another long-term problem is the Gulen movement and its infiltration of the Turkey's institutions and economy. However, there are also security challenges similar to the ones found in the first two national case studies like work safety, energy security or natural disasters. The new political situation after the 2015 elections will probably lead to new impulses for these challenges as well.

Overall, the region of SEE shows how very different and very similar the evolving concepts of security in its constituent countries are in many aspects. Even though it is possible to find some security challenges like corruption and energy security which are shared by all three of the country case studies, many more challenges were found to be discussed prominently only in two. While the security challenges for the countries differ, some of the surrounding aspects are similar. The main level for the security discourse is the national one and the most prominent and active actors are the national governments and parliaments while the actor being most affected is the general public. It is also a shared trait of the countries of this region that the main actors are aware of and address the security challenges of the public discourse but that long-term solutions are still missing, or, as was remarked in the Bulgarian case study, strategies are being drafted "that no one can or cares to follow". These differences and similarities are also reflected in the different political situations the countries of this region find each other in.



## 5.2 Key findings

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The key findings of the present regional case study can be summed up in the following list:

1. Most of the current and prominent security challenges which are being discussed in the public discourse are long-term and have a history.
2. The public discourse in the SEE region focuses on traditional challenges like organised crime, natural disasters or discrimination. Non-traditional challenges like climate change or cyber security are also part of the discourse but are either not as prominent or are not perceived as such (for example, there is a discourse on floods in the media, but those are not connected to climate change, while government policy documents refer to the latter)
3. The security challenges in SEE are perceived as being mostly national. Every country seems to look inward. There are of course some exceptions to this as the examples of Turkey's challenges at the Syrian border or Serbia's on-going conflict with Kosovo shows.
4. The most active actors are national governments and national parliaments which reinforces point 3 on the national perception of the security challenges. The object of most of the discussions is the general public.
5. Ethical and fundamental rights issues are part of many security challenges common in this region like immigration, discrimination or cyber and information security.

## 5.3 Recommendations for security decision makers and other relevant stakeholders

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The recommendations for security decision makers and other relevant stakeholders can be summed up in the following list:

1. From a European Union point of view, any security strategies that involve the countries of South-Eastern Europe need to take into account the different history, culture and current geopolitical situation of the different countries. A strategy for the whole region might be possible for some challenges like corruption or organised crime, but a one-size-fits-all strategy will probably not be helpful. An alternative would be a common guideline in the strategy while the possibilities for implementation would have to be tailored to each country.
2. Since the most prominent level of discourse is the national level, any kind of European Union involvement in drafting security strategies for the region should take this level as the main point of focus and the national governments and parliaments as the main addressee. Also, the fact that security challenges like organised crime, human trafficking, drug trafficking have a cross-border nature needs to be taken into account.
3. In contradiction to point 2, it might also make sense to focus on the possibilities of strengthening the European Union level, since there are still many countries in this region who wish to join the EU. Presenting the EU as a prominent actor in the security discourse and

supporting think tanks and NGOs might help to introduce new players to the discourse and thus broaden the perspective.

4. Some of the results of the national case studies are also of relevance for security end-users like national police forces, fire fighters or crisis reaction forces. Having a better understanding of the security discourse in each of the region's countries can help during international peace missions (e.g. in Bosnia or Kosovo) or international aid after natural disasters.

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## 7 Annexes

### 7.1 Bulgaria




Figure 1 : The most salient core values per source in Bulgaria. Who talks about what?




Figure 2 : The most salient levels of action per source type in Bulgaria.

## 7.2 Serbia

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**Table 2 : List of theme clusters and the number of their mention in the source items of Serbia**

<b>Cluster names</b>	<b>No. of Mentions</b>
Societal transformation / Civil challenges	66
Organized/Petty crime	63
Traffic challenges	53
Discrimination	51
Cyber and information challenges	42
Economic challenges	36
Kosovo - Violence	22
International relations	22
Health challenges	20
Corruption	19
Natural hazards	18
Terrorism - International	18
Kosovo - Judicial	17
Ecological challenges	14
Police/Security Services	13
Yugoslav Wars	13
Media/Freedom of Speech	11
Other	11
Terrorism - National	10
Man-made hazards	10
Spying	4

**Table 3 : Data on Serbian actors and their role: Who is what in each publication?**

	Addressor	Object	Addressee	Both Addressor and Addressee	Sum of Addressor and Both Addressor and Addressee
<b>National government (domestic)</b>	74	9	47	109	183
<b>National parliament (domestic)</b>	22	5	8	55	77
<b>Private sector</b>	36	27	16	12	48
<b>Civil society</b>	33	5	9	11	44
<b>Academia and research institutes</b>	24	1	4	10	34
<b>Foreign government</b>	16	8	10	14	30
<b>Media</b>	12	9	49	8	20
Regional state apparatus (domestic)	6	14	9	12	18
General public or individual citizen(s)	4	196	78	12	16
International institution	7	7	16	5	12
Think tanks and policy institutes	6	0	2	1	7
European Union	4	7	19	3	7

**Table 4 : Number of items with levels as « Main Level » in Serbia: At which level is the security discourse taking place ?**

Local (municipality/commune)	Subnational (Province/state/region)	National (country)	International (abroad)	Regional (transnational)	Global (world)
88	46	235	30	44	16

**Table 5 : Actors as addressors in combination with human rights and ethical issues (« Mentioned » and « Main Topic ») in Serbia**

	Addressor (Mentioned)	Addressor (Main Topic)	Sum
Civil society	7	8	15
National government (domestic)	6	3	9
National parliament (domestic)	6	0	6
International institution	2	2	4
Academia and research institutes	3	1	4
General public or individual citizen(s)	2	1	3
Media	2	0	2
Foreign government	1	0	1
Think tanks and policy institutes	0	1	1
Regional state apparatus (domestic)	0	0	0
European Union	0	0	0
Private sector	0	0	0




Figure 3 : Share of core values in the Serbian source items (in relation to the total number of « Main Topic »-characterisations only).




Figure 4 : The most salient core values per source in Serbia. Who talks about what?




Figure 5 : The most salient levels of action per source type in Serbia

### 7.3 Turkey




Figure 6 : The most salient core values per source in Turkey




Figure 7 : The most salient levels of action in Turkey



## 7.4 Region of South-Eastern Europe




Figure 8 : Share of analysed publications for each of the three countries of the SEE region



Figure 9 : Share of analysed items by source category for the SEE region




Figure 10 : Share of core values in the source items (« Main Topic » only) for the SEE region




Figure 11 : Share of actors being « Addressors » and « Both Addressors and Addressees » : Who is talking the most in the security discourse ?




Figure 12 : Share of actors being « Addressees » and « Both Addressors and Addressees » : Who is being talked to the most ?




Figure 13 : Share of actors being « Object »-actors




Figure 14 : Share of levels (counting « Main Level »)